Mutiny at the Margins
New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857
Series Editor: Crispin Bates

Volume 1
Anticipations and Experiences in the Locality
Edited by *Crispin Bates*

Volume 2
Britain and the Indian Uprising
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A Source Book: Documents of the Indian Uprising
Edited by *Crispin Bates*, *Marina Carter* and *Markus Daechsel*

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New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857

Volume 2

Britain and the Indian Uprising

Edited by
Andrea Major
Crispin Bates

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Series Note

THE volumes in this series take a fresh look at the Revolt of 1857 from a variety of original and unusual perspectives, focusing in particular on traditionally neglected socially marginal groups and geographic areas that have hitherto tended to be unrepresented in studies of this cataclysmic event in British imperial and Indian historiography.

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Preface

THE seven-volume *Mutiny at the Margins* series published by SAGE is the product of a research project of the same name undertaken at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland^ with funding from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council. Taking place 150 years after the Indian Uprising of 1857-1858, the *Mutiny at the Margins* project was created to challenge conventional understandings of the uprising through thematic, collaborative research, a network of scholars centred on Edinburgh and international conferences. This innovative project aimed to confront some of the many myths surrounding popular and academic conceptions of the revolt, to move beyond traditional nationalist and imperialist perspectives, and to explore previously neglected margins in the history of this tumultuous event.

Marginality is invoked in several ways throughout the series. It is presented in the telling of tales that fall outside the mainstream historiography of the period and pursued chronologically as the historical context of the Indian Uprising is enlarged in an exploration of both the progenitors and consequences of 1857. The series ventures into overlooked geographical margins, both within India and overseas, with the global impact of the revolt being examined in Volume 3. Finally, a core purpose of the series is to emphasise the critical roles played by socially marginal groups in the uprising and to use this to highlight new areas of current research.

Independent scholars from across the globe came together for the *Mutiny at the Margins* project. This collaboration fostered ground-breaking research, aided by three international conferences held in Edinburgh, London and Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi, and four workshops held in Edinburgh and at the Royal Asiatic Society in London. Altogether, some thirty leading Indian and Pakistani researchers were involved, along with a dozen academics from the United States and twice that number of participants drawn from universities across the United Kingdom and Europe. A majority of the chapters in the series are the product of the cooperative, committed and original endeavour of these scholars. The *Mutiny at the Margins* project was accompanied by,a high level of public engagement, including a programme of public lectures, collabbrative exhibitions, seminars

and workshops in Edinburgh and London. A number of source materials were published online, for the benefit of students and future researchers. These are to be found at www.csas.ed.ac.uk/mutiny.

The original research carried out by the Edinburgh-based scholars of the *Mutiny at the Margins* project forms a key part of the material for this series. It led to new insights into the British experience of 1857 regarding the experiences of white subalterns (men and women) and of the often overlooked British communities in areas peripheral to the revolts, as well as British attempts to explain the meaning of the uprising. The research of the Edinburgh team—comprising Crispin Bates, Markus Daeschel, Andrea Major, Marina Carter and Kim A. Wagner—addressed the involvement of Muslims and Dalits and the long-term impact of the events of the mid-nineteenth century for the development of Islamic political culture and identity. In addition, new investigations scrutinised the role of Indian Adivasis (or tribals) in 1857, as well as the economic consequences of 1857 in north India and in particular the huge impetus it gave to labour migration within India and overseas in subsequent years. Kim A. Wagner undertook further innovative work concerning the mutiny of the regiments at Meerut in May 1857 and description of the impact of 1857 within European literature.

The series comprises seven volumes, each with a distinct thematic focus:

Volume 1y*Anticipations and Experiences in the Locality*, centres on unrest and disorder in the long history of resistance to colonial rule (the *belli* Britannica) prior to 1857 and the impact of the revolt itself in diverse localities within India.

Volume 2, *Britain and the Indian Uprising*>looks at the varied responses of British missionaries, colonial leaders and working-class voices and how they reveal the multiplicity of British reactions to the revolt.

Volume 3, *Global Perspectives*, widens the geographical remit of the series and examines the global dissemination and portrayal of the events of the uprising in the international press and literature. It also examines the impact of the events of 1857 and the socio-economic impact of displaced mutineers and their experiences in the broader colonial world.

Volume 4, *Military Aspects of the Indian Uprisings* deals with how battles were won and lost and how the army reorganised itself after the revolt. It also touches on the thorny issue of how to define the events of 1857—a rebellion, a national uprising or a small war of the kind experienced in many colonial states.

Volume 5, *Muslim*, *Dalit and Subaltern Narratives*, addresses the role of marginal and Muslim groups, respectively. The first half of the volume explores minority perceptions of the uprising, including Dalit narratives and the use of 1857 in their invented histories; the second half looks into

the response and involvement of different Muslim social groups, from civil servants, philosophers and logicians to the mujahidin, as well as exploring the experience of indigenous participants in their own words.

Volume 6, *Perception, Narration and Reinvention: The Pedagogy and Historiography of the Indian Uprising*, moves into the territory of hagiography, historiography and pedagogy. It qovers the reactions of people to the revolt and the various ways in which historians and the wider public in India have sought to understand, categorise, and at times distort or exaggerate, salient aspects and particular events.

Volume 7, *A Source Book: Documents of the Indian Uprising*, is both a research tool and a teaching resource. This collection of documents drawn from the extensive research conducted during the *Margins* project employs images and texts to offer a unique range of 1857 sources, emphasising a subaltern perspective and designed to complement the previous six volumes of the series.

Collectively, the series presents the most comprehensive collection to date of historical writings on the Indian Uprising of 1857. It is hoped that it will provide a benchmark of research to inform and inspire future scholars and encourage new perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 that are both respectful of previous interpretations and permitting of re-imaginings of the past that are suited to the twenty-first century. The body of research and writings contained in the seven-volume set is much more than a collection about the 'revolt'; it demonstrates that the events of 1857 were, in their origins, progress and impact, vastly more significant than is implied by the usual emphasis on a unique historical event, with ramifications that reach forward into the present day.

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Introduction

Fractured Narratives and Marginal Experiences

Andrea Major and Crispin Bates

DESPITE the enduring myth of a nineteenth century *Pax Britannica*, British rule in India and across the empire was punctuated by revolts, rebellions, insurrection and instability. So endemic were such challenges to British imperial rule that the events of the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857 have been described as 'unique only in their scale'.[1] 1857 was also unique in another way, in that the rebellion and its aftermath embedded itself in the British national consciousness in a way unmatched by previous colonial confrontations. One of the first conflicts to be covered by press reporters in the field, the unfolding of events in India in 1857-1858 caught the popular imagination, provoking both virulent debate and a wealth of historical, literary and artistic productions, both at the time and since.[2] The sudden, unexpected eruption of violence, the longevity of the subsequent unrest and the atrocities committed against combatants and civilians on both sides, together with the very real threat posed to British rule in India and the perceived challenge to British honour and prestige as an imperial power, set the Uprising of 1857 apart from previous conflicts and left an indelible scar on the national psyche. The year 1857 represented a seminal moment in British imperial history and in Britain's relationship with, and attitudes to, India. Bringing about fundamental changes in the structure of British power—the end of East India Company government and the imposition of Crown rule in India—it also impacted in less quantifiable ways on British attitudes to other races and ideas about the potential equality of man, as well as challenging and revealing the fissures within Britain's emerging self-perception and identity as an imperial nation.[3]

British colonial rule in India can be dated from their victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and their subsequent acceptance of the *diwani*, or administrative authority, of Bengal in 1765. Over the next century, from footholds in Bengal, Bombay and Madras, the British expanded their territorial control and influence via a combination of treaties, agreements, conquests and annexations, until, in

1857, they directly controlled roughly two-thirds of the subcontinent's land and four-fifths of its population, exercising indirect influence over the remainder.4 Significantly, however, this vast area was not governed by the British Crown or Parliament, but by an independent trading concern, the East India Company, which had taken on the administrative control of India in order to secure it as a trade and revenue resource. Its control of the subcontinent was based on a thinly stretched network of British administrators, officials and civil servants and a large mercenary army of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. When, in May 1857, sections of this army began to rebel—first at Meerut and then at cantonments across north and central India—they were quickly joined by significant sections of the civilian population, and many Britons found themselves stranded and outnumbered in a hostile land. Some were killed at the hands of the rebels, both individually and at infamous massacres such as those at Delhi and Cawnpore.5 Others fled their homes, losing everything, or were besieged in forts and residencies at Agra, Lucknow and elsewhere.6 The chapter by Ira Bhattacharya in this volume explores some of the diverse experiences of British men and women of different social backgrounds who found themselves under siege, drawing out from their accounts the details of ordinary life under extraordinary circumstances.

This was the first experience of 'total war' for the British, and the first—since the English civil war of 1642—in which British civilians were seriously caught up in the front line of conflict alongside officers and soldiers. It was quite unlike the Napoleonic Wars, or the colonial wars fought elsewhere in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, in which professional armies were engaged in foreign lands with minimal (British) civilian casualties. Communications had also vastly improved, which gave the conflict an unprecedented immediacy to the British public. The impact upon British public opinion was thus unparalleled until the Great Wars of the twentieth century. Tales of atrocities against British civilians—especially women and children—circulated freely, both in India and in the British press, as did demands for ferocious British retribution.7 On the peripheries of the affected areas, British communities lived in a state of constant excitement and alarm for over a year, and for a while the restoration of British control looked uncertain. Only the arrival of British reinforcements, some of them redirected from an intended expedition to China, saved the situation for the British, but even with their help, it took until 1859 before the subcontinent was completely pacified. In her chapter in this volume, Sarmistha De explores the experiences of the large numbers of Britons living on the geographical margins of the unrest, and of those, socially marginal, lower class soldiers who were drafted into India to suppress the uprising.

The post-mutiny pacification process involved the summary execution of vast numbers of Indian 'rebels', sometimes in quite horrific ways, and swathes of the countryside were laid waste by the British 'scorched earth' policy. There was widespread suffering on all sides during the rebellion, as food reached famine prices, trade and industry were devastated and personal property and security

placed at risk. Among the victims on the colonisers' side, in addition to the much-lamented British fatalities of the uprising, were the less well-known victims from peripheral groups attached to Anglo-Indian society. As Rosie Llewellyn Jones demonstrates, Eurasians, Indian Christians, Indian employees of the East India Company, lower class widows of British soldiers and civilians all suffered, both from the persecution of the rebels and the indifference or ineptitude of the British authorities. Although some of the most salacious atrocity stories of rape and mutilation—whipped up to inspire the British troops (and popular support in the metropole)—proved subsequently to be inaccurate, the level of brutality and carnage on both sides left an indelible stain on Anglo-Indian relations and made the mutiny one of the most emotive and controversial events in both British and Indian history.

The causes and meanings of the 1857 Revolt were the subjects of virulent debate at the time and remain highly contested to this day. The immediate trigger was said to be the Meerut sepoys' refusal to use new rifle cartridges for fear that they were greased with pig and cow fat (although no such cartridges were actually issued), and this explanation, together with the associated tales of British religious insensitivity and Indian paranoia, has loomed large in British accounts of the causes of the uprising. These saw 'The Indian Mutiny' as primarily a military insurrection, bolstered by support from a few disgruntled princes and civilian malcontents and provoked by fears over caste and religion.[8] The very terminology used to describe it implied both limited political significance and an essential illegitimacy as a treacherous rebellion against legitimate and benevolent British authority. In the decades that followed 1857, as Ainslee Embree has argued, a national consensus emerged in Britain in which the 'Mutiny' was depicted as originating with intransigent Indian elites, whose social, cultural and economic dominance was threatened by benevolent British reforms. Religious and caste grievances were stripped of their political and economic dimensions and incorporated into an imperial narrative that delegitimised the uprising by portraying its participants as reactionary and fanatical.[9] As Rebecca Merritt points out, the causes that were invoked in this regard were really 'non-causes'; explanations that, while appearing to account for Indian hostility to British rule, simultaneously proved the uprising to be unreasonable, unfounded and illegitimate and shifted blame away from British actions and onto supposedly paranoid, credulous and irrational Indians. When British culpability was acknowledged, it was via criticism of specific East India Company policies and failings, rather than of the ideological and practical structures of imperial rule itself. These kinds of ideas and explanations have had remarkable longevity. In 1958, Hugh Tinker criticised the lack of significant reassessments of the mutiny and the continued reliance upon Victorian value judgements.[10] More recently, in *The Peasant Armed*—published posthumously in 1986—Eric Stokes commented (from a determinedly positivist perspective) that the principal obstacle he had faced was 'folk memory' of the mutiny, suggesting that a responsible

rewriting of 1857 must struggle constantly against these deeply traced 'lines of interpretation".[11]

British imperialist interpretations were solidified by their juxtaposition against an Indian Nationalist historiography that presented the uprising as the 'First War of Indian Independence", a proto-nationalist nineteenth century challenge to inequitable imperial rule that was a direct precursor of the Indian Independence Movement.[12] Such partisan interpretations have led to a division in the historiography along national lines, with British and Indian historians and commentators presenting very different interpretations of events and their meanings, which both exist in opposition to each other and exhibit a degree of internal interpretative consistency. Such dichotomous interpretations have been challenged in more recent years by the emergence of new historical and theoretical perspectives that explore the wider social, political and economic conditions that prevailed under British rule and the diverse and multifaceted nature of both Indian unrest and British response. Critical approaches to the history of British imperialism, including those from Marxist[13] and other perspectives, have uncovered the problematic nature of colonial control in India. Despite attempts by the East India Company to represent the early nineteenth century as a period of slow but progressive improvement for India, it was in reality a time of radical experimentation and desperate contingency in the development of a British system of government, which created widespread resentment.

The formation in the 1980s of the Subaltern Studies collective, with their emphasis on recovering a South Asian history 'from below", has led to the emergence of Indian perspectives on 1857 that emphasise the multiplicity of individual motivations for, and experiences of, revolt at grass-roots level. Scholars like Guha, Bhadra, Mukherjee, Pandey and others[14] have begun to explore the diverse subjectivities that informed popular involvement in the uprising, presenting a multidimensional interpretation of revolt that emphasises the existence of varied motivations and grievances across the social and geographical spectrum and complicating arguments that imply a single, unified or coherent set of causes or stimuli. From the British perspective, the growth of postcolonialism and a more critical approach to the history of empire in the Western academy has led to a reassessment of the traditional Victorian interpretations of the uprising and an exploration of their contribution to what Ranajit Guha has called 'the prose of counter-insurgency".[15] This has involved a recontextualisation of Victorian arguments in the light of the political and ideological expediencies of continued colonial rule. Recent studies by the likes of Gautam Chakravarty, Jenny Sharpe and Don Randall, among others,[16] have begun to draw out the wider implications of the various facets of British 'mutiny" discourse for our understanding of the construction of both colonial power and colonial knowledge. These developments have led to a more nuanced and multifaceted understanding of the British experience of the uprising and have encouraged recognition of the fractures and divisions within the hegemonic

national narrative. Thus, despite the late nineteenth and early twentieth century solidification of an imperialist interpretative frame, at the time of the uprising itself British understandings of events can be seen to have been neither static nor homogenous, as a range of different attitudes, opinions and interpretations emerged out of the confusion of the conflict. The various contributions to this volume seek to draw out this sense of heterogeneity within the British experience of, and response to, 1857, exploring various views from both the centre and the social, political, ideological and spatial margins of British society.

Any attempt to reinterpret 1857 from the perspective of British experience and understanding must be positioned within the wider theoretical framework suggested by the recent resurgence in interest in the history of empire and the development of what has been termed the 'New Imperialism'. These developments have been epitomised, in part, by a reassertion of the need to see the history of 'home' and of 'colony' as mutually constituting. As David Cannadine put it, of the ideological project behind his recent work *Ornamentalism*,

> there can be no satisfactory history of Britain without empire, and no satisfactory history of empire without Britain. By stressing the interconnections between social visions of the metropolis and the periphery, and the structures and systems that unified and undergirded them, it seeks to put the history of Britain back into the history of the empire and the history of the empire back into the history of Britain.[17]

While such developments have been extremely useful in breaking down the traditional boundaries between 'British history' and 'Empire history', they have been hampered, in some instances, by a tendency to privilege metropolitan sources and a failure to critically engage with indigenous perspectives and revisionist histories. This has resulted in an inadequate rethinking of European culture and history in the making of the colonial world order, in the manner called for by Dipesh Chakrabarty.[18] While this volume accepts that 'the white man's subjectivity is worthy of study'[19] and makes this its primary, though certainly not its only, focus, it seeks to explore the impact of 1857 on British subjects without reproducing the Anglocentric perspective of the importance of empire in world history that characterises the work of some adherents of the New Imperialism.[20] Instead, it endeavours to conceptualise Britain's experience within a contextured understanding of the sites of empire, in which events at the centre and the periphery, and the experiences of coloniser and colonised, are related, whilst given equal weight. By exploring not only mainstream British experiences and interpretations of the uprising, but also those of marginal Britons, Eurasians and Indians associated with the British state, it seeks to improve our understanding of the bidirectional impact and dialogic nature of the imperial project and the fractured and multivalent subjectivities and identities that constituted it. Above all, it accepts[1] that 'modernity' and enlightenment were not unitary and exclusively western inventions, but fractured, evolving

and subject to multiple cultural influences and interpretations. This collection, which should be read alongside the other volumes in the *Mutiny at the Margins* series, will thus concentrate on the varied and often conflicting experiences and responses that the uprising engendered within British society itself and amongst those connected with it—at home, in India and around the empire—in order to draw out the multi-vocal and fractured nature of the imperial response. It brings together articles exploring the British response to 1857 from various sections of an imperial polity that was fissured along social, class, religious, national and racial lines in order to reinvest the history of 1857 with the heterogeneous and multivalent meanings that it originally carried for British observers and participants, both at the centre of the imperial polity and on its social and geographic margins.

Given the multiplicity in grievances, aims and resentments that actuated the rebels, retrospective Victorian impositions of consensus on the historical narrative of 1857 seem all the more contrived. Immediate reactions to the uprising show the wide diversity of interpretations that the events of 1857 inspired at the time. Of course, the multi-vocal nature of the British response to the uprising as it was happening was in part the result of a lack of accurate and immediate information. As the *Lady's Newspaper and Pictorial Times* lamented in August 1857, the piecemeal news of events that emerged as the revolt spread provided

> a strange contradiction to a Parliamentary speech that endeavoured to convince the innocents of the land that no serious calamity had occurred. It is a calamity superlatively serious__ It is only by degrees that the truth creeps out. Private information appears in the papers and as the different statements get pieced together, the public wakes up with a roar, and incontinently plunges into a panic.[21]

Although communications were vastly improved, it still took at least six weeks for letters to reach Britain from India, and the public at home received their information on the uprising in a fragmented fashion: from letters from friends in India, from press correspondents in the field, published letters from the public in both Britain and India, editorials and opinion pieces in the press, sermons, governmental statements and speeches in Parliament and the ‘official* statements of the British Indian authorities. As the uprising wore on, these were supplemented by pamphlets, tracts and ‘histories’ asserting specific points ofview. The press media through which such sources were distributed to the public had their own social, political and ideological agendas, ranging from their affiliation to different political parties to their position on evangelical issues or on East India trade. In addition to this, public reactions and experiences were conditioned along social, political, class, religious, national and racial lines, providing a complex matrix of interpretation within the greater British polity. These varied British responses both overlapped and reinforced each other and countered and contradicted attempts to fashion a hegemonic narrative. An overview of the

contours and key themes of this wider public debate can be found in the chapter by Rebecca Merritt, which uses a sample of publications—evincing a range of ideological and political positions—to explore the oppositions and shifts within the public response and the extent to which a coherent narrative had emerged by 1858. Although the initial response to the revolt was fractured along political and ideological lines, press reactions still demonstrated a cpnsensual element that contained the seeds of the later hegemonic narrative. The absence of rational Indian political agency in these accounts, as well as the discursive use of atrocity, the emphasis on fanaticism and the need to restore British authority, both practically and symbolically, are all apparent in many of the earliest reactions to the uprising, and the main features of the late Victorian consensus were certainly becoming concretised by the time the first 'historical' narratives began to appear from 1859 onwards.

Immediate reactions to and explanations of the uprising, together with the discursive use made of racial and cultural stereotypes and the appropriation of images of atrocity, must be understood within the context both of the political, social and ideological background of the observer and of the immediate imperatives of a nation under attack. As Gautam Chakravarty points out, initial inquiries into the causes and meanings of the revolt functioned primarily as a 'means of containment', but there were significant difficulties in locating 'a rubric which would adequately signify the event in its totality, while mirroring the constitutional relation between the state and its subjects'.22 Perhaps the most obvious source of disagreement over the interpretation of the uprising came from the divisions instilled by party politics. From the time that news of the outbreak arrived, its meanings and implications became a site of contestation between the ruling Whig party and the Tory opposition led by Disraeli, and these party divisions were reproduced in the partisan press. Three of the main interpretations placed upon the uprising at the time it was unfolding, together with their varied ideological and political significance within the national response, are explored in the chapter by Salahuddin Malik. The military mutiny theory, put forward primarily by the Whigs and the East India Company itself, limited the social and political implications of the revolt and deflected culpability away from liberal reform or administrative mismanagement. They did so, however, at the expense of an accurate assessment of the scale and seriousness of the revolt, leading the *Calcutta Review* to warn that a 'misrepresentation of the character and the causes of the revolt... would lead to even direr calamities....*m* The 'civil rebellion' theory provided a more accurate assessment of what was going on and created space for a more searching exploration of the shortcomings of British rule. This explanation was vigorously upheld by the Tory opposition, which appropriated it, in part at least, for its own party political advantage. In his famous speech to the House of Commons on 27 July 1857, Disraeli argued that discontent was the result of the insensitive imposition of liberal reforms by the East India Company, that the uprising represented a full-scale national revolt, rather than a limited

Sepoy Mutiny and that it was the result of "our forcible destruction of native authority ... our disturbance of the settlement of property [and] our tampering with the religion of the people/24 Disraeli's remarks, which blamed British/East India Company actions rather than Indian fanaticism or perfidy, were attacked as unpatriotic by his political opponents, but they set the context for a debate about the real scale of the uprising and its implications that it was hard for the East India Company and the Whig government to ignore or suppress. Finally, suggestions of an Islamic conspiracy, which were often also accepted by proponents of both of the previous interpretations, provided an explanation for the scale, ferocity and organisation of the revolt that both played on pre-existing stereotypes about Muslims and exculpated the vast majority of the Hindu population from blame. All three explanations must be understood in the context of a politically divided nation struggling to locate an interpretation of events that would allow effective suppression of the revolt, without undermining their specific understanding of the nature and legitimacy of colonial rule. As Salahuddin Malik's study reveals, the implications of party political bias on the contours of the public debate show the extent to which, even in the throes of insurgency, events in India were being appropriated to serve wider political agendas at home.

Political parties and their supporters were, of course, not the only groups with specific or vested interests in portraying events in India in a certain way. As the chapters by Major, Breitenbach and Lewis demonstrate, evangelical or missionary publications also presented the uprising to their readers from the perspective of a specific pre-existing ideological agenda. The missionary press provided an important source of information about empire for the middle and educated working class in Britain. Missionary depictions of indigenous societies, which were designed to engender sympathy and support for the missionary cause, dwelt on the iniquitous influence of 'heathen' religions and customs on local societies, the benefits of successful conversion and the need for Christian evangelisation and civilisation in these distant lands. Their accounts of the various sites of empire were refracted through and shaped by an evangelical and providentialist master narrative, which both set them apart from more 'secular' depictions of empire and preconditioned their response to events in India as they unfolded. As the chapter by Andrea Major argues, the uprising in India represented a serious practical and discursive challenge to the missionary cause. Not only were missionary stations across India threatened with violence and destruction, but the shift in public attitudes to India and Indians, together with a general sense that proselytisation and conversion may have been to blame for the unrest, tested public support for missionary endeavour and temporarily destabilised the existing evangelical discourse on the relationship between Christian Britain and her 'heathen' subjects. As a result, missionary publications had to fashion a public narrative of the uprising that both deflected wider public accusations that missionary activity was partly responsible for the revolt and reasserted their own ideological position in relation to the desirability of Christianisation. The

result was a narrative of events that both denied that missionary activity was a cause of confrontation or conflict and ascribed to a pre-existing providentialist narrative that saw the struggle in India as a battle between heathen darkness and Christian light. The contradictions and ambivalences created by these conflicting expediencies resulted in a fluid narrative that shifted its position over time and demonstrated significant internal inconsistencies and^ fractures between the reports of missionaries in the field and the material published for consumption by the evangelical public at home.

The chapter by Esther Breitenbach picks up the theme of how the missionary and evangelical narratives intersected with wider public discourses, arguing that Scottish missionary accounts were able to transcend the boundaries of their usually limited circulation and influence the direction of mainstream Scottish press coverage of the uprising. Thus, while Scottish missionaries were, for the most part, neither at the centre of events in India, nor at the centre of public discussion of these events in Scotland, they were able to influence public opinion in significant ways. Moreover, while Scottish Presbyterian missionaries certainly shared a discursive terrain with their evangelical counterparts in the English London Missionary Society (studied by Major), Breitenbach's contribution highlights the existence of regional and national divisions within British evangelical interpretations of the uprising. Both viewed the uprising as the result of God's displeasure with Britain's failure to evangelise India, used it to highlight the iniquitous influence of Hinduism and Islam, and urged the case for renewed efforts at conversion. Breitenbach also argues, however, that the relationship between national identity and empire was differently articulated in the Scottish context, with appeals to 'British' Christians to save the 'British' Empire supplemented by signifiers of Scottish identity such as references to Highland soldiers, fellow Presbyterians such as General Neill,[25] and national heroes such as Wallace and Bruce. For Breitenbach, 1857 provided an opportunity for Scottish missionaries to both enhance their public profile at home and claim their place as interpreters of imperial affairs for a specifically Scottish audience.

If the evangelical treatment of the uprising contained subtle differences across denominational and regional lines, gendered perspectives and assumptions also bisected the missionary discourse. In her close reading of the mutiny accounts of Church Missionary Society wife Mary Weitbrecht and Society for the Promoting of Female Education in the East-sponsored missionary Jane Goodenough, Caroline Lewis explores how both women engage with gender and 'Britishness' throughout their narratives, arguing that the invocation of gender issues in their accounts was deliberate and not simply a response to the public accounts of the violation of white women. Neither woman, Lewis argues, presented a stable 'white' or 'British' response to the uprising and both texts demonstrate a resistance to describing 1857 as a shared or collective British experience. Moreover, both accounts were written at a time in the history of British foreign missions when women were consolidating their arguments for increased support

for female outreach to Indian women, and the events of 1857 disrupted both the practical and ideological work of missionary women. As a result, their treatments of the uprising reflect both their specific gendered perspective and the practical and discursive expediencies of wider female missionary project concerned with rehabilitating the rationale of Protestant missions in India.

If missionary narratives of 1857 showed significant diversity across denominational, regional and gender lines, they were at least unified by a relatively stable social and class demographic—catering to the evangelical middle and upper working class—as well as by a relatively consistent broader ideological perspective. Their accounts, though textured by internal variations, fissures and contradictions, shared a providentialist interpretation of the social and religious meanings of the uprising as an act of God and a call to Christian duty. In doing so they contrasted sharply with the more secular stance of the East India Company, with whom missionaries and their societies had always had an ambivalent relationship, and other groups who thought that the uprising should presage less rather than more active intervention in Indian religion. They also contrasted with the ideas of British subalterns, whose experiences of and reactions to the uprising were quite different to those of the polite, political and evangelical classes. Projit Mukharji's chapter on subaltern retellings of 1857, studied primarily through the street literature of 'broadside ballads', employs subalternist techniques developed in a South Asian context to give a voice to an all too often mute British social class. In doing so, he reveals a range of interpretations of and reactions to the revolt quite at odds with the emerging hegemonic narratives of the upper and/or educated classes, or what he refers to as 'a non-linear set of interruptions to the dominant narratives of the history of the "mutiny"'. A close study of the broadside ballads, Mukharji suggests, reveals a variety of factors that influenced subaltern reactions to and interpretations of the Indian Uprising, the principal among these being the experience of returning army subalterns, the influence of radical religion and the long history of racial proximity to poor South Asians on the streets of Victorian Britain. Returning British soldiers from the subaltern classes often felt let down by a military that failed to support them in their old age, injury or infirmity and their accounts, as preserved in the ballads, showed an ambivalent conception of the justness of the British cause in India and of their own role within it. This, Mukharji suggests, undermines the idea that the 'mutiny' fostered a sense of 'British' national identity,[26] emphasising instead the fractures in the national response. Far from uniting in a consensual 'British' response to the war, many of the ballads display a strong sense of national identity as Scots or Irish instead of 'British' and some even demonstrate a sense of solidarity with the oppressed Indians, expressed through their articulation of British class grievances and perhaps reinforced by their authors' proximity to poor Indians in Britain.

Class identities clearly influenced how events were perceived and reported in Britain. They had a profound effect too on the ways in which British men

and women in India experienced the uprising. The chapters by Rosie Llewellyn Jones and Sarmistha De reveal some of the experiences of marginal groups within, or attached to, Anglo-Indian society. Jones, for example, reconstructs the experiences of previously often ignored victims of the uprising whose racial, religious or class status meant that they were marginal to both British and Indian society. Although deeply affected by the uprising, Eurasians, Indian East India Company employees and Indian Christians often found themselves caught between hostile rebels, who saw them as collaborators with the imperial regime, and an unsympathetic British government, whose primary concern was protecting the mainstream white population. De looks at the impact that the uprising had on the colonial capital Calcutta, an area on the geographic peripheries of the revolt, exploring how episodes of panic were handled and discussing the impact that an influx of 'lower class' British soldiers had upon the city. Often from very different social backgrounds from the majority of East India Company employees, new to India and representing a range of national, religious and class identities, these men experienced the uprising in quite different ways from their 'sahib* counterparts, while at the same time, their presence impacted significantly upon the lives of the local British communities near whom they were stationed.

Ira Bhattacharya takes a literary perspective on the study of marginal British experiences of the uprising, exploring subaltern British narratives of 1857 to give us 'the texture of the fabric of daily life*. She tells us, 'The British men and women writing their accounts of the Mutiny were common people—wives, widows, soldiers, chaplains, judges, magistrates and the like—unremarkable except in the extraordinary nature of their circumstances.' Her study draws out the experiential differences between men and women during the uprising, as well as between those of different social classes, exploring how these differences manifest themselves in the 'mutiny' literature that she explores. Bhattacharya draws a contrast between the mutiny texts produced by men and women, contending that while the scope of women's writing was confined spatially by their situation as the besieged, and ideologically by Victorian expectations about appropriate subjects for women's literary endeavour, men had a wider sphere with which to deal. Thus, women's writings concentrated on day-to-day events, the domestic and the immediate, whilst men could position the uprising within its broader historical context, seeing it as an event in motion and in which they were active agents, rather than the static backdrop to the day-to-day lives recorded in women's journals. She also underlines the fact that even in the midst of crisis, class distinctions within the British community were maintained, as high ranking officers and their families were housed differently, had better food and drink apportioned to them and benefited from a number of other luxuries not available to the majority of the less illustrious besieged.

The recent historiography of British imperialism has emphasised the need to explore both the bidirectionality of the colonial experience and the 'networked'

nature of the sites of empire. The chapters by Michael Fisher and Jill Bender provide accounts of 1857 from two very different viewpoints within this wider matrix of an integrated empire. The former looks at the experience of 1857 from the perspective of the colonial subject at the heart of the empire—the Indian in Britain—while the latter explores the implications of the uprising for the British colonialist in the wider sites of empire around the globe—specifically the Cape Colony and New Zealand. Fisher's discussion of changing British press reactions to the deputation of the royal family of Awadh to Britain in 1856-1857 highlights the way in which events in India influenced how Indians living in Britain were perceived and the pressures that it put upon them to decide and declare their allegiance to Britain. Although the Awadh delegation represented the Indian elite, there were many South Asians from various backgrounds in Britain during this period, including lascars, ayahs and other servants, as well as more elite members of embassies and delegations. Some were transient in their residence in Britain, but others had assimilated to some degree with the local population, taking British wives or mistresses and creating a living space for themselves within the lower echelons of British society. In the aftermath of the revolt, as Fisher demonstrates, racial attitudes hardened and the Indian population faced persecution and abuse as 'Johnny Sepoy' As with similar conflicts to this day, the racial/cultural polarisation inculcated by the events of the uprising had a significant impact on how Britons dealt with their 'internal others' and how they sought to negotiate an emerging multicultural society within the metropole.

The chapter by Jill Bender in this volume further examines the impact of 1857 on racial attitudes, although from quite a different perspective. Her study explores the effect of 1857 on the career of Sir George Grey, then governor of the Cape Colony, in order to extrapolate conclusions about the significance of this event for the strategies and processes of colonial rule. Her careful discussion of Grey's reaction to events in India and the interpretations placed upon them in Britain, the Cape and elsewhere, reveals how events in India influenced local policy and racial attitudes at other colonial sites, as well as exploring the wider political uses to which the uprising could be put in various locations within the empire. Thus, while Grey was initially applauded for his quick and generous response to the Indian crisis, his use of the uprising to promote the financial interests of his colony, and to justify his own controversial 'native policy', demonstrates the ways in which imperial crises could be appropriated to specific local and political ends. Moreover, as Bender demonstrates, the trajectory of Grey's career and the impact that the Indian Uprising had upon it is indicative of the wider impact of events in India in 1857 on British ideas about the nature of colonial rule, the processes of colonial governance and the correct relationship between imperial power, colonised peoples and subject races.

The chapters in this volume bring together a wide range of 'British' interpretations of 1857, ranging from deconstructions of hegemonic narratives

to the explorations of subaltern, Indian and other marginal perspectives that interrupt and undermine any sense of a unified national response. By emphasising the heterogeneity of reactions, interpretations and experiences within the wider British encounter with the uprising and its productions, the contributors present a picture of an imperial polity divided along social, economic, political, religious, racial, national and gender lines and counterbalance the suggestion that the mutiny—together with other nineteenth century conflicts—fostered, for the first time, a unitary 'British' national identity.[27] Recent research into the multiplicity of Indian motivations for, experiences of and reactions to the uprising, in all their regional, social and political diversity, have provided us with a more textured and nuanced understanding of the causes and courses of the revolt. It is hoped that a similar approach to British experiences will destabilise the tendency to see British responses to the uprising as epitomised by a monolithic British imagination, conceived with the burdens of hindsight, and reinsert a similar degree of complexity, diversity and dissent to our understandings of the British experience of 1857, from both the centre and the margins of the imperial polity.

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19. David Trotter, cited in John Mackenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 12.
20. See for example Niall Fergusson, *How Britain Made the Modem World* (London: Penguin, 2004).
21. *Lady's Newspaper and Pictorial Times*, 8 August 1857.
22. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 23.
23. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 23.
24. Cited in Embree, *India in 1857,* p. 13. It should be noted, of course, that Disraeli and the Tories were opposed to liberal reforms both at home and overseas, so their position on the causes of the Indian Uprising is consistent with their general ideological stance.
25. Alexander Duff's sensational treatment of atrocity stories and his support for the brutal reprisals of General Neill, for example, contrast sharply with the more measured tone of the LMS missionaries, who refused to engage with the 'pornographic fantasies of rape* which were dominating the popular discourse and privately expressed significant sympathy with the suffering of the Indian population.
26. Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837* (London: Yale University Press, 2005) and *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World* (London: Anchor, 2004).
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 1857
An Overview of British Press Responses to the Indian Uprising

Rebecca Merritt

EVER since military and civil insurrection swept northern India in 1857, the nature of this bloody conflict has been the source of heated debate, as historians and commentators from various intellectual and political backgrounds have interpreted its meanings in line with their wider ideological agendas. This trend was epitomised in the century after 1857 by British imperialist representations of the uprising as a limited military mutiny1and Indian Nationalists' reclamations of it as the 'First War of Indian Independence'.2 As Gautam Chakravarty observes, early British histories of the uprising, which used information collected by the authorities in its immediate aftermath, began to construct a consensus, exemplifying 'the ways in which historiography worked in tandem with the administrative needs of the colonial state during periods of crisis, producing narratives, explaining events and enlisting opinion'.3 This, however, tells only one part of the complex story of Britain's responses to the uprising. As news of the revolt and its progress filtered back to Britain in 1857-1858, these events—and a broad range of attitudes, opinions and ideas arising from them—were disseminated to the British public via a range of publications. Some, such as missionary periodicals or official publications from the government or East India House, had specific or vested interests in India that determined the idiom through which events were interpreted. Other sections of the popular press, though certainly subject to political bias, catered to the keen interest of a less partisan general public, which they fed with letters from their correspondents and from 'ordinary' Britons caught up in events at various sites in north India, as well as with numerous editorial opinions and 'educational' pieces providing background information on Indian citibs and, religions. These articles provide

fascinating insights into British ideas about India, the ideologies that upheld them and the effect that the explosive events of 1857 had on attitudes to empire. This chapter provides an overview of a sample of British press responses to the uprising in 1857-1858, as reported at the time,4 exploring how they both reflected fractures and disagreements within the imperial polity and attempted to fashion coherent narratives out of events in India, in line with their own social or political agendas.

The main publications used in this chapter are: *The Times*, a politically independent newspaper that tended to follow the Whig line with regard to the uprising; The Tory, supporting *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine;* the progressive *Illustrated London News;*5 the weekly women's periodicals *The Lady's Newspaper and Pictorial Times*6 and *The Ladies9Own Journal and Miscellany;* the evangelical publications *The Christian Lady's Magazine*, *The Baptist Magazine* and *The Missionary Herald*. These publications all had their own specific ideological and/or political agendas, and their discussions of events in India must be understood as both reflections of—and attempts to shape—popular perceptions of the uprising. Although technological improvements in the first half of the nineteenth century and legislative developments like the abolition of the stamp tax in 1855 allowed newspapers and periodicals to command a greater circulation than ever before, the consumption of the publications used in this article was primarily confined to the middle and upper classes. As Gautam Chakravarty points out, there were other media through which the experiences of empire could be disseminated to the working classes, such as the 'penny dreadfuls' and other non-elite publications, stage, music hall and popular print culture.7 These productions often distilled sensational accounts and ideas from the elite press for popular consumption, and their treatments of 1857 would make a fascinating alternative focus of study. They lie, however, outside the scope of the present article, the focus of which is to deal with the narratives and counter-narratives on 1857 as they appeared in the mainstream press.

The British Press and the Construction of a Popular History of 1857

The 1857 Uprising represented a significant threat to British control of India, the extent of which only gradually became clear in 1857-1858. Early press reports of the uprising displayed a determined optimism that events were not serious and would soon be over. Letters from India took six weeks to arrive in Britain, and, in the absence of to up-to-date information, attempts were made to limit public alarm. 'By the next mail', *The Lady's Newspaper and Pictorial Times* observed, 'we shall probably hear that Delhi is again in our custody and the "King" shot'.8 The expediencies of continued British rule required the formation of an official

narrative that both disguised the true extent of popular discontent in India and limited the need for 'excessive' retributions against the supposed majority of Britain's 'loyal Indian subjects'. As a result, official accounts tended to emphasise the military aspects of the insurrection, categorising it primarily as a 'Sepoy Mutiny' that had drawn support from some limited sections of the general public. Culpability for the insurgency could thus be Confined to a minority group of disgruntled sepoys,[9] local badmashes (bad characters),[10] unruly tribals[11] and fanatical Muslims,[12] while the majority of ordinary, respectable Indians could be exculpated from involvement or blame. As news of atrocities against British women and children—at Cawnpore and elsewhere—arrived, however, events took on a more serious and sensational aspect. When the Queen's Speech on the opening of Parliament in December 1857 declared, 'It is satisfactory to know that the general mass of the population of India have taken no part in the rebellion, while the most considerable of the native Princes have acted in the most friendly manner, and have rendered important services,'[13] its assertions were immediately challenged in the press. 'The Ministerial Speech ... takes a very favourable view of the campaign', complained *The Lady's Newspaper*, 'and affects to believe that the mutiny has only been a military one, which we fear, facts will scarcely bear out'.[14] Indeed, the press tended to dispute official interpretations of events throughout the campaign and reported a variety of opinions and ideas that revealed its determination to challenge the hegemonic narrative.

During the early phases of the insurrection many newspapers, short of up-to-date information on Indian events, took the opportunity to print background information about India's cities, religions and peoples, so as to enable readers to visualise the scene of the action they were reading about. These accounts constructed India as a mysterious, barbaric land inhabited by fanatical religious devotees, thus providing a suitable setting and cast of characters for the events that were about to unfold. The most dramatic descriptions were employed, unsurprisingly, by missionary publications, a genre with an established tradition of describing 'abhorrent' Indian practices and denigrating Indian religion in order to encourage support for the spread of Christianity. Rev. Charles Stovel, for example, reported that 'error and disease walk the earth in that region, developed in gigantic forms as if to elucidate each other. Her pestilences and her idolatry alike disclose, in monstrous shapes, the terror of departing from the truth and law of God.'[15] Other publications described the Indian cities that formed the uprising's backdrop, often reproducing orientalist stereotypes about the Indian environment. *The Illustrated London News* described Delhi as a place of extreme sensuality and religious feeling, 'of Oriental pomp, infinite luxury, and indescribable religious fanaticism', adding, 'There is no difficulty, therefore, in supposing what the influences of such a place on native character would be, or the effect of it on the safety of the European society, unless defended by an overpowering force.'[16] Such essentialist portrayals of Indian society represented it as existing in an ahistorical and timeless context. Ranajit Guha has argued that

the uprising itself was portrayed as 'de-chronologised',[17] positioned within an amorphous context of Indian events that occurred with neither cause, purpose, nor semblance of legitimacy.[18] Certainly, the newspapers studied presented India as a land stuck in the distant past,[19] removed from the civilised world's chronological time frame, while the British were the only active agents in what was unfolding: 'History opens suddenly on India. We look upon it when it first appears as geologists suppose one might have looked on the world during one of its stages of creation.'[20] 'History' in India existed only as it was made by the British presence and they claimed absolute control over what could happen there. Indian-led events existed outside the civilised, logical march of progress that characterised European history and were seen as chaotic, ahistorical and illegitimate.

As India was argued to have no 'history', the press incorporated the uprising into the narrative of British history, making its Indian setting almost irrelevant. The storming of Delhi was 'one of those bold, dashing adventures which show of what mettle the soldiers of England are made', which surpassed 'in dramatic interest' that of Sebastopol.[21] India was the arena in which acts of British valour could unfold,[22] bestrode by 'great men' such as Napier. As *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* put it:

> Charles Napier now appears on the stage. Henceforth in all the scenes and acts his figure is most prominent. Amid the lights and shadows of Eastern policy, the picturesque groupings of Eastern life, the stern action and the gloomy catastrophe, first and foremost moves the fierce grey-bearded warrior.[23]

Men possessing the finest British qualities populated the story. Heroes like Havelock were endowed with almost mystical powers;[24] the *Ladies' Own* even speculated that one of his ancestors, 'Havelock' or 'Havluck', was 'the lost child of a Norse sea-king',[25] while *The Baptist Magazine* portrayed him as a Christian hero or martyr:

> Mourn, England! Of thy soldier sons,
> Is fallen the good, the true, the brave;
>
> The warrior witness of the Christ,
> Who made him all he was, for whom
> He fought so well, until the tomb
> Closed over him, self-sacrificed.[26]

By writing about events in India as an adventurous narrative over which the British exercised complete agency, the press could exorcise the stigma of loss

of British control and reconstruct the uprising as part of a wider narrative of Britain's rightful place in world affairs. As *Blackwood's* put it:

> Only by constant *cursus* and *recursus* is life itself preserved; and hence the necessity of nations advancing against nations, of England establishing itself in India, and France in Africa. Hence also the value of that instinct which urges individuals over the earth. Thus the East is taught by Europe.[27]

From this perspective, the uprising, though traumatic, was merely another episode in the inevitable advance of European civilisation.

The idea that the historicity of the uprising could only be understood by reference to European agency helps explain the emergence of 'conspiracy theories' that interpreted it in the context of the 'Great Game' of European geopolitics. 'It is whispered that Russia has had a share in the instigation of this insurrection;' *The Lady's Newspaper* reported, and 'that for some time past her agents have been inflaming the minds of the superstitious Sepoys— While we have no direct evidence against Russia, we confess to having a suspicion that she is guilty, for the simple reason that we believe her capable of anything of this sort.'[28] These theories removed Indian agency by explaining the uprising in terms of wider British foreign policy assumptions, without reference to the desires or reasoned motivations of the Indian population, removing the need to probe too deeply into the causes of Indian discontent or to recognise the Indians as autonomous agents in their own affairs.

The Debate Over Causes

One of the most controversial and difficult tasks faced by the press during 1857-1858 was to provide convincing explanations for events in India, without under-mining the ideological base of British imperial rule. As Gautam Chakravarty points out:

> The interpretation of insurgency, like the conduct of counter-insurgency, was marked from the outset by disagreements among policy-makers, publicists and historians. The clearest evidence of the difficulty of interpreting the rebellion lay in the search for, and the quarrel over, a rubric that would adequately signify the event in its totality, while mirroring the constitutional relation between the state and its subjects.[29]

The debate over causes was often conducted in a partisan fashion, with disagreements between various groups, within the imperial polity being reproduced in the press. What these debates shared, however, was a failure to

seriously analyse potential reasons for Indian discontent—such as East India Company (EIC) economic policies—and instead to emphasise causes that were really 'non-causes'; that is, explanations that proved the uprising to be groundless and rooted in Indian irrationality.

Differences of opinion over the causes of and culpability for the uprising revealed the interpretational fissures between different interest groups. 'Official' accounts blamed the introduction of new cartridges greased with cow and pig fat, to the exclusion of almost all other issues stressing that the uprising's 'proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing else ... as a body, the native army did really believe that the universal introduction of cartridges destructive of their caste was a matter only of time__ Such truly was the origin of the mutiny.'[30] They also maintained that popular unrest only followed and never preceded mutiny.[31] This explanation constructed the uprising as limited in scope, with its causes fixed in irrational, unfounded and illegitimate religious fears rather than 'real' grievances. As one official report put it, 'the only of the causes that is quite certain is, what appears to us almost as insane ... but is ... a rooted and universal persuasion ... that it is the fixed design of the British Government to interfere by force with the religious liberty of the people.'[32]

The greased cartridges explanation alone was rarely considered sufficient by the press, which, while often agreeing that this was the catalyst, also offered various antecedent causes. Indian fears of government-sponsored, forcible conversion to Christianity provided a context for wider popular discontent than the official line allowed, affecting the Indian community at large. As *Blackwood's* put it, 'It is certain that the cartridge was the spark which fired the train, but the train itself was the general suspicion of an intention on the part of Government to bring the natives over to Christianity.'[33] Since many argued that the EIC had done little—perhaps too little—to introduce Christianity to India, this idea was considered a ridicdlous delusion, but Indian credulity made their belief in it plausible, while their religious fanaticism explained their violent reaction. As one Baptist missionary put it, 'A religious panic may have given occasion to this violence; but it had its foundation in the prevalent superstitions of India—in Hindooism, which proscribes Christians as loathsome pariahs; and in Mahommedanism, which commands Mahommedans to kill them as infidels.'[34] As Gyanendra Pandey[35] points out, figuring the uprising as a religious revolt allowed the British to deny structural flaws in the colonial state, discount economic motivations for discontent, and represent it as a senseless panic that the British must quell: an issue of colonial law against Indian disorder that actually upheld the ideological basis of legitimate British power.

The role of religious grievances in provoking the uprising was a difficult subject for the religious press, as issues of proselytisation and conversion came under critical popular scrutiny. Keen to disassociate themselves from the outbreak, and to secure their position in India in the aftermath of the uprising, missionaries claimed that they had not been the targets of particular hostility.

'There is not the slightest symptom of any special animosity against missionaries or their doings;' The *Christian Intelligencer* asserted, 'nor of the present disturbances having in any degree whatever been caused by any missionary proceedings. On the contrary, if any European is respected and trusted by natives at present, it is the missionary.'[36] Both the *Missionary Herald* and the *Baptist Magazine* stressed that missionaries were not to bjame for the outbreak, despite its religious character, and were confident that 'missionaries in India will ... meet with no obstruction in the future from the authorities'.[37] Paradoxically, however, they also sought to represent the uprising within the framework of a Providentialist narrative that saw it as a traumatic but necessary battle in the war between 'darkness and light'. Indian religious fears indicated the decline of Hinduism and Islam in the face of an ascendant Christianity. The *Missionary Herald* declared:

> During the extraordinary troubles from which we are now emerging, nothing has so much cheered our own minds as the fact that the disaffection of the native troops has originated in their dread of the growing power of Christianity. Most strangely have they erred in believing that the Government was endeavouring to entrap them into the sacrifice of their caste, yet we believe they are right in apprehending that their idols and superstitions are decaying and will be speedily overthrown, though 'not by might nor by power.[38]

Rather than criticise the government's excessive interference with Indian religion, missionary publications blamed its failure to actively encourage the spread of Christianity, presenting the uprising as God's punishment for the EIC's 'secular' ways: 'God had given India to England for great and eternal purposes, and she ignored her high mission— And, at last, God rose up in judgment against men.'[39] Conversion to Christianity, it was argued, would have civilised India and secured British rule more effectively than any EIC policy, while the present troubles represented both divine retribution for past failures and a traumatic, but necessary, clearing of the way for renewed and reinvigorated Christian endeavours.

If some publications emphasised Indian fears of religious change, others depicted a more general hostility to colonial modernity. For the British, India was mired in timeless tradition, and, as Gautam Chakravarty asserts, the Sepoys' refusal of the greased cartridges functioned as 'a metonymy for the culture of a pre-modern society locked in an "invincible immobility"'.[40] Thus, Indian religious grievances were supplemented by fears of impending social and technological revolution in their apparently 'stationary' world.[41] *The Economist*, quoted in *The Ladies' Own*, stressed perceived challenges to caste and other aspects o f 'traditional' society, attributing the unrest to

> the terror with which the Hindu and* the Mahometan acknowledge the swift and inevitable progress of English influence in the region of science and

> religion they see with the greater panic a movement which they feel to be fraught with social revolution----Hereditary faith and caste, which is even more than faith, seem sinking away beneath their feet, while the School, the Railway, and the Telegraph overshadow them with a sense of arbitrary fate ...[42]

Indians were believed to want security based on the repetition of timeless practices to

> tread the little round that his parents trod before him; to scratch the fields with the same crooked stick that served his father for a plough; to shave with the same razor the children of those whom his father shaved of old to tell the same stories, eat the same food, share the same ceremonies, lead the same solid life, and die the same apathetical death, which millions have done, are doing, and will continue to do, before, around, and after himself, in most supreme indifference whether Prospero or Stephano be king of the island.[43]

As a desperate, retroactive attempt to preserve Indian society from the march of 'progress', the uprising was presented as the irrational rejection of Western modernity and the evident benefits of British rule.

As the uprising spread and reports of atrocities at Cawnpore, and elsewhere, filtered back to Britain, the official 'military mutiny' interpretation was increasingly challenged. Violence against British civilians suggested a widespread hatred of Britain's presence in India, which was being expressed in 'a revolt of race, religion, and colour, against a dominant Power, alien in all these respects'.[44] As Peter Robb points out, the insurgency was not clearly demarcated along racial or religious lines; rebels came from all social, political and religious groups, and equally diverse people helped Britons to escape or hide.[45] Despite this, portrayals of the uprising as a 'clash of civilisations' appeared across all sections of the press, as the conquering British race faced down its 'dark enemies'. The conflict was figured both as a religious battle between 'the crescent and the cross',[46] and a racial one that sought to 'exterminate the hated Europeans'.[47] Unable to reconcile attacks on the British civilian population with the idea of a limited military mutiny, the uprising was reconfigured as a larger battle between two monolithic entities: the inhabitants of India, and the alien Europeans, or, more particularly, the new British rulers of India and its former overlords, the Muslims.

Although Hindus were certainly not excused culpability, especially after Nana Sahib's actions at Cawnpore, many Britons believed that the revolt was a Muslim plot. The *Missionary Herald* claimed that

> [t]he mutiny of the Bengal native army has developed itself into a formidable Mohammedan conspiracy, having for its object nothing short of the utter extermination of the European population, and the overthrow of the British Government__ The Kings of Delhi and Oude were to be reinstated, and all the influential Mohammedans of the country, most of them being the descendants

> of those who held high offices under the former dynasty, have been discovered to have employed their wealth in fostering the rebellion.[48]

Aristocratic Muslims were singled out as the ringleaders of the conspiracy, and the King of Delhi went from being a 'puppet5[49] in the hands of the insurgents to an evil mastermind as the insurrection progressed.[50] A$ a result, attempts were made to undermine the legitimacy of 'disloyal5 Indian rulers[51] and emphasise their motivations of personal aggrandisement and greed. By denying that they could represent the interests and beliefs of the larger Indian population, the British could deny claims to power by Indian sovereigns and present themselves as reasserting 'rightful5 authority in India. Moreover, by emphasising the cruelty and injustice of India's former rulers, they could legitimise 'benevolent5 British rule. Given the lack of evidence supporting the Muslim conspiracy argument—Alex Padamsee asserts that it 'was significantly at variance with Anglo-Indian intelligence reports at the time5[52] and was disproved as early as 1859—its almost universal acceptance indicates the multifaceted nature of its discursive utility. It allowed the missionary press to disassociate themselves from the causes of revolt by blaming the section of the population with whom they were least involved. For the rest, the spectre of a Muslim conspiracy to reinstate 'tyrannical5 Islamic rule allowed them to justify its suppression in terms of 'saving5 the Hindu population from 'oriental despotism5[53] and to reassert a British identity as just, benevolent 'secular Christian5 rulers.

Explanations for the uprising focusing on Indian attributes, fears and fancies deflected public attention from the EIC's more tangible failings, but these were not purged from the debate completely. Initial press reports met the calamity with patriotic assertions of confidence in the Indian authorities. 'Fortunately the Indian Government has vigour enough for the emergency5, declared the *Illustrated London Newsy* 'and if it have not means will be supported by all the wealth, power, energy, and resources of Great Britain— Fortunately the people of England may speculate and argue on the subject if they please, for while they are cogitating the Indian Government is working.'[54] As news of the revolt's successful suppression failed to arrive, however, the Indian government received substantial criticism: accusations of understaffing the civil and military establishments,[55] serving primarily mercenary interests,[56] adopting an 'inconsistent course with respect to the religious habits and prejudices of the people5,[57] and general mismanagement[58] abounded. It had allowed the Bengal army to slide into decay by failing to provide adequately skilled European officers[59] and by unwisely recruiting a high proportion of high-caste Sepoys: 'the most aristocratic, exclusive, and high-spirited of the natives.5 Accusations of EIC ineptitude provided both an explanation and a focus for blame, without threatening the fundamental principle of British rule. No attempts w[ere made to explore the economic and

political impact of British imperialism on India or uncover wider structural reasons for discontent with British rule, and emphasis on EIC failures thus actually worked to limit the ideological threat posed by the uprising and resulted ultimately in the end of the system of 'double government' and the institution of Crown rule.

Justice? Atrocity, Retribution and the Reversal of Honour

As the uprising unfolded, another major concern debated in the press was the form that British retribution should take. The India Office, with one eye on the future, advocated 'a policy distinguished by a wise and discriminating generosity', exhorting its representatives 'to temper justice with mercy, and, except in cases of extreme criminality, to grant an amnesty to the vanquished'.[60] Excessive retributive violence would make the re-establishment of British rule more difficult, and accordingly the authorities urged remembrance 'that they are our people; our erring, guilty subjects, but our subjects still. By force of arms have we recently asserted our right to rule over them, and we must now show towards them the magnanimity of rulers.'[61] Officially, there was to be no mass, uncontrolled retribution and punishments were reported as measured and legitimate: 'The prisoners were all executed by martial law.'[62] If Indians were to continue to be subjects, the state had to punish precisely and lawfully. These sentiments are at odds, however, with the contents of published letters from soldiers at the scene, who took pride in dispensing rough and degrading 'justice', and adopted a policy of guilty until proven innocent. General Neill, who has become infamous for his brutal reprisals against the Indian population, reported that 'whenever a rebel is caught, he is immediately tried, and unless he can prove a defence, he is sentenced to be hanged at once.'[63] In some instances, soldiers apparently acted purposefully against the orders of authority,[64] indicating a discrepancy between official policy and popular practice. Clearly, the definition of 'justice and retribution' varied between the government and its agents, the former failing to limit the scale of revenge exacted by the latter.

Some newspaper reports adopted the official tone of firm, but measured justice. 'Sir Colin Campbell, and the true soldiers of Britain who are with him,' the *Illustrated London News* declared, 'have but one duty, and they will do it. That duty is to quell, and to punish, the mutiny as to render future mutinies improbable, if not impossible. They will do JUSTICE—no more and no less. They will be soldiers and not executioners.... It is for Asiatics to be revengeful. It is for Englishmen to be just.'[65] They were in the minority, however, and although some evangelical and other publications spoke out against excessive

retribution,[66] humanitarian sentiments were largely met with ridicule. 'I think I hear a faint wail from Exeter-hall', declared one correspondent to *The Times*, 'and the usual talk of European brutality and torture on the mild Hindoo Sepoy. If you hear any such sentiments by all means ship off their propounder to this country at once. Let him see one-half of what we have seen, and compare our brutality with theirs, then send him home again, and I think you will find him pretty quiet on the subject for the rest of his life.'[67] At its most extreme, public sentiment desired the extermination of all who had offended them. 'The name of Sepoy will be erased from the dictionary of the world', declared the *Delhi Gazette Extra*, 'and the homes of these devils will be but discernible by the burning embers and smouldering ashes of villages, which, like the Cities of the Plain in Scripture, will at once serve for the scene of their crimes and their sepulchres'.[68] A 'scorched earth' policy was adopted that no doubt caused the death of many who were not the proven rebels against whom alone the authorities sanctioned punishment.[69] Large-scale vengeance, it was argued, was necessary and desirable. *The Lady's Newspaper* commented of those killed when Delhi fell that 'these were not mutineers, but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say they were disappointed'.[70] Similarly, *The Times* considered that 'it is a fatal mistake to suppose that the natives appreciate such leniency. They all expect a fearful retribution, and attribute all hesitation on our part to fear.'[71] Paradoxically, punishment was even figured as an act of humanity:

> That his [the King of Delhi's] two sons and his grandson should have been shot does not appear at all unjust. The few must suffer for the good of the many. This is true humanity ... we have but to recall the horrors of the immediate past, and then decide whether or not such lessons are not absolutely necessary for the admonition of the Hindoo and the protection of the European ... as a cure and a preventative the guilty must suffer.[72]

If the authorities defined the uprising as a military mutiny and sought to punish it as such, the public believed it was something more and deserved more spectacular revenge.

Press calls for dramatic acts of retributive justice reflected just how severely the uprising and accompanying violence against British men, women and children had shaken the previously self-confident imperial nation. As Cohn and Mukherjee[73] both argue, 1857 represented the ultimate rejection of British rule and an Indian attempt to reclaim lost power via the enactment of public violence and the reassertion of political authority. The initial loss and subsequent restoration of honour and power was an important aspect of 1857 in the British public imagination. As Chakravarty argues, the uprising interrupted a British language of 'agency and command that required the submission and expropriation of a subject population, and exposed them to "humiliation by an

inferior race"'.[74] It was 'a serious interruption of the habitual hierarchy of status and authority that structured British relations with India'.[75] In the wake of this, it was necessary to develop what Daniel Rycroft terms a 'counter-insurgency complex'— 'a critical framework within which to negotiate the ideological tensions and slippages implicit in imperial visual narratives'.[76] In order to reassure the British public that control had been restored, 'governmental coercion against subaltern resistance'[77] must be displayed. This theme of loss and restoration of power informs many reports of the uprising. Indian appropriations of the emblems of British authority caused palpable confusion and distress. As Chakravarty argues:

> Rebel violence is at once the sign and the effect of an event that had 'indescribably^ upset habitual hierarchies, replacing the symbols and institutions of the British with indigenous alternatives, and physically attacking the person of the rulers. More than the causes of the rebellion, or the judicious means of containment that preoccupied the echelons of high policy, it was this reversal that dominated the popular media, bringing forth calls for vengeance.[78]

The appropriation of symbols of British power by Indian subjects challenged Britain's self-perception as India's undisputed master and scenes in which Indians mixed British signifiers of power with displays of native agency were particularly troubling. 'Ram Singh, of the Light cavalry', it was reported, 'showed himself yesterday, in all his treacherous glory, ready for the fight, attired not in the grotesque and monkey-like display of English cut pantaloon, shell jacket, and military forage cap, but like his delinquent compeer, in the more easy dishabille of the Brahminical thread and *dhotes*—with our medal hung round his neck, and our greased cartridge ever and anon between his lips.'[79] Ram Singh is thus both incorporated into the system of British rule (adorning himself with a British medal), yet has rejected its authority. Disturbingly, his apparent assimilation has been proved false, but he has appropriated some aspect of British power. He is at once ridiculous and threatening. Another letter reported:

> At Baroda ... they had the impudence to cut down the Residency flagstaff for their own use. But the most impertinent thing of all was done at Bareilly, where the Sudder Ameen (a native judge) took our judge, Mr Robertson, prisoner, made a regular trial, English fashion, and hanged him. And at Allyghur they put a wretched Sepoy on horseback and called him the 'General Sahib/ and forced the English officers and civilians to salute him![80]

Such anecdotes reflect both British consternation at their exposure to Indian violence and a deeper concern that their 'grateful subjects' could appropriate and corrupt symbols of their power. If Indians could mimic British authority figures, could they actually fill these roles?

Indian acts of aggression shattered the British idea that their 'natural' supremacy gave them a monopoly on violence in India.[81] They believed themselves racially superior, protected by an almost-sacred 'whiteness'. As *The Times* put it:

> There is something quite new to English minds in hearing of the dreadful outrages committed upon the persons of English men and women. We thought we were lifted above such a dreadful risk, that our higher than Roman citizenship would shield us, that some Palladium would protect one of English blood from the last indignities, even in such terrible extremities as these. It seems we are mistaken___ The Sepoys have not only mutinied, but have done what they have done to the bodies of English people.... They have broken the spell of inviolability that seemed to attach to an English man as such, and have plunged headlong into this horrible abyss of cruelty.[82]

The enactment of violence by Indians on British bodies thus had deep psychological meanings. Had it damaged, perhaps permanently, British honour and prestige as an 'inviolable' race? By refusing them physical and figurative respect, Indians had purposefully tried to undermine British superiority: the complete suppression of the revolt demanded its restoration.[83]

As Jenny Sharpe discusses, the symbolic implications of Indian aggression were most dangerous when violence was directed towards British women and children. Although the more extreme atrocity stories were largely groundless, the interpretation of the mutiny as a crime against British womanhood loomed large in the public imagination.[84] It was considered viciously inappropriate that tender British women should even *know* of the violence perpetrated in India, let alone fall victim to it:

> If I did write with tears and blood, meseems that I should shame
> To set this savage villany in sight of English dame.
> Ah! Lady, lady! Turn aside the knowledge from your heart,
> Or knowing not its hideous tale, keep all its pain apart.[85]

Within the national discourse, women were 'that sacred nucleus of our race, wherein as in a shrine our honour makes abode'[86] and were 'the embodiment of all that the Englishman must protect'.[87] Public attacks on British women were invested with deep symbolic meaning, as humiliating violations of the essence of the British nation. 'I die happy', one of the King of Delhi's sons was said to have declared as he was led to execution, 'since I have defiled English women, and seen them walking naked about the streets.'[88] So serious were such supposed violations deemed that some publications even preferred British women's death to their 'dishonour' by Indiaft men:

> But if in God's dark maze of providence^
> Such hour of darkness should appear again,

> Oh men, if ye be men!
> Kiss them, and kill them in their innocence!...
> Oh fathers, husbands, brothers, think no sin!
> But out of horror, out of agony,
> With your swift tender bullets tenderly
> Dismiss them to the keeping of their God![89]

More than the simple act of rebellion, it was the supposed atrocities against British women that necessitated such brutal reprisals against the Indian population. Interestingly, *The Lady's Newspaper* initially objected to the invocation of sacred womanhood to incite violence, declaring:

> There is at this hour a war-cry resounding in India which fills us with horror; it is this, "For the Ladies and the Babies!" and as the words pass from lip to lip, and from rank to rank, men rush to the slaughter, mad with the thirst for blood…If there is a political necessity for wholesale butchery, let it not be done in the name of woman; if the women and the children of our country have been the victims of the heathen, it is not so we would have them avenged...That fearful war-cry chills the very heart, sickens the very soul. Oh, not in the name of woman let the tumult of battle rage….[90]

This rejection, by a women's publication, of the symbolic role awarded to them in the narrative of British valour and honour is fascinating, although the same newspaper later shifted its position and declared that, 'the rebellion of the Sepoys is the lesser of their offences; it is their savagery to the innocents that stands out the most hideously, and it is their savagery which has to be punished so severely ….'[91]

The inversion of the power hierarchy inherent in Indian violence against Europeans helps to explain the forms British vengeance took; as Gautam Bhadra argues, British retribution incorporated the symbolic reassertion of their power.[92] The 'martyrdom' of British womanhood and the desecration of the symbols of Christianity represented a powerful symbolic violation—'after we stormed and entered Delhi', one letter to *The Times* reported, 'we saw a poor woman crucified naked, and nailed up in the same manner as our Lord and Saviour is represented'[93]—and had to be countered by a similar defilement of the articles of Indian faith. Thus Hindu and Muslim 'insurgents' were not only executed in vast numbers, but were killed in ways that violated their religious sensibilities. *Blackwood's* explained the practice of blowing Sepoys from the mouths of guns thus:

> You must know that this is nearly the only form in which death has any terrors for a native. If he is hung, or shot by musketry, he knows that his friends or relatives will be allowed to claim his body, and will give him the funeral rites required by his religion----But if sentenced to death in this form, he knows that his body will be blown into a thousand pieces, and

> that it will be altogether impossible for his relatives, however devoted to him, to be sure of picking up all the fragments of his own particular body; and the thought that perhaps a limb of someone of a different religion to himself might possibly be burned or buried with the remainder of his own particular body, is agony to him.[94]

Similarly the punishment devised by General Neill at Cawnpore, in which high-caste sepoys had to wash blood from the *bibighar* floor before being hanged, was considered especially effective because it violated their caste.[95]

Although there was unprecedented brutality on both sides, the scale of the atrocities practised on Britons during the uprising was vastly inflated in popular accounts caught up in a 'pornographic fantasy of rape'.[96] Interestingly, attempts were made in the wake of the uprising to dispel some of these stories. At the EIC quarterly meeting in March 1858, the Chairman was asked whether he 'had any positive knowledge of the mutilations which were said to have been committed by the Sepoys on women and children', to which he replied that 'his own impressions of India led him to believe that no such mutilations and atrocities had occurred'.[97] Similarly, when an officer present at the siege of Delhi was asked whether it was true that Europeans had been found chained to guns and crucified, he replied that 'to the best of his belief nothing of the kind had occurred'.[98] Such public denials of the more sensational atrocity stories peddled in. the press suggest a need both to downplay the 'damage' done to British prestige and to quell public demands for bloody vengeance. Reactions in the press, however, suggest that such attempts to limit public perceptions about the scale of the atrocities met with little success, and popular ideas about what was required to restore proper order remained markedly more severe than those of the authorities.

Changing Attitudes to India, Indians and Empire

The violent expression of discontent with British rule that the uprising represented shattered comfortable British notions of their imperial destiny, calling into question both their policies in India and their purpose for being there. During and after the revolt, various interest groups reinterpreted its meaning as they put forward 'competing narratives of justification'[99] in the debate over the future of India. Many hoped that the uprising, though traumatic, would usher in a new era in imperial policy, although the form that this would take was subject to debate. Some still believed that the British should eventually re-introduce Indian self-government. *Blackwood's* argued that they should raise

> the governed to the state of the governors ... respect their customs and religions ... rule them intermediately bylaws made sacred through time-honoured

> usage inculcate civilisation by contact; and by giving them community and individual interest in the welfare of the State, involve them in its prosperity and progress.[100]

Such suggestions assumed that Indians, though currently irrational and uncivilised, were capable of improvement through Britain's 'civilising mission'. As Catherine Hall points out, however, popular belief in the redeemability of subject races and the potential equality of man was significantly damaged by events in 1857, which 'proved' the base nature of Indians.[101] Such a race could be controlled only through a sterner form of rule; 'having neither the intelligence nor the moral principle to govern themselves we must place them under a despotism.'[102] The *Illustrated London News* believed that British rule had been too lenient, arguing that:

> The spectacle of power is that which we should exhibit.... Asiatics differ not simply in religion, but in blood, from Europeans. They worship Power.... They despise weakness; and any attempt to introduce the farce of constitutional forms among them is not only a failure and an error, but the source of discontent and rebellion.... What is required for India is a despotism—unquestionable, but kindly, a fatherly despotism controlled only by fatherly justice and wisdom; strong to punish as the native Sovereigns have generally been, but prompter than they have ever shown themselves to do justice and mercy.[103]

By presenting despotism as the only system Indians could understand, the British granted themselves *carte blanche* to impose a more stringent, controlled regime in India—a comforting prospect in the wake of recent events. By advocating a benevolent, paternal despotism, they bestowed legitimacy upon a form of rule that would deny its subjects all agency. 'Native custom' should no longer play a part in government policy: 'There can hereafter be no communion betwixt light and darkness,' *The Times* declared, 'and he who claims the privilege of being guided by "native custom" must renounce the hope of European countenance or sympathy. The Bengal mutineers have done nothing more than indulge in the customs of their caste and country, and nothing beyond what was sanctioned by custom and by creed.'[104] Only a firmer form of rule, based on European principles, would secure British power in India.

Although some argued that India was held for British benefit, to allow the 'natural expansion of an adventurous race' and aid 'the progress of the nation and the happiness of the country',[105] others invoked a higher mission. 'We do not hold India to make fortunes for civilians,' one Baptist missionary declared, 'nor to afford distinction to soldiers, nor to establish there a flourishing British community, nor to secure to Great Britain a profitable trade, nor to increase our influence in Europe; but to make the Hindoos intelligent, prosperous, moral, religious, free, and happy.'[106] In this vein, the evangelicals argued, it was the

Indian government's duty 'to confess Christ, and to serve Him both as individual Christians and as a government … every law that they pass, and every measure which they adopt, should be in harmony with His law'.[107] 1857 had proved the inefficacy of EIC policies of religious 'neutrality' and opened the door for a more overtly Christian form of government. 'There is now an avowed desire even in high quarters,' the *Baptist Magazine* declared, 'that Christianity may be diffused throughout India, and that, since the result of a humiliating patronage of heathenism has been so unfruitful, the experiment of Christian influence may be tried. Long as the door was shut against missionaries lest they should do harm, it is now thrown wide open to them, in the hope, more or less strong, that they may do good.'[108] No amount of superficial civilisation could secure India, only Christianity would efficiently assure British rule. As *The Ladies' Own* put it:

> We might cover India with a network of railways, irrigate her deserts, reclaim her jungles, reform her courts of justice, and make it a model of successful government, but if we did not Christianise the people we should still be liable to the outrages and rebellions of miscreants like Nana Sahib.[109]

Such views were not universally held, however; in direct contrast to missionary position, the *Illustrated London News* argued:

> Let us not make the mistake of thinking that we owe them Christianity, and of endeavouring to force it upon them before they are ripe to receive it Christianity was never yet successfully inculcated by the sword, and never will be___ Soldiers and railroads are what are needed in India.[110]

If differences in the British press about the best way to rule India predated the events of 1857, the uprising did nothing to forge a consensus on the matter. If anything, it further polarised the field, as various groups took the opportunity to influence the new direction of British rule in India.

Although British interpretations of the uprising had sought to direct culpability away from British actions, the insurrection had exposed flaws in the current system of government, and the EIC inevitably suffered much of the blame. As early as July 1857, *The Times* asserted that the insurrection should 'awaken the attention at home to the vast interests at stake, and to the very anomalous character of the Government of India',[111] an argument that it revisited as the uprising dragged on, declaring in November 1857 that:

> It must be established in practice, as it is proclaimed in theory, that the time is come when India shall be governed for its own good, and not for the advantage of a small fraction of a small class of Englishmen___ After a long and troubled infancy, India has been weaned, and is now handed over to the Imperial Government.[112]

By December, the *Illustrated London News* was suggesting that it was no longer a question of whether the EIC charter would be renewed, but how the Queen's government should be organised.[113] This was the obvious conclusion of the correlation between EIC mismanagement and the revolt. Constructing the EIC as a flawed ruler of India allowed the 'cause' of the uprising to be removed, while British rule continued under a new order of government.

In addition to debates about the form and purpose of empire, the uprising also provoked discussions about the nature of the Indian character. Chakravarty argues that for the British it proved 'the impossibility of assimilating and acculturating subject peoples',[114] while Metcalf believes that after 1857, ideas of Indian difference came to dominate imperial ideology.[115] Belief in the essentially pacifistic nature of Hinduism was undermined by the image of 'the mild Hindoo, who would up all by imbruing his perfidious villain hands in British blood'.[116] Some used this essential 'Indian difference' to argue that Indians should be kept at a distance, not entrusted with key positions of responsibility.[117] 'No dependence is to be placed on the loyalty of either Mussulmans or Hindus,' the *Missionary Herald* declared, 'The Government ought to be convinced that the only truly loyal section of the community are the Europeans, the Eurasians, and the native Christians, from among whom the various grades of office should be filled.'[118] Such attitudes, while common, were not, however, universally subscribed to. The idea that Hindus had been duped into participating in the uprising by perfidious Muslims confirmed the missionary opinion that their efforts were best directed towards the Hindus:

> The Mohammedans, indeed, have exhibited both sympathy with the rebels and a malignant hatred of the English. But this they have always been ready to evince, and the difficulty of missionary labour amongst them will be no greater after the pacification of the country than it was before. The Hindus have been quiet spectators of the rebellion, or passive sufferers of the violence of armed men, or of the bands of depredators which these events have called forth. In very numerous cases they have actively interfered for the safety of the refugees, and conducted them to places of security.[119]

Some evangelicals, noting the potential for increased missionary activity in the wake of the uprising, defended the idea of Hindu redeemability, arguing that they were potentially similar to Europeans, and thus ripe for conversion. Rev J. George Wrench commented that

> The Hindoo is very nearly, if not quite, equal in mental endowments, and in delicacy of feeling, to ourselves. Indeed he is much more nearly of kin to us than we suppose. He is much more nearly related to us than many an intelligent and partly civilized race__ We and the Hindoos are nearly allied in race.[120]

Blackwood's even declared that Hinduism was essentially similar to Christianity[121] and compared acts of ascetic penance to British 'circus acts', observing that

> [w]e Britons do not understand how this can be; but quite as little do the quiescent Hindoos understand how reasonable beings can have a passion for running, leaping, cricketing, fox-hunting, and other violent and fatiguing pursuits, which would be worse torture to the Hindoo than an occasional turn on the swinging-hooks![122]

Ideas about Indian difference were not, perhaps, so firmly decided as Chakravarty and Metcalf suggest.

Conclusion

The British press represented a variety of opinions and interpretations of 1857, reporting the views of missionary groups and military representatives alike. Their coverage sought to build narrative structures through which the uprising could be interpreted without fundamentally undermining the ideological basis of British rule, to contain the event and make it non-threatening. As the uprising progressed, however, a more fragmented narrative emerged, that splintered off in various directions and incorporated the views of various interested parties. They quickly moved beyond the narrowly defined official construction of a 'military mutiny', as popular history-in-the-making represented 'the rebellion of 1857-58 as an "Indian revolt", providing "a myth, a history and heroes, of the cultural or ethnic kind"'.[123] Their interpretations often clashed with official versions of events; the negative and dehumanised portrayal of Indians, for example, was at variance with the 'enunciation of the territorial principle and of plurality whereby all subjects of the Crown were entitled to equality of respect and treatment, whatever their creed or race',[124] expressed in Queen Victoria's proclamation. The construction of events in the public imagination displayed the fractures between different factions and the lack of a single, coherent 'imperial ideology'.[125]

The events of 1857 represented a threat to British power that had to be put down in order to maintain Britain's international status. To lose their Indian empire would be to 'lose power, prestige, and character—to descend in the rank of nations, and take a position more in accordance with our size on the map of Europe than with the greatness of our past glory and present ambition'.[126] As Bhadra argues, the British had to restore their honour in visible ways[127] to negate the humiliation caused by its loss. Their main concern, as Chakravarty claims, was the threat signified by a dark, subject people's rebellion against

Britain's supposedly all-powerful world position.[128] This necessitated the reassertion of authority in a variety of ways,[129] including the violent punishment of the Indian population. The uprising was written in the British press as part of a wider narrative of British greatness, replete with revered heroes and rascally villains. After the recent 'disgrace' of the Crimean war, by which 'the prestige of England was somewhat lessened',[130] the British could not allow themselves to be humiliated within their own empire. Rather, the uprising had to be ideologically structured in order to allow the British to emerge stronger than ever, proving that 'England still is, and still deserves to be, the paramount empire of the globe'.[131] While press coverage of the uprising reflected divergent views about the purpose of empire, the overriding theme was the preservation of British prestige. Instead of a measured debate, over the causes of unrest in India, the main concern of the press was to deny that it was a reflection of British weakness and to assert a strong identity at a time of uncertainty in the global balance of powers. This was the hidden narrative underlying coverage of 1857 and informing the assumptions used in structuring it.

Notes and References

1. Charles Ball, *The History of the Indian Mutiny: Giving a Detailed Account of the Sepoy Insurrection in India; and a Concise History of the Great Military Events which have tended to consolidate British Empire in Hindoostan*, vol. I (London: London Printing and Publishing Company, 1858); George Dodd, *The History of the Indian Revolt And of the Expeditions to Persia, China, and Japan, 1856-8* (London: W. And R. Chambers, 1859); John William Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War in India 1857-8*, vol. I (London: W.H. Allen, 1864); *Accounts and Papers (Commons) (5) Vol XVIII* (1859) (hereafter APC).
2. V.D. Sarkar, 'The Indian War of Independence' in Ainslie T. Embree, ed., *1857 in India: Mutiny or War of Independence!* (Boston: Heath, 1963).
3. Gautam Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 20.
4. The main publications used include *The Times*, *The Illustrated London News* (hereafter ILN), *Blackwood*s Edinburgh Magazine* (hereafter BEM), *The Lady*s Newspaper and Pictorial Times* (hereafter LNPT), *The Ladies' Own Journal and Miscellany* (hereafter LOJM), *The Christian Lady*s Magazine* (hereafter CLM), *The Baptist Magazine* (hereafter BM) and *The Missionary Herald* (hereafter MH), with coverage carried between July 1857 and early 1858 as the main focus.
5. The ILN was one of the best selling weekly pictorial newspapers of the period, costing 6d and circulated mainly among the middle and upper classes. It avoided the sensationalism of the radical Sunday press, but did take a progressive line on social issues and reforms.
6. The LNPT was a weekly women's periodical, costing 6d and advertising itself as containing: news of the week 'carefully revised', needlework patterns, pictures and description of the latest Paris fashions, reviews of books, theatre and music and 'occasional articles by well known Authoresses on subjects connected with the position and influence of women'. From an advertisement in John Dennis, *A Handbook of Dorking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1855).
7. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 33.

8. LNPT, 18 July 1857.
9. There was considerable debate within the press and in the ranks of the British army over the extent to which the Bengal army had been tainted, with some arguing that the majority of the sepoys remained loyal, while others decried the officers' refusal to acknowledge disaffection among their own men. See, for example, 'Letter from Cawnpore' (31 May 1857) in *The Times*, 5 September 1857; MH, October 1857, p. 648; BEM, November 1857, p. 606.
10. As one officer at Cawnpore put it, 'There are a number of rascals in the city anxious for a row, that they may murder and plunder at their ease___But among our men I believe we are perfectly safe'. Letter from Cawnpore, *The Timesy*5 September 1857.
11. Tribals were widely blamed for any signs of unrest outside of the army, although their actions were not considered to be political statements, but rather the senseless deeds of 'tribes by nature predatory, who before our rule subsisted on plunder and rapine ... and ... long for a return of the days of misrule'. APC, p. 7.
12. For more on supposed Muslim culpability see below.
13. LNPT, 5 December 1857.
14. LNPT, 5 December 1857.
15. Rev. Charles Stovel, *India: Its Crimes and Claims—A Lecture* (London, 1857), p. 21.
16. ILN, 24 July 1857, p. 92.
17. Ranajit Guha, cited in Daniel J. Rycroft, *Representing Rebellion: Visual Aspects of Counter-insurgency in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 2.
18. Rycroft, *Representing Rebellion*, p. 2.
19. 'The sons of England stand aghast as for the first time they open their eyes upon the Hindoo world.... Has time stood still here? Or are there indeed nations with whom existence has been stagnation for two thousand years, and which, like earth's poles, remain for ever stationary while all else whirls onward in the march of Time?' BEM, December 1857, p. 743.
20. BEM, December, 1857, p. 644.
21. *The Times*, 19 December 1857.
22. 'Nowhere have all the phases of conquest been so thoroughly illustrated as in that vast tract which we call India. It has been the great stage on which the great drama has been acted in all its successive scenes and acts'. BEM, December, 1857, p. 644.
23. BEM, August 1857, p. 245.
24. See, for example, LOJM, 31 October 1857.
25. LOJM, 23 January 1858.
26. BM, February 1858, p. 87.
27. BEM, October 1857, p. 489.
28. LNPT, 8 August 1857.
29. Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny, p. 23.
30. APC, p. 3.
31. APC, p. 3.
32. APC.
33. BEM, November, 1857, p. 637.
34. Baptist Wriothesley Noel, *England and India: An Essay on the Duty of Englishmen Towards the Hindoos* (London: J. Nisbet, 1859), p. 443.
35. Gyanendra Pandey, 'A View of the Observable: a Positivist "Understanding" of Agrarian Society and Political Protest in Colonial India', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1980).
36. BM, November 1857, p. 700.
3.7. MH, September 1857, p. 580.
38. MH, August 1857, p. 512.
39. Fulwar William Fowle, *A Thank-Offering for the Quelling of Mutiny and Rebellion in India; and for the Preservation of Dear Children, in that Land of Horrors and Heroes* (Salisbury, 1857), P-7.

40. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 30.
41. BEM, September 1857, p. 88.
42. Extract from *The Economist* in LOJM, 1 August 1857.
43. BEM, September 1857, p. 374.
44. LOJM, 27 September 1857.
45. Peter Robb, 'On the Rebellion of 1857: A Brief History of an Idea*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 12 May 2007, p. 1699.
46. MH, November 1857, p. 717.
47. BEM, September 1857, p. 380.
48. MH, October 1857, p. 658. This interpretation was not limited to the religious press, but can be found in a number of secular publications, for example, BEM, January 1858, p. 96.
49. ILN, 18 July 1857, p. 49.
50. 'The instigators of this insurrectionary movement turned out to be no other than the ex-king of Oude and the present king of Delhi*. LNPT, 8 August 1857.
51. See, for example, BEM, January 1858, p. 138.
52. Alex Padamsee, *Representations of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 49.
53. Padamsee, *Representations of Indian Muslims*, p. 58.
54. ILN, 4 July 1857, p. 1.
55. 'Two or three things, however, seem pretty clear—there has been a criminal neglect on the part of our Indian authorities of warnings as to the state of our Bengal army—our whole staff of Europeans, both civil and military, has been injuriously underhanded, the immense accessions of territory recently made having been accompanied by no adequate corresponding increase of European officials.' BM, August 1857, p. 507.
56. LOJM, 28 November 1857.
57. Speech by J.H. Stocqueler, in LNPT, 15 August 1857.
58. 'To the gross mismanagement of our Indian empire, and the manifest injustice of which the East India Company has been so frequently guilty, may be mainly attributed the deplorable state of affairs which now exists.' ILN in LOJM, 3 October 1857.
59. 'It is said, however, that the alleged outrage, and the generally dissatisfied or distrustful condition of the troops, are but a part and consequence of a deterioration that has taken place of late in the officering of the native regiments, the men of experience having been withdrawn to other and semi-civil employments, and too much having been entrusted to young men ignorant of their profession and of India....' Extract from *The Scotsman* in LOJM, 4 July 1857.
60. In *The Times*, 'The Governor-General of India and the Directors of the East India Company*, *The Timesy* 18 May 1858, p. 12.
61. India Office Papers, 'Mutiny in the Punjab, in 1857' (14 April 1859).
62. India Office Papers, 'Mutiny in the Punjab, in 1857' (14 April 1859).
63. Letter from General Neill, in Wriothesley Noel, *England and Indiay*p. 67.
64. 'Some seventy or eighty Sepoys, belonging to a regiment which had previously mutinied,, were tried at Benares or Cawnpore, by court-martial. There was no proof that they had murdered their officers, and the court, influenced by the Hon. John P. Grant, carrying out the spirit of the Governor-General's order acquitted the men; but another tribunal awaited them. The 78th Highlanders, on learning that they were acquitted, immediately issued forth and bayoneted every man of them, swearing that if the Government did not know how, or were afraid, to take revenge on the murderers of innocent women and children, they knew how to avenge the deaths of their countrymen and countrywomen.* 'Letter from Calcutta*, 18 September 1857, in LOJM, 7 November 1857.
65. ILN, 19 September 1857, p. 285.
66. Alfred Bowen Evans, *India: Two Discourses* (London: Enfield, 1857), p. 31.

67. 'Letter from a Lieutenant of the Bengal Engineers at Delhi', 7 July 1857, in *The Times*, 22 September 1857.
68. 'Letter from Dinapore', 13 July 1857, in *The Timesy*25 September 1857.
69. *Delhi Gazette Extray* 13 June 1857, in LOJM, 8 August 1857. When the British retook Delhi, they killed large numbers of its inhabitants. All the city people found within the walls when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot, and the number was considerable, as you may suppose when I tell you that in some houses forty and fifty^persons were hiding. LNPT, 21 November 1857.
70. LNPT, 21 November 1857.
71. *The Times*, in LOJM, 31 October 1857.
72. LNPT, 14 November 1857.
73. Bernard Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India', in Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); R. Mukheijee, "'Satan Let Loose Upon the Earth": The Kanpur Massacres in the Revolt of 1857' in *Past and Present*, vol. 128 (1990).
74. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 39.
75. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 4.
76. Rycroft, *Representing Rebellion*, p. v.
77. Guha in Rycroft, *Representing Rebellion*, p. 3.
78. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 38.
79. 'Letter from Delhi', 15 June 1857, in LNPT, 29 August 1857.
80. 'Letter from an Englishwoman at Murree*, 27 June 1857, in *The Times*, 10 September 1857.
81. Mukherjee, 'Satan Let Loose Upon the Earth'.
82. *The Times*, 31 August 1857.
83. Gautam Bhadra, 'Four Rebels of 1857', in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri C. Spivak, eds, *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988).
84. Jenny Sharpe, *Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
85. *The Press*, in LOJM, 24 October 1857.
86. BEM, October 1857, p. 505.
87. Sara Suleri, *The Rhetoric ofEnglish India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 76.
88. LNPT, 12 December 1857.
89. BEM, October 1857, p. 505.
90. LNPT, 19 August 1857.
91. LNPT, 28 November 1857.
92. Bhadra, 'Four Rebels of 1857'.
93. *Carnarvon Herald*, in *The Times*, 7 April 1858.
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95. *Bengal Hurkaru*, 5 August 1857, in *The Times*, 21 September 1857.
96. Sharpe 'The Unspeakable Limits of Rape*, p. 235.
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99. Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny, p. 45.
100. BEM, December 1857, p. 643.
101. Hall couples 1857 in India with the Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica in 1865 in terms of its impact on attitudes to other races. Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 284.
102. Wriothesley Noel, *England and India*, p. 39.
103. ILN, 22 August 1857, p. 185.

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105. LOJM, 4 July 1857.
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107. Wriothesley Noel, *England and India*, p. 10.
108. BM, January 1858, p. 43.
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115. Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997).
116. 'Letter from Delhi', 25 June 1857, in LNPT, 5 September 1857.
117. See, for example, Speech by J.H. Stocqueler, in LNPT, 15 August 1857.
118. MH, October 1857, p. 658.
119. MH, September, 1857, p. 579.
120. Rev. J. George Wrench, *Thanksgiving to Almighty God> For the Constant and Signal Successes Obtained by the Troops of her Majesty, and by the Whole of the Forces Serving in India* (London, 1859), p. 6.
121. For example, the argument was made that idols were not nearly so revered as was generally believed:

    Sometimes temporary idols are made by the worshippers themselves. A Brahmin, after squeezing a lump of the Ganges mud in his hands into something like an image, will set it up on the bank, offering it rice, fruit, flowers, and oil ... and then, after a little pause, he will throw it away.... Such practices serve to illustrate the fact that, with a large portion of the Hindoos, idols are no more regarded as actual gods than is the crucifix in Roman Catholic countries,—sometimes less so.

    BEM, December 1857, p. 749.

122. BEM, December, 1857, p. 750.
123. Robb, 'On the Rebellion of 1857', p. 1701.
124. Robb, 'On the Rebellion of 1857', p. 1701.
125. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*.
126. ILN, 4 July 1857, p. 1.
127. Bhadra, 'Four Rebels of 1857*.
128. Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny*.
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130. ILN, 26 September 1857.
131. ILN, 26 September 1857.

2

POPULAR BRITISH INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MUTINY'
Politics and Polemics

Salahuddin Malik

THE causes, nature and meaning of the Indian Uprising of 1857 have long been the subject of controversy, with the opposition between British imperialist and Indian nationalist interpretations often dominating the debate. The ideological agendas behind these conflicting historiographies has led to a degree of internal homogeneity, with the British imperialist historians tending to see 'The Indian Mutiny5 as limited in scope and meaning,[1] while Indian nationalists presented 'The First War of Indian Independence5[2] as a proto-nationalist conflict with wider socio-political significance within the history of India's transition to independence. Such divisions along racial/national lines are the retrospective impositions of defined imperial and national political projects, the homogenising tendency of which has obscured the heterogeneity of immediate reactions to the events as they unfolded, both in Britain and India. More recently, the emergence of subalternist perspectives in Indian historiographical method has led to the recognition of the multiplicity of identities, motivations and meanings that insurrection and resistance could have, depending on the various social, economic, religious, regional and circumstantial situations of the participants.[3] Moreover, developments in postcolonial theory, and the emergence of more critical approaches to the study of colonialism, have helped to reinterpret the British response in terms of its relationship to the practical, ideological and discursive expediencies of the imperial project.[4] Far from immediately coalescing in an organised and unified national response to the crisis, British reactions to and interpretations of events varied considerably, both over time and between groups from different political and ideological backgrounds. Indeed,.as Gautam Chakravarty has pointed

out, divisions within the initial British response foreshadow later dichotomies in the imperialist/nationalist debate, as some sections of the British polity downplayed the insurrection as a limited military mutiny, while others read into it wider social, political and even national significance.5The debates about its causes, origins, instigators, scope and potential 'national* or 'nationalist* meanings that have become so dominant in more recent historiography, were thus present within a multifaceted and often conflicted British response in 1857-1858 itself. This chapter explores three of the most prominent British interpretations of the uprising that emerged at the time, although, of course, there were others. These can loosely be categorised as the 'military mutiny' explanation, the 'civil uprising* interpretation and the 'Muslim conspiracy/rebellion' theory. By exploring each in turn, the chapter will seek to elucidate both the political and ideological assumptions and expediencies that actuated the adherents of each interpretation and their wider significance for our understanding of British perceptions about the nature and future of empire.

A Military Mutiny

The outbreak of rebellion in May 1857 was initially taken relatively lightly in both Calcutta and London. It took Governor General Lord Canning several days to realise the serious challenge his government was facing, while in Britain it was weeks before Palmerston fully grasped the gravity of the situation. Both hoped that the next mail, or the mail thereafter, would bring news that the 'mutineers* had been crushed and the region completely pacified. Canning even rejected the governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone's offer to send news of the revolt to England by a special steamer, in order to speed the arrival of British help.6 In London, Palmerston ignored his parliamentary colleagues* advice to dispatch immediate military assistance via the Mediterranean and Red Sea, instead downplaying the extent of the revolt and finally sending reinforcements late, and by the longer Cape of Good Hope route. The intensity of the insurrection and the tenacity of the rebels were initially incomprehensible to the British authorities, whose immediate reaction was to present it as a limited military mutiny. Such an event was not unprecedented; the British were used to receiving periodic reports of military uprisings in India. The mutiny at Vellore in 1806 was perhaps the most serious previous military insurrection, but was certainly not unique: the 47th Regiment had been disbanded in 1824 for refusing to serve in Burma, as had the 38th Bengal Native Infantry in 1852, four Bengal regiments had refused to serve in Sind in 1844, and the 66th Native Infantry at Govindgarh had mutinied in 1849. Understood in this wider context, the news of the outbreak at Meerut was neither exceptional, nor a cause

for serious alarm. Palmerston's government minimised the threat, hoping the British forces already in India would quickly suppress the mutiny. V.A. Smith, president of the Board of Control for India, speaking in the Commons on 29 June 1857, pinned his hopes on the 'gallantry and quick action of [his] friend', General George Anson, the commander-in-chief of India. As the mail left India on 18 May, he felt sorry he could not inform the House that the insurgent headquarters at Delhi was already 'razed to the ground', but was confident that the next mail would certainly bring the news of its reduction.[7] The popular press initially took a similarly confident view. *The Scotsman*,[8] *Manchester Guardian*[9] and *Illustrated London* News,[10] among others, had no doubt that the 'mutiny' would be immediately suppressed, while *The Times* felt confident that the revolt at Meerut and Delhi was already crushed.[11]

The determination of the government to represent the uprising as a military mutiny reflected both the political expediencies of the moment and wider British interpretations of their role in India. Many Britons were psychologically unprepared to admit that the revolt was a civil rebellion, as this would challenge the legitimacy, popularity and success of colonialism. The need to secure the renewal of its Charter at regular intervals throughout the early nineteenth century had led the East India Company (EIC) to cultivate an image of slow but steady progress in India, and many Britons had positive ideas about the beneficial nature of British rule. Utilitarians and Benthamites saw India as a *tabula rasa* for social improvement,[12] whilst evangelicals saw EIC control—though flawed by its secularism—as a divinely given opportunity to promote Christian light in a land that was awash in idolatry, inequity and 'Islamism'. Ideas of divine sanction and secular imperial destiny both relied on the assumption that Indians would willingly accept social and religious 'progress' and would ultimately be grateful for the benefits colonial rule bestowed. Government pronouncements, media descriptions and missionary assertions, combined with a lack of first hand knowledge of India,[13] were enough to convince most Britons that their rule was a boon to their Indian subjects. Excepting the Muslim population, whose rule they had replaced, the majority of Indians were thought to be content with the British takeover of India. To admit that the uprising was a civil rebellion based on widespread disaffection would negate Britain's self-image as a benevolent ruler by demonstrating that the civilian population was resentful of colonial control. Ideologically, it was easier to dismiss the revolt as a military mutiny.

Before long, news of the uprising brought by the Indian mail spread throughout Britain. The first delivery alone brought more than 20,000 letters.[14] These British 'correspondents' from India provided varied views of the events at Meerut and Delhi. Many letters provided ample evidence of civilian participation and of an astonishing degree of discipline and organisation within the rebel ranks.[15] British failure to reduce Delhi promptly led to a greater acceptance of the situation's seriousness and to a virulent debate over the causes of and responsibility for the rebellion. The House of Commons, which earlier could hardly produce

a quorum on Indian issues, not only attracted a full house, but also began crisis sessions. Even the debates on the Persian War, the situation in China and the financial crisis at home tended to become debates on India.[16] Similarly, the press took up the issue with enthusiasm, providing not only reports of events in India and coverage of Parliamentary debates on the issue, but editorials and opinion pieces espousing different interpretations of the uprising. Some emphasised military grievances; from the greased cartridges to the administration of the army, the ratio of Indian to British troops and the quality of the British officer class. Others blamed the Whig Party for its expansionist policies in India, or the administration of Lord Dalhousie for its controversial doctrine of annexation and lapse.[17] Missionaries were accused of creating a religious panic by aggressively promoting Christianity without regard for Hindu and Muslim religious sensibilities, whilst evangelicals hit back by suggesting that the uprising was in fact an act of divine retribution for the EIC's support of 'idolatry' and failure to propagate the Gospel in India.[18] The Anglicists were accused of privileging English language and culture, to the detriment of indigenous languages and cultures,[19] and 'progressive' reforms that had once been lauded as British successes were presented as provoking social and religious paranoia in a reactionary Indian population. Many believed that the uprising was primarily a Muslim revolt, aimed at the restoration of their lost glory on the subcontinent[20] and embodying a clash of civilisations between Islam and Christianity.[21] It was even suggested that it might be a carefully crafted Russian intrigue to find a warm water seaport via Afghanistan and north-west India on the Arabian Sea.[22] The proponents of all these explanations were producing 'facts' as they saw them, gleaned from field accounts by civil and military officials in India, missionary correspondence with their home offices, letters to various newspapers, magazine articles, reports by business interest groups, diaries, pamphlets, and Parliamentary debates, but their interpretation of these 'facts' depended heavily on their social, political and ideological backgrounds.

The Whig government and its liberal allies largely championed the 'mutiny' interpretation of the uprising, focusing on the composition, disposition and administration of the native army. This position was upheld by: the party press; the independent, but (insofar as the mutiny was concerned) invariably pro-government newspaper, *The Times*; many EIC shareholders; its Courts of Proprietors and Directors; many civil servants and some ardent evangelicals like Lord Shaftesbury. It was not in the interest of any of these groups to describe the outbreak as a national rebellion caused by widespread discontent in India. The Whigs had been in government for long periods between 1830 and 1857 and had been deeply involved in the British imperial and foreign policy issues, especially in India where they had advocated both intervention in Indian social reform and the expansion of British territorial control. All the directives advocating the annexation of Awadh, for example, proceeded from Whig administrations. Earl Grey's administration suggested the occupation of Awadh in 1831, while

Viscount Melbourne’s government gave the same instructions to Lord Auckland in 1835. When Lord Dalhousie finally annexed Awadh in 1856, it was during Palmerston’s prime ministership. Indeed, Palmerston was the foreign secretary in the two aforementioned administrations, indicating the continuity in Whig policy. The liberal and independent press, such as *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian* and *Saturday Review*, had similarly supported a ‘forward? policy in India, both in political and social terms. As suggestions emerged that the revolt was a reaction against the speed of Anglicisation and modernisation in India, these newspapers resisted acknowledging that it was caused by popular disaffection towards the British, fearing, perhaps, that the ‘reforms’ they themselves had advocated might be held responsible. Similarly, the EIC administration could not admit widespread civil disaffection in India, as would certainly raise questions about their own responsibility for the tumult.

Those ascribing to the ‘mutiny’ theory had to resist any suggestion that the revolt was actuated by political grievance or ‘nationalist’ sentiment. Consequently, they contended that India did not contain one nation, but rather ‘a good score of native populations, far more distinct from each other in language, customs and religion than the nations of Europe’.[23] The *Saturday Review* regarded India as a mere ‘geographical expression’, an ‘untempered assemblage of tribes, races, classes, and sects bound into a whole by obedience to some strong master’, adding, ‘Even if there were an India, there would be, we repeat, no people of India. The word is a foolish misnomer for a collection of stratified castes.’[24] ‘From the Himalayas to Cape Comorin’, argued a writer in *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine*, ‘the use of the term national is in India a mockery, a delusion and a snare’. India was not a nation, it was not even a confederacy of nations, and fusion among Indians did not exist, even at village level.[25] As Indians were not a nation, there was no question of ‘national discontent’ or a ‘national insurrection’.[26] Indians were spiritually ‘heathens’, socially stratified and politically immature and incapable of unified action. Rev. Henry S. Polehampton, an Anglican priest at Lucknow, even suggested that it was Hindu-Muslim disunity of the acutest kind, combined with Shi’a-Sunni differences, that had originally enabled a small band of Britons to establish themselves as the rulers of the land.[27]

Disregarding evidence of widespread civilian participation, those supporting the ‘mutiny’ interpretation focused their attention upon the native Indian army: its composition, ethnic and religious divisions and the harmful effects of the ‘monopoly of caste’ on military discipline.[28] The privileges and potential grievances of the sepoys were discussed in detail, as were their failings as a fighting force. Some argued that the sepoys had been unnecessarily pampered,[29] being coaxed and cajoled to duty by unmerited rewards,[30] and had divided loyalties between native rule and British authority. Moreover, it was argued, respect for British authority had been damaged by the policies of Lord Cumbermere, commander-in-chief of India,[31] as well as by various other measures such as

Bentinck's abolition of corporeal punishment for native troops (it was retained for Europeans),[32] permitting appeals against the decisions of European officers,[33] commissioning sepoys to spy on their officers[34] and giving court-martial authority to native officers.[35] Others listed the sepoys' supposed grievances. The disproportionately low wages of native soldiers vis-^t-vis their European counterparts;[36] changed pension rules for disabled soldiers;[37] the erosion of the authority of native subahdars and jamadars by appointment of 'raw lads fresh from England' to fill military vacancies;[38] and the racist attitudes of these new recruits toward native soldiers, who they referred to as *soor* (pig), or 'nigger',[39] were all cited as potential causes for discontent, as were recent reforms such as the suspension of free mailing privileges[40] and the General Service Enlistment Act, which mandated foreign service for new recruits/1 For those prepared to delve a little deeper, structural problems in the army included a visible imbalance between the strength of Europeans soldiers stationed in India and the size of the native army, exacerbated by the withdrawal of European troops for service in the Crimea, Persia and China;[42] the transfer of experienced army officers to meet acute shortages in the civil service;[43] and the 1854 Charter Act's centralising of power in the hands of the governor-general.[44] Moreover, growing sepoy fears for the integrity of caste and religion were exacerbated, it was argued, by the evangelical zeal of 'missionary Colonels and Padre Lieutenants'.[45] The greased cartridge issue was just the spark that set the whole ablaze. Blaming an army whose loyalty and superior service had received multiple plaudits from the British and which was the backbone of British rule in India was problematic, however, and this argument soon began to break down under the weight of its own internal inconsistencies and contradictions. Moreover, as the full scale of the uprising became apparent, it became harder to maintain that it was confined to the military and a few civilian malcontents.

A Civil Uprising

The 'civil uprising' interpretation of the revolt was accepted by a much wider segment of British society, including the Tories, led by Disraeli. Also supporting this interpretation was the party press; British military servants such as General Sir Robert William Gardiner; many missionaries, including Alexander Duff; journalists 'on the ground', most notably William Howard Russell of *The Times;* the Irish nationalists and their publication *The Nation*; the Chartists, led by Ernest Charles Jones; the Positivists, led by Richard Congreve; and various poets, philosophers and intellectuals, including Lord Byron. Most of those ascribing to this theory were critical of the government and EIC, although the nature of their critique of colonial rule varied. Some demonstrated considerable sympathy with the cause of the rebels. Having

visited Delhi and Bareilly in the 1830s, one George Canning, nephew of the former prime minister, observed:

> There needs but some surpassing act of wrong
> To break the patience that has bent so long;
> There needs but some short sudden burst of ire ^
> May chance to get the general thought on fire;
> There needs but some fair prospect of relief
> Enough to seize the general belief,
> Some holy juggle, some absurd caprice
> To raise ONE COMMON STRUGGLE for release
>
> Think not that prodigies must rule a state,
> That great revulsions spring from something great;
> Outbreaks at once the far resounding cry,
> The standard of revolt is raised on high;
> The murky cloud has glided from the sun
> The tale of English tyranny is done,
> And torturing vengeance grinds as she destroys,
> Till Sicil's vespers seem the game of boys.[46]

More radical still was the poem *The Revolt of Hindostan* by Chartist leader Ernest Jones, which was published in 1857 to garner popular support for the Indian cause. This seemingly prophetic poem, originally titled *The New World*, was written while Jones was in prison in 1848-1850 and sympathised with the suffering of Indians under the barbarous rule of the British and forecasted a bloody revolt.[47]

If the socialist Chartists felt solidarity with the oppressed masses of Hindustan and supported the uprising, others turned the revolt to party political ends, criticising Whig policies and EIC rule without challenging the fundamental legitimacy of British imperialism. The Tory leader Benjamin Disraeli epitomised this position. The Tory Party had long been concerned about India, attempting, when in government, to control the long-arm policies of the EIC and opposing territorial expansion. Their wars were usually followed by partial or full restoration of territories to the vanquished Indian rulers, a policy which both safeguarded a semblance of Indian authority and kept the princes interested in the continuance of British rule. The Tories believed that Whig encouragement of progressive, liberal reforms and unbridled territorial expansion was the root cause of Indian unrest. As if by premonition, more than five weeks before the news from India arrived, former governor general, Lord Ellenborough had warned the government about the deteriorating military situation there.[48] Three days later, on 21 May 1857, he wrote to the secretary of the war department, inquiring again about the Indian situation and the steps taken by the government.[49] Despite this, however, the Tories did not jump to conclusions, adopting instead a

'wait and see" attitude until, on 27 July 1857, exactly one month after news of the revolt arrived, Disraeli made his famous speech to the House of Commons, observing, 'The decline and fall of empires are not the affairs of greased cartridges. Such results are occasioned by adequate causes and the accumulation of adequate causes.'[50] Citing the street riots in Boston and Paris that had ushered in the two greatest revolutions of modern times, he remarked that significant events always started in an insignificant manner and that this might well be the case in India.[51] It was essential, therefore, that they make realistic assessment of full scale of the revolt and face the challenge effectively.[52]

Disraeli's speech quickened the pace of public debate. While many criticised it as unpatriotic, many more found in it food for thought, and it initiated a searching public exploration of what Disraeli called 'adequate causes'. All those reports, books, pamphlets, memoirs, observations and warnings that had earlier gone unnoticed were now carefully analysed and appraised. People like John Malcolm,[53] Sir Henry Russell,[54] Sir Charles Metcalfe,[55] Lord Ellenborough,[56] Sir Thomas Monroe,[57] Charles Napier,[58] Mountstuart Elphinstone,[59] Bishop Reginald Heber,[60] Sir Henry Lawrence,[61] the Duke of Wellington[62] and many other British Indian celebrities became frequently cited figures. The diagnosis reached was that it was more than an army mutiny, with the cartridge affair as its immediate cause. Various national, social, political, religious and territorial grievances were discussed and the sepoys even portrayed as pawns of the civilian rebels. Dr Edward Henry Nolan asserted that to call the outbreak a 'disturbance created by a pampered sepoy and some of the vagabond population of the cities' would be deliberate denial of evident realities.[63] Likewise, *Eclectic Review* called the greased cartridge a 'diagnosis of the disease and not the disease itself'.[64] Disraeli himself carried his convictions into office in February 1858, where, as chancellor of the exchequer and leader of the Commons in Lord Derby's administration, he passed the India Act transferring control of the subcontinent from the EIC to the Crown.

Proponents of the 'civil rebellion' interpretation had to explain Indian discontent without undermining Britain's supposed right to rule. Some, like the Chartists, did challenge the ultimate legitimacy of British imperialism in India, but most sidestepped this problem by criticising the specific failings of the EIC's administration. The EIC's rule in India has been called an anomaly of history; as rulers they were bad traders, and as traders they were bad sovereigns. It was hard for Indians to accept a small band of traders as rulers of India. Referring to the imperative necessity of the transfer of power to the Crown, the author of the 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion' argued:

> Fancy the efforts of a native to get an idea what the Company is! 'Is it a King?' 'No.* 'An army?' 'No.* 'A Religion?' 'No.' 'It is a sabe [sic]/ 'Ah a society?* 'Yes/ 'Of Padrees (i.e., parsons)?' 'No/ 'Of Kings?' 'No.' 'Of officers?' 'No/ 'Of Pundits (i.e., learned Doctors)?' 'No/ 'Of merchants!* 'Of merchants! Ah a society of Merchants! And does the society of merchants do the sirkar business

> (the government) of England?' 'No, the Queen does that!' 'And Does the Queen do the sirkar business of Ceylon?' 'Yes.' 'Not the Company! And who is the highest, Queen or Company?'[65]

This kind of confusion, it was argued, lowered British prestige in the eyes of the Indian princes,[66] while profits and dividends rather than the welfare of India motivated its merchant rulers.[67] Tory M.P. Henry Drummond, addressing the Committee on the Government of India on 7 June 1858, forcefully observed: 'If we are going to look upon India as we had looked upon it hitherto, as a mere place of plunder for English officials, we should surely lose it, and we deserve to lose it.'[68] The outbreak was ascribed to various economic, social, political, religious and administrative grievances. The 'de-Indianisation* of the services excluded educated Indians from many jobs and positions of authority and consequently, it was contended, widened the distance between rulers and ruled.[69] *Westminster Review* angrily observed that this exclusion of Indians never happened 'in the Mussulman kingdom of India. Under Mogul kings, Hindoos have frequently been prime ministers, and from every rank persons have risen into high office/[70] Even Sir Benjamin Colin Brodie, a strong adherent of the 'mutiny* theory, agreed that this policy galled the feelings of both Hindus and Muslims.[71] The liberalisation effected by the 1833 Charter Act was negated by the introduction of English as necessary for government employment, while the inclusion of exam questions in Greek and Latin, or on Christian theology, further damaged the job prospects of Indians. On this issue, Malcolm Lewin, Second Judge of the Sadar Court of Madras, angrily observed: 'Our rule has been that of the robber and the bandit and we are suffering from the natural result—insurrection.*[72] The land revenue system of the EIC was also found to be oppressive and extortionist, including the use of torture and the forced sale of zamindars* property to collect assessments.[73] Henry Mead, an experienced British-Indian journalist, stressed that rebellion alone could wake the British people to the Indians' plight,[74] while Charles Napier, British 'hero* of Sind, called all aspects of British-Indian administration oppressive beyond belief.[75] The administration of justice was also criticised—'a little better than lottery* and a 'system of justice falsely so-called*.[76] Examples of fabricated cases,[77] the sacrifice of female honour for a favourable judgement and the abduction and seduction of women for the pleasure of British officers[78] were all reported. Rev. James Bradbury, an LMS missionary in Lower Bengal, dubbed the courts 'sinks of inequity*, where justice was 'bought and sold like any marketable commodity*.[79] The system of taxation was equally unbearable—L.E. Ruutz Rees lamented: 'There was a duty on stamps, on petitions, on food, on houses, on eatables, on ferries. There was an opium contractor, a contractor for the supply of corn and provisions, a salt and spirit contractor....'[80]—as was the new policy of 'land grab* by the British under various pretexts. Inquiries instituted into the titles of rent-free tenures end^d in the confiscation of 'thousands of estates'.[81] A writer in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* bemoaned: 'At last

resumption became a passion; hundreds of decisions in favor of government were passed in a single day; and the principle was broadly proclaimed, that the very existence of a rent-free tenure was a nuisance and ought to be abated.[82] William Edwards, the Collector of Budaun, publicly warned the government on this issue but was considered an alarmist.[83] Asserting that Vengeance sleeps long but never dies, Henry Drummond told the Commons that there were grounds for Indians to hate the British and enough causes for half a dozen rebellions.[84]

In addition to economic and political grievances, the EIC was also criticised for its imposition of Anglicist reforms and its interference with social and religious practices. The abolition of female infanticide, prohibition of Sati, legalisation of widow remarriage, undermining of Hindu adoption, Religious Disabilities Act and ending of the Kali, Durga and Charkh Pujas were all represented as attacks on Hindu sentiment that created a sense of religious unease and quickened the pace of anti-British feeling. The Religious Disabilities Act, for example, led to separate memorials by the people of Madras and those of Bengal. Calling it an 'act of tyranny', the Madras memorial virulently attacked the government:

> On their first arrival the British behaved kindly, securing to the natives of the Carnatic, by Proclamation under date of 31 July 1801, the immunity of their religion, laws and privileges: for this the Hindoos willingly engaged in the Military Service of the Honourable Company; and wherever the British Standard has been victorious in India, down to the last perilous engagement, on the banks of Sutlej, their Hindoo blood has freely flowed to secure the East India Company's dominion over their native land; because they have preferred it to Mohammedan; and now that the British government has become consolidated by the assistance of the Hindoos, the country is inundated with missionaries, who bring their creed in the one hand and the sword of persecution in the other—bidding the Hindoo to take their choice between conversion and extermination. British and Christian policy thus delineated, is far more oppressive and unjustifiable than that of the Mohammedans, for it adds ingratitude to partiality and injustice, and creates a belief that in weakness they are friends to the oppressed, and in power the perpetrators of oppression and wrong.[85]

Concurrent with these 'liberal' reforms had developed what a Madras judge Malcolm Lewin called 'missionary mania' in the chief departments of the government.[86] Many high-ranking civil and military officers took an interest in missionary activity in India,[87] and even the courts of justice were reported to have shown partiality to Christian converts.[88] This supposed zeal to convert Indians became so worrying to the EIC, which had always had an ambivalent relationship with missionary activity,[89] that the Court of Directors issued a dispatch to Government of India forbidding such activities for government employees, an order that, V.A. Smith complained, failed to take hold.[90] Likewise, the Anglicisation of education, including missionary involvement in public schools and the withdrawal of government support from Hindu and Muslim

institutions, were viewed as a threat to Indian culture and Indian pride.[91] *Fraser's Magazine* termed these policies, which were strongly resented by the people of India, a triple-edged sword against the British.[92]

A further cause of unrest pinpointed by those who blamed EIC mismanagement was the controversial policy of Annexation and Lapse. The British annexation of various Hindu states, including Jhansi, and abolition of Nana Sahib's pension were thought to have alarmed the Hindus, while their occupation of Awadh struck at the Muslims. Such policies, it was argued, brought Hindus and Muslims together, giving them shared grievances, to the extent that their disaffection was said to have a national character.[93] Norton cited the angry harangue of a Satara conspirator from the gallows on 19 June 1857:

> Listen all! As the English people hurled the Raja [of Satara] from his throne, in the like manner do you drive them out of the country. This is murder. I am illegally condemned__ This example is made to frighten you, but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmins, Mahrattas and Mussulmen revolt. Sons of Christians look to yourself.[94]

From the perspective of the 'civil uprising' theorists, there were sufficient problems in the British administration of India to account for discontent among all sections of the Indian population. These were, however, largely seen as the failings of the EIC and Whig governments and their policies, rather than intrinsic flaws in the whole system of British rule and must be understood in the context of a British discourse that sought to challenge the existing structure of British rule in India for party political reasons, rather than undermine the overall legitimacy of British imperialism.

A Muslim Conspiracy/Rebellion

As the revolt progressed, it engulfed large sections of the subcontinent. Parts of Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Awadh, Rohilkhand, North-western Provinces and Punjab[95] were all reported to be up in arms. Parts of the Bombay and Madras presidencies were also affected; Sawunt rebels along the Goa frontier remained in the field until November 1858 and were only suppressed with the active cooperation of Portuguese government in Goa.[96] In Hyderabad the situation was only saved by the individual loyalty of the prime minister, Salar Jang.[97] In short, although this was actually far from the case, the British increasingly thought of all India as in revolt against them. Many native officials, contractors and domestic servants of longstanding fled from their posts or joined the rebels,[98] and the fealty even of loyal princes was considered suspect, as many were accused of trying to keep all sides happy.[99] Men like Havelock and Hudson, among

others, often referred to India as 'a nation in arms',[100] 'a continent in arms'[101] or complained that 'all India is up in arms against us'[102] and 'ever/ cottage has turned into a place of arms and defended by villagers with resolution'.[103] Scottish missionary Alexander Duff ruefully observed:

> No sooner is one city taken or another relieved, then some other one is threatened. No sooner is one district pronounced safe through influx of British troops, than another is disturbed and convulsed. No sooner is a highway re-opened between places of importance, then it is closed again, and all communication for a season cut off.[104]

If *The Press* complained of the inexhaustible number of rebels,[105] *Quarterly Review* lamented that 'like a field of corn stricken by the wind, the population bends as we pass but to rise again'.[106]

The undeniable extent of the revolt bolstered the 'civil rebellion' argument, and many who had originally written it off as a military mutiny began to make exceptions to their case, undermining their overall position. The scale of events and apparent organisation of the mutineers seemed to go beyond a spontaneous outpouring of discontent and required a more structured explanation. As a result, arguments of civil unrest and military mutiny were increasingly coupled with discussions of pre-existing plans and conspiracies. Rumours of the impending revolt, it was now argued, had been afoot for some time. It was reported, for example, that in January-February 1857 General Hearsey had repeatedly written to the government that emissaries of Delhi and Awadh were corrupting the 19th Regiment.[107] 'We have at Barrackpore', he declared, 'been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion'.[108] Concomitant with this, all kinds of devices had supposedly been employed to corrupt the civil and military populations. Chapattis had travelled from village to village, far and wide, for a whole year,[109] while several prophecies proclaiming the imminent end of the British rule were also abroad.[110] All these portents were presented as indicating a premeditated plot for the overthrow of the British. The speed with which power was transferred to Bahadur Shah on 11 May 1857 was considered by some to be proof that he and King of Awadh, Wajid Ali Shah, had conspired to cause the rebellion.[111] Bahadur Shah issued coins, sent proclamations, wrote letters to various rulers requiring submission, attempted to bring Hindus and Muslims together, dated decrees in the Hindu calendar and forbade slaughter of cows on the Muslim festival of sacrifice, all of which were considered signs that he had embraced his renewed authority.[112] *The Times* Ambala correspondent was surprised at sepoy unity, organisation and loyalty to Bahadur Shah. He observed:

> It is to be remarked throughout the rebellion that all mutinous troops within several hundred miles of Delhi seem to have made for that place as the center

> and nucleus of the rebellion* They have established no local posts, indulged in none of the cares of districts on their own, but have marched to the point where a common stand was to be made against the common enemy— the Feringhee. Still more strange, they have generally not divided the plundered treasure, no man has been permitted to act for himself.... They have, almost all in the regular order, marched to Delhi with the treasure, as public treasure. Indeed, the quiet, orderly and peculiar character of the sepoy has been throughout the rebellion our greatest difficulty.[113]

Such organisation could only be the result of a calculated plot. Similarly, Nana Sahib's actions in quietly withdrawing from his government securities, until the amount dwindled from 500,000 pounds to just 30,000 pounds,[114] were considered a sign of premeditation. All these leaders, it was believed, had tampered with the native regiments at different stations and Hindu–Muslim unity was quite noticeable. Nana Sahib was said to have declared for the King of Delhi, flew his flag, and issued his proclamation in the Muslim calendar. The *Morning Herald* ruefully observed: 'The Hindoos and Mohammedans have at last coalesced. The priests acted upon the minds both of soldiery and civilians, and the three classes animated by the fiercest hatred and foulest passions are leagued in opposition to our rule.'[115] Hence, the *People's Paper* editorially described the revolt to be a 'national rebellion' with Delhi 'as capital of the patriotic power'.[116]

Although in the wake of Cawnpore, the British clearly recognised a Hindu dimension to the uprising,[117] most assumed that it was primarily a Muslim rebellion intended to overthrow the British and restore Mughal authority. The Muslims of India, it was argued, had never accepted the British as their rulers. From Tipu Sultan onwards, British Indian history was marked by Muslim conspiracies and rebellions aimed at the eventual restoration of Mughal authority in India. Muslim involvement, it was argued, was apparent in the Vellore Mutiny of 1806.[118] William Taylor, the chief commissioner of the Patna Division, stressed that the Patna conspiracy of 1846 was aimed at the restoration of the Muslim rule.[119] A writer in *Westminster Review* referred to a plot to murder all Europeans in January 1857 and maintained that the royal houses of Awadh and Delhi were involved in it,[120] while *Dublin University Magazine* discussed Mawlawi Skandar Shah, who, with his followers, publicly preached a holy war against the British in Awadh on 17 February 1857.[121] Similarly, Capt. G. Hutchinson pointed to the revolt of Mawlawi Ahmad 'Ullah Shah at Faizabad in January 1857. The Shah, of Arcot in the Madras Presidency, was said to have visited a 'vast number of cities and stations' under the British, established his disciples everywhere and preached jihad against the Europeans.[122] Having already travelled to England to assess British power and plan his strategy, he led an 18-month campaign against the British, January 1857-June 1858, which included some notable successes and only

ended when he was betrayed by Raja Jagan Nath Singh of Powain, for a British prize of?50,000. Col. George Bruce Malleson paid him the following tribute:

> If a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country, then certainly the Maulvi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination, he had connived at no murders; he had fought manfully, honourably, and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had seized his country and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and true hearted of all nations.[123]

In addition to active Muslim resistance, it was argued that from the dawn of the British rule, prayers had been going up in mosques all over India invoking Allah's mercies and help 'for the restoration of ancient Mahomettan princes ... and for the final expulsion of the stranger from the land'.[124] If this was so of public prayers, it was no less true of private ones and was said to have become the beat of the Muslim pulse, their hourly wish and permanent longing. *Missionary Magazine* thus reported the conclusions of Maj. Gen. W.H. Sleeman, late British Resident at Lucknow:

> The Muslims in India sigh for the restoration of the old Mohamedan regime. 'We pray\ said they, 'every night for the emperor and his family, because our forefathers ate the salt of their forefathers.' As a result of personal inquiry, I am enabled to state positively that for nearly the last hundred years daily prayers have been offered in the mosques throughout India for the House of Timur and the re-establishment of the King of Delhi on the throne of his ancestors— a fact probably, which at this moment is wholly unknown to the British rulers of this land.[125]

Prophecies promising the end of the British rule and the restoration of Muslim ascendancy around the centenary of Plassey were said to have supplemented Muslim prayers and kept their minds in a state of excitement and expectation.

Unlike the Hindus, whose discontent was ascribed to immediate social and religious grievances, for Muslims the rebellion was deemed a national struggle, based on a consciousness of their history, faith and culture. Islam was considered an 'ambitious' and 'bloodthirsty' religion that bore an active religio-political hostility to Christianity.[126] Every Muslim, however much he might pretend otherwise, it was boldly asserted, was an enemy of Christianity whose antagonism was so ingrained that no amount of affection, kindness or benefit could change it. Even British/European converts to Islam, and Muslim women, demonstrated this 'nationalist' zeal. A number of converts fought against the British at Lucknow,[127] while H.H. Greathed, commissioner at Delhi, discussed an Indian 'loan of Arc'; a Muslim lady who, dressed in male attire, led a sortie out of Delhi and fought like 'satan' until she was captured.[128] This widespread

hostility to British rule, combined with Muslim history in India, produced a combustible mixture. One year before the outbreak at Meerut, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* quoted from the First Punjab Report: 'They [Muslims] look upon the empire as their heritage and consider themselves as foreigners settled in the land for the purpose of ruling it. They hate every dynasty except their own and regard the British as the worst because'the most powerful of usurpers.'[129] At heart, the Muslims of India had always looked to the king of Delhi as their real sovereign.[130] Moreover, political hostility was bolstered by the longstanding religious antagonism between the 'crescent and the cross'. The Church Missionary Society argued that Muslims had chafed 'under the British dynasty, not merely on religious grounds, but also as conquered conquerors, whose rule has been immediately suppressed by Nazarenes from the west'.[131] A writer in *Quarterly Review* pointed out that no 'Moslem people, before our conquest of India, were ever long subject to the Christian yoke, while their whole history is full of their triumphs over the sons of Nazareth'.[132] This, it was argued, gave the Muslims a feeling of pride and the Muslims of India, who had long ruled over the subcontinent, could not be expected to willingly accept the yoke of an alien people. Their Indian past and its glories were too recent, and the glimmers of it were still alive.[133] This was viewed to be a dangerous phenomenon because it combined religious hatred and political pride[134] and resulted in either fanatical hatred of, or a sullen animosity towards, the British.[135] The Resident of North-western Provinces of India held that 'Muslim hostility to the conquerors of India is deadly. It is a fire always burning. Proud, vengeful, and fanatical, they look upon the British as a lawful prey, to be slaughtered and exterminated by every means that cunning and cruelty could devise,'[136] while the editor of the *Delhi Gazette* wrote in his 'Indian Mutiny to the Fall of Delhi':

> Instead of being the dominant race, the friends and kinsmen of the mighty emperors of Hindustan, they found themselves reduced to the miserable alternative of engaging in trade and agriculture, or accepting subordinate situations in our law courts.... The unwonted humiliation rankled sorely in their hearts, but they felt their impotence and were constrained to abide their time.[137]

Even the *Manchester Guardian*, a newspaper wedded to the 'mutiny' theory, editorially remarked: '[That] the Mohammedans should be ill disposed is natural enough. When the English first landed in India, they were the rulers ofthe country; they have been dispossessed, and they have not yet forgotten or forgiven.'[138] Ever brooding upon their political, social and economic losses, *Edinburgh Review* contended, it 'was a necessity that the descendants of Mahomedan conquerors of India should hate us, and that mingled with this hatred there should be an undying hope of recovering the supremacy they had lost'.[139]

Muslim antipathy towards British rule was bolstered by their failure to 'make good' under the British colonial system. Their hostility to Christianity led them to boycott western education,[140] and the number of Muslim children attending British schools—public and missionary—was .very small. Even native initiatives or the presence of a Muslim teacher associated with the British failed to achieve results.[141] Referring to the new generation of Indian teachers and students educated in the western tradition, *Chambers1Journal* bitterly commented:

> Not one Mussulman, not a single follower of the Prophet of Mecca is to be found in their ranks. Those stiff-necked, stubborn disciples of the Koran remain as they were a thousand years ago, and they will be found a thousand years hence. They never change or progress; they are neither softened or civilized; they have still the same undying hate for every 'dog of a Christian', for every 'unbelieving' Feringhee, as of old..,.[142]

The lack of Western education among Muslims meant that Hindus supplanted them in most fields of employment, meaning they were unable to turn the colonial system to their advantage.[143] Muslim antipathy to Christian missionary activity was equally strong and missionaries seldom made any headway in Muslim districts.[144] Rev. John Mackay frankly admitted the difficulty 'of converting Muslims to Christianity'. Admitting the 'superiority' of their race, intelligence, valour, civilisation and knowledge of Christianity, but blaming them for their bigotry, this Baptist missionary complained of the challenges posed by Muslims to Christian evangelism.[145] *The London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Arts* called it fruitless even to think of Christianisation of the subcontinent, unless 'Mohamedan passion for rule in India was tamed and broken'.[146] R.H.W. Dunlop, the deputy commissioner of Meerut, added that like a conquered nation, Muslims discussed the ways to achieve their independence; naturally, they were always 'engaged in plotting our destruction'.[147]

As a result of the above-mentioned assumptions, Muslim submission to the British was viewed as perfunctory, whereas that of the Hindus was considered sincere. While Hindus had collaborated in the British rise to power, Muslims tendered their fealty because there was no other alternative and did so 'with a painful recollection of their fallen greatness and with the hope of restoration of their power'.[148] Such assumptions predated the uprising and, as E.I. Brodkin points out, informed the tactics of British forces when dealing with 'loyal' Hindus and 'rebel' Muslims. While Alexander Padamsee has questioned the existence of a general Muslim conspiracy to overthrow the British,[149] field reports from all over India suggest that the rebellion was led by Muslims to a significant extent, whilst there is ample evidence that Muslims across India shared a common dislike of British rule. Thus, although it would be far-fetched to call 1857 a clash of civilisations, or part of a worldwide jihad (an idea discussed in some circles in 1857-1858, and which has been resurrected by some modern day writers[150]),

British interpretations of the Muslim dimension of the revolt, together with their assessment of it as a civil as well as military uprising, reflected both political expediencies of the colonial state and the realities of the conflict as it unfolded in India.[51]

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24. *Saturday Review* [SR], 3 October 1857; See also, 'The Government of India and the Mutinies', *British Quarterly Review* [BQR], XXVI (1857), pp. 499-500; 'Hindooism and Mohammedanism in India', *Church of England Magazine* [CEM], XLIII (1857), p. 191; MG, 17 August 1857.
25. 'The Bengal Mutiny', BEM, LXXXII, 1857, p. 374.
26. 'The Bengal Mutiny', BEM, LXXXII, 1857, p. 374; 'The Indian Mutinies: The Mutiny in Bombay*, MG, 25 September, 1857; 'The English in India', WR, New Series, XIII (1858), p. 199; *Times*, 1 July 1857.
27. Rev. H.S. Polehampton, *A Memoir* (London: Richard Bentley, 1858), pp. 235-236; Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, vol. Ill (London: Black and Son, 1861), p. 556.
28. 'Editorial Article 1\ 'The Indian Mutinies: Historical Review of Events in India*, MG, 14 October 1857; also MG 31 October 1857; Kenneth Macqueen, *Who is to Blame for the Indian Mutinies?* (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1857), p. 25; Rev. J. Wallace, *The Revolt in India: Its Causes and its Lessons* (Belfast: C. Aitchison, 1859), p.21; Brig. Gen. John Jacobs, *Tracts on the Native Army of India* (London: Smith Elder, 1858), p. 34; 'The Indian Mutiny', *Eclectic Review*, II (1857), p. 538; 'Has the Preservation of Caste Conduced to the Present Revolt in India. Affirmative Article II', *British Controversialist* (BC), vol. 5 (1858), pp. 32-34; 'The Outbreak in India', CEM, XLIII, 1857, p. 266; Richard Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh and of the Siege of Lucknow Residency* (London: Richard Bentley, 1858), pp. 88-90; Henry Mead, *The Sepoy Revolt: Its Causes and Its Consequences* (London: John Murray, 1857), p. 22.
29. 'Editorial Article 1*, MG 14 October and 'The Earl of Shaftesbury on the Mutiny in India', 3 November 1857; 'Indian Military Mistakes', SR, 25 July 1857; R. Campbell, *The Indian Mutiny, its Causes and its Remedies. A Letter to Rt. Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston* (London: Charles Evans, 1858), p. 5; *India, the Revolt and the Home Government* (London: Robert Hardwicke, 1857), p. 23; O. Jones, *Recollections of a Winter Campaign in Indi in 1857-58* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1859), pp. X-XI.
30. Jones, *Recollections*, pp. X-XI.
31. 'Article 1', MG, 26 August 1857; J.H. Stocqueler, *India* (London: George Routledge, 1857), pp. 17-18; Jones, *Recollections*, pp. X-XI; 'Past Errors of Military Management in India, to

be avoided in the Future', *The Spectator*>22 August 1857; Campbell, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 5; 'The English in India', WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, p. 196; Sydney Cotton, *Nine Years on the North-West Frontier of India* (London: Richard Bentley, 1868), p. 154.
32. MG, 26 and 28 August 1858; Stocqueler, *India*ypp. 17-18.
33. 'Past Errors', *Spectator*, 22 August 1857.
34. Caubulee, *Crisis in India* (London: Richard Bentley, 1857), p. 15.
35. *Crisis in India*, pp. 15-16.
36. *Investigation*, p. 15; 'Indian Heroes', WR, New Series, XIV, 1858,^p- 353; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 495.
37. *Crisis in India*, pp. 13-14; Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*, pp. 94-95.
38. 'Article 4*, MG, 29 September 1857.
39. *Investigation*, pp. 46-47; MG, 1 August; 7,10 and 29, September, 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 496-497; Edward Smith Mercer, *A Letter to the Rt Hon. the Earl of EUenborough* (London: Edward T. Whitehead, 1861), p. 6.
40. Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*.
41. Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 21-22; 'An Anglo-Indian's View of the Indian Crisis', part I, *Fraser's Magazine* [FM], LVII (1858), p. 271; William Wootherspoon Ireland, *History of the Siege of Delhi* (Edinburgh: Adams and Charles Black, 1861), p. 11.
42. *Investigation*; Brodie, *English Tenure of India*, pp. 4-5; Wallace, *The Revolt in India*, pp. 17-18; Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*, p. 99. Advocates of the mutiny theory and others almost universally held this view, but Disraeli and his followers refused to admit this as a cause of the outbreak, pointing to Meerut where there was no deficiency of European troops. Hansard 3, CXLVII, p. 495.
43. *Examiner*, 3 October 1857. 1,215 officers were absent from their regiments. Of these, 416 were either on sick or private leave. For other similar views, also read: 'India, the Revolt and the Native Troops', *Missionary Magazine and Chronicle* [MMC] XXI (1857), p. 182; 'Article 4', MG, 29 September 1857; 'The English in India*, WR, New Series, XIII (1858), p. 199; Maj. Tucker, 'The Indian Army*, *Times*, 24 June 1857; *Spectator*, 25 July 1857; 'The Indian Mutiny', *Eclectic Review*, II, 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVI, 1591 and CXLVIII, 426; Leopold Von Olrich, *Military Mutiny in India; Its Origin and Its Results* (London: T and W. Boone, 1859), p. 8; Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies*, p. 97; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 24; *The Mutiny in the Bengal Army* (London: John Chapman, 1857), p. 18; 'The Sepoy Rebellion', *London Quarterly Review* [LQR] IX, (1857-1858), p. 233; Scrutator [Sir Benjamin C. Brodie], *The Indian Mutiny* (London: W. Kent and Co., 1857), pp. 25-26; Henry Mead, *The Sepoy Revolt* (London: John Murray, 1857), p. 29; J.L. Archer, *Indian Mutinies Accounted For* (London: Ward & Co., 1857), pp. 4-6.
44. Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 39-40; 'The English in India', WR, New Series, XIII, p. 196; 'Our Indian Empire', QR, CIII, 1858, p. 262; Julius George Medley, A *Years Campaigning in India, March 1857 to March 1858* (London: W. Thacker, 1858), pp. 200-201; Campbell, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 5.
45. Jennings, *The Indian Religions*, p. 144; 'A Missionary Colonel—A Strong Light on the Indian Mutinies', *The Tablet*, 22 August 1857; 'India and China: The Mutinies in Bengal', MG, 30 June and 14 August 1857; Sir George Trevelyan, *Cawnpore* (London: Macmillan, 1866), p. 29; 'The Camp and the Mission* and 'Indian Military Mistakes', *Saturday Review*, vol. 4, nos 95 and 91, respectively (25 July and 22 August 1857), pp. 169-170 and 73-74; 'The Bengal Mutiny', BEM LXXXU (1857), p. 380; 'The Mutiny in India' and 'Errors of Indian Policy*, ILN, 4 July and 22 August 1857; Brodie, *The Indian Mutiny*, pp. 15-16; *The Scotsman*, 15 August 1857.

AE.*Atheneaum* 29 August 1857. Likewise, CEM XLIV, 1858, p. 232 quoted Byron's 'Curse of Minerva*, in which he predicted approaching revolt in India. See also 'The Indian Nemesis', *The Nation*, 19 September 1857.

47. Ernest Jones, *The Revolt of Hindustan or the New World* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1857). Jones was so passionate about the plight of the Indians that he penned this poem in his blood, the facility of pen and ink being denied to him.
48. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 66.
49. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 67. Later on the Tories criticised the government for not heeding Ellenborough's warnings, 42-43 and 570.
50. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 475.
51. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 440.
52. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 475-79 and CXLVIII, 42-43.
53. Rev. Alexander Duff, *The Indian Rebellion: Its Causes and Results* (London: James Nisbet, 1858), p. 268; Hansard 3, CXLVI, 525; FP, 11 November 1857; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 85-86.
54. Hansard 3, CXLVI, 525; 'Prospects of the Indian Empire', ER, CVII, 1858, p. 3; Gen. Sir Robert William Gardiner, *Military Analysis, of the Remote and Proximate Causes of the Indian Rebellion* (London: Byfield, Hansworth and Co., 1858), pp. 24-25.
55. *The Press*, 25 July 1857; Gardiner, *Military Analysis*, pp. 45-63,66-72,74-75 and 82-83; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 29-35 and 60; The Rev. William Brock, *A Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock* (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1858), p. 129.
56. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 475-79 and CXLVIII, 42-43.
57. *Atheneaum*, 15 and 29 August and 10 October 1857; FP, 11 November 1857; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 7 and pp. 83-84.
58. *The Press*, 25 July 1857; Gardiner, *Military Analysis*, p. 19 and pp. 34-38.
59. John Malcolm Ludlow, *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* (London: James Ridgeway, 1859), pp. 16-17; Gardiner, *Military Analysis*, pp. 25-26; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 87.
60. *The Press*, 25 July 1857; 'Christianity in India*, BEM LXXXV, 1859, p. 477; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 7.
61. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 68. Sir Henry*s own essays, written and contributed to various periodicals and magazines long before the outbreak, were also republished by W. N. Allen of London in 1859, under the title: *Essays: Military and Political*
62. Hansard 3, CXLVI, 525.
63. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, II, pp. 712-713.
64. 'The Indian Mutiny*, *Eclectic Review*, New Series, IV, 1858, p. 338.
65. 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion*, LQR, IX, 1857-58, p. 567. For a similar view, see: George Dodd, *The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan, 1856-7-8* (London: W. and R. Chambers, 1859), p. 561. Cf.: Wilson Beekles, *The Ledger and the Sword or the Honourable Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies* (London: Longman's Green, 1903).
66. 'Crisis of the Sepoy Rebellion', LQR, IX, 1857-1858, p. 567.
67. Gardiner, *Military Analysis*, p. 65; *Investigation*, pp. 53-54; The Rev. Charles Stovel, *India: Its Crimes and Claims* (London: Jackson and Walford, 1857), p. 27; Hansard 3, CL, 1652; G.B. Malleson, *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army* (London: Bosworth and Harrison, 1858), pt. I, p. 29.
68. Hansard 3, CL, 1652.
69. 'British India*, QR, CIV, 1858, p. 232. The article pointed out that while the average salary of an Englishman was 1,750 pounds a year, only six Indians received between 840 and 960 pounds a year, 1,370 received between 120 and 240 pounds a year, and 850 received less than 120 pounds a year. It should be further added that the sepoy, the mainstay of British rule in India, received only fourteen shillings a month.
70. 'Our Relations to the Princes of India', WR, New Series, 1858, p. 456.
71. Brodie, *English Tenure*, pp. 7-8; 'Our Relations to the Princes of India*, WR, New Series, 1858, p. 456.

72. Malcolm Lewin in FP, 17 March 1858.
73. Hansard 3, CXLV, 714-17; *The Nation*, 19 September and 10 October 1857; Mead, *The Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 207-209; 'The Indian Monopoly*, *London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Arts* [LJWRLSA], XXVI, 1857, p. 53; 'Review of the Report of the Commissioners for the Investigation of Alleged cases of Torture, in the Madras Presidency', *Athenaeum*, 20 October 1855.
74. *The Press*, 22 August 1857. \
75. *The Press*, 22 August 1857.
76. 'Our Relations to the Princes of India', WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, 475n; *Investigation*, p. 32; Hansard 3, CL, 1652; Rev. lames Bradbury, 'Notes of Bradsbury's Tour through the Districts of Murshidabad and Rajshahi', MMC, XXII, 1858, pp. 263-264; Norton, 'Review of the Rebellion' *Athenaeum*, 10 October, 1857; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 119; 'Our Indian Empire', BEM, LXXXII, 1857, p. 658; 'The Indian Monopoly', LJWRLSA, p. 53; Eriskine Perry, 'Review of A Bird's Eye View of India', *Athenaeum*, 12 January 1856.
77. Hansard 3, CXLV, 250-57 and CL, 1971-1972.
78. *The Press*, 22 August 1857; *The Tablet*, 22 August 1857.
79. *Investigation*, p. 32; Hansard 3, CL, 1652.
80. L.E. Ruutz Rees, 'Review of a Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow*, *Athenaeum*, 6 March 1858.
81. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 458. See also FP, 3 March 1858; Thomas Frost, ed., *Complete Narrative of the Mutiny in India* (London: Read & Co., n.d.), p. 4. Disraeli regarded this 'disturbance of the settlement of property' as one among the three major causes of the outbreak, the other two being 'forcible destruction of native authority', and interference in the religion of the natives. Hansard 3, CXLVII, 448.
82. 'Indian Mutiny and the Land Settlement', BEM, LXXXIV, 1858, p. 704. See also William Edwards *Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rochilcund, Futtehghur, and Oude* (London: Smith, Elder, 1859).
83. Edwards, *Personal Adventures*, p. 14; 'Indian Mutiny and the Land Settlement*, BEM, LXXXIV, 1858, p. 707.
84. Hansard 3, CL, 1650-52. See also: Norton, *Rebellion in India*, pp. 6-7; 'Has the Preservation of Caste ...Negative Article III*, *British Controversialist*, 1858, p. 126.
85. FP, 2 September 1857.
86. FP, 2 September 1857.
87. Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 18; see also Brodie, *English Tenure*, p. 8; FP, 3 March 1858; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 487 and CXLVIII, 1155-1156; Kaye, *Christianity in India*. p. 448; Rev. Baptist Wriothesley Noel, *England and India* (London: James Nisbet, 1859), p. 16. Noel had no hesitation in recognising the 'earnest and constant* help given by the officers in facilitating the task of the missionaries. Polehampton, a missionary at Delhi, happily wrote to his mother in August 1856 and informed her about the successful efforts of Dr Nai Smith of the 17th Native Infantry to convert his servants. (Polehampton, *A Memoir*, pp. 118-119). *The Press*, 11 July 1857, also criticised the administration of India, complaining that the Cannings had made their missionary zeal quite conspicuous, the members of the Indian Legislative Council presided at missionary meetings, and their daughters preached in the Bazars lin defiance of oriental propriety*.
88. Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 16. See also: FP, 2 September 1857.
89. See Ian Copland, 'Christianity As An Arm Of Empire: The Ambiguous Case Of India Under The Company, c.-1813 -1858*, *The Historical Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2006), pp. 1025-1054.
90. Kaye, *Christianity in India*, p. 449n; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 487.
91. Tucker, *A Letter*, pp. 5-6; Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 199.
92. 'The Indian Army', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 166. See also, Hansard 3, CXLVII, 823; Lewin, *The Way to Lose India*, p. 16; 'The Proselytising Danger in India*, *The Scotsman*, 1 and 12 September 1857.

93. 'Has the Preservation of Caste.../ loc. cit.; FP, 5 August 1857; *Morning Herald* quoted by the *People's Papery* 26 September 1857; *Investigation* pp. 2-4. See also 'The Sepoy Rebellion*, LQR, IX, 1857-58, p. 255; Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History*, p. 256; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 444.
94. Norton, *Rebellion in India*, p. 97. Also see, Ludlow, *Thoughts*, pp. 28-29.
95. See Salahuddin Malik, 'The Punjab and the Indian Mutiny', *Journal of Indian History* (Silver Jublee Number) and *Islamic Studies* and '1857 Gogira Rebellion in Southeastern Panjab: A Forgotten Chapter of Muslim Response to British Rule in India*, *Islamic Studiesy* vol. XVI, no. 2,(1977), pp. 65-95.
96. Sir G. Le G. Jacob, *Western India before and during the Mutinies* (London: King and Co., 1871), pp. 232-236. Jacob himself was sent to the Portuguese Governor-General, the Visconde de Novas Torres, at Goa to invoke the help of his government.
97. MG, 9 September 1857; *The Press*, 8 August 1857; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion* p. 288; SR, 19 December 1857; Olrich, *Military Mutiny*, pp. 26-27.
98. Edwards, *Personal Adventures*, p. 142; Malcolm Lewin, *The Way to Regain India*, pp. 9-10; Maj. Gen. Sir James Outram, *Outram's Campaign in India, 1857-58* (London: Smith, Elder, 1860), pp. 40-41; K.H. Bartrum, A *Widow's Reminiscences of the Siege of Lucknow* (London: James Nisbet, 1858) p. 22; 'The Defence of Lucknow - Martial Incidents in Oude', *Dublin University Magazine*, LI, 1858, pp. 488-89; Rev. M.A. Sherring, *The Indian Church During the Great Rebellion* (London: James Nisbet, 1859), p. 80; Rev. W.H. Carey, ed., *The Mahomedan Rebellion* (Roorkee: Directory Press, 1857) pp. 130-131.
99. Plain Speaker [John Henry Temple] *Justice for India. A Letter to Lord Palmerston* (London: Robert Hardwick, 1858), pp. 19-20; Hansard 3, LI, 1858, 508; Volunteer [Maj. Gen. W.G. Swanston] *My. Journal; or What I Did and Saw between the 9th June and 25th November, 1857* (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1858), p. 12; Lieut.-Col. Sir Jas Travers, *The Evacuation of Indore in 1857* (London: Henry S. King, 1876), pp. 5-6; *Crisis in India*, pp. 24-27. The author of the *Crisis in India*, a military officer of thirty-two years* experience in India, reported how a Hindu Raja near Delhi played a three-fold game; he saved some European lives, kept some of them as hostages and 'secretly attended the installation of the Delhi usurper*.
100. Hodson, p. 181.
101. Hodson, p. 245.
102. Brocky*A Biographical Sketch*, pp. 190-191.
103. Plain Speaker [Temple], op. cit., p. 18.
104. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 223.
105. 5 September 1857.
106. 'The British India*, QR, CIV, 1858, p. 226. See also: *People's Paper*, *2* and 16 January, 10 April and 19 June 1858; Hansard 3, CLI, 2041.
107. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 39.
108. Hansard 3, CXLVIII, 39. See also *Spectator*, 8 August 1857; Beveridge, A *Comprehensive History*, p. 558; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 1417.
109. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 712; Rev. A.C. Ainslie, A *Few Words about India and the Indian Mutinies (3rd*. ed.; Tauton: Frederick May, 1857), pp. 12-13; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny', BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, p. 96; *Annual Register*, 1857, p. 245; ILN, 28 November 1857; Hansard 3, CXLVII, 467-71; 'Pancakes', *Notes and Querries*, Second Series, IV, 1857, p. 161; 'The Indian Mutinies', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 238; 'Lotus Leaves and Pancakes. The Indian Mystery*, *Leisure Hour*, 14 January 1858; 'Sepoy Symbols of Mutiny', *Household Words*, XVI, 1857, p. 231. Sir Colin Campbell called these signs 'the first appearance of the Mutiny', displaying them as a frontispiece in his book *Narrative of the Indian Revolt* (London: Geog. Vickers, 1858).
110. Brock, A *Biographical Sketch*, p. 130; Capt. Mowbray Thomson, *The Story of Cawnpore* (London: Richard Bentley, 1859), p. 124; The Rev. J.E.W. Rotton, *The Chaplain's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1858) The Rev. James Charles, *The Lord's*

Voice to Britain from the Far East (Edinburgh: Paton and Ritche, 1857), p. 8; Rev. J.C. Miller, 'The Fast-Day Sermons No. VF, *The Fast- Day Sermons. The Indian Mutiny Twelve Sermons*, p. 81; Rev. W.J. Newman, 'Our Mercies in the Past and Our Prospects for the Future*, *The Pulpit*, LXXV, 1859, p. 441; *The Indian Mutiny Thoughts and Facts* (London: Seeley, Jackson and Halliday, 1857), pp. 5-6; Col. George Bourchier, *Eight Months Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys during the Mutiny* (London: Smith, Elder, 1858), pp. 1-2.

111. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, II, p. 722. See also 'Our Relations to the Princes of India*, WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, pp. 468-469; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny*, BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, p. 94; 'The Indian Mutinies', FM, LVI, 1857, p. 628; Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, pp. 131-132.
112. *People's Paper*, 1 August 1857; *Annual Register*, 1857, p. 305n; 'The Poorbeah Mutiny, No. Ill*, BEM, LXXXIII, 1858, pp. 600-602; Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 740 and p. 757; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 47; SR, 7 November 1857; Rees, 'Review of a Personal Narrative* pp. 261-262; MG, 31 October 1857.
113. MG, 31 October 1857; 'Crisis in India: Its Causes and Proposed Remedies', *Athenaeum*, 29 August 1857; *Sixty-sixth Annual Report of the Baptist Missionary Society*, p. 43.
114. William Howard Russell, *My Diary in India* (London: Routledge, Warne and Co., 1860), p. 168; Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, p. 726; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 53.
115. *Morning Herald* quoted in the *People's Paper*, 26 September 1857; Rotton, *The Chaplain's Narrative*, pp. 100-102; Brock, *A Biographical Sketch*, p. 129; 'Glance at Public Occurrences*, *Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine*, Fifth Series, III, 1857, p. 929; *England's Troubles in India* (Tauton: T. Hiscock, 1857), p. 31.
116. 3 October, 1857.
117. See Randall, 'Autumn 1857*, p. 9.
118. Mackenzie, 'Review of Delhi, the City of the Great Mogul*, *Literary Gazette and Journal of Archeology, Science and Arts*, pp. 804-805; Indophilus [Trevelyan, Sir Charles Edward] *The Letters of Indophilus on the Mutiny of Vellore* (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones and Co. 1857), pp. 4-7.
119. William Taylor, *The Patna Crisis* (London: W.H. Allen, 1857), pp. 21-22.
120. 'The English in India*, WR, New Series, XIII, 1858, p. 196.
121. 'The Revolt of the Bengal Army', *Dublin University Magazine*, L, 1857, p. 392.
122. Capt. G. Hutchinson, *Narrative of the Mutinies in Oude* (London: Smith Elder, 1859), pp. 35-36. See also MG, 15 April 1857; M. Wylie, *The English Captives in Oudh* (London: W.H. Dalton, 1858), pp. 30-31.
123. G.B. Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859* (London: Longmans, Green, 1896) II, p. 541 and p. 544.
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124. MG, 23 July 1858 and 3 September 1857. See also 'State Intervention in the Religions of India', MMC, XXI, 1858, p. 226; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. 177.
125. 'State Intervention in the Religions of India*, MMC, XXI, 1858, p. 226.
126. 'India in 1807 and 1857*, CEM, XLIV, 1858, p. 151; *What Shall We do to the Mussulmans* (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones and Co., 1858), p. 3; Dr A. Christian, Letter to *The Scotsman*, 2 September, 1857; 'The Crisis in India*, *The Scotsman*, 9 September 1857; 'The Sane and the Insane*, Letter to the FP, 21 October 1857; *The Examiner*, 8 August 1857; 'The Revolt of the Bengal Army*, *Dublin University Magazine*, L, 1857, pp. 385-386.
127. L.E. Ruutz Rees, *A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow from its Commencement to its Relief* by Sir Eolin Campbell (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1858), pp. 116-117 and p. 144.

128. H.H. Greathed, *Letters Written during the Siege of Delhi*, ed. Mrs H.H. Greathed (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1858), p. 130. For similar information, also read: Maj. W.S.R. Hodson, *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, ed. by Rev. Geo. H. Hodson *(2nd* ed.' London: John W. Parker, 1859), p. 259.
129. 'India under Dalhousie*, BEM, LXXX, 1856, pp. 254-255. For similar opinions, also read: *Investigation*, p. 7; 'India in 1807 and 1857*, CEM, XLIV, 1858; Wallace, *The Revolt in Indi* p. 9.
130. Rev. William Beynon (letter from), MM, XXI, 1857, p. 245.
131. *Religious Neutrality in India—Delusive and Impracticable* (Church Missionary Society, 1858), p. 16. See also: 'India in 1807 and 1857*, CEM, XLIV, 1858.
132. 'Our Indian Empire*, QR, CIII, 1858, p. 257.
133. Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857, p. 245; Brodie, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 19; Russell, *My Diary in India* II, pp. 77-78; 'The Christianization of India*, LJWRLSA, XXVI, 1857, p. 109; 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858; *Walayat Ali of Delhi. A Martyr's Narrative of the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857* (London: T. Pewtress and Co., 1858), p. 8; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, pp. 176-177; R.C. Mather, *Christian Missions in India* (London: John Snow, 1858), p. 6.
134. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion.*
135. R.H.W. Dunlop, *Service and Adventure with the Khakee Ressaiah* (London: R. Bentley, 1858), pp. 152-153; Russell, *My Diary in India*; Brodie, *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 19; Wallace, *The Revolt in India*, pp. 8-9; 'India in 1807 and 1857', CEM, XLIV, 1858; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, *Investigation*, p. 14.
136. *Investigation*, p. 14; *Crisis in India*, p. 29; J.L. Archer, *Indian Mutinies Accounted For*, pp. 7-8; Russell, *My Diary in India*; 'India in 1807 and 1857*, CEM, XLIV, 1858.
137. *Indian Mutinies to the Fall of Delhi* (London: G. Routledge and Co., 1857), p. 7. See also Brodie *The Indian Mutiny*, p. 19; 'India in 1807 and 1857*, CEM, XLIV, 1858.
138. 7 August 1857.
139. 'India*, p. 568.
140. See *Investigation*, p. 7; Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857, p. 246; Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, pp. 39-40.
141. *Minutes of the Marquis of Tweedale* (London: Church Missionary House, 1859), p. 14; Sherring, *The Indian Church*, p. 175; Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857; Sale (letter from), *Missionary Herald* [MH], L, 1858, pp. 182-183; James Culross, *The Missionary Martyr of Delhi: A Memoir of the Reverend John MacKay* (London: J. Heaton, 1860), p. 121.
142. 'Young Bengal*, *Chambers's Journal of Popular Literature, Science and Arts*, XXIX, 1858, p. 199. See also Sherring, *The Indian Church*; Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857; Sale, MH, L, 1858; Culross, *The Missionary Martyr*.
143. *Investigation*, p. 7.
144. Russell, *My Diary in India*, II, p. 78; John Mackay (letter from), MH, XLIX, 1857, p. 583; Culross, *The Missionary Martyr*, p. 121; Sherring, *The Indian Church*, p. 266; Mather, *Christian Missions*, p. 6; Beynon, MM, XXI, 1857.
145. Culross, *The Missionary Martyr*, pp. 104-124. See also, Sherring, *The Indian Church*, p. 186; 'Foreign Intelligence - India', MH, XLIX, 1857, p. 717; Storrow, op. cit., p. 16; Russell, *My Diary in India*, II, p. 78; Mackay (letter from), op. cit.; [The Rev.] Anderson (extracts from his journal), MH, L, 1858, p. 255.
146. 'The Christianization of India*, XXVI, 1857, p. 109.
147. Dunlop, *Service and Adventure*, p. 152. See also, *India and its Future* (London: L. Booth, 1858), p. 47; *The Indian Mutiny - Thoughts and Facts* (London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday, 1857), p. 20; Mackenzie, 'Review of Delhi, the City of the Great Mogul*, *Literary Gazette and Journal of Archeology, Science and Arts*, 1857, pp. 804—805; Frederick H. Cooper, *The Crisis in the Punjab from 10th of May until the Fall of Delhi* (London: E. Wilson, 1858), pp. 133-134; Rev.J. Trafferd (letter from), MH, XLIX, 1857, p. 514 and also 'Foreign Intelligence - India', p. 649 and p. 717;

Rev. Dr Boaz (letter from), MMC XXI, 1857, p. 222; *Investigation*, pp. 7-8; *India. The Revolt and the Home Government*, pp. 80-81.

148. Wallace, *The Revolt in India*, p. 9.
149. Alex Padamsee, *Representations of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse* (Hampshire, 2005), p. 49.
150. See, for example, William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), and also recent documentary on fhe BBC entitled 'Clash of the Worlds' which propounded the same view.
151. See Salahuddin Malik, *1857. War of Independence or Clash of Civilizations?* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2008, Chapters 7,8 and 9).

3

'SPIRITUAL BATTLEFIELDS' Evangelical Discourse and Writings of the London Missionary Society

Andrea Major

WRITING to the London Missionary Society (LMS) in January 1858, Rev. J. Bradbury of the Berhampore mission, Orissa, commented that 1857 had been a year 'of great and startling events. Seldom if ever have such dire calamities happened as those which have befallen India during the past few months, and never in any country were they less apprehended.'1 The military and civil insurrection that swept north-west India in 1857 took Britain largely by surprise, shattering any sense of colonial complacency and forcing a renegotiation of the moral, ideological and practical basis of British imperialism. Despite retrospective impositions of cohesion and consensus,2 immediate reactions to the uprising were fractured: a cacophony of conflicting voices that exposed the fragility of colonial identities and the many 'fault lines'3 within the national imperial project. By tracing the shifting textual terrain of published and unpublished LMS missionary accounts of 1857-1858, this chapter will examine how immediate events, pre-existing agendas and embedded preconceptions were reconciled in a public evangelical discourse that intersected wider popular narratives of 1857. The evangelical response both diverged from and negotiated with other public discourses on the uprising, and tensions between missionary accounts and those of the popular press, the Houses of Parliament and East India House highlight the multivalent nature of the national response, while the fractures found within and between missionary accounts demonstrate that the 'public' evangelical discourse of the LMS was itself constructed out of a variety of sometimes conflicting individual narratives. By looking at these constituent elements we can, as Ranajit Guha suggests, 'examine those cuts, seams and stitches—those cobbling marks—which tell us about the material it is made of'.4 This chapter will explore 'ruptures in the apparently seamless colonialist textual practice'5 for

what they reveal about missionary attitudes to religious confrontation in 1857 and their position in relation to wider British nationalist/patriotic discourse/s. By doing so it aims to elucidate the complex cultural and political contexts in which British interpretations of 1857 were formed.

Missionaries were prolific writers, and although, as Anna Johnston points out, volume did not automatically ensure diversity,[6] the LMS archive contains a rich collection of letters from missionaries stationed across India. Extracts from these letters made up the main content of the LMS journal, the *Missionary Magazine and Chronicle*, a monthly publication running to some twenty pages, which also included reports of LMS meetings and lists of subscribers. The magazine, which cost 1d, had a circulation of 37,000 in 1887, although this would have been significantly higher in the 1850s. Missionary publications were 'the end result of a well oiled and efficient production machine'.[7] They were propagandist in nature, aimed at engendering ideological and financial support for missionary endeavours. As such, Johnston argues, published missionary writing conformed to an identifiable set of generic regulations, recycling trite narratives of evangelisation, where successes were lauded and failure rarely mentioned.[8] In the unprecedented circumstances of the uprising, this closely regulated pattern falters, allowing us to glimpse the seams of the carefully fashioned 'public' narrative, and the fractures between this and the unpublished texts. This is not to imply an artificial distinction between 'authentic' private, unpublished opinions and a synthetic, premeditated public discourse. Missionaries fashioned their private writings in the knowledge that they might be published—Rev. J.M. Lechler of the Salem mission said of his account of the uprising, 'I send you a letter, which you may use as you please'.[9] Moreover, the *Missionary Magazine*, though choosing extracts selectively, usually reproduced passages verbatim.[10] The editing of original texts was typically by omission, albeit sometimes at the expense of context, rather than alteration. The choice of extracts, however, reveals the agenda informing the LMS's 'public' representation of events, while unpublished letters, though palpably self-conscious, provide glimpses of the conflicted reality of missionary experiences in 1857.

Missionaries and India

The London Missionary Society was founded in 1795, when John Ryland and William Carey conceived the idea of a non-denominational forum, similar to the Anti-Slavery Society, through which both nonconformist and Anglican evangelists could cooperate to finance and coordinate missionary activity. It soon had missions in Africa, China, the South Seas and India, being by the mid-nineteenth century the 'largest evangelical institution peddling its spiritual wares in the arena of empire'.[11] By 1857, the LMS had missionary stations of

varying sizes in Calcutta, Benares, Mirzapore, Almorah, Autully, Bangalore, Bellary, Berhampore, Salem and Vizagapatam,[12] along with a large constituency of supporters and contributors in Britain.[13] In May 1857 the LMS reported that missionary endeavour had resulted in the establishment of 330 Christian churches and upwards of 100,000 Indians converts.[14]

Missionaries inhabit a conflicted space within the history of British imperialism, simultaneously representing both marginality and, complicity. Frequently seen as peripheral to the economic and political projects of empire, missionary espousal of a transformative agenda that would remake indigenous societies in Britain's own likeness was contentious.[15] The East India Company (EIC), ostensibly committed to 'religious neutrality', viewed them with suspicion, fearing the impact of their religious enthusiasm even after their activities were legalised in 1813.[16] Recent historians like Brian Stanley and R.E. Frykenburg believe missionary motivation was distinct from imperial ambition, with the majority of missionaries not predisposed in favour of colonialism.[17] Indeed, despite their cultural racism, missionary engagement with local communities often made them vocal critics of imperial policy that infringed indigenous rights. They thus occupied an ambivalent position within colonial society, undoubtedly one of the 'dominant foreign groups' in an imperial polity,[18] but never completely integrated with Anglo-Indian society. The majority of missionaries came from the 'lower middle class' or 'skilled' working class,[19] and were constantly attempting to renegotiate their social status within the colonial context.[20] By the nineteenth century the vast majority were not wandering preachers or itinerants, but 'institution builders' ministering to established churches, schools and hospitals, with a tangible stake in colonial society.[21] Nor was their relationship with the civil authorities in India always antagonistic. Ian Copland depicts an ambivalent, but sometimes mutually supportive relationship, arguing that in the years before 1857, missionaries and the colonial state were moving closer together, collaborating on projects of English education, among other things.[22] 1

Missionary attitudes to Indian society were similarly complex. The ethnocentrism of the mission venture is reflected in an often-disparaging view of indigenous cultures. A new missionary to India, the LMS declared, must have 'a charity for the heathen which no experience of Hindu duplicity, indifference, ingratitude or moral degradation could diminish'.[23] The most defamatory missionary rhetoric was, however, usually saved for audiences in Britain and America,[24] whose financial contributions they needed to secure, and focused on the iniquitous influence of Hinduism and Islam as systems, rather than on any innate flaw in Indian humanity. The missionary project was, after all, based on the *potential* equality of man and the possibility for other races to be redeemed and raised from savagery to Christian civilisation. Indians were considered corrupted, but ultimately redeemable, children 'hurrying to eternity under the fearful oppression of a deadly system'.[25] Proselytisation and

conversion were certainly conflicted processes: missionary correspondences are replete with depictions of sundered families, distraught parents, shattered marriages and internal struggles, which, although embedded in a providentialist framework, give a refracted glimpse of the trauma of the conversion experience. Rev. Edward Storrow of Calcutta, for example, reported of a convert: 'While residing with us, previous to his baptism, his steadfastness was sorely tried by the attempts of his friends, and especially of his father, to induce him to abandon his purpose; he himself wept bitterly to see his father weep, but his will remained firm.'[26] Although missionaries claimed to be religious voluntarists, the nature of the power relationship between white missionary and potential convert made this problematic, and some questioned both missionary tactics and the sincerity of Indian Christianity. Despite their overt ethnocentricity, missionaries were also often the most spatially proximate and accessible Europeans. Unlike colonial officials, who were not 'tied to local Indian society for their prestige, their social or psychological well-being, their livelihood or their view of themselves',[27] missionary identity was validated by their engagement with the local Indian community. They often provided important services like healthcare and education, as well as engaging theologically and philosophically with the converted or the curious. In this respect, Cox argues, missionaries existed in a zone of 'transculturation',[28] their encounter with Indian society being both fluid and multivalent.

Missionaries, Religion and Blame in 1857

On 12 May 1857, unaware of events unfolding in India, members of the LMS convened for its 63rd Annual General Meeting. Optimism was high; India had not yet provided large-scale conversions, but rapid social progress and improving relations between missionaries and the civil authorities augured well.[29] The LMS still deplored EIC support for mosques, temples and Hindu festivals, its discrimination against Indian Christians and its refusal to disseminate Christian values, but it also acknowledged its improvements. They criticised the exclusion of Christianity from government schools, for example, but commended the spread of Western education as engendering a subtle shift away from 'superstition' that opened Indian minds to Christian influence. Society secretary Mr E.B. Underhill even declared that, though converts were few, missionaries in India had succeeded in influencing EIC policy on humanitarian issues like Sati and more generally. 'At the commencement of the present century,' he noted, 'British authority in India was exerted to the utmost to exclude the blessings of Christianity from the idolatrous Natives, and to perpetuate the monstrous evils under which they suffered, but in our time the administration of the Indian Government is enlightened, just and humane.'[30] He also noted the valuable

financial and ideological support the Society received from individuals of 'high rank and office' in India.

The outbreak of rebellion presented pressing practical and discursive problems. Not only did the violence endanger the physical welfare of LMS missions, debates surrounding it directly challenged the desirability of proselytisation, necessitating a re-articulation of the missionary venture. Hostility to the activities of men like Captain Wheler, opposition to missionaries themselves and the credence given to Indian fears of forcible conversion in parliamentary speeches by Disraeli[31] and Lord Ellenborough,[32] were deeply worrying for missionary societies that relied on public approval and support. 'We do not so much fear the Hindus and Mohammedans,' claimed Rev. Lechler, 'as we fear the spirit that made an appearance in the House of Lords.'[33] Emphasis on religious motivations for the uprising, and the accompanying focus on proselytisation and conversion, drew both on wider orientalist stereotypes about the religious fanaticism of Indians and on pre-existing discourses of blame—Sydney Smith, for example, had held missionaries, those 'little detachments of maniacs',[34] directly responsible for the Vellore Mutiny of 1806.[35] Hostility to their activities emphasised missionary marginality as they were made a convenient scapegoat for a beleaguered colonial state. It also, however, created a space for evangelical discourses to be projected outside their limited sphere of influence and intersect discursively with wider public and political narratives.[36]

From its first reference to the uprising, the *Missionary Magazine* was engaged in damage limitation. 'Various statements,' it declared, 'alike absurd and contradictory, have been put forth regarding the causes of the mutiny, and amongst other unfounded statements it has been alleged that the teaching and influence of missionaries has been in some way connected to the movement.'[37] Early missionary treatments of the revolt were dialogic in nature, engaging directly with wider public narratives that implicated missionaries, proselytisation and conversion in the revolt and attempting to absolve themselves of blame. Outright refutations, such as 'A Letter from An Old Indian', which called Lord Ellenborough's comments 'such nonsense',[38] were accompanied by descriptions of proselytising as a non-confrontational activity; in November 1857 the *Missionary Magazine* published an idyllic description of Rev. James Bradbury's itinerant tour in north India. 'Nothing occurred', the *Missionary Magazine* assured its readers, 'to betoken the approach of so terrible a convulsion, but on the contrary he was welcomed with the utmost courtesy and respect ... and his message was listened to with general attention, and evident interest, which may serve, among other innumerable facts, to show that Christian teaching has in no respect tended to bring about the catastrophe.'[39] It was keen to stress that supposed connections between missionary activity and revolt could not be maintained by dispassionate investigation; the main insurgents, sepoys and Muslims, constituted 'precisely that class of the native community that is least accessible by the missionaries'.[40] Moreover, as Rev. Coles of Bellary argued,

Christianity was most influential in Madras, the governor there being a well-known supporter of missions, yet that presidency had remained quiet.[41]

Both individual missionaries and the *Missionary Magazine* stressed that the symbols of Christianity were not specifically targeted. 'The rebellion', Rev. Dr Boaz of Calcutta declared, 'is not laid at the doors of the missions. The rebels have shown no enmity to missionaries as such, arid if they have suffered it has been because they belonged to the European race.'[42] The *Missionary Magazine* editor reiterated this point, saying none of fallen missionaries 'were marked out for death on account of their being teachers of Christianity. On falling into the hands of the savage mutineers, they were regarded merely in the light of foreigners—as belonging to the hated race which they were bent on exterminating.'[43] As a discursive strategy, the emphasis on race rather than religion as determining victimhood allowed missionaries to separate themselves from the causes of revolt and realign with the wider colonial community. By emphasising the insurgents' desire to 'massacre all white faces',[44] they subsumed pre-existing fissures in the colonial polity into an inclusive cultural construction of race. Under ordinary circumstances 'whiteness' as a category 'was masked because it was seen as normal'.[45] In the context of the atrocities of 1857, whiteness was unmasked and became an ideologically loaded collective category that countermanded individual identities. Such racially motivated attacks manifested not specific grievances, but were symbolic of hostility to an entire civilisation.

In an inversion of later tendencies to overemphasise 'fanatical' religious motivations, early missionary accounts collapsed the distinction between religion and politics. 'It is evident from what is taking place all around us,' Rev. William Benyon remarked, 'that religious principle and religious feeling have nothing to do with the revolt... it is of a political nature, of course mixed up, especially in the case of the Mohammedans, with the religious motive and principle.'[46] Similarly Rev. A.F. Lacroix of Calcutta believed, 'The struggle is daily becoming more and more a political one ... to which I should add a religious one too, which is always the case where Muhammedans are concerned.'[47] Muslim religious conviction was seen as inextricably implicated in a serious, if reactionary, political agenda—the restoration of a state of *Dar-ul-Islam*—rather than purely religious fanaticism or superstition. Lacroix called the insurrection the 'crescent against the cross',[48] thus historicising the confrontation by invoking the Crusades and an accompanying sense of providentialism, while simultaneously embedding the religious aspects of the confrontation in a wider political context. Hindus were not at this stage considered agents in the insurrection. 'The Mussalmans, and they alone, have originated this foul conspiracy', reported Rev. Sherring of Mirzapore, adding that 'there was scarcely a Mussalman of influence in all Northern and Central India who was ignorant of it.'[49] The Hindus, he claimed, when involved at all, were 'gulled' by the Muslims into rising against their rulers.[50] Locating culpability within the (Muslim community coincided with popular British assumptions about 'rebel' Muslims and 'loyal' Hindus[51] and

drew on the pre-existing assumption that Muslims were 'a restless race [who] would oppose every other government and religion except their own'.[52] It also allowed missionaries to distance themselves from the instigators of violence; Muslim converts to Christianity were few and mission work among them 'but desultory'.[53] Moreover, by exonerating the Hindu community, missionaries could emphasise the beneficial impact of their work on those exposed to it. 'The whole country, including all its wealth and respectability, is with us/ reported Benyon, 'that is the mass of the Hindoos, and they are the people with whom we, the missionaries, have had chiefly to do.'[54] Far from being a cause of revolt, the *Missionary Magazine* argued, missionary activity inculcated loyalty,[55] and 'missionaries and the results of their labours, were never more highly appreciated by the most respectable and influential portion of native society in India than at the present moment'.[56]

Overt attempts to disassociate missionary endeavour from the unrest, such as the ones discussed above, are destabilised when read against missionary experiences on the ground. The vast majority of missionaries throughout India suspended public preaching and itinerating during the uprising, believing it 'a danger to public peace'.[57] In an unpublished letter, Rev. Kennedy of Benares reported:

> Since the end of May there has been no outdoor preaching, no preaching from the verandahs of friends or in our city chapels. The last time it was attempted by missionaries here, the people became much excited and there was danger of a riot. It was deemed prudent by the missionaries of the three societies to suspend the work for a season__ We have thought it well to avoid everything that could increase the existing complications. If we had preached in the usual way a fanatic might have attacked us from among our hearers and the consequences might have been very serious.[58]

Others complained of 'threatening language'[59] directed at them and their Indian assistants and took measures to protect Indian converts, who were deemed vulnerable by virtue of their faith,[60] suggesting that despite their protestations, Christianity and proselytisation were considered incitements to unrest. When read against these unpublished concerns, the defensive agenda behind the 'public' missionary dialogue on causation and culpability is thrown into sharp relief.

Re-emerging Providentialism

If the *Missionary Magazine* was clear about what the revolt was not, determining what it was proved harder. As with the wider national discourse, interpretations

varied. Significant fissures exist between the explanations of individual missionaries and the carefully edited public narrative, while the focus of the latter also shifted over time. Initially the *Missionary Magazine* cautiously highlighted the paucity of British officers and indiscipline within the Bengal army, simultaneously tempering criticism with patriotic praise for the 'prompt and energetic measures' taken by the authorities in Ind\a and the 'firmness and bravery' of the British troops.[61] Despite the previously ambivalent relationship between missionaries and the EIC, the LMS had always advised missionaries to disregard their own political inclination and 'manifest in their own conduct, and promote also in others, a sincere and affectionate respect to the Government and to the subordinate authorities it appoints'.[62] This was not always implemented, of course, resulting in slippage between LMS directives and individual missionary activities, but in 1857 the public discourse, at least, was firmly 'on message', with the *Missionary Magazine* eagerly awaiting the day 'when the cause of justice and humanity shall once more be vindicated and the revolted provinces shall again bow to the British Supremacy'.[63] The most pointed criticisms of the EIC found in the unpublished letters, such as Rev. Sherring's assertion that 'the whole administration of the country is radically unsound',[64] were conspicuously absent from the early published narrative. Instead published missionary letters focused on individual experiences and local events. Overtly patriotic, they repeatedly detailed relatively small European losses,[65] inflating enemy casualties to underline the superior prowess, and masculinity, of European troops. 'The sepoys have gained many advantages over little parties of unarmed men, women and children,' Rev. James Kennedy reported, 'but they have their first advantage yet to gain over European soldiers. Wherever there have been even a few English soldiers they have made a successful stand against the sepoys.'[66]

Evangelical responses to the uprising were constantly evolving, reacting both to new events and shifts within the wider national discourse. As Don Randall demonstrates, news of the actions of Nana Sahib at Cawnpore implicated high caste Hindus in the violence and focused British indignation on the 'piquant barbarities of Hindooism'.[67] LMS accounts mirror these trends.[68] As Rev. Benjamin Rice of Bangalore put it:

> Although the Mohammedans have taken the lead in the revolt, yet it has to a large extent been a high caste Hindoo rebellion. No one ever expected Brahminism to descend from the position which it had held for ages without a struggle, and the present conflict may be the beginning of the end. That end, the utter downfall of Brahminical power and of Hindoo superstition, must come, and the sooner the better for this benighted, priest ridden, wretched country.[69]

Allusions to Brahminical complicity were embedded in a pre-existing missionary discourse that vilified them ;as guardians of an 'oppressive' religious

system. They also reflect a shift in textual strategy towards a more aggressive and overtly providentialist position that abandoned attempts to disassociate missionary activity from the insurrection, representing it instead as a traumatic, but necessary, corollary to the spread of Christianity in India. In sharp contrast to earlier accounts, Rev. Budden of Almora believed 'the actors in the conspiracy are inspired by a fanatical enmity against everything Christian ... it appears like a desperate struggle—and we may hope the last—to extinguish by violence every ray of Christian and European light. Churches and schools and such places are the first to be burned down....'[70] Similarly, Rev. Colin Campbell of Bangalore commented:

> I cannot agree... that missionary efforts, and other efforts to spread Christianity in India, have nothing to do with the matter. I doubt not that there are many other causes at work, and that the principal ones may be those of a political nature; but it is clear that as a people we are hated for our Christianity, and we are both feared and hated on account of our persevering efforts to spread the Gospel among them __ It cannot be wondered at, therefore, that those whose interest or wish it is to keep up the old systems should take alarm at the progress everywhere made in educational and missionary efforts.[71]

Writing at the end of 1857, from stations not directly affected by the revolt, Budden and Campbell had had both time and space to realign the uprising with the evangelical agenda, claiming and capitalising on it discursively rather than disowning it. The confrontation was the bloody realisation of the metaphorical image of India as a 'spiritual battlefield'[72] in the struggle between darkness and light. Evangelisation was 'an onward movement', Campbell declared, 'which no created power can successfully resist. The people know this and the well disposed among them are glad of the prospect of the deliverance which it holds out to them, but the wicked and oppressors tremble at the consequences, and thoroughly hate all who help it forward.'[73]

Missionary efforts to discursively reclaim the uprising drew on a wider upsurge in evangelical attitudes, epitomised in Autumn 1857 by the rhetoric of the 'Fast Day' sermons.[74] These sermons were given on 7 October 1857, a day of 'penitence' on which the country, led by non-conformist and Anglican clergy, was encouraged to reflect on the 'mutiny' as a national chastisement. Although superficially self-effacing, this position assumed divine endorsement for the imperial project, casting the mutiny as a punishment for failing to fulfil heavenly expectations. Both published and unpublished LMS texts shared the assumption that the uprising was an act of God, although they portrayed it less as a chastisement than as a seismic upheaval through which He would transform India into a 'field for our exertions such as we never had before'.[75] The *Missionary Magazine* foresaw that 'out of this great trial will be evolved incalculable benefits, both social and religious, to the population of that country',[76] facilitating the spread of 'our religion, language and literature throughout the country'[77] and contributing to the extinction of Hinduism and Islam. 'All the things I have

mentioned seem at first view to be calamities ...', Rev. R.C. Mather told the LMS in February 1858, after outlining losses of life and property, 'yet it is easy to perceive how it has all been working together for good, how all these events have been overruled for the furtherance of the Gospel of Christ.'[78] That Providence had spared the LMS missions from destruction underlined righteousness of the missionary venture,[79] while the preservation to British rule was a second chance to perform His will.[80] Settling the country in peace and prosperity under British rule, it was argued, was now inextricably linked to spreading Christianity.[81] Stability and security in India would not be achieved through the temporal coercion of 'the wickedness they cannot eradicate'.[82] It could only be guaranteed through Christian civilisation, which would pacify the country and ensure continued divine sanction for the imperial project.[83] The uprising was thus an opportunity—a call to action 'too powerful to be resisted, too urgent to admit delay'[84] and a means of 'rousing and stirring the minds of Englishmen' to the duty of proselytisation.[85] In February 1858 a special meeting of the LMS responded by proposing twenty new missionaries for India, at a cost of £5,000 passage and £6,000 per annum maintenance, of which £3,000 had already been pledged—a project which the beleaguered missionaries in India, desperate for both financial assistance and additional manpower, warmly welcomed.

Despite the increasing self-confidence of missionary rhetoric, the evangelical textual position was riven with contradictions. The uprising was represented simultaneously as a punishment for failure, proof of success and an opportunity for further action, while evangelical intentions were split between strident providentialism and cautious commitments to toleration, voluntarism and state neutrality. That these tensions were not fully resolved even within the limited sphere of the LMS public narrative reflects the extent to which the political/ideological climate impacted the missionary response, forcing a merging of providentialism and political rhetoric. Thus, while the LMS publicly blamed the uprising on 'the paganism of the so-called Christian government',[86] which, it claimed, obstructed enlightenment and shored up idolatry, it carefully denied seeking state involvement in proselytising activity. Similarly, while in February 1858 the *Missionary Magazine* published Rev. Colin Campbell's assertion that 'There is no system of religion so intolerant as the one we labour to introduce. It admits no rival and no associate. Its aim is to destroy Muhhamedanism and Hindooism in all its forms and reign absolute and alone,'[87] only a month later it asserted that they stood 'not for the suppression of the religion of the people of India, but for freedom of the manifestation of our own religion.... Valuing religious liberty ourselves, we have no wish to see it violated in the case of the people of India.'[88] These glaring contradictions reflect the different discursive strategies needed to navigate a fissured ideological terrain. They are also symptomatic of an emerging political discourse within the missionary movement that addressed wider issues about the nature of the colonial polity and the relationship between state, evangelicalism and civil society.

Given the political climate, asking only for a 'fair field and no favour'[89] to seek voluntary conversion was prudent, although some still doubted missionary intentions. *The Times* in May 1858 carried an editorial reporting on a petition by evangelical societies asking for state neutrality in matters of religion in India, which parodied the upsurge in evangelical enthusiasm in the wake of i857:

> The missionaries who have returned from the South Seas will find themselves of small account, the oppressed Negro will be forgotten for this one season, even a Jewish convert will for the moment cease to be interesting. But Brahmins and fakirs, Hindoo widows, precocious neophytes won from the worship of Vishnu, or Mussulman gentlemen in the North Western Provinces who have expressed liberal opinions on religion, will be the principal characters in each speaker's string of anecdotes. In fact we must prepare for a very strong proselytising crusade in India.... We shall probably call down upon our heads some indignant oratory, but it is a duty to declare our conviction that the first efforts at conversion when the present disorders shall be over, ought to be cautious, well studied and made with a due regard to the political situation of the country.[90]

Such suspicions were not entirely unfounded, for while the LMS publicly and self-consciously avoided advocating anything but government neutrality, in unpublished letters some missionaries looked for more active intervention. 'If our rulers came out strongly in favour of Christianity,' Rev. Sherring declared:

> I think the natives generally would be strongly impressed by it. It is in my opinion the duty of all who have any influence with the members of Parliament to exert that influence strenuously in regard to this important matter. With a religious government in India the progress of Christianity would I believe be immensely expedited.[91]

At the sixty-fourth Annual General Meeting of the LMS, Rev. Newman Hall complained of the India Board's declaration that India would continue to be governed in line with the 'ancient and traditional policy ... of absolute neutrality on matters of religion'—an announcement of 'dark significance and fearful import' in the eyes of the evangelists.[92]

Talking About Atrocities

Despite missionary attempts to reclaim the uprising for the evangelical project, the violence that accompanied it represented a real threat to the missionary venture, practically and ideologically. Within India, the rebellion seriously impacted on mission finances. Prices were high, outside employment interrupted and unprecedented and expensive measures like the evacuation of

families necessary. Simultaneously, local sources of support were substantially diminished. 'Several of our best friends and most generous supporters have been most foully murdered ', reported Rev. Boaz of Calcutta, '... others have lost all everyone, in some way or another, appears to have suffered, and the suffering and loss is so great that in many cases one man cannot help another.*93 Under these circumstances there was little sdope for contributions to charitable causes like missions, even when benefactors were still willing to help, which many were not. 'Local aid fails us in this season ...*, reported Rev. James Kennedy, adding, 'our good friend Mr _ continues his very liberal subscription, but it is evident he is well nigh ready to despair of the people. He has hitherto done much for them, and has been most hopeful of their improvement; but the recent wretched displays of fawning with the intention to destroy, of treachery in the face of the strongest obligations, of eagerness to shed blood even of benefactors, have quite sickened him and would lead him, if he could, to leave the country altogether.'94 The impact of the uprising thus went beyond pragmatic issues, posing a real ideological threat to public support for mission activity. The 'mutiny' revealed the 'treachery, rapine and cruelty'95 of Hinduism and Islam as religions, something that missionaries had long asserted was a 'powerful claim' on the evangelical community for the further 'diffusion of the Gospel among the myriads of these degraded and infuriated idolaters.'96 In the context of the uprising, however, these characteristics could also alienate people from projects involving the welfare of 'the enemy'

Atrocity stories in particular were an ambivalent discursive terrain for the missionary movement. The emphasis on (largely imaginary) accounts of the rape and mutilation of British women in popular discourses on 1857 acted both to rally public sentiment against the metaphorical violation of the nation, and to mask the vicious acts of retributive justice with which the uprising was suppressed. Jenny Sharpe tells us that

> The British army subsequently preserved the Bibighar with its dried blood and rotting remains, as a kind of museum for passing troops 10 visit__Thus began the mythic invention of the dying women's torments, as soldiers covered the walls with bloody inscriptions in the hands of the "ladies" directing their men to avenge their horrible deaths.97

Such stories emphasised the very characteristics of Hinduism and Islam that made their extinction desirable, but they also demonised the perpetrators as savage, inhuman and ultimately irredeemable, fundamentally challenging evangelical -certainty about the potential spiritual equality and shared humanity of man. The *Missionary Magaziney* although referring with regret to the 'wanton barbarities'98 of the mutineers, did not report the supposed atrocities in detail. Published letters do hint at the influence of rumours and imaginings—Rev. Dr Boaz, for example, reported that 'the stories that reach us from the mofussil are most heartrending and sickening. The details so far as

the women and children are concerned, are not fit for recital, they are the acts of demons and not of men'[99]—but do not dwell on these issues. This may in part reflect pious prudery, but it is also indicative of the need to omit damaging or rhetorically dangerous subject matter. As with all missionary narratives, the aim was 'to titillate and encourage, not appal and dishearten the metropolitan faithful'.[100] As a result, while atrocities were alluded to, there was a marked unwillingness to engage with the 'pornographic fantasy of rape'[101] that was informing wider popular discourses. Moreover, when atrocities were alluded to, they were depicted as resulting from the 'dehumanising' influence of Islam or Hinduism—'that combination of cruelty, falsehood and lust, which has ever been and must ever be the direst curse of India'[102]—limiting any implication of the inherent or irreversible evil of Indians as men. Rev. Budden of Almora, for example, commented that the atrocities made 'one blush for one's own nature, that can be capable of it',[103] simultaneously condemning the actions of the mutineers and reaffirming the shared humanity of the perpetrators. When read against the demonisation and dehumanisation of the rebels in the popular press, such subtle inflections and omissions are significant, representing a point of divergence from wider public discourses, as the constituent parts of the missionary narrative are refracted through the lens of a larger evangelical agenda.

Representations of violence were carefully discursively managed, with vilification of the insurgents often juxtaposed against compassion for suffering of local communities. 'Whatever our feelings may be,' Rev. Kennedy at Benares reported, 'we cannot but approve of punishment inflicted on the monsters who have disgraced humanity; but they cannot suffer without involving others in suffering. The community are suffering now to a mournful extent.'[104] Similarly Rev. Sherring of Mirzapore reported that '[fjood of almost every description is approaching what it commonly termed famine price, and the destitution existing on every hand is frightful— About 70 persons receive a small sum every morning in the mission compound, which is contributed by the station and of which I am almoner.'[105] He also reported that the local magistrate disbursed of his own accord upwards of £50 a month to the poor.[106] Sherring's account was published in the *Missionary Magazine* in February 1858, its emphasis on British benevolence helping to reassert the fundamental missionary aim of 'raising up' the unfortunate, reinstall ideas of 'Christian love' within the mutiny discourse and accentuate the superior humanity of the British. Significantly, more detailed, evocative and problematic accounts of Indian suffering, without British redress, such as some by Rev. Kennedy, were not included:

> The unsettled state of the country has of course, here and elsewhere, paralysed trade. Thousands of weavers and artisans of every description have been thrown out of employment, and to add to their troubles, with the district on which we are most dependent for food in the hands of the rebels, grain is at famine prices. The wretchedness is extreme.... Many are pawning everything they possess for food. Not a few respectable men have become beggars. I am told that there are

> women now performing manual labour out of doors, who had never previously ventured from the privacy of their homes. In this district cultivation is generally carried on, but over the country there has been much less than usual and there is too much reason to apprehend great scarcity. God graciously avert the fearful calamities, which appear impending over this people![107]

British actions, though 'just and necessary', added to the trouble of the local community. In an unpublished letter he reported the daily, summary hangings that were taking place in the vicinity:

> The very severe measure employed by the authorities have struck terror into the hearts of the evil disposed. Punishment has followed closely on the heels of the crime. The ordinary courts are shut up and martial law prevails. The gibbet has, I must acknowledge, become for a time a standing institution here, and scarcely a day has elapsed for weeks that some have not been executed. This procedure is so unlike our ordinary course that it has taken the people by surprise, and whatever opinion maybe entertained regarding its propriety, not a doubt can exist that it has done much to frighten men bent on mischief. Within the last fortnight there has been the most marked improvement, and to terror alone it is attributable.[108]

Adding in a later letter that

> [i]t was hoped that the execution of so many plunderers and murderers would have thoroughly terrified evil-doers into peaceable conduct. The effects of this dreadful procedure was to some extent beneficial. It is acknowledged on all hands— I have heard it mentioned by several natives, that several of the men who have been hung have been long the terror of their neighbours, and that their execution has made a good riddance. A number have been hung, however, who hitherto have been deemed very respectable men— landholders and other influential persons.[109]

The tenor of his accounts reflect the tensions between overarching discourses of national retribution, pragmatic, if distasteful, necessities, and discomfort with the potential victimisation of an innocent Indian population. 'When I think of the sufferings of our own countrymen,' Kennedy lamented 'and look at the same time at the sufferings of the children of the soil, I often feel as if a horror of great darkness were falling on my spirit.'[110]

Indian Christians

Indian Christians often fell victim both to persecution by the insurgents and the general hardships faced by the Indian coinmunity. Their marginality in terms of both British and Indian support networks left them extremely vulnerable.

'The native Christians are fully alive to the danger of their position,' reported Rev. Sherring, 'for they together with the missionaries are the objects of repugnance to the sepoys.'[111] Several missionaries reported rumours that insurgents threatened to destroy all Christians;[112] Rev. William Buyers of Benares even advised his Indian Christians to leave the mission station and lose themselves in the bazaar to avoid massacre by the rebels.[113] Of course, insurgent hostility towards Indian Christians was predicated on their status as 'collaborators' with the imperial regime as well as their adherence to an alien faith; Rudrangshu Mukherjee argues that at Cawnpore the rebels designated all Europeans and Indian loyalists Christians, irrespective of their actual religion.[114] From the missionary perspective, the carefully selected experiences of Indian converts in 1857 represented a valuable discursive tool. Reports of the courageous defence of Indian Christians by their missionary brethren, as epitomised by CMS missionary Mr French's refusal to enter the Agra fort until reluctant commanders also allowed Indian Christians shelter,[115] as well as shared experiences of persecution and of faith, were used to remind the reader of the sincerity and benevolence of the missionary project. Rev. James Kennedy reported that missionaries had not left Benares because '[f]or us to flee at present would be to send a panic among the native Christians, to surprise our friends and delight our enemies, and to bring dishonour on our Master's name.'[116] Rev. William Buyers' account reveals that although in the initial panic, Benares missionaries left the Indian Christians to find their own shelter in the city, while they took refuge with other Europeans in the Mint, subsequently they arranged with the Christians that in case of a further attack they too should take shelter behind the British guns. In the absence of immediate danger, they remained with them in the mission station, performing prayer meetings and Sunday services as usual amid the excitement. At the Mint, Kennedy later reported, 'All the Europeans, East Indians and many of the native Christians [were] huddled together in the greatest confusion imaginable.'[117] Rev. Sherring, of Mirzapore, took many of his Indian congregation with him to the relative safety of Benares when fighting broke out near the station, an action that earned him the approbation of his fellow missionaries.[118] The missionaries were not always able to help their congregation, however: 'Our native Christians have suffered greatly from these disturbances', reported Kennedy.

> Our poor people have been dismissed, and with food at exorbitant prices, they are in great distress. We help them as we can, but we know not what to do. They were improving greatly in their circumstances, and th;s cessation in their employment is a great check to them.[119]

The uprising did create some opportunities for Indian Christians. Rev. Dr Boaz reported the use of Indian Christian volunteers on night patrols in Calcutta,[120] while both Sherring and Kennedy advised their converts to join the 'Native Christian Military Corps' which was formed at Benares. Sherring

considered it a significant opportunity for young men without families. ‘In two ways the formation of the corps will do good/ he reported.

> It will help the government in the first place, which is beginning to perceive the egregious folly of trusting absolutely to the fidelity of the heathen and Musselman classes, and of neglecting the Christian class, \which is bound by every consideration to be faithful to a Christian government. And then secondly, they themselves, the Christian class, will be raised in station and importance.121

It was hoped that the establishment of the corps indicated the end of discrimination against Indian Christians in the army and police force, and examples of their service were used to underpin LMS demands for more favourable conditions for Christianity in India. Rev. Sherring awaited the day when ‘a Native Christian officer marches a band of Native Christian Sepoys to the house of God on a Sabbath day5'22 although he also revealed a more pragmatic reason encouraging converts to join, saying, ‘my expenditure will be diminished by the amount of the pay of the men who have left/123

Beyond calls for less discriminatory government practices, the primary discursive utility of the persecution of Indian Christians was the affirmation it afforded of their religious sincerity. Rev. R.C. Mather, for example, commented at the special meeting of February 1858, ‘There has been a general unbelief as to the Christianity of the natives; but the events which have taken place have demonstrated that it is a genuine Christianity after all. We have now had out martyrs in India/124 He then went on to list in detail the Indian Christians who had undergone ridicule, torture and even death without renouncing their faith, thus invalidating the common reproach that they ‘only became Christians for their bread*.125 Of course, the pages of the *Missionary Magazine* had long been filled with ‘sentimental images of the sacrificial deaths of missionaries and their families*.126 In 1857-1858 this pre-existing pattern was adapted to include Indian Christians, although tales of Indian Christian martyrs were also embedded in a wider conversion narrative. Missionaries were obsessed with the fear of ‘backsliding’ native converts and death ‘in the faith* was widely represented as the ultimate consummation of the conversion experience. Rev. James Kennedy, for example, recounted the tale of an Indian Christian from Futtypore who had

> fallen in with some sepoys who had seen him at Futtypore and recognised him as a Christian. They called on him to deny Christ and made him large promises, but he said he would rather die than renounce his Lord and Saviour. On hearing this they hacked him in the most cruel manner with their swords and left him for dead— All about his head, neck and arms, there were the marks of the fearful gashes, the wounds his cruel enemies had inflicted.127

The man had lost his hand and had only survived the ordeal because some low-caste Hindus took him in. When Kennedy saw him, however, he was near

death. In Kennedy's narrative he is made a symbol for an idealised version of Indian Christianity—staunch, loyal and sincere, but also simple, acquiescent and undemanding. Of course, while tales of heroism and martyrdom are recorded in the pages of the *Missionary Magazine*, they are entirely narrated through the white missionary voice. They provide no record of Indian Christians' own attitudes to the uprising, or accounts of those who may have adapted, concealed or renounced their faith as circumstances required. Thus despite the overt praise for Indian Christians' stoicism and fidelity, as figures in the missionary text they remain ciphers, representative of the ideal 'native convert' but shorn of agency, complexity or voice.

Conclusion

Although the immediate aftermath of the revolt was accompanied by an upsurge in missionary enthusiasm, several scholars, including Catherine Hall, Anna Johnston and Thomas Metcalf, have pointed to the negative impact that the 'Mutiny', together with the Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica (1865), had on public attitudes about the potential of other races to achieve Christian civilisation.[128] Catherine Hall, for example, notes that ideas of racial difference solidified, for while the evangelical community defended Christian blacks in Jamaica, there was little concern over the persecution of Hindus and Muslims in 1857-1858.[129] Public hostility towards Indians engendered in 1857 represented a major ideological challenge to the missionary movement going forward. In its carefully constructed representation of events, the LMS narrative displays a keen awareness of shifting public attitudes and the need to deploy different textual strategies in order to limit the negative impact of the uprising and keep wider evangelical opinion engaged with the missionary enterprise in India. Such self-conscious constructions reflect both the apprehensions of the missionary movement and the growing fissures between their version of evangelical imperialism and wider public interpretations of the colonial project. Jeffrey Richards, for example, suggests that after the uprising the evangelical impulse faltered, its ethos being transferred to the secular aspects of empire building, while missionary activity became less theologically driven and smaller, more tightly focused, societies emerged that concentrated on 'good works' like healthcare and education and on specific communities and problems.[130]

The uprising provided an opportunity for the amplification of evangelical values of stoicism, faith and vigour. 'It has been a season for great humiliation, for much prayer, for energy of character, for courage and for decision,' reported Rev. Sherring of Mirzapore, 'Personally I can say that I have found it good to be afflicted and to be in trouble and danger.'[131] Endurance for the Lord's sake was central to a sense of missionary identity. Missionaries were, as a matter

of principle, among the last to send away their women and children, often doing so only at the insistence of the civil and military authorities; a position that reflects evangelical fortitude, the familial basis of the Christian household and the relative permanence of missionary life in India compared to the more transient experience of soldiers and administrators. Although missionaries were non-combatants, the published accounts emphasise the everyday acts of courage undertaken in pursuit of their calling. Rev. James Kennedy, for example, reported that he had resumed work at the school, saying, 'We the missionaries are the only Europeans who have ventured into the city unarmed for the past four months ... not a finger has been raised to touch us, though the people have now and then stared at us, as if wondering at our temerity'.[132] That said, both public and private missionary accounts provide at best an ambivalent textual terrain for those seeking the exposition of a coherent 'muscular Christian' identity. While Anna Johnston suggests that missionary publications were predicated entirely on the representation of success—'missionaries figures are almost exclusively heroic, long suffering and do not experience religious doubts, debilitating diseases or personal crises',[133] this is only partially true in the context of 1857. The worst crises of conscience, cases of physical and mental debilitation and financial and organisational retrenchments were largely purged from the public narrative, existing only in the unpublished letters. The death of Mrs Buyers from dysentery during the outbreak at Benares is briefly lamented, but the subsequent emotional breakdown of her husband is not adverted to.[134] No mention is made of Mrs Kennedy's return to England with her children, or the palpable pain that the parting caused her husband. The loneliness expressed by Rev. Sherring at Mirzapore[135] and the jitters of Rev. Edward Storrow in Calcutta also receive no mention.[136] Similarly, while the need for increased subscriptions are emphasised, the impact of limited funds—closed schools, severed employment and increasing debts—are omitted,[137] as are the repeated missionary reproaches about their lack of money and manpower.[138] That said, even the published missionary letters, especially those from affected stations like Benares and Mirzapore, reflect the constant state of apprehension in which they existed during the uprising and are replete with expressions of fear, discomfort, alarm and concern for the welfare of loved ones. Such examples allow us glimpses of a missionary experience of 1857 that is more diverse and textured than the carefully controlled narrative of muscular Christianity that Johnston implies. It also highlights the tensions between self-image and immediate circumstances. While, in many cases, remaining at their posts allowed missionaries to assert both their commitment and their masculinity, their helplessness in many situations could also lead to a sense of impotence and even feminisation. In an unpublished letter Mr Owen, for example, recalled how, while besieged in the fort at Agra, missionaries had been holed up with the women and children while the other men went out to fight.[139] While emphasising that he kept hi$ revolver ready to protect the women, his spatial location destabilises his own assertions of masculinity.

If missionary experiences during the uprising undercut evangelical stereotypes of the missionary hero, the confrontation also underlined the combustibility of aggressive proselytising attitudes and techniques. As Susan Thorne points out, the period after 1857 saw a 'feminisation' of the missionary movement, evinced both through the increasing number of British women becoming missionaries and a growing emphasis on 'domestic* issues—in India epitomised by the 'zenana* missions—and a 'softer' approach based around families, homes and schools.[140] Such developments, though not directly attributable to the uprising, may reflect a shift in attitude and policy away from 'muscular Christianity', with its association with the 'ideologically charged and aggressively poised male body'.[141] Within the LMS, the conclusive victory of education over itineration can be dated from the post-1857 period, for although, as Ian Copland has shown, missionary interest in education long predates the uprising,[142] it is only in the 1860s that it replaces itineration. The move away from aggressive public preaching and towards the more structured, formalised and sanitised environment of the classroom and the hospital may reflect, in part, the fears of an uncontrolled and hostile local society instilled by the events of 1857, as well as an emerging commitment to the need to pacify and 'civilise' before Christianising and to avoid aggressive or confrontational methods. Missionary rhetoric absolving their activities from blame notwithstanding, the shift towards less confrontational methods reflects changed rhetorical and strategic attitudes that can only be fully understood in the context of the hostility evinced towards proselytisation in 1857. In the aftermath of the rebellion, Rev. Sherring of Mirzapore, for example, reported that though public preaching had been resumed,

> I think of trying a new plan in regard to the instruction of the heathen. It is this: instead of spending only two or three hours in the bazaar, I think of passing a good part of the day, so as to have intercourse by private conversation as well as by public preaching with the people— Much may be done in the lazy familiarity of personal intercourse which perhaps could not be affected by public harangue. Now that the rebellion has instituted a new order of things in the relations of the government to the people, it is a good opportunity for us missionaries to try new schemes in the prosecution of our great work.[143]

The challenges of the mutiny, while perhaps not changing the direction of the^missionary 'master narrative', did force a renegotiation of the ideological and practical terms of missionary endeavour, and the relationship between this and civil society, which would continue throughout the late nineteenth century. The ideological, practical and discursive problems posed by the uprising are apparent within, but not limited to, the immediate narrative of 1857. Moreover, the fissures and fractures that are made apparent in this narrative highlight the extent to which seemingly organic evangelical discourses were the products

of careful construction, serving predefined agendas, responding to immediate ideological challenges and deploying different discursive strategies at different moments and for different audiences.

Notes and References

1. London Missionary Society Archives, Council for World Mission Archive, SOAS, London (hereafter LMSA), Bradbury, Berhampore, 6 January 1858.
2. Ainslee Embree suggests that by the 1880s a national consensus had emerged in which the 'Mutiny* was depicted as originating with intransigent Indian elites, whose social, cultural and economic dominance was threatened by benevolent British reforms. Religious and caste grievances were stripped of their political and economic dimensions and incorporated into an imperial narrative that delegitimised the uprising by portraying its participants as reactionary, credulous or fanatical. Ainslee Embree, *India in 1857: The Revolt against Foreign Rule* (New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1986).
3. To use Jeffrey Cox's phiase. Jeffery Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
4. Guha, cited in Anna Johnston, *Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800-1860* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 64.
5. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 8.
6. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 4.
7. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 7.
8. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 7.
9. LMSA, Lechler, Salem, 4 August 1857.
10. Johnston refers to the 'shocking liberties' taken with missionary letters and the many 'ink and lead corrections' that obscure the original hand, but I found the letters relating to 1857 showed relatively few signs of revision. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 33.
11. McClintock, cited in Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 16.
12. 1have retained the spelling of place names used at the time, although of course many have now been updated or changed.
13. See L. Kitzan, 'The London Missionary Society and the Problem of Authority in India', in *Church History*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1971), pp. 457-473, for more on LMS history.
14. *Missionary Magazine and Chronicle* (hereafter MM), June 1857, p. 142.
15. See Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), for an excellent discussion of the missionary attempts to transplant early nineteenth century gender ideologies and social and familial norms to the colonial context.
16. Missionaries were very conscious that some regarded them as 'visionaries or fanatics'. See MM October 1857, p. 226.
17. See, for example, Brian Stanley, *The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Mission and British Imperialism in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (London: Apollos, 1990); R.E. Frykennurg, 'Christian Missions and the Raj', in Norman Etherington, ed.. *Missions and Empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2005).
18. See Ranajit Guha, 'On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India' (1982), in Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial* (London: Verso, 2000), p. 7.
19. See Stuart Piggin, *Making Evangelical Missionaries, 1789-1958: The Social Background, Motives and Training of British Protestant Missionaries to India* (London: Sutton Courtney Press, 1984) for more on the social background of missionaries. Their official counterparts were usually from

the landed gentry or old professions. See Bernard Cohn, 'The British at Benares: A Nineteenth Century Colonial Society', in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 4, no. 2, (1962). The lowly origins of many missionaries did not go unremarked: Tf a tinker is a devout man*, commented Sidney Smith, 'he infallibly sets off for the East'. Cited in Andrew Porter, 'Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm And Empire', in A. Porter ed., *The Oxford history of the British Empire*, vol. 3, (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 228.

20. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 16.
21. See Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines*, introduction, for a detailed discussion of both the historiography on and reality of the relationship between missionaries, the colonial state and colonial society in India.
22. Ian Copland, 'Christianity As An Arm Of Empire: The Ambiguous Case Of India Under The Company, c. 1813 -1858, *The Historical Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2006), pp. 1025-1054.
23. MM June 1858, p. 148. Such attitudes were not unique to missionaries, of course; the majority of Britons viewed Indians as 'an inferior race, totally different from ourselves in their moral character' and their time in India as a form of 'moral exile' Cohn, 'The British at Benares', p. 172.
24. See, for example, the different ways in which missionaries discussed sati in publications intended for Britain or India. Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions. The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 121-158.
25. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 58.
26. Edward Storrow, 'Additional Fruits of Christian Instruction in the Calcutta Institution', MM August 1857, p. 183.
27. Cohn, 'The British at Benares', p. 169.
28. Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines*.
29. 'Sixty-third Annual General Meeting: India', MM June 1857, pp. 138-142.
30. 'Sixty-third Annual General Meeting: India', MM June 1857, p. 138.
31. In his speech to the House of Commons on 27 July 1857, Disraeli was careful to stress that it was not missionary activity alone that caused hostility, but 'the union of missionary enterprise with the political power of the Government.* Cited in Embree, *India in 1857*, p. 13.
32. The former governor general blamed Indian unrest on the belief that government officials in India actively supported missionary activity.
33. LMSA, Lechler, Salem, 4 August 1857.
34. 'ART. IX. Considerations on the Policy of communicating the Knowledge of Christianity to the Natives in India', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1808), p. 173.
35. See *Edinburgh Review*, 12, (1808), pp. 151-181. Smith's attack on that occasion is referred to in MM June 1858, p. 129.
36. Missionary society publications had limited circulations, catering for a niche market and lacking the national coverage of the mainstream press. Although they usually remained bounded by their own textual agendas, they did sometimes pick up issues that overlapped with the mainstream press. Missionary debates on Sati in the 1810s and 1820s and their coverage of the Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica in 1865 are just two examples of evangelical incursions into 'national* discourses.
37. 'India: the Revolt of the Native Troops', MM August 1857, p. 182.
38. This letter, originally printed in *The Times* on 20 July 1857, was reprinted in MM October 1857, pp. 224-226.
39. 'Missionary Itinerancy in Bengal*, MM November 1857, p. 247.
40. Rev. J.B Coles, 'Letter dated 10th October*, MM December 1857, p. 268.
41. Rev. J.B Coles, 'Letter dated 10th October*, MM December 1857, p. 268.
42. Rev. Dr. Boaz, 'Letter dated July 18th', MM October 1857, p. 222.
43. 'India', MM November 1857, p. 242.

44. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 3rd September, MM November 1857, p. 243.
45. Catherine Hall, Wizte, *Male and Middle Class. Explorations in Feminism and History* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 212.
46. Rev. William Benyon, 'Letter dated 24th August', MM November 1857, p. 246.
47. Rev. A.F. Lacroix, 'Extract from a letter dated 17th June', MM September 1857, p. 203.
48. Rev. A.F. Lacroix, 'Extract from a letter dated 17th June',.MM September 1857, p. 203.
49. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 3rd September', MM November 1857, p. 243.
50. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 3rd September', MM November 1857, p. 243.
51. See E.I. Brodkin, 'The Struggle for Succession: Rebels and Loyalists in the Indian Mutiny of 1857', in *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1972), pp. 277-290.
52. Rev. William Benyon, 'Letter dated 24th August', MM November 1857, p. 244.
53. Rev. William Benyon, 'Letter dated 24th August', MM November 1857, p. 247.
54. Rev. William Benyon* 'Letter dated 24th August', MM November 1857, p. 246.
55. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 45.
56. 'India*, MM November 1857, p. 242.
57. Rev. A.F. Lacroix, 'Letter dated 9th September', MM November 1857, p.'244.
58. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 22 September 1857.
59. MM November 1857, p. 247.
60. For more on this see below.
61. MM September 1857, p. 202.
62. Cited in Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 76.
63. MM December 1857, p. 263.
64. LMSA, Sherring, Mirzapore, 4 January 1858.
65. See, for example, 'India: The Progress of the Insurrection', MM September 1857, p. 205.
66. LMSA, Kennedy, 30 June 1857.
67. Don Randall, 'Autumn 1857: The Making Of The Indian "Mutiny'", *Victorian Literature and Culture* (2003), p. 9.
68. See, for example, LMSA Kennedy, 20 July 1857.
69. Rev. Benjamin Rice, 'Letter dated 23rd September*, MM December 1857, p. 267.
70. J.H. Budden, 'Letter dated 3rd August', MM December 1857, p. 263.
71. Rev. Colin Campbell, 'Letter', MM February 1858, p. 28.
72. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 59.
73. Rev. Colin Campbell, 'Letter', MM February 1858, p. 28.
74. For a detailed discussion of the significance of the Fast Day for British perceptions of the Uprising, see Randall, 'Autumn 1857'.
75. Rev. J. Kennedy, 'Letter dated 22nd September', MM December 1857, p. 266.
76. 'India', MM November 1857, p. 244.
77. Rev. William Benyon, 'Letter dated 24th August', MM November 1857, p. 246.
78. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 49.
79. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 125.
80. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 149.
81. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 42.
82. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 146.
83. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 42.
84. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 129v
85. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 46.
86. 'Extension of Missions in British Indi ', MM March 1858, p. 49.
87. MM February 1858, p. 28.
88. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 43.
89. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM Marchfl858, p. 43.

90. Times, 4 May 1858, p. 9.
91. LMSA, Sherring, Mirzapore, 4 January 1858.
92. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 141.
93. Rev. Dr. Boaz, 'Letter dated July 18th', MM October 1857, p. 222.
94. Rev.J. Kennedy, 'Letter dated 22nd September', MM December 1857, p. 265.
95. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting', MM June 1858, p. 148.
96. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 41.
97. Jenny Sharpe, 'The Unspeakable Limits of Rape' in Williams and Chrisman, eds, *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 228.
98. 'India: The Progress of the Insurrection', MM September 1857, p. 202.
99. Rev. Dr. Boaz, 'Letter dated July 18th', MM October 1857, p. 222.
100. Bronwen Douglas, cited in Johnston, *Missionary Writingy*p. 34.
101. Sharpe, 'The Unspeakable Limits of Rape', p. 235.
102. 'Sixty-fourth General Meeting*, MM June 1858, p. 140.
103. J.H. Budden, 'Letter dated 3rd August', MM December 1857, p. 263.
104. LMSA Kennedy, Benares, 19 October 1857.
105. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 17th November', MM February 1858, p. 26.
106. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 17th November', MM February 1858, p. 26.
107. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 22 September 1857.
108. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 30 June 1857.
109. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 13 July 1857.
110. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 30 June 1857.
111. LMSA, Sherring, Benares, 23 June 1857.
112. See for example MM October 1857, p. 222.
113. MM September 1857, p. 204.
114. Rudrangshu Mukheijee, 'Satan Let Loose upon Earth: The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857', in *Past and Presenty* vol. 128 (1990), p. 116.
115. See MM March 1858, p. 53.
116. LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 20 May 1857.
117. Rev.J. Kennedy, 'Extract from a Letter dated 12 June*, MM September 1857, p. 205.
118. See Rev. James Kennedy, 'Letter dated 22nd April', MM July 1858, p. 161.
119. MM December 1857, p. 265.
120. Rev. Dr. Boaz, 'Letter dated July 18th*, MM October 1857, p. 222.
121. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 3rd September*, MM November 1857, p. 243.
122. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 17th November', MM February 1857, p. 26.
123. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 3rd September*, MM November 1857, p. 243.
124. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 51.
125. 'Extension of Missions in British India', MM March 1858, p. 51.
126. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 66.
127. MM March 1857, p. 51.
128. See Hall, *Civilising SubjectSy* p. 284.
129. Hall, *Civilising SubjectSy* p. 54.
130. Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 18.
131. Rev. M.A. Sherring, 'Letter dated 17th November*, MM February 1857, p. 26.
132. Rev. J. Kennedy, 'Letter dated 22nd September*, MM December 1857, p. 265.
133. Johnston, *Missionary Writingy* p. 7.
134. See LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 3 September 1857 and Kennedy, Benares, 19 October 1857.
135. LMSA, Sherring, Mirzapore, 6 October 1857.
136. Storrow's sudden desire to return to England, 'on account of his health', was put down by a fellow missionary to his being 'much alarmed by the disorders of the country' LMSA, Mullens, Bhowanipore (Calcutta), 8 August 1857.

137. See, for example, LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 13 July 1857; Kennedy, Benares, 22 September 1857.
138. Kennedy, for example, in an unpublished section of a published letter commented, 'I do not wish to blame anyone, I do not believe our directors are to blame, but I must be allowed to state the obvious fact that our missions in Northern India are weaker than those of any other society.' LMSA, Kennedy, Benares, 22 April 1858.
139. LMSA, Owen, n.d.
140. Cited in Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 26.
141. Catherine Hall, cited in Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, p. 40.
142. Copland, 'Christianity As An Arm Of Empire'.
143. LMSA, Sherring, Mirzapore, 4 January 1858.

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SCOTTISH PRESBYTERIAN MISSIONARIES AND PUBLIC OPINION IN SCOTLAND1

Esther Breitenbach

CHARACTERISATIONS of the events of 1857 in India have long been a subject of debate and contestation. While the description of the events as the "mutiny* by the British imperial regime has dominated both popular and historical discourses, the events have been severally characterised as a revolt, rebellion, war of independence, people's uprising, an attempt to restore the sovereignty of the Mughal emperor and as a religious war.2 If there is no clear agreement among historians on a definitive characterisation of the events, historical investigation has at least established the complex and multifaceted nature of the causes of the uprising, and that considerable local variation existed. One factor that was clearly integral to events was religion, yet the precise nature and extent of its significance remains disputed. Views on why the breaking of religious taboos by the use of greased cartridges triggered the initial revolt at Meerut have ranged from the dismissal of this as political manipulation to the sympathetic treatment of it as an insensitive blunder by the British. Similarly, assessments of the provocative nature of missionary activity range from denials that they had much impact on the Indian population to the depiction of a "clash of rival fundamentalisms' between British evangelical missionaries and Muslims.3There is evidence that the activities of evangelical Protestant missionaries, who were increasingly making their presence felt in the period before 1857, were causing disquiet among Muslims.4Hindu responses to the activities of missionaries were mixed, as Hindus were said to be often willing to make use of the educational opportunities provided by missionary schools, but were in general resistant to attempts at conversion, with individual conversions often provoking protests and the temporary withdrawal of pupils from schools.5It has been argued that, in the period preceding the 1857 uprising, what was most alarming to Indians was the perception of government support for missionary activities. As Disraeli put it to the House of Commons in July 1857, what the "Hindoo does dread' is 'the union

of missionary enterprise with the political power of the Government'.[6] While the official East India Company position was one of religious neutrality, in practice among both civil servants and military personnel there were active supporters of missions and of Christian proselytising, a factor which may have led, as Copland has argued, to a growing belief that 'the British were secretly encouraging the missionaries to spread Christianity'.[7] Given that religion is widely understood to have played a role in the events of 1857, it seems pertinent to ask how missionaries themselves interpreted events and how they represented their role in events. This chapter takes as a case study Scottish Presbyterian missionaries in India, how they depicted the uprising and its causes to the public in Scotland, and how missionary perspectives were reflected in the contemporary press in Edinburgh.

Scottish Presbyterian Missionary Activities in India Prior to 1857

India was among the early fields of missionary activity by Scots Presbyterians, and became a major location for Scottish foreign missions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Organised support for foreign missions was first established in Scotland with the formation of the Scottish Missionary and Glasgow Missionary Societies in 1796. Having endorsed foreign missions in 1824, the established Church of Scotland sent their first missionary, Alexander Duff, to India in 1829. By then the Scottish Missionary Society had already commenced missionary activity in Bombay. Following the split in the Church of Scotland—the Disruption of 1843[8]—missionary work in India was undertaken by both the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland, and from 1860 onwards also by the third main Presbyterian denomination, the United Presbyterian Church. By 1857, then, there were a small number of Scottish Presbyterian missionaries active in India, in around half a dozen locations scattered across the subcontinent: Bombay, Calcutta, Poona, Madras, Nagpur and Sialkot.[9] The overall number of Scottish missionaries, including wives of missionaries, at work in India between the 1820s and 1850s was small, probably around 60 altogether, with around 40 being in India in 1857.[10] Missions also employed Indians as ordained missionaries, teachers, catechists, and assistants, probably numbering as many as the Scottish missionaries if not more.[11]

The Sialkot mission was established in early 1857, and the Rev. Thomas Hunter, his wife, Jane Scott, and their infant son were to fall victim to the uprising in July 1857. They were the only Scottish missionaries killed during the uprising. Other Scottish missionaries were less directly affected by the events, and many of the reports sent back to Scotland suggested that as far as possible mission work continued as normal. Though the number of missionaries active in India was small, several missionaries in service in 1857 had already lived and

worked in India for substantial periods of time, most notably Alexander Duff, John Wilson and John Murray Mitchell. Duff, in particular, was one of the most influential missionaries of his time, both in terms of his promotion of education in the English language and his influence in building up missionary support at home in Scotland.[12] A prolific writer and passionate publicist for missionary activity, Duff was, not surprisingly, the most vocal contributor of views about the uprising among Scots missionaries.

In the period up to 1857, missionaries carried out evangelical and educational work, including educational work with girls, supported by Ladies' Associations at home from the late 1830s onwards. That education of girls was understood to contravene the views of Indians was often commented on, and arguments for its importance in the process of Christianisation were stressed. Regular denunciations of the treatment of girls and women in India were made, especially of sati,[13] the treatment of widows, child marriage and temple prostitution. In the 1850s a new approach of 'zenana' visiting was adopted, i.e., visiting at home those Indian women who lived in seclusion. Accounts of Scottish missionary work in India have claimed this as a Scottish innovation, apparently first mooted by Dr Thomas Smith, a Church of Scotland missionary in Calcutta, in 1840, and first put into practice in 1855 by a Miss Toogood.[14]

That a number of aspects of missionary work provoked a reaction or produced tensions is apparent in reading missionary reports. Scottish missionaries' activities, like those of other Protestant missionaries, could disrupt family relationships, breach rules of caste or the religious beliefs of Hindus and Muslims, and contravene Indian views of girls' and women's roles. Missionaries attempted to carry Christianisation into women's homes, actively promoted education in the language of the conquering power and clamoured for the abolition of practices and customs associated with indigenous religions. Furthermore, they took their preaching of Christianity into the streets and villages of India as far as they were able, preaching in public places, itinerating in provincial cities and towns, and establishing rural missions. They also actively organised occasions where disputations on different religious systems might take place, in their own accounts always declaring their victory in such intellectual battles. Between the 1830s and the 1850s missionaries were thus increasingly making their presence felt, through a range of activities that had the potential to cause disquiet.

Missionary work had a dual character, focused not only on the Christianisation of others in foreign countries, but also on the communication of 'missionary intelligence' to people at home. This was integral to their work, and was part of the contract of missionary 'agents', regulated by committees and boards at home. Periodicals containing news of foreign missions, alongside news of home missions, first appeared in Scotland in the 1820s. Following the 1843 Disruption, periodicals were produced on denominational lines, with both the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland additionally launching periodicals on women's mission work around the late 1850s and early 1,860s. An

abundant pamphlet literature was also produced, including sermons, addresses to General Assemblies, speeches to AGMs of the Ladies' Associations, and so on.

This literature 'relied on the endless recirculation of tropes in a discourse condemning Indian customs and practices'.[15] Its key themes were: the superiority of Christianity; the civilising mission, with its emphasis on education and European science; and the 'degradation' of womefc in India. The idea of the superiority of Christianity was often articulated through a denunciation of Indians' 'horrid delusions' and 'multifarious idolatries',[16] while missionary education afforded moral protection and brought the 'fierce light of European thought' to challenge the 'terrible power' of Indian religions.[17] India was denounced as witnessing 'the greater degradation of women and her subjection to the man' than any other country.[18] Such discourses of religion, race and gender were structured around the counterpoint of Scots Christians and their values, justifying missionary intervention and projecting an austere Presbyterian ethic, emphasising hard work, education and self-help.

By 1857, there was in Scotland what might be described as an 'educated' public with an interest in India, an audience of regular consumers of first-hand accounts from Scots and other Protestant missionaries, albeit accounts framed by a religious understanding with a particular bias. That Scottish missionaries had the capacity to comment on events in India, drawing on direct experience of living and working there, would have naturally aroused interest among supporters, and it is in this context of the growth of an actively engaged public that contemporary debate on the events in India should be understood.

Reporting of the Uprising in Missionary Periodicals

Given the proximity of Scots missionaries in India to the events of the uprising, it might be anticipated that missionary periodicals would have commented on events, their causes and their impact on missionary work. In fact the coverage given to the uprising in periodicals appears to have been very limited.[19] This may have been on the one hand because, with the exception of Thomas Hunter and his family, none of the Scottish missionaries was caught up directly in the conflict, and on the other because of a conscious desire to emphasise the efforts of missionaries to continue steadfastly in their labours despite the difficult circumstances.

The overall number of missionaries and members of their families who lost their lives during the uprising was relatively small. Duff, writing in October 1857, estimated the number of 'British Christians' who had died to be at least 1,300. This number 'includes *four* chaplains, and *ten* male missionaries with their wives. Of the latter ten, two, belonging to the Propagation Society, fell at Cawnpore, and three at Delhi; four, of the American Presbyterian Mission, at

Futteghur; and one, of the Established Church of Scotland, at Sealkote, in the Punjab/[20] Thus most Scottish missionaries appeared not to have been directly in danger during the uprising. Duff and his colleagues in Calcutta were probably the most affected, given the episodes of panic that afflicted Europeans in Calcutta in the period after the initial 'mutiny' at Meerut. Other Scots had some involvement in events, such as John Wilson, whose linguistic skills were of use to British intelligence in deciphering intercepted letters (an involvement only acknowledged much later).[21]

With mail taking months to travel between India and Scotland, it was not until September 1857 that the first reference to the uprising occurred in the pages of the Church of Scotland's *Home and Foreign Missionary Record* (hereafter *HFMR)*. This described the 'calamities in India' that had 'extinguished in blood' the Delhi mission. However, the article urged against the spirit of vengeance apparent in some Indian papers. Justice should be done, and 'the guilty' should be 'condemned to die, as far as their cruelty can be proved, and as far as they persist in rebellion'. But 'our fellow-countrymen in India must see to it that they act as Christians' and not imitate 'the barbarities which, even when perpetrated by heathens, are universally condemned'.[22]

The deaths of Thomas Hunter, his wife and child, were of course recorded, briefly in September 1857, followed in October by a lengthy obituary of Hunter and his wife, Jane Scott. This gave an account of their family background and commitment to Christian work both at home and as missionaries to India, together with an account of their death. Having stayed on at 'Sealcote' when most other Europeans had left for safety in the Fort at Lahore, the Hunters eventually attempted to also make their way there, but were 'murdered on the road'. The author of the obituary speculated as to the reasons for this: 'It seemed to have been no part of the Sealcote mutineers' plan to massacre ladies and children, but perhaps Mrs Hunter had offended the fanatic Mohammedans by establishing a small female school, a crime in their eyes deserving death.'[23] A more detailed account of the Hunters' death was subsequently published as part of the General Assembly's Foreign missions report in July 1858, drawing upon a paper by Hunter's brother, Robert, a Free Church missionary at Nagpur.[24]

Clearly, events in Sialkot put an end to missionary endeavour there for the duration of the uprising, though the Church of Scotland initiated a new mission there as soon as it was possible. Elsewhere, the widespread unrest accompanying the uprising had some impact on missionary operations. In August 1857 Frances Hebron wrote from Calcutta that 'mission work is at a standstill at present' and that recently the missionaries had been 'in great danger'. The 'disturbances' were also preventing new work, such as a planned day-school 'in the heart of a Mohammedan village'.[25] At around the same time, missionaries from Chota Nagpore 'had been constrained to seek refuge in Calcutta', while in April 1858, educational work in Calcutta was interrupted as institution buildings had to be

given up 'for a good many days for the accommodation of European soldiers'.[26] In Bombay the number of pupils had declined, but this was not to be regarded as 'a matter either of surprise or disappointment' when 'the excitement caused by the reception of converts into the Mission, and the condition of the native mind during the past year, are taken into account'.[27]

In general the emphasis in the Church of Scotland *HFMR* was on ongoing mission work, with little discussion of the causes of the uprising, an attitude typified by the 1858 General Assembly's report on Foreign Missions. This stated that 'Opportunities of becoming acquainted with the public transactions that have recently taken place in India, have been so abundant, and so universally embraced' that the Committee 'abstain from entering on any general details'. They therefore contented themselves with a 'passing allusion to the nature and consequences of a revolt, marked by a spirit of treachery and fierceness perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world, and resisted, in circumstances of peculiar difficulty, with a measure of success at once most honourable to British valour and endurance'.[28] In the limited discussion in the pages of the Church of Scotland *HFMR* about the 'revolt' and about the Government of India, the main emphasis was placed on the attention drawn by events in India to the need for its more effective Christianisation, and on the best methods for doing this. These events had influenced the nation's character, since 'by their disasters in India, the British have become a more serious, a more God-fearing people'. This had increased the conviction 'among all classes' that the true plan for Christianising India was 'THE PREACHING OF CHRIST, (emphasis in the original) in season and out of season, early and late' and not the 'English language', 'English literature', 'English politeness'—which, in a rare positive comment about Indian people was described as 'very far inferior to that of the Hindoos'—or 'English science'.[29] A subsequent article on 'The Government in India', in October 1858, was similarly concerned with the best means of promoting Christianisation in India. Though suggesting that the government had been responsible for mismanagement, it refused to explore possible causes of the 'revolution' other than that of God's displeasure: 'even if we could discern enough in the Indian revolt to warrant us in giving an opinion of its causes, that opinion would neither be so profitable nor so indisputable as the inevitable reflection that God must have had a controversy—that He has a controversy—with the British people, in reference to their management of India.'[30]

That the hand of Providence could be seen at work in visiting judgement on the British for failing to carry out properly the Christian duty entrusted to them was a view widely shared by missionaries, missionary societies and churches, also finding expression in the secular press. What particularly rankled with evangelicals was the government's 'obstruction to Christianity and Christian missions' and their giving of aid to 'heathen shrines'. Supporters of missionary activity within the Church of Scotland, as ip other denominations, thus reacted to the events in India with a renewed lobbying of government over the issue of

how Christian proselytising should be handled in India, as well as spurring on the church-going public to make greater efforts to support foreign missions.

Missionary Interventions in Scottish Public Debate

The most influential missionary writing on events in India was the series of letters written by Alexander Duff to the Rev. Dr Tweedie, Convenor of the Free Church of Scotland Foreign Missions Board, and published in the Edinburgh newspaper, the *Witness*.[31] The close relationship between the Free Church and the *Witness* meant that it was the natural vehicle for the publication of Duffs letters. The circumstances in which Duff wrote his letters presupposed a wide public circulation, as indeed occurred.[32] A collection of these letters, commencing on 16 May 1857 and continuing until 22 March 1858, was subsequently published in a single volume in 1858.[33] The publication of this collection was by popular demand, as the publishers' note makes clear, while it also offers an endorsement of Duff as a man of judgement and experience. Although 'it was first believed by some that Dr Duff had exaggerated the nature of the Indian crisis', subsequent reports had borne out Duffs views, which were 'the ripe result of thirty years' and would be valued 'as the deliberate judgement of one who has possessed opportunities of observation almost unequalled'.[34] In his history of Free Church missions, Robert Hunter was later to attribute to DufFs letters a significant impact on Scottish public opinion. When the initial news of the 'mutiny' at Meerut and the capture of Delhi arrived, the trial of Madeleine Smith,[35] then taking place in Edinburgh, 'almost entirely occupied the attention of the Scottish public'. However, 'the letters of Dr Duff, which exhibited the peril in its full magnitude ... had no slight influence in dissipating the false security that prevailed, and making it plain that Britain must put forth all her strength if she wished to retain possession of her Indian empire.'[36]

The context of an ordained missionary writing to the church leadership and addressing church members, missionary supporters and a wider Christian public, is important in understanding the character of these writings. They are throughout imbued with religious rhetoric and with religious- purpose—primarily that of arousing greater enthusiasm for the task of Christianising India and encouraging greater support for foreign missions. Intermingled with religious rhetoric in these writings were a number of strands: the reporting of events based on news and eye-witness accounts reaching Duff in Calcutta; an analysis of attitudes towards British rule in India; explanations for the causes of the 'rebellion' and debates with the views of others on this; suggestions about appropriate government responses; and criticisms of the 'old traditional' policies of the East India Company and Board of Control for their treatment

of Christianity and of indigenous religions in India. While these strands may be treated separately for analytic purposes, in Duffs writings such topics were invariably accompanied by a religious coda, and the two essential points that underlay Duffs understanding of the existence of British rule in India were that India was a gift of God's Providence to Britain for the purpose of Christianising it and that the 'rebellion' was a sign of God's displeasure for Britain's failure to rise adequately to this duty.

As noted, missionary writings on India had routinely propagated negatively stereotypical views of Indian religions and peoples in the decades preceding the uprising. Accounts of specific incidents, of killings, of Indian leaders, and of other aspects of the uprising thus provided plentiful opportunities for reinforcing these stereotypes, and of elaborating these in ways that intensified their negativity. Thus, characterisations of Indians as 'superstitious' and 'fanatical' were much in evidence. For example, the 'superstitious' nature of the sepoys allowed them to be manipulated over the greased cartridges affair by 'some deep designing men',[37] while the conviction that British rule would end on the centenary day of the battle of Plassey came to be a certainty 'in the minds of an ignorant, superstitious, fanatical people'.[38] To these characteristics were added the further, and more damning ones, of disloyalty, faithlessness and 'Asiatic treachery', while accounts of British fatalities at the hands of Indians were invariably accompanied by epithets such as 'ruthless savages'.[39]

Duff did not stint himself in giving details of 'atrocities', in particular of the killing of women and children, accounts peppered with exclamation marks and sensationalist in tone, though he also confided that many details 'of the most loathsome and revolting kind had been purposely suppressed, to spare the agonised feelings of distant mourning friends'.[40] He hinted that European women were raped,[41] for example at Allahabad, where the rebels' 'treatment of any European females that have fallen into their hands has been too horrible to be expressed by me'.[42] To describe Duff's descriptions of such events as sensationalist is not to deny that the killings were genuinely shocking, but rather to emphasise that such intemperate sensationalism encouraged vengefulness and intensified the racism of missionary representations of Indian peoples and society. Notably, and somewhat surprisingly for a Christian minister, Duff explicitly came to the support of General Neill, criticised for the severity and character of his reprisals against rebels in Cawnpore.[43] The extent to which Duff's accounts were factually accurate has been contested,[44] though Duff himself was at pains to assure readers that he had access to many witnesses and reliable sources. Whatever their accuracy, he was not alone in providing accounts of this nature, and, indeed, extensive coverage of a comparable character, drawing on many supposedly eye-witness accounts, appeared in English and Scottish newspapers for months, as Duff was well aware, judging by the several allusions to his readers' familiarity with the coverage of 'public

journals'. In general these denunciations of Indian 'atrocities', Indian society and religions, served to justify British rule and a robust military response to the uprising.

A striking characteristic of Duffs account was the extent of hostility towards British rule that he imputed to Indians, a view consonant with his assertion that the 'rebellion' was not merely a military revolt.[45] In his view there was never '*anything like affection* or *loyal attachment*' (emphasis in original) to British rule,[46] and although British rule had often been welcomed at first by 'the labouring classes', after a while they were 'apt to settle down into a state of necessitated acquiescence or sullen indifference, or latent disaffection and discontent'.[47] However, there were differences among different groups in India in their attitudes to British rule, with the haters of it 'to be found chiefly among the Mohammedans, Brahmins, Rajputs, and other armed and turbulent classes of Northern and Central India',[48] although, generally, to 'genuine Mohammedans and Hindus our rule, merely as the rule of Christian foreigners, would be a standing grievance and unforgivable offence'.[49] In his earlier letters in 1857, Duff repeatedly declared that the 'revolt' was a 'Mohammedan conspiracy' that had been 'long-concocted',[50] and also made reference to the theory that 'Russian spies' had 'been successfully at work in inflaming the bigotry of the Mussulman and the prejudices of the high-caste Hindu', with Persia too, having a hand in this.[51] By December 1857, however, he had moved to the view that the 'long and deliberately concocted' rebellion had 'been able to array the Hindu and Mohammedan in an unnatural confederacy'.[52] Notwithstanding this recognition of Hindu involvement, it is Muslims who were particularly the object of Duff's vituperation—the 'Mohammedans to a man' were regarded as being against the British government, while not all 'Hindustanis' were.[53]

Though clearly taking the view that government officials had not grasped the potential danger that might arise from disaffection among Indian people as well as among the army, Duff in general applauded the effects of British rule for having brought order, social advancement for the people, and social reforms. However, he inveighed against the 'old "traditional policy" of the Home and Foreign Indian Government' with its 'shrinking dread, if not actual repudiation, of Christianity, and its co-relative pandering to heathenish prejudices'.[54] This issue rankled the most with missionaries, and led them to declare that God was visiting punishment on Britain: 'It is the Lord who, in a strange way, and for the accomplishment of one of the noblest of ends, even that of the evangelisation of its people, gave India to Britain. It is the Lord who, on account of our culpable misimprovement of the awful trust, in His sore displeasure, suffered India to be nearly lost to us.'[55] Stressing the benefits of Christianity for India and for British rule, Duff declared that 'native Christians' were the only Indians demonstrating true loyalty to the British government. He also asserted of missionaries that

> *nowhere has any special enmity or hostility been manifested towards them by the mutineers*.... Such of them as fell in the way of the rebels were simply dealt with precisely in the same way as all other Europeans were dealt with. They belonged to the governing class.... (Emphasis in the original.)[56]

For Duff, as for his co-religionists, the fierce condemnation of Indian actions during the uprising served to strengthen the argument for Christianisation of India. The widespread disaffection and resentment towards British rule described by Duff, probably with considerable accuracy, never gave rise to a questioning of the rightness of British rule in India, nor to many aspects of its administration, with the notable exception of the East India Company's reluctance to give free rein to missionary activity. While there was, no doubt, considerable accuracy in attributing the aim of overthrow of British rule to those groups whose power had been or was most likely to be eroded by that rule, it is interesting that Duff stressed the political dimensions of this and downplayed the religious. This is of a piece with the view that no hostility was exhibited towards missionaries as such, and effectively amounted to a denial that missionary activity could have played any role in provoking the uprising. Thus, while Duff's experience and knowledge of India produced an analysis that viewed the causes of the uprising as complex, and which on certain points demonstrated some depth and persuasiveness, overall his presentation of the situation was inevitably shaped by his commitment to the goal of extending Christian proselytisation in India.

Duff's writings have been discussed at some length, both because they provide a more in-depth account than any other Scottish missionary writings on this topic, and because of the wider audience they reached. Duff was not, however, the only missionary who communicated his views on the uprising to the Scottish public, as is evident both from other correspondence in the *Witness*, and from occasional references to public meetings in the press. John Wilson, in Bombay at the time of the uprising, and Robert Hunter, a Free Church missionary at Nagpur, at home on furlough at this time, both had letters published in the *Witness* in 1857. Wilson was critical of the deference to caste within the army, which he saw as having been a major factor in the revolt—a position in line with his general views about caste.[57] Like other missionaries, he asserted the need for greater evangelisation of India.[58] Unlike Duff, however, he thought there was a lack of evidence of Muslim conspiracy at work in the uprising.[59] Hunter was similarly critical of the role that caste had played in discontent within the Bengal army, contrasting favourably the Bombay and Madras armies, which tended to recruit more from lower castes.[60] He demonstrated some sympathy in his understanding of the offence caused by the greased cartridges to Hindus and Muslims, even if their religions were seen as a commitment to 'mere ceremony'.[61] Hunter gave no credence to the theory that Russia had a

hand in instigating the 'mutiny", though like Duff he expressed strong hostility to Muslims.[62] Hunter was unusual in his gloomy prognosis for the future, in which he anticipated greater difficulties for missionary work and further outbreaks of violence in the longer term,[63] in contrast to the typical reaction, which was to call for increased missionary efforts as a means both of civilising and pacifying India. To what extent Hunter's position was influenced by the death of his brother Thomas, with his wife and son, is hard to say. The impact of this event, however, appears to have led to his resignation as a missionary.[64]

Hunter also took an active part in public meetings in Edinburgh at this time, as did John Murray Mitchell, a Free Church missionary in Bombay, in Scotland in this period for reasons of health. Their names were among the proposers of the formation of an 'Association for the removal of all Government encouragement of caste, connection with idolatry, and opposition to Christianity in India",[65] and Mitchell was subsequently a speaker at a public meeting in Glasgow held to establish a similar association there.[66] Mitchell delivered a lecture on the uprising on a number of occasions, with this being published in 1859. His pamphlet, *Indian Missions: viewed in connexion with The Mutiny and Other Recent Events*, was less concerned with the events of the 'mutiny" or its causes, but rather with the lessons to be learned. Like Duff's writings, Mitchell's pamphlet served to encourage support for the missionary cause. For Mitchell, the events in India had revealed the true character of 'Heathenism", which was to be contrasted with Christianity: 'Although, in the sad history of earth, deeds of equal atrocity have been committed, yet never was the spirit of Paganism so clearly and sharply defined against the spirit of Christianity.'[67]

Like Duff and other missionaries, Mitchell declared that no one could deny the connection between British shortcomings and God's punishment, resulting from the government having banned missionaries from contact with the army. He stressed that the 'natives' had no quarrel with missionaries, and argued that the loyalty of 'native Christians" to the British government was a riposte to the criticism of missionaries that they had made few converts. Thus he anticipated that there would be greater support for missions from British Christians for the urgent task of the evangelisation of India. He publicised the increase in missionary activities occurring prior to the uprising, such as translations of the key texts of other religions, which allowed such religions to be exposed to comparison with Christianity, and translation and circulation of Christian scriptures in vernacular languages. The 'positive blessings" of material progress resulting from British rule were also enumerated: railways, the telegraph, mines, irrigation, social reform and education—including education of females.[68] Despite these benefits, British rule was criticised for its 'traditional system' of governance in India, and particularly for the endowment of 'heathen" temples.[69] Thus he welcomed the end of the system of government of the East India Company and the Board of Control.

Representation of Missionary Perspectives in Edinburgh Newspapers

Coverage of the events of the uprising in leading Edinburgh newspapers of the day was extensive, including reports of events with many detailed, supposedly eye-witness, accounts, reporting of parliamentary debates and government action. As noted, the Edinburgh *Witness* provided the major vehicle for the expression of missionary views on events in India, though editorials did not always concur with these.[70] However, the newspaper was strongly supportive of the need for greater freedom to Christianise India, and took a lead in urging a missionary conference to discuss the situation in India and the appropriate response to this.[71]

In the *Scotsman* the main coverage given to the churches' attitudes towards the uprising was occasioned by the national day of ‘Humiliation and Prayer', held on 7 October 1857. Queen Victoria had issued a proclamation, ‘For a Day of Solemn Fast, Humiliation, and Prayer, in Scotland',[72] on account of the ‘grievous mutiny and disturbances which have broken out in India.' The object of the day was that people might humble themselves before God, ‘in order to obtain pardon of our sins', and to implore ‘His Blessing and Assistance on our Arms for the Restoration of Tranquillity'.[73] The day of ‘National Humiliation' was a significant event both in Scotland and elsewhere in Britain. The *Witness* reported that ‘Business was everywhere suspended, even the railways in general discontinuing their ordinary trains.'[74] Sermons on the theme of India were preached throughout the country—in London a crowd of 24,000 people gathered at the Crystal Palace to listen to the Rev. Charles Spurgeon.[75]

While the lengthy Fast Day sermons and addresses published in the *Scotsman* generally supported the view that events in India were a sign of God's wrath for the failure of the government to promote Christianity, there were a small number of dissenting voices. Proclamation of the Fast was not greeted with universal approval, since it meant the sacrifice of a day's wage for ‘the working man' who could ill afford it. Nor was it obvious how this could have ‘any effect in mitigating the mutiny or helping Havelock to relieve Lucknow'.[76] Furthermore, the experience of events in India should have ‘taught those in authority that forced prayers are no devotion', since it was evident that the ‘attempt to force religion down the throats of the Hindoo and Mussulman' was ‘inimical to their tastes and prejudices'.[77]

The widespread notion that the sins of the people of Britain were being punished by God in the form of the Indian uprising was not accepted by all. The Rev. Dr Robert Lee,[78] preaching a sermon at Greyfriars Church, declared that though ‘their gracious sovereign' had called on people ‘to humble themselves and confess their sins in connection wit!) the disasters in India', it was ‘not a matter quite plain what were the particular transgressions which they ought to

acknowledge'.[79] Though 'some religious persons thought that these misfortunes were designed to punish us for not having used our public authority more absolutely and forcibly in promoting the Christian religion',[80] he 'denied that a foreign nation was justified in using the taxes of a people to propagate a religion which the population almost universally rejected'.[81] Lee thought both that a policy of religious neutrality was sound, and such acts of British rule as the abolition of sati were just, but despite such acts of justice, '[p]erhaps the sin which would be least thought of this day was our being rulers in India at all. It was not evident that we had any call to "garrison the world", or any peculiar qualification for the task.'[82] In questioning the imperial project in itself, Lee appears to have stood alone, but even he ended up defending British rule. Since Britain had reached this position, 'we must maintain it if we can'.[83]

The *Edinburgh Courant* similarly provided extensive coverage of the events of the Indian Uprising, though it did not provide editorial comment, and many of the articles printed in it were reprinted from other newspapers, such as the *Times*, and also, occasionally, the *Witness*. For example, some of Duff's letters from the *Witness* were reprinted in the *Courant* Unlike the *Scotsman*, the *Courant* did not publish the sermons delivered on the 'Day of National Humiliation and Prayer', though the proclamation announcing the day was published. References to missionaries were relatively few, but, where these occurred, tended to give voice to the evangelical view. For example, in an article on 'The Bengal Army and the Missionaries' it was pointed out that missionaries had been banned from contact with the army, an indication of 'the wretched worldly spirit that has guided our Indian Government'. Furthermore, if fear of proselytism had been the real cause of the uprising, 'the property and lives of the missionaries would have been selected for special vengeance'.[84] On a number of occasions the issue of government policy on religion was referred to, mostly in reporting church and missionary meetings, which indicated that in various parts of Scotland church worthies were putting on record their opposition to government policy, urging, for example, that the government should 'openly assert its Christian character', give encouragement to missions, and abolish regulations prohibiting the introduction of 'Scriptures' into government-supported seminaries.[85]

The *Edinburgh Courant* also provided some coverage of the views of missionaries and their supporters on the causes of the uprising. Of the Duff letters it reprinted, one expounded his view that the 'rebellion' was neither purely a military revolt nor a national one.[86] A debate that took place at the City Council in September 1857 moved a resolution critical of the government, asserting that it was not a military mutiny, 'but a revolt of race, religion, and colour against a dominant Power alien in all these respects'.[87] A public meeting in Glasgow had heard from Sir Archibald Alison[88] that, 'It is in vain to speak of the greased cartridges; the revolt was organised by the Mohammedans years before the greased cartridges were heard of.'[89] Alison, like Duff, took the view that it was not a national movement, contrasting the acts of Indians with national heroes

such as William Tell in Switzerland, and William Wallace and Robert the Bruce in Scotland.

Cowan has commented of reaction to the Indian Uprising in the Scottish press in general, that the Church press 'responded most briskly' to the suggestion that missionaries had a role in provoking this, and 'repudiated it as a slander'.[90] And although the *Scotsman* urged respect for Indian institutions, in joining in the call for the day of 'national humiliation and prayer' it supported the view that the calamity arose from neglect of the duty to Christianise. There were of course defenders of the position of 'religious neutrality' adopted by the government, and attacks on evangelicals for their desire to establish a 'theocratic' form of government in India.[91] However, while opinion in the press was not unanimous, it was the demand for enhanced efforts at Christianisation that was to garner more support, since 'public reaction to the horrors of the struggle was predominantly against the view that India had a culture worthy of being preserved, or that its people had substantial grievances against our commercial, administrative, and religious purposes'.[92] This evidence indicates that while newspaper coverage of events in India consisted predominantly of accounts of 'atrocities' and British military retaliation against Indians, the missionary presence in India was also recognised in the press, and the views of the Presbyterian churches had a hearing. Indeed, the complaints of missionaries and their supporters that the government had been wanting in its attitude to Christianity were widely supported, though there were also some dissenting voices. Missionaries and their supporters were thus clearly able to communicate their views to the wider Scottish public. How wide this readership was in Edinburgh is suggested by figures cited by Cowan on circulation and the development of the Scottish newspaper press in the 1850s. In 1850, the *Witness* had a circulation of 2460, compared to 2900 for the *Scotsman* and 1630 for the *Edinburgh Courant*,[93] with the two former papers being Liberal in their politics, while the *Courant* was Conservative. By 1858, the *Scotsman* had achieved a circulation of 10,000. This increased newspaper circulation was due in part to the lower price of newspapers resulting from the removal of the advertisement duty in 1853 and of the compulsory newspaper stamp in 1855, and partly due to 'the adventitious aid of sensational news, as from the Crimea and India', which did much to boost circulation in the short term.[94]

As with the leading Edinburgh newspapers discussed here, it can be assumed that similarly wide coverage of events in India was provided by Glasgow newspapers and those of other cities such as Dundee (particularly given its connection to Calcutta through the jute industry). It is also likely that such newspapers would have given some space to missionary and church opinion, though both the extent of coverage and the views expressed may have varied considerably in different parts of Scotland.[95] In Edinburgh specifically there was an important overlap between the publication of views for the church-going audience as such and for a wider public in the form of the *Witness*, in which Duff's letters were published, and this suggests that missionary and church

opinion may have received more extensive circulation in Edinburgh than in other Scottish cities.

Conclusion

Given the religious nature of Scottish society at this time (25.6 per cent of the population were church-goers in 1851, rising to 50.5 per cent in 1905),[96] missionary literature in itself had the capacity to reach a sizeable audience. During 1857 and 1858, this capacity was enhanced by press coverage relevant to missionary concerns. Moreover, there was active support for foreign missions among leading members of Scottish elites, who were well placed to influence public opinion. In this sense, 1857 represented a new phase in the profile of missions and missionaries in Scotland, which at least in the short-term generated greater support.[97] Thus, while Scottish missionaries were for the most part neither at the centre of events in India, nor at the centre of public discussion of these events in Scotland, they were able to influence public opinion, and with the change in the nature of government in India following the uprising, missionaries effectively achieved their objectives of greater freedom of action to proselytise.

Among a network of missionaries active in promoting their views Alexander Duff was most influential as a shaper of opinion, though his views on the nature and causes of the uprising were not always shared. His writings have been characterised by modern historians as both 'bigoted' and 'sensationalist'. Cox, in discussing the evangelical tradition in India, cites the approach of Duff 'as being in some respects the most defamatory of all' in its attitudes to Indians,[98] with much of the religious discourse of Duff and his fellow missionaries being 'painful reading, transparently awfi.il in its ethnocentric bigotry'.[99] Taylor has commented more generally of accounts of the uprising, that it was 'men of the cloth' who spread the most sensationalist accounts, without attempting to verify their accuracy, and particularly singles out Duff for criticism: 'Dr Duff was a clergyman but his account is bereft of Christian forgiveness—indeed contains uncorroborated sensationalist propaganda.'[100] Taylor implies that this was not merely a matter of journalistic style, but that it perhaps had a more 'sinister' aim of 'preparing the public for a more intense effort to convert India to Christianity'.[101] It is not possible to say to what extent Duff was acting in good faith in reporting the tales of 'atrocities', which he was garnering in Calcutta from various sources,[102] though it is clear that he turned these to account in the promotion of Christianisation in India. However, there is a case to be made that there is more to Duff's letters than 'sensationalist' reporting of 'atrocities', and that, while biased in particular against Muslims, they do offer some insights into conditions in India at the time. It is nonetheless striking, at least to a modern reader, that Duff's view of the widespread hostility and resistance to British rule

did not lead him to question the justifiability of that rule, but rather to a renewed evangelical fervour for Christianisation as the means of generating loyal Indian subjects of the British crown.

In general, Scottish Presbyterian missionaries, together with their counterparts in other parts of Britain, demonstrated the capacity to get their case aired in the press and supported at home, and to influence gbvernment decisions. This suggests that they were relatively integrated into the apparatus of temporal power and able to operate its levers in their interest. But at the same time, the extent to which they were (or perceived themselves to be) separate from the state and to which they were peripheral to state action allowed missionaries to persuade themselves that they played no role in provoking the uprising. The distinction missionaries made between church and state, and their emphasis on the prohibition from approaching sepoys as absolving them from any provocative role, were distinctions that were probably not apparent to Indian observers, especially given the penchant of missionaries for seeking support of governors and other civil service dignitaries, for example, at annual examinations in mission schools, and given their links with army officers. That there was apparently regular contact between army officers, soldiers and missionaries in various places in India, that some military men were known to be committed Christians and that some actively supported missions through financial donations, rather undercuts the argument that the army had been free from Christian influence. While it seems to have been largely true that army officers did not attempt to preach Christianity to Indian soldiers (although there were exceptions to this, such as Colonel Wheler, whose case was covered in the newspapers at the time),[103] the social interaction between some officers and missionaries must have nonetheless been apparent. It is also clear from their own accounts that missionaries' actions could provoke a negative response, but whether this was sufficiently intense to motivate rebellion is another question, and any more definitive answer to this is likely to come from investigation of Indian sources about Indian responses. This chapter can therefore do little to answer the question as to what role the activities of missionaries may have played in provoking the 'mutiny', not least because it considers exclusively the views of Scots. The significance of the evidence considered here lies rather in demonstrating the crucial role that even a small number of missionaries could play in the creation of understandings of empire for people at home.

In their representations of the uprising, missionaries used events to reinforce and deepen negative stereotypes of Hindus and Muslims, the latter in particular being the object of hostile comment, and to bolster their arguments for the need for Christianisation. In this, missionaries can be said to have manipulated events to further their own cause, just as some Indians were said to have manipulated religious sensitivities in relation to the greased cartridges affair. The increasingly apparent racism of missionary discourses at this time also perhaps represents a definitive shift towards the dominance of theories of 'scientific' racism as a key

component of imperialist discourses.[104] Moreover, the missionary commitment to global Christianisation was paralleled by a commitment to the British empire and British rule, even if in specific aspects the latter was found wanting.

It can be argued then that the events of 1857 and 1858 represented a crucial stage in the crystallisation of negative, racialised stereotypes of Indians of various faiths, and of consolidation of widespread public support for imperial power. Randall has argued that, in particular, the day of 'national humiliation" on 7 October was 'a key moment, perhaps *the* key moment, in the consolidation of the meaning of the Indian "Mutiny" for England and the British Empire",[105] and has demonstrated the extent to which sermons preached that day drew on the rhetoric of English national destiny and of definitions of Englishness. While there were clearly many similarities between English and Scottish discourses on the 'mutiny"—vilification of Indian peoples and religions, Providentialist interpretations of events, criticism of the East India Company but support for the empire—the relationship between national identity and empire was differently articulated. Although it was often to 'British Christians" that appeals were made to save the British Empire from its own shortcomings, signifiers of Scottish identity were just as frequently present in missionary writings and in the press, whether references to Highland soldiers, fellow Presbyterians such as General Neill, or national heroes such as Wallace and Bruce. In reporting and commenting on the events of 1857 and 1858 the opportunity was afforded to Scottish missionaries to enhance their public profile at home, and to claim their place as interpreters of imperial affairs for a Scottish audience. In making use of this opportunity, they provided moral justifications for empire and imperialism, and thus played a role in fostering imperialist sentiment in Scotland.

Notes and References

1. This is a revised version of a paper given at a workshop on '"Reporting 1857": The Indian Uprising and the British Media', 23 July, 2007, University of Edinburgh. I am grateful for the award of an ESRC postdoctoral fellowship, which enabled this research to be undertaken.
2. See, for example, Ainslie T. Embree, *1857 in India: Mutiny or War of Independence?* (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1968); and, for a more recent discussion, Nupur Chaudhuri and Rajat Kanta Ray, *1857: Historical Works and Proclamations*. Paper presented to the 'Mutiny at the Margins' conference, Edinburgh University, July 2007.
3. For the 'clash of fundamentalisms' thesis, see William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), especially Chapter 2, 'Believers and Infidels', pp. 58-84.
4. See Avril Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) (first published 1993).
5. See Ian Copland, 'Christianity as an Arm of Empire: The Ambiguous Case of India under the Company, c. 1813-1858', in *The Historical Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4, (2006), pp. 1025-1054.
6. Quoted in Embree, *1857 in India*, p. 9.

7. Copland, 'India under the Company*, p. 1050.
8. The Disruption, in which a considerable proportion of the ministers and congregations of the Church of Scotland left it and established the Free Church of Scotland, as the consequence of a disagreement over the issue of patronage, i.e., whether landowners rather than congregations had the right to appoint ministers, created a major division in Scottish religious life which was to last until 1929.
9. I have followed the usage of primary sources from 1857 and 18^8 for place names, though recognise that many have since been renamed or are written differently.
10. It is difficult to provide a precise number for Scottish missionaries in India in 1857, since contemporary Free Church records listed only 'ordained* missionaries, and this excluded missionary teachers, and the wives of missionaries, who often worked as teachers, or ran schools or orphanages. Nor did Free Church records list the women missionaries employed by the Ladies* Association linked to the Free Church. In the Church of Scotland's General Assembly proceedings, lists of missionaries employed were not included. However, such lists did appear in the annual *New Edinburgh Almanac.* The figures cited above are based on missionaries listed in these sources plus an estimated figure for the number of missionaries* wives working in missions.
11. Numbers of Indians working in Scottish missions were not always specified.
12. Embree describes Duff as 'one of the most influential missionaries of the nineteenth century*. Embree, *1857 in India*, p. ix.
13. For a discussion of changing attitudes to Sati, and of missionary representations of this as emblematic of Hindu religion, see Andrea Major, *Pious Flames: European Encounters with Sati* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).
14. See *Free Church ofScotland Record*, No XI, December 15,1861, and Elizabeth Hewat, *Vision and Achievement, 1796-1956: A History of the Foreign Missions of the Churches united in the Church ofScotland* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1960).
15. Anna Johnston, *Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 81.
16. John Wilson, *Memoir of Mrs Margaret Wilson* (Edinburgh: John Johnstone and London: Whittaker and Co and J Nisbet and Co, 1838), p. 340.
17. Mitchell, J. Murray, *In Western India: Recollections of My Early Missionary Life* (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1899), p. 120.
18. Duff, Scottish Ladies* Association, *Report*, 1839.
19. Periodicals published by the Church of Scotland and Free Church of Scotland were consulted for this section. Unfortunately, no extant copies of the Free Church of Scodand *Home and Foreign Missionary Record* for 1857 and 1858 have been located. Subsequent issues from 1861 to 1863 reveal only a few passing remarks relating to the uprising.
20. Alexander Duff, *The Indian Rebellion: Its Causes and Results. In a series of letters from the Rev. Alexander DuffD.D. LL.D, Calcutta* (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1858), p. 130.
21. See George Smith, *Life ofRev. John Wilson ofBombay* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1878).
22. Church of Scodand, *Home and Foreign Missionary Record*, September 1857, p. 241
23. Church of Scotland, *HFMR*, October 1857 p. 253.
24. *Foreign Missions. Annual Report to the General Assembly by the Committee*, Edinburgh, 1858.
25. Church of Scodand, *HFMR*, November 1857, p. 283.
26. Church of Scotland, *HFMR*, July 1858 p. 154.
27. Church of Scotland, *HFMR*, July 1858 p. 155.
28. Church of Scotland, *HFMR*, July 1858 p. 154.
29. Church of Scodand, *HFMR*, February 1858, p. 26-27.
30. Church of Scotland, *HFMR*, October 1858, p. 245.

31. The *Witness* was one of three main newspapers published in Edinburgh in the 1850s. Though not officially under the control of the Free Church, it was a vehicle for its views.
32. Embree describes Duff's letters as written to a friend, while Randall describes them as being 'first posted to private correspondents'. In my view these comments indicate a misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between a missionary and his employing institution, represented in the form of the Convenor (Chair) of the Board for Foreign Missions, in this instance Dr Tweedie. Therefore the letters cannot in any sense be understood as 'private'—they were always intended for publication and public consumption. See Embree, *1857 in India*, p. 13, and Don Randall, 'Autumn 1857: The Making of the Indian "Mutiny"', in *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 2003, pp. 3-17, p. 15, footnote 2.
33. Given the time taken for letters to travel from India, the first of Duff*s letters was not published in the *Witness* until 1 July, 1857. Letters from Duff were published in the *Witness* throughout 1858.
34. Duff, *The Indian Rebellion*, p. iv.
35. Madeleine Smith was a young middle class woman from Glasgow, accused of murdering her lover, Emile L'Angelier, by poisoning him. Much of the evidence in the case consisted of love letters written from Madeleine to Emile, and these received extensive coverage in the press. See, Elizabeth Ewan, Sue Innes, Sian Reynolds, and Rose Pipes, eds, *Biographical Dictionary of Scottish Women* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).
36. Robert Hunter, *History of the Missions of the Free Church ofScotland in India and Africa* (London: T Nelson and Sons, 1873), p. 118 (footnote).
37. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 18.
38. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 26.
39. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, passim.
40. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 19.
41. Investigation into the claims of rape after the uprising was over found that there was no evidence for these. See P.J.O. Taylor, ed,, *A Companion to the Tndian Mutiny' of 1857* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
42. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 20.
43. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 245-246.
44. See Taylor, *Companion to the Tndian Mutiny'*, p. 380.
45. Embree describes Duff thus: 'His special contribution to the historiography of the period is his insistence on the deep-seated hostility of most Indians to British rule'. Embree, *1857 in India*, p. 13.
46. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 98.
47. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 98.
48. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 193.
49. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, pp. 193-194.
50. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 47.
51. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 93.
52. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 219.
53. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 112.
54. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 238.
55. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 263.
56. Duff, *Indian Rebellion*, p. 132.
57. John Wilson, Letter, *Witness*, 1 July 1857.
58. John Wilson, Letter, *Witness*, 3 October 1857.
59. John Wilson, Letter, *Witness*, 18 November 1857.
60. Robert Hunter, Letter, *Witness*, 1 August 1857.
61. Robert Hunter, Letter, *Witness*, 8 August 1857.
62. Robert Hunter, Letters, *Witness*, 8 August and 15 August 1857.
63. Robert Hunter, Letter, *Witness*, 15 August 1857.

64. See Free Church of Scotland, *Missions of the Free Church of Scotland in India and Africa*, no II, June 1858, p. 1; and entry on Hunter in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. www.oxforddnb.com
65. Public meeting advertised in the *Witness* on 7 November, 1857, and report of meeting in the *Witness* on 11 November 1857.
66. A report of the Glasgow public meeting appeared in the *Witness* on 3 January 1858.
67. J. Murray Mitchell, *Indian Missions: Viewed In Connexion with th^ Mutiny and Other Recent Events* (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1859), p. 6-7.
68. Mitchell, *Indian Missions*, p. 24.
69. Mitchell, *Indian Missions*, p. 28.
70. Cowan notes, for example, that editorials in the *Witness* supported Canning^ 'reasonable* response to the 'mutiny*, while many missionaries and their supporters were urging sterner measures. See R.M.W. Cowan, *The Newspaper in Scotland* (Glasgow: Outram, 1946), p. 408.
71. See 'Missionary Conference in Connection with the spread of Christianity in India*, *Witness*, 14 October, 1857.
72. *The Scotsman*, Monday, 28 September 1857. Separate proclamations were issued for England and Ireland.
73. *The Scotsman*, Monday, 28 September, 1857.
74. Report on the day o f 'National Humiliation*, *Witness*, 10 October 1857.
75. See Randall, 'Autumn* 1857, p. 3.
76. Letter from 'A Working Man*, *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1857.
77. Letter from 'A Working Man*, *The Scotsman*, 6 October 1857.
78. Rev. Robert Lee was a Church of Scotland minister, prominent as a reformer of church worship. Although prominent, he often dissented from majority opinion. See *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, www.oxforddnb.com
79. *The Scotsman*, Thursday, 8 October 1857.
80. *The Scotsman*, Thursday, 8 October 1857.
81. *The Scotsman*, Thursday, 8 October 1857.
82. *The Scotsman*, Thursday, 8 October 1857.
83. *The Scotsman*, Thursday, 8 October 1857.
84. *Edinburgh Courant*, 5 August 1857; article reprinted from *News of the Churches*.
85. *Edinburgh Courant*, *2* April 1858. Previous reports of such meetings and resolutions had appeared in the *Edinburgh Courant*, 16 October 1857, and 4 November 1857.
86. *Edinburgh Courant*, 4 January 1858.
87. *Edinburgh Courant*, 23 September 1857.
88. Sir Archibald Alison (1792-1867), born in Shropshire, was a lawyer and historian, and played a prominent role in academic institutions in Scotland in the mid-nineteenth century.
89. *Edinburgh Courant*, 25 September 1857.
90. Cowan, *Newspaper in Scotland*, p. 406.
91. See, for example, discussion of evangelical proposals for the greater Christianisation of India in *The Scotsman*, 9 January 1858.
92. Cowan, *Newspaper in Scotland*, p. 407.
93. Cowan, *Newspaper in Scotland*, p. 280.
94. Cowan, *Newspaper in Scotland*, p. 276.
95. Richard Finlay has cautioned against treating the *Scotsman* and *Glasgow Herald* as being representative-of Scottish opinion, and has stressed the importance of local newspapers and how local links informed coverage of issues related to empire. Richard J. Finlay, 'The Scottish Press and Empire, 1850-1914' in Simon J. Potter, ed,, *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004).
96. See Callum G. Brown, *Religion and Society in Scotland since 1707* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

97. The missionary periodicals suggest that there was an immediate upsurge in support in Scotland, including very generous donations from individual benefactors, though this does not appear to have been sustained through the 1860s.
98. Jeffrey Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 24.
99. Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines*, p. 25.
100. Taylor, *Companion to the 'Indian Mutiny'*, p. 380.
101. Taylor, *Companion to the 'Indian Mutiny'*, p. 22.
102. Randall notes that Duff both commented on 'unauthenticated rumours' and repeated 'atrocity' stories that later turned out to be unsubstantiated. He similarly comments that Sir Colin Campbell, while explicitly aiming to tell the 'truth' of the 'mutiny' repeated similar unsubstantiated accounts. See Randall, 'Autumn 1857', p. 5.
103. See, for example, the *Edinburgh Courant*, 14 August 1857.
104. See Susan Thorne, *Congregational Missions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in 19th Century England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
105. Randall, 'Autumn 1857', p. 3.

5

CAPTIVE WOMEN AND MANLY MISSIONARIES
Narratives of Women Missionaries in India

Caroline Lewis

IN 1860, the evangelical writer Maria Louisa Charlesworth wrote in support of British foreign missions to women in India:

> The claim before us is, that we emancipate millions of captive women. Yet the work of emancipation is not, alone, the work of women. Havelock did not think it was— when he died in victory for captive women and children.... And shall any say that there is no moral chivalry in the brothers of our land? that they are only ready, when the sword is in their hand, to endure the self-denial that alone wins victory? that when physical energy is at rest, they cannot rise to the calm home endurance of self-sacrifice, in order to achieve the liberation of countless women and children, from a captivity more hopeless and more deathlike by far than that of Lucknow__Will not Christian men draw back the darkening veil, and prove to the women of the East that 'a BROTHER is born for adversity?'1

Charlesworth's tract utilised stories from the 1857 uprisings to add pathos and force to her polemic about the need to revive the evangelical project to Indian women. By using the captivity of white women in Kanpur as an analogy for the spiritual 'captivity' of Indian women and by goading Christian men to take up spiritual arms and recreate the 'rescue' mission of Sir Henry Havelock, she was evoking a set of well-established ideas about the gendered meaning of the Indian revolt. Although Charlesworth's tract did little to challenge these assumptionst and the prose collapsed into predictable cliches about British men rescuing Indian women from behind the 'darkening veil', the uprisings of 1857 also produced more complex texts by British women missionaries, which were structured around the multiple gender roles played out by men and women. As Anna Johnston notes in her study of missionary writing during this period, texts

by missionary women are hard to come by,[2] yet the two accounts of 1857 that form the basis of this article are important for more than their rarity as sources. Not only do they problematise existing tropes about British women's experiences and understandings of 1857, undermining the idea of a shared British response to the revolt, but they also reveal a great deal about the woman missionary's sense of self and of mission at a time when the evangelisation of India was becoming an increasingly 'feminised' project. In terms of raw numbers of missionaries[3] and the gendered inflection of the ideologies that motivated evangelisation to India,[4] British women became the force that shaped the missionary project in India in the second half of the nineteenth century. As Jeffrey Cox points out in his study of the Church Missionary Society's mission in Punjab, 'The typical missionary in the late nineteenth century was not a male itinerant preacher but a female schoolteacher or administrator.'[5] These women occupied a unique and sometimes ambivalent position within British colonial society, and their accounts provide a complex insight into how both their gender and their evangelicalism shaped their interpretation of the uprising.

In this chapter I explore two accounts of 1857 by British women missionaries. The first 'text', a series of letters that appeared in the *Female Missionary Intelligencer* in 1858, was written by Jane Goodenough, a woman missionary of the Female Education Society (FES)[6] who ran an orphan school in Secundra. The letters were written during her time at Agra Fort from September 1857 onwards and reflect on her experiences of 'captivity' along with other members of the European community. Jane Goodenough was sent to north India in 1856 by the first foreign mission society in Britain to prepare single women for evangelical work overseas. At this stage in the progress of nineteenth century Protestant missions in Britain, the main foreign mission societies were closed to single women, although individual mission stations in India sometimes appealed to the FES for single women to augment their work. The number of single women missionaries sent to India was still small in the 1850s, but the FES also became an important source of direct funding for schools, orphanages and training institutions in India that subscribed to their aims. In 1853 they started a magazine to publicise their work. The *Female Missionary Intelligencer* was the first British women's missionary periodical and the venue for Jane Goodenough's letters about her experience of life in Agra Fort.

The second text is a book-length treatment of the history of missionary activity in north India by Mary Weitbrecht, the wife of a Church Missionary Society missionary in Burdwan. By the time that Weitbrecht wrote *Missionary Sketches in North India, with References to Recent Events* in 1858,[7] she was already a celebrated writer on mission work in India and had strong interdenominational connections with foreign mission societies in Britain. In 1858, the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*,[8] a national evangelical publication, commended the *Missionary Sketches* as a contribution to the missionary perspective on 1857 and reviewed it alongside Alexander Duff's celebrated account, *The Indian*

Rebellion: Its Causes and Results. Weitbrecht’s status as a commentator on 1857 was augmented by her appearance alongside Duff in such a notable publication.

This chapter analyses the responses of Jane Goodenough and Mary Weitbrecht to 1857 and examines the ways in which gender roles were played out in their accounts. Stories of the captivity and violation of white women were central to British press constructions of the events of 1857, as was the role of British men as the protectors and rescuers of European women. Symbolic gender roles structured a variety of textual responses to 1857, including those studied here.[9] Jane Goodenough narrated her story of 1857 through different versions of her identity as a woman and constructed a variety of roles for the white, male subjects at Agra Fort. Mary Weitbrecht put white women at the centre of victim narratives in her work in order to enhance and valorise the role of missionary men and Christian masculinity. Both writers used gender as a means of negotiating a sense of ‘Britishness’ and a sense of Christian selfhood during the uprising and its aftermath. I will also argue that these accounts of 1857 display an ambivalence about asserting a collective or ‘shared’ ‘white response’.

The Eye of the Storm: Jane Goodenough at Agra Fort

The centrepiece of the *Female Missionary Intelligencer's* reporting of 1857 was a series of letters written by a woman missionary who was virtually imprisoned at Agra Fort with other white Europeans, native Christians and soldiers. Jane Goodenough’s letters became the focus of the special ‘Mutiny in India’ section of the magazine, which lasted from January until May 1858.[10] The letters recorded her experiences at Agra Fort from 1 September 1857 to 31 January 1858. There were other women missionaries who wrote short letters about their experiences for the magazine,[11] but Goodenough’s account differed from those of the Calcutta- and Landour-based women, because of her proximity to iconic events in the uprising, and because her letters became an important source of ‘information’ for Mary Weitbrecht. Weitbrecht reworked the Agra Fort letters in her book-length review of missions and mission history in north India, which incorporated a carefully organised polemic about the causes of the 1857 uprising. Mary Weitbrecht’s *Missionary Sketches in North India with Reference to Recent Events* ensured that Goodenough’s account circulated beyond the limited ambit of the *Female Missionary Intelligencer*[12] and received notice in the national evangelical press.

As an immediate response to the unfolding of events near Delhi in 1857, Jane Goodenough’s letters were very different from the more propagandist narratives found in Weitbrecht’s *Missionary Sketches* of 1858. Even though the letters did engage with emerging narratives, rumours and discourses of 1857 from other

sources, her treatment of them was erratic, shifting and unsystematic. She began her letters to the female missionary public back in Britain with an initial assertion that she was, in many ways, not an authority on the events unfolding around her, and readers in Britain with access to newspapers were more likely to be knowledgeable about the uprisings:

> As you are most likely better acquainted with the past and present state of this country than I am, shut up in this Fort, hearing nothing of what is going on around us, or, if a report spreads about any matter, afraid to believe it, if it be good, because we have been so frequently deceived.[13]

In her letter dated 20 October 1857 she retracted this position and argued that, 'You seem to think that the accounts given of the terrible mutinies in India are exaggerated. I, for one, could almost wish they were; but alas! They are all too true.'[14] The letters from October 1857 onwards began to emphasise Miss Goodenough's authority as a commentator on events in India. Rumour, reports from friends, suspect military intelligence and domestic anecdotes were integrated into her letters, providing her with source material with which to counter reports that played down the scale and severity of the uprisings. She displayed little anxiety at this point about the veracity of her new sources, stating, for example, that, '[w]e hear, on good authority, that servants set fire to their masters' houses and bungalows, carried off their property, and would, no doubt, have taken their lives.'[15]

The vilification of servants, evident in the previous extract, was a particular feature of her letters and central to Goodenough's attempt to construct a story of blame. At one level, this feature of Goodenough's narration conformed to aspects of an emerging public discourse, or 'white response', to the uprising. Satadru Sen and others[16] have argued that accounts of 1857 became 'domesticated' and retold through the idiom of domestic drama. The account of servant insurrection in the colonial home was, for example, also repeated by Mrs Willing, a missionary woman in Landour, Himalayas, who wrote letters for the *Female Missionary Intelligencer* detailing her fears of domestic rebellion rather than her actual experience.[17] Goodenough produced similar narratives of servants turning on masters, and of Indians violating the white family, using reports of servant 'insurrection' to enable her to cite 'authoritative' sources outside the confines of Agra Fort and to establish credibility as a commentator on the uprisings. However, in Goodenough's version of 1857 as a domestic drama it is the British male and, more poignantly for her, the male missionary patriarch who is the particular victim of servant violation and disloyalty. She comments, 'Have I not heard the jests and seen the impudent laugh of the servants of the friends of mine when the family was in the deepest affliction, when the kind and tender-hearted master lay dying on his bed—a missionary too, one who had made his dealings with his servants a matter of conscience, as too many do not!'[18] By foregrounding

the vulnerable male missionary, Goodenough was making the point that he was different from other European men who often did not, in her view, treat servants appropriately. This early anecdote was prescient: as a narrator, Goodenough constantly veered away from establishing a univocal white, British perspective on the experience of 1857, however cliched and derivative her narrative was in other respects. She was also interested in reporting stories of alleged male suffering and victimhood, which were repeated throughout the letters, and which inflected the gender focus of her narrative.

Jane Goodenough's response to the events of 1857 was shaped by a conflict between a sense of herself as a Christian subject and her sense of loyalty to other white Britons. The Christian and British 'selves' are most visibly in conflict when relating the treatment of native Christians and when describing herself in relation to British soldiers. In her letter of 1 September 1857, native Christians occupy a symbolically loaded position at the gates of Agra Fort, and are not permitted to enter, despite the efforts of missionaries, 'until the firing had begun in earnest'.[19] Goodenough reports that both Muslims and Hindus victimised them and 'many native Christians were murdered; it is said that even children, not Christians, but having Christian names, were butchered by those Mahometans, so great is their hatred of the Christian religion'.[20] In spite of identifying Muslims as the main persecutors of the native Christians, those who denied them entry into the fort, namely the British authorities, are symbolically vilified. She wrote bitterly that '[notwithstanding all that had been said, done and written by different missionaries [t]he authorities would not listen. "Nothing would happen;" "No room at the Fort".'[21] The implied criticism of the British authorities is brief but profound—symbolically, they turned away the Christian 'holy family' like the innkeepers of Bethlehem in the Christian nativity story. This moment of distance from the white, colonial authorities, and the sense of the narrator as a Christian rather than a white, British subject is one of several moments in the letters when the narrator's sense of her own 'subjecthood' and belonging during the uprisings is ambivalent and conflicted.

Another such* moment of ambivalence and ambiguity came during a long, diary-like letter of 20 October 1857, when Goodenough described the arrival of Colonel Greathed's column from Delhi on the morning of 10 October 1857, and their entry into the fort. Her identification with a sense of Britishness cohered around this moment—she wrote that '[i]t was a glorious sight indeed; and then to think that these were the dear, brave men who had risked their lives and fought before Delhi to save us, as well as to punish the murderers of our countrymen and women.'[22] Her descriptions of soldiers allowed for her momentary inclusion in the collective 'we' of life at Agra Fort. She referred constantly to 'our own soldiers'; 'our militia men', 'our little army', until the reader might suspect the playing out of an erotic rescue fantasy by men on horseback, particularly when she noted that '[o]ur European Landers presented a grand spectacle, such handsome faces, and tall, fine men.'[23] At one level she communicated a sense

of belonging to a country whose subjects were under threat, when she wrote of the murders of her ‘country' people; however, she also played out the role of a female subject, eulogising military masculinity and romanticising her gaze. Yet her sense of belonging to this imperial moment as the troops arrived at Agra Fort was undermined by her criticism of her fellow English. She described seeing the troops pass while she was at the bazaar and claimed that:

> I wanted to cheer them, but I was not able to do so; I smiled a welcome which many returned; but I did feel sorry that no one cheered them. Ah, India is a cold country in this respect; not like dear, happy England! The tender, gentle sympathizing feelings of Englishmen undergo a great change here. I suppose that circumstances harden those fine feelings which exhibit themselves on an occasion similar to this at home. I remember how we cheered and welcomed the poor sufferers from the Crimea.[24]

This extract foregrounded Goodenough’s sense of difference from the Britons who might have cheered the troops ‘at home' but did not do so in India. More importantly, she called into question the ability of the British in India to acknowledge the shared nature of 1857, at least in public. She asserted that ‘the Englishman’ was transformed and hardened by the imperial encounter, which rendered him a very different ‘subject’ from the public patriot back home in Britain.

Despite the ambivalences of the previous extracts, Goodenough’s letters eventually constructed a narrative perspective on life in the fort which reaffirmed her sense of ‘self’ as a missionary and as a Christian. Goodenough ministered to sick soldiers at the fort’s hospital, and her accounts of this work were published in the *Female Missionary Intelligencer* in April 1858. Her new role as a missionary nurse echoed that of Florence Nightingale during the Crimean War. Indeed, Goodenough had evoked the ‘poor sufferers from the Crimea’ in her earlier critique of the Englishman in India, and towards the end of her letters, she seemed to rehearse the role of the battlefield nurse so celebrated by Nightingale. Goodenough reflected that:

> My work was to give the poor sufferers water or any little nourishment the medical men allowed them; to bathe their feverish heads with vinegar and water; and to keep their wounds wet with the latter; as also to keep away the flies, which swarmed there as in the time of the plague.[25]

The ‘poor sufferers’, who were soldiers returning from the Crimea in an earlier extract, were now transformed into the European soldiers in her ‘care’. Her account of her relationship with military masculinity, I would argue, was one that had been fashioned by reports about women as nurses during the Crimean War, where female heroism found a celebrated place on the battlefields of the 1850s. Goodenough’s Christian and missionary ‘self’ was also re-established

by her treatment of those in her care. When an Irish Private was brought to the hospital dying of cholera, Goodenough administered wine and the chance to obtain mercy: 'I begged him to pray to Christ alone, not to the Virgin Mary, nor to the saints, as they could not help him'.[26] Each soldier, however British and white, was subject to the deathbed treatment that typified conversion narratives in missionary texts. Dying soldiers were asl^ed by Goodenough and other missionaries within to consider the 'guilt and consequences of sin, and the plan of salvation by Jesus Christ'.[27] The narrative perspective on life within Agra Fort at the end of her account became more typical of missionary conversion narratives. The 'heathen' subjects at the close of her letters were often British soldiers, and Goodenough's attempts at their conversion restored the powerful sense of distance between her Christian self and these British 'others'.

Goodenough's account of 1857 in the *Female Missionary Intelligencer* concluded with a self-dramatisation of herself as a ministering angel to suffering men and a powerful reassertion of the missionary world view. The gender roles in her letters certainly shifted in form and meaning, encompassing both her identity as a woman being 'rescued' by the handsome soldiers, and those soldiers being 'rescued', in turn, by her nursing skills and offers of salvation. The reference in the letters to the Crimea, and Goodenough's interest in the relationship between women and soldiers, suggests that she fashioned her account to develop a role appropriate to a mid-nineteenth century woman in battle. Heroic self-representation was certainly a feature of other female missionary writing of the period,[28] but Goodenough's account is particularly interesting for its evocation of female autonomy in the business of women's work. Significantly, however, this emerging, and rather triumphalist, sense of female selfhood, however Christian and keen to save the souls of those she nursed, was problematic for Mary Weitbrecht. Her accounts of 1857 modified the self-dramatisation of Jane Goodenough, and re-inscribed her into a story of 1857 that foregrounded missionary masculinity and emphasised narratives of female victimhood.

Mary Weitbrecht: Missionary Manliness and 1857

During the summer of 1857, the celebrated missionary wife and writer Mary Weitbrecht was in England touring the auxiliary institutions of the *Female Education Society* and preparing to submit a report on them to the metropolitan steering committee in London. Mrs Weitbrecht, as she was known, was something of an authority on women missionaries, having published *Female Missionaries in India* in 1843.[29] Weitbrecht was married to a Church Missionary Society missionary who worked largely in Burdwan, Bengal, and her perspective on women's missionary work in the 1840s was 'drawn from her experience as

a missionary wife rather than as a single woman like Jane Goodenough. Mary Weitbrecht, despite her prolific output and varied missionary activities, was a pragmatist about women's work in India rather than an ideologue. Her *Female Missionaries in India* acknowledged the value and importance of British women and their outreach to Indian females, but it certainly did not advocate a separate missionary project to evangelise Indian women, or 'an exclusive female sphere of missionary activity'.[30] She did not theorise, at this stage, about the civilisational uplift of Indian women and their families through targeted women's missions but argued instead:

> There is, I know, a diversity of opinion on the point of single ladies going out to India, to engage in mission work; but as in practice they do it, and as there are societies both in England and on the continent which are organized for preparing and sending them forth, it seems desirable to describe the character and qualities that should appertain to the female labourer, irrespective of her being married or otherwise.[31]

In her early writing, Weitbrecht saw women inflecting the work of Protestant missions with 'the affectionate heart of the sex successfully occupied in communicating that sympathy which it has been peculiarly in their power to afford'.[32] Her ideas about British missionary women in India were driven by gender ideologies that were typical of mid-nineteenth century missionaries. Far from advancing ideas about British women working autonomously to uplift their 'Indian sisters',[33] Weitbrecht believed that British women missionaries could model appropriately gendered relationships within the Christian family:

> How many husbands have found in their partners the wise counsellor, the encouraging fellow-helper, the calmer of his troubled spirit, the messenger of comfort, directing him to God, and assisting him in drawing down his blessing. Women, as missionaries, have afforded the most important examples of the happiness of domestic life, when regulated on Christian principles. What instruction have they given to the heathen, of the extreme folly of degrading females, as they are accustomed to do; and in the other hand, how often have they exhibited to the degraded partners of a brutal husband, the blessing of religious principle, in making them happy, useful and independent.[34]

Mrs Weitbrecht's version of the place of a woman in missionary work shaped her response to the uprising of 1857. Her *Missionary Sketches in North India, with References to Recent Events* was a history of Protestant missions in the region; a polemic about the politics and providence of the uprising; and an attempt to re-establish the importance of missionary masculinity and the rightful place of the missionary man within the foreign mission enterprise. Unlike Jane Goodenough's letters, it is probable that Mrs Weitbrecht had access to public accounts of the

rape and violation of European women, and this focus on the vulnerability of white women was emotively written into one of her key chapters. Chapter Seven of the *Missionary Sketches* reported the effects of the uprisings on Calcutta. While careful to stress that missionaries were spared attack, the chapter assimilated reports and anecdotes about European women who escaped to Calcutta. She quotes directly from two letters that detailed the flight of women and children, and ends with an account of a British woman who fled violence to wander the jungle.[35] This British woman was rescued by Europeans but had apparently lost her mind and her memory. In spite of the fact that the account mentioned her husband's death, the suffering of the British female was foregrounded and constantly reiterated in Weitbrecht's retelling of British experiences in Calcutta.

Mrs Weitbrecht not only deliberately engaged with the emerging 'symbolic' narratives of 1857 as a violation of the white woman and her children, but she also re-fashioned Jane Goodenough's experiences at Agra Fort to 'restore' her to narratives of white, female suffering. Weitbrecht's rendition of Miss Goodenough's letters mentioned her work at the fort's hospital, but ended with a comment on Goodenough's failure to keep her mission school intact:

> Poor Miss Goodenough was most disconsolate: her health suffered. Her interesting charge had no place of meeting, no school, no instruction. She felt sad as she met them and received their salaams, and thought of the happy days at Secundra, when they surrounded her a smiling, happy group, contrasting it with present sad trials.[36]

Miss Goodenough was not rendered heroically as the lady with the lamp, ministering to sick soldiers, which was vital to her self-dramatisation in her letters. Instead, she was described as stranded at the fort, her health broken, and her missionary endeavours in ruins. This contrasted with the story of male missionaries inside Agra Fort. Unlike Miss Goodenough, we hear of the heroism of resourceful male missionaries who pitch tents, continue their work and provide 'a beautiful specimen of real devotedness'.[37] Instances of male missionary heroism inside the fort precede the comments about 'poor Miss Goodenough', and exemplify the constant focus on manly missionary activity, competence and bravery.

Missionary manliness was central to the *Missionary Sketches*. The work was a hagiographical account of the history of missions in north India, which dealt at length with the ideas and endeavours of celebrated male missionaries from William Carey to her own late husband, the Reverend John Weitbrecht of Burdwan. Her 'study' memorialised her husband, incorporating his words and accounts of his activities into her narratives; yet she also demonstrated a more general tendency to emphasise male endeavour in the missionary field, a

perspective that is central to her political response to 1857. In her introduction to *Missionary Sketches* she states quite clearly:

> That crisis has now occurred, and all the sanguinary details connected with it are before the public. May it speak to this nation convincingly, and lead to another course of policy! May it lead Indian statesmen to see that their timid, time-serving plans will never ensure the respect or obedience of a people who are far too acute to be deceived by specious professions, and who, though untruthful themselves, honour the manly and straightforward Christian who carries out his religion in his actions, as much as they despise him who acts a contrary part.[38]

The Missionary Sketches pitted 'the manly and straightforward Christian* against the implicitly *unmanly* British official whose cowardice denied the East India Company government the unique opportunity to make imperial and 'manly* subjects out of Indians. Weitbrecht asserted that Christianity alone could have prevented the 1857 uprisings, because in the business of empire building, 'it remained for Protestant and Christian England to stand out alone, as a government intolerant of its own religion ... where conqueror and conquered should never know the bonds of brotherhood, by the sympathies and hopes of a common religion*.[39] One carefully schematised aspect of her argument was that imperial subjects were only created when 'the seeds of moral obedience and social order are all in Christianity*.[40] Her account of the various mission fields of north India and the different methods of evangelisation employed suggested that only Protestant Christianity could penetrate deeply into such varied cultural, religious and social terrain. There was the constant implication throughout *The Missionary Sketches* that the East India Company government had limited social penetration. Weitbrecht*s journey around the mission fields of north India bore witness, in her view, to the wide ranging 'success* of missionary outreach to 'tribal groups*, 'high caste* Indians, Muslims and Hindus. But there was little mention of Indian women, or reference to outreach work that specified them as a target group. Weitbrecht*s account of 1857 was about men*s work, and the centrality of the male missionary to revive a Christian-imperial project and make loyal Christian subjects out of Indian men.

Christian manliness and loyalty to Britain are made synonymous in the story of 'Shamacharun Mukerjea', a converted Brahmin from Calcutta, who was sent to London to study engineering. Not only was he able to 'work diligently, bearing more manfully than many English youths would have done, the exposure to the chilling cold of winter*,[41] but he was:

> A Christian, and a man of courage, honour, and prudence, he was selected, when the present troubles broke out, as the most suitable person who could be found to take charge of the English ladies, when they were sent away on board the steamer from Allahabad to Calcutta, and he ensured their regard and

respect by his kind, gentle bearing, and the care and attention he shewed them on their voyage down the river.[42]

The test, therefore, of both manliness and imperial loyalty during the events of 1857 was in the protection of British women on their journey to Calcutta. Weitbrecht's imperial vision of Christian manhood and her constant reference, as in the case of Shamacharun Mukerjea, to loyal native Christians had two distinct motives. As Catherine Hall's study of Baptist missionaries in Jamaica and England has argued, ideas about middle-class English masculinity and patriarchal relations within the family underscored much of the thinking behind the mid-nineteenth century missionary project. Christian masculinity was at the centre of an imagined domestic and political order, which was increasingly shaping middle-class culture in England, and which was being exported to the colonies by missionaries. Hall argues that the Baptist missionary project to Jamaica petitioned for emancipation in the belief that enslaved black men and women could be remodelled as English, middle-class Christians* by missionaries.[43] Weitbrecht, therefore, was simply restating the contemporary missionary world view that put dependable, Christian men at the heart of the colonial order of things.

If Weitbrecht's foregrounding of men in the missionary project, and of their loyal converts, at the expense of women's work and outreach in India was in keeping with common missionary tropes, it also reflected a wider discursive agenda. *Missionary Sketches* was a response to '1857' as it was being constructed in the British press and in other public discourses, and Weitbrecht sought to counter arguments that missionaries were to blame. She incorporated 'anecdotes' of missionaries being spared attack, even in dangerous areas:

It would, indeed, have been very easy for some of those murderous hands, who must have been for months past wandering over the face of the country, to have attacked and annihilated these defenceless missionaries and their convert; and the fact that they have been left unhurt is a speaking one, declaring more loudly than anything else could, that the objects of vengeance have not been missionaries, not the religion that they preach.[44]

Providence was cited intermittently as a reason why missionaries and native Christians did not suffer more, but Weitbrecht pursued a more political point in her story of 1857. In general, the British official had obstructed important attempts at Christian education and pursued wrong-headed, anti-Christian policies that had failed to produce loyal Indian subjects. Much of her historical analysis of the causes of 1857 focused on the failure of the East India Company to support Christian education during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, and her narrative was shaped by a clear demarcation between the Orientalist bias of some of the administrators of that period and the clear, Christian vision of the early male missionaries .in Bengal. The political and historical dimension to her work focused on a period of clear conflict in the history of

missionary and East India Company relations, which excluded female missionary activity.

Weitbrecht's account is significant for its vituperative attack on East India Company policy; its use of historical analysis in attempting to explore the causes of insurrection; and its attempt to construct a 'systematic' political response to 1857. That response, however, drew much of its historical force from the period when missionary work was an almost exclusively male endeavour, focusing on a period of particular conflict between male missionaries and the East India Company. Weitbrecht's use of gender in her stories of 1857 served her political argument, but in doing so, she manipulated Jane Goodenough's story to emphasise the heroism of male missionaries at Agra Fort, and she avoided discussions of missions to women and expunged the original author's sense of self as an autonomous female Christian and missionary.

Conclusion

The responses of Jane Goodenough and Mary Weitbrecht to the uprisings of 1857 share an attempt to recreate order. In her discussion of diaries written by six British women during the siege of the Lucknow Residency, Alison Blunt argues that women attempted to contain and manage the disruption of the colonial order in their domestic settings. The diarists in Lucknow, wives of British officers, 'played important roles in establishing and maintaining a class hierarchy in domestic and social terms'.[45] The reassertion of hierarchy and difference was a particular feature of the texts explored by Blunt. Both Goodenough and Weitbrecht reasserted the missionary world view in their texts, which maintained distance and a sense of separateness from other non-Christians. For both women, 1857 was not an experience they shared with other 'white Britons', and the differences between missionaries and other subjects in their narratives were central to building an evangelical narrative of the uprising and its aftermath. I have argued, however, that the key to understanding the responses of these two British women missionaries is their engagement with gendered self-representations in the case of Goodenough, and missionary masculinity in the case of Weitbrecht. They deployed 'gender' for very different purposes in their respective narratives, and Weitbrecht attempted to modify the more autonomous vision of female missionary endeavour that Goodenough created for herself. But both still drew on notions of the proper place of Christian men and women to explain what happened in 1857, and, in the writing of Mary Weitbrecht, to create an explanation of why it happened at all.

Notes and References

1. See Maria Louisa Charlesworth, *India and the East: or, A Voicefrom the Zenana* (London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday, 1860), pp. 9-10.
2. See Anna Johnston, *Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially Chapter Two, 'Gender, Domesticity, and Colonial Evangelisation*, pp. 38-44. Johnston discusses the issue of source material relating to the activities of missionary women (including wives) and texts written by women involved in foreign missions during this period.
3. See Susan Thorne, *Congregational Missions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in Nineteenth-Century England* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 94-97. Thome constructs an argument about the popularity of foreign missions among British women in the second half of * the nineteenth century. Thorne argues for a connection between an increased beliefin commerce as central to ideas of an imperial 'civilising mission* and the British missionary movement's increased focus on women within the same period. See also Brian Stanley, *The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Missions and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Leicester: Apollos, 1990), p. 81. Although Stanley is primarily concerned with contesting that there was a connection between imperialism and the popularity of foreign missions, he does discuss the gender basis of recruitment patterns within British foreign missions during the second half of the nineteenth century.
4. For a discussion of gender ideologies and colonial evangelisation in India see Chapters Two, Three and Four of Anna Johnston, *Missionary Writing*, pp. 38-105. See also Steven S. Maughan, 'Civic Culture, Women's Foreign Missions, and the British Imperial Imagination, 1860-1914*, in Frank Trentmann, ed., *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New perspectives on Modern German and British history*, (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), pp. 199-222. Maughan argues that there was 'a new focus on reforming the Indian home combined with the growth of imperial anxiety following the 1857 Rebellion to provide both a unique realm for women's activity and a reinforced desire within the evangelical community to rebuild Indian society from the family upwards*. See Maughan, 'Civic Culture*, p. 206. Theories about 'civilisational uplift in India' being achieved through the targeting of Indian women predated the mid nineteenth century. For a general discussion of this theory see Jane Rendall, 'The Condition of Women, Women's Writing and the Empire in nineteenth-century Britain* in Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds, *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 103. Rendall describes how a stadial theory of civilisation was shaped by the idea of gender relations, and how women were interpreted as indicators of a country's place in a hierarchy of civilisational progress.
5. See Jeffrey Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940* (Stanford; CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 8.
6. 1 cite the abbreviation used at the time, Female Education Society or FES, in the text of the article, although the full, formal title of the society was the Society for Promoting Female Education in the East, and this fuller title is appropriate for bibliographical information.
7. See Mrs Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches in North India, with References to Recent Events* (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1858).
8. See, *The British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, Vol VII, (1858), p. 727.
9. See Jenny Sharpe, 'The Unspeakable Limits of Rape* in Williams and Chrisman, jeds, *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
10. See the Society for Promoting Female Education in the East, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, January 1858, p. 5.

11. There were other women who contributed letters to the *Female Missionary Intelligencer* on how the uprising affected them and their work in Alipore, Calcutta, Landour (Himalayas), and Bhagulpore. However, Miss Goodenough's account dominated the special 1857 section.
12. *The Female Missionary Intelligencer* had a circulation of about 1500 in 1857, according to the committee minute 2882 of 30th November 1857.
13. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 20.
14. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 26.
15. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 26.
16. See Satadru Sen, *Mutiny's Children: Race, Childhood and Authority after Eighteen Fifty-Seven.* Paper presented to the 'Mutiny at the Margins' conference, Edinburgh University, July 2007.
17. *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, May 1858, p. 73. Mrs Willing's letter of 29th December 1857 details her domestic paranoia following a report, spread in Mussoorie, that the missionaries were to be massacred on Christmas Day. She claims that her head servant 'placed a curious, unknown dish before me of mince patties, swimming in tomato sauce, and told me that was "the cook's present." In vain I asked what they were. The children wished for some, and I followed the example at last, not without misgivings of treachery. Three days have since passed, and we are all well, through mercy.'
18. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 27.
19. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 22.
20. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 23.
21. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, February 1858, p. 22.
22. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, March 1858, p. 37.
23. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, March 1858, p. 37.
24. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, March 1858, p. 37.
25. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, April 1858, p. 49.
26. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, April 1858, p. 51.
27. Jane Goodenough, *Female Missionary Intelligencer*, April 1858, p. 51.
28. See Jane Rendall, 'The Condition of Women', p. 110. Rendall discusses the 'heroic' element of women's missionary writing.
29. See Mrs Weitbrecht, *Female Missionaries in India* (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1843).
30. See Steven S. Maughan, 'Civic Culture*, p. 207.
31. Weitbrecht, *Female Missionaries*, pp. 3-4.
32. Weitbrecht, *Female Missionaries*, p. 6.
33. See Alison Twells, 'Missionary Domesticity, Global Reform and "Women's Sphere" in Early Nineteenth-Century England', in *Gender and History*, vol. 18. no. 2, August 2006, pp. 266-284. Her introduction comments on the tensions between a growing feminist understanding by nineteenth-century women of the opportunities afforded by empire, and evangelicalism's focus on ideologies of women in the domestic sphere.
34. Weitbrecht, *Female Missionaries in India*, p. vii.
35. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, pp. 91-101.
36. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, pp. 460-461.
37. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 460.
38. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. ix.
39. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 29.
40. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 40.
41. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 90.
42. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 90.
43. See Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Polity Press, Oxford, 2002). For a discussion of missionary ideas of manliness, see

in particular the 'Prologue: the Making of an Imperial Man', pp. 23-65, and Chapter One, 'The Missionary Dream 1820-1842*, pp. 84-139.

44. Weitbrecht, *Missionary Sketches*, p. 116.
45. See Alison Blunt, 'Spatial Stories under Siege: British Women Writing from Lucknow in 1857*, in *Gender*, *Place and Culture*, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 230.

6

AMBIGUOUS IMPERIALISMS
British Subaltern Attitudes towards the 'Indian War'*

Projit Bihari Mukharji

> The battle for the past is the battle for the future
> Must be the winners of the memory war
> Smash, reach out and then grab the flower
> At the end of the day their defeat will be for sure.
>
> — 'Memory War\ Asian Dub Foundation.

WITH the demise of Liberal, as well as Marxist, Humanism in intellectual circles and the rise of a post colonial regime of difference, colonial historiography has often lapsed back into an ironically Kiplingesque assertion that the 'east is east and west is west and ne'er the twain shall meet'.[2] Nowhere is this tendency more pronounced than in the scholarship on the Indian Mutiny. Even as localised studies proliferated in the 1990s, adding nuance and shade to the Indian side of the picture, talk of a unified and often monolithic 'British imagination' continued to haunt much of the scholarship on the Mutiny and Rebellion of 1857.[3] The Briton and the Indian in this narrative are two mutually opposed identities ranged across the imperial divide. Even when one occasionally hears of the odd 'White Mughal' actually fighting on the side of the rebels, this is usually a one-off. For most people 1857 continues to mark a watershed, after which a thoroughly arrogant imperialism inspired every Briton in her/his attitude towards India. Even studies of popular culture in mid-century Victorian Britain have usually served to strengthen this picture of rampant imperial arrogance.[4]

* I am thankful to my colleague Dr jane McDermid for helping me see the trees from the woods of the Scottish Highlands. Discussions with Prof. Waltraud Ernst and Monjita Mukhaiji have also helped me clarify and develop this chapter in myriad ways. The chapter has also been greatly enriched by the comments of many of the participants at the 'Mutiny at the Margins' conference. I remain thankful to all of them. Whatever failings remain are of course mine alone.

A not wholly intended consequence of this state of the historiography has been to reaffirm the older and more avowedly imperialistic narrative frame where fractious Indians incapable of united action—a sign perhaps of their savage and/or child-like state—were pitted against a British nation united in their outrage if not in their imperial blood-lust.5Such a view emerges in part from the historical archive that informs these narratives. Scholars'studying British views on the rebellion have relied largely upon the huge number of memoirs, journals, government records and newspapers, intended mostly for the consumption of polite society. The contradictions and ambiguities of the subaltern orders towards the imperial project have thus been rendered opaque. Yet there is enough incidental evidence to suggest that ambiguity was indeed present among large sections of the British population. Lilian Nayder, for instance, has mentioned how authors such as Charles Dickens and Wilkie Collins were motivated into writing on the subject due to the sagging recruitment figures and the working class's persistent lack of enthusiasm for 'winning the empire back'.6

Studies in popular culture that may have addressed such concerns have also remained hamstrung by looking merely at the production of popular cultural phenomena without attention to their consumption. As subaltern historians have long pointed out, the subaltern—by definition—does not enjoy cultural or political independence from domination. Its autonomy resides in its capacity to re-imagine elite cultural narratives and artefacts, through an oppositional consciousness, into different registers of meaning. The British subaltern thus often lacked both the confidence and the freedom to voice its lack of commitment to the imperial project openly and often raised a cheer for Empire in the name of 'King and Country!' To mistake this cheering for a firm commitment to a common imperial ethic would be, I would argue, erroneous. By tapping into hitherto unused archives of British street literature and by focusing on the reception/consumption of cultural phenomena along with the contexts of their production, this essay attempts to fracture the binary model of mutiny historiography and show that British subaltern attitudes to imperialism were manifold and often ambiguous in their zeal and commitment to colonisation.

Broadside ballads are a good window into the opinions of the Victorian streets. Unfortunately, however, a combination of technological possibilities and social priorities has ensured that not many of these have survived. Moreover, those that have survived have usually done so through their inclusion in the collections of polite enthusiasts, and the latter's own cultural proclivities, shaped by their social positions, have influenced their selection. Broadside ballads were, after all, until very recently looked upon, even by enthusiasts and scholars, as 'sub-literary' productions, plagued by 'corruptions' of 'original' ancient ballad literature.7 Amongst these too, the short-lived ballads which narrated contemporary events before disappearing were thought to be the most corrupt of all and hence largely ignored by collectors and archivists of the nineteenth century. Francis lames

Child for instance, the nineteenth century Harvard scholar whose five volume collection of English and Scottish ballads published between 1882 and 1898 is still seen as the most authoritative repository, did not include any ballads directly related to India. Similarly David Murray, the nineteenth century Glasgow lawyer and ballad and broadsheet collector, also largely overlooked ballads that spoke of India.8

Yet ballads dealing with Indian themes were by no means scarce. The collections of the Bodleian Library, Oxford and the National Library of Scotland together hold some hundred odd ballads dealing with India. Most of these ballads, though not all, are concerned with martial themes. An overwhelming number of these are concerned with the events of 1857. Attesting to the instant popularity of these mutiny ballads, a contemporary report in the *Banbury Guardian* on the Banbury Michaelmas Fair wrote as early as October 1857 that, 'The martial character of past fairs was completely banished if one excepts the "portraits" of Nena Sahib and the Indian Mutiny, the songs being such as the "Farmer's Boy," and "Lily Dale".'9 Belying the allegation that such ballads were short-lived, in the 1970s Roy Palmer still found a couple of these ballads being sung by local balladeers in the Orkneys and Wiltshire. Palmer's excellent collection of old British ballads collected from ballad and folk singers themselves from 1977 mentions a Peter Pratt in the Orkneys and another Mr Smith in the Wiltshire village of Combe Bissett as singing *The India War* and *The Great India War.*

Broadsides: Nature, Function and Distribution

While broadsides had been around in Britain since the sixteenth century, the nineteenth century witnessed a virtual explosion. Changes in printing technology, combined with the prolific urbanisation of the late eighteenth century created both an increased demand and an increased capacity to meet that demand. This expansion of its market also affected its thematic and formal characteristics. Especially during the Jacobean years and the Corn Law unrest, the broadside ballad succeeded in expanding its market by catering to a growing demand for 'news' at affordable prices. Thus the pastoral themes of the older ballads and their longevity were replaced by hurriedly written-up ballads on contemporary affairs that often borrowed tunes and verses from other older ballads and were themselves in turn soon transfigured into other ballads.10 The extent of their popularity can be gauged by the fact that when the leading broadside printer and seller on the London streets, James Catnach, retired in 1839, he was able to buy a country house in Barnet, and at his death his wealth was estimated as being between £6,000 and £10,000, after having inherited a debt-ridden business in 1813.11 The broadside ballads themselves were

> usually a set of unsophisticated verses, either narrative, lyric, or polemic in character, which were printed on one-side of a single sheet of folio-size paper. It was sold in bookstalls, at fairs, or hawked through the streets. Possessing little art or profundity [sic], the ballad normally specified the title of a familiar tune to which it could be sung, thus making it immediately accessible to— and performable by— every cobbler and tinker in the city.[12]

The power of the broadside ballad in moulding popular opinion is expressed in the old catechism: Tf a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he should not care who should make the laws of the nation.'[13] Their themes ranged from 'political lampoons to execution songs and from the comic to attempts at fashionable sentimentality'. Their only commonality was in their origin at the 'pens of street authors'.[14] The broadside ballads, moreover, were situated in the grey zone between orality and textuality and facilitated the traffic in both directions. Catnach is supposed to have always had a fiddler at hand.[15] While old folk tunes and traditions were adapted and moulded in print, the print was also often memorised and introduced into a repertoire of oral traditions. While John Ashton wrote on the incorporation and adaptation of oral folk traditions into English print literatures way back in the 1950s, Robert A. Schwegler has more recently demonstrated that broadside ballads had in turn been memorialised and adapted into oral traditions as well.[16]

The early nineteenth century broadside-seller, William Cameron, or Hawkie as he was better known on the streets of Glasgow, mentions a few interesting anecdotes that well outline the performative/oral nature of these texts. Hawkie arrived in Paisley in the course of his journeys sometime in the 1820s. The town had but one printer, a certain George Caldwell, who had retired from business. Having already sold his fare on the way to Paisley, Hawkie bought Caldwell's stock of old 'newspapers' and proceeded to sell it by embellishing it with significant additions from his memory of other ballads. It was a Saturday night and Hawkie made enough to stay drunk till Sunday night. On Monday though, a young woman confronted him, calling him a 'rascal' and asked for her money back, since the sheet he had sold bore scant resemblance to the tale he told. Surprisingly though, passers-by supported Hawkie and said the woman had no cause for complaint as long as she had been entertained by his performance on Saturday.[17] On another occasion, when Hawkie arrived in Auchterarder, a group of young men warming themselves on a fire next to a dungheap recognised him and asked him to tell a tale and promised to buy him drinks as long as he did. Hawkie confessed he had no 'papers' and the lads immediately went and found a few old newspapers and handed them to him, insisting though that he tell an Auchterarder tale based on them. Hawkie told his story till he had passed out that night.[18]

Edwin RofFe, a middle-class enthusiast and collector's description of the establishment of the James Catnach in London's East End in 1864 is very similar to Hawkie.

> ... in front of a pork butcher's shop, situated near the western end of Chapel Street... a gentle Swain is to be found on Saturday evenings, from eight or nine o'clock upto the 'witching time of night*, when, as the bells strike he prepares to return to his home. His stall stands in the gutter but is well furnished with bundles of ballads: while his memory is, I think, better furnished still.[19]

James Catnach's Seven Dials Press in Monmouth Court was a family concern, started by his father John sometime in the early decades of the nineteenth century. John had become one of the biggest balladeer/ballad sellers by adding attractive woodcuts on top of his sheets. According to Henry Mayhew, 'Jemmy' Catnach and Tommy Pitt were the 'Colburn and Bentley of the paper trade'.[20]

The balladeer/ballad-sellers or 'gangrels', to use Hawkie's word, were authors, publicists and entrepreneurs all in one.[21] They exchanged and bought each other's pieces and built up collections from which they liberally drew to create new ballads or to reprint whenever thought fit. Occasionally a single sheet or 'slip' ended up including two ballads said to be published and printed by two different printers. James Catnach, printer and seller, was reported to have a collection of 12,000 broadsides, while his relative, Ryle, advertised a collection of over 4,000 sheets.[22] Occasionally some of the gangrels dabbled in religion as well, becoming what Henry Mayhew called 'street preachers'. Hawkie, for instance, mentioned having indulged in street-preaching as an easy way of earning money. Itinerant gangrels like Hawkie travelled widely, picking up, selling and exchanging ballads and broadsides.

Issues of individual authorship of broadside ballads are relatively difficult to establish, as well as being somewhat perfunctory. A set of themes, tropes and images circulated along semi-formal networks. Old stories, in the process, got re-peopled by new characters, while new stories got shaped in the moulds of older legends. Broadside ballads that claim to deal with the events of 1857 are therefore often adaptations of older pieces written at other times. Two broadside ballads entitled *The Late War in India* and *The Battle of Indiay* for instance, mention the names of Generals Gough and Sale, both of whom had fought in the Sikh Wars of 1845-1846 and not in 1857.[23] A third broadside entitled *William and Mary or The Indian War* substantially reproduces the two Sikh War ballads, but introduces the name of Sir Colin Campbell to make it relevant to the present purpose, though it continues to mention Gough and Sale as well.[24] Moreover the latter ballad also combines the Sikh War ballads with other older broadside ballads such as *I Wish the Wars Were All Over, A Favourite Song* from 1799 which sang of a girl dressing up as a soldier and going to war in order to be with her beloved.[25] The *William and Mary* ballad also mentions Tipu Sultan, another historical figure popularised by earlier broadside ballads such as *Siege of Bangalore* and *Come Soldiers Cheer*.[26] Another ballad, *A New Song called the Late Indian War*, purportedly 'composed by a soldier of H.M. 54th Regiment', mentions the gruesome killing of Sir William McNaghten and his wife. McNaghten had in fact

been killed in the Afghan War, although the regiment mentioned in the ballad had not served in the Afghan War, but did fight in Lucknow.[27]

While the production and circulation of the broadside ballads were controlled largely by the urban under-class, their audience was definitely not limited to this class alone. Hawkie, for example, had mentioned the friend of a magistrate at Kirkcaldy as having been one of his supporters in the tovyn, and as the century progressed, middle-class interest grew. Spurred on perhaps by the dislocations and consequent nostalgias of rapid urbanisation, journals such as the *Notes and Queries* regularly published discussions amongst its middle-class readers on specific broadsides. In fact, much of the information we have mentioned above has been preserved due to this mid-Victorian middle-class appetite for the world ofbroadsides.

Social Class

Despite their fascination, much of the interest shown by the likes of Henry Mayhew in subaltern cultures remained patronising and denunciatory. Mayhew himself compared the people on the streets of London at one time to 'savage tribes' and 'the Bushmen of Africa'.[28] Hence when one John Camden Hotten bought up the woodcut blocks of the Catnachs, he still found that many of them were 'exceedingly rude and not nearly so well drawn'.[29] A reciprocal subaltern angst similarly motivated many of the broadsides despite their multiple sympathies with the world of polite society. The much touted 'spoils of empire', in fact, hardly percolated to the lower ranks of British society. As one contemporary commentator in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* pointed out, 'The patronage of the Directors flows almost wholly to the middle classes.'[30] Another commentator wrote in 1862 that the 'war of the classes' and the Indian Mutiny were two signs of the same problem, i.e., the policy of telling 'each separate interest' to fight for its own individual interest without any regard for 'the bundle of interests that form the well-being in aggregate'.[31] The reasons for this so-called divergence of interests and its reflection in the broadsides were the results not of any ephemeral principle of class-antagonism, but rather of concrete conditions on the Victorian streets and the effects that the 'Indian War' had on those conditions. A close study of the Broadside Ballads suggests that the experience of returning army subalterns, radical religion and the long history of racial proximity to poor South Asians on the streets of Victorian Britain were three important vectors that shaped the oppositional consciousness of the gangrel poets.

The most open refutation of the 'spoils of empire' thesis are to be found in the ballads professing to narrate the experiences of the returning soldiery. *The Poor Discharged Soldier* mentions the salary for fighting in India being as little as

'thirteen pence a day\ More than the salary, however, what hurt the old soldiers the most was the lack of a pension. Military pensions till the 1870s were only available to those permanently injured. A good many of those who fought in 1857 returned, able-bodied, to utter poverty. Moreover, even when one was crippled and therefore eligible for a pension, this pension was seen to be wholly insufficient. *The Poor Discharged Soldier* thus lamented:

Now very long ago, you must know, it was so,
Off to India I did go, says the poor soldier boy,
And fought the black men there, I declare, and I swear,
Without either dread or fear, says the poor soldier boy.
But after the campain [sic] I was sent back again,
Some were kilt, and more were lame but it mattered not a toy,
They'd no pension give to I, live or die, I might fly,
To the devil or Buckleroy, says the poor soldier boy.

It was from this impoverished position that the 'poor discharged soldier' now looked back and wished for a different past. He thus sang:

So now to end my theme, I'm to blame for the same,
I wish I had been slain, says the poor soldier boy.32

In another ballad entitled *Dear Old Saxhorny* Jim Williams, who had served in the army band told how his old age was racked by poverty, disease, desolation and starvation.

My once erect form is now bent with woe,
And my steps they are tottering, feeble and slow;
Whilst poverty, sickness, sorrow and care,
And grief beyond measure have whitened my hair.

Commenting on the insufficiency and unfairness of the pension, the *Late India War*, said that

A freedom box of massive gold we understand will be
Presented to the officers all for their bravery
But soldiers that have lost their limbs which they cannot restore
They will not so rewarded be for the late India war,
The poor man for his serviced now mark what do
His reward will be a wooden leg and perhaps 6d a day33

Such stark poverty often precipitated millenarian religions. A ballad entitled *Jordan* published from Brick Lane, an area known for its religious radicalism, used biblical imagery to suggest that unless the crushing poverty at home was addressed there would be no difference between India and England, i.e., that the

English poor would also rise up in rebellion.[34] While expressing hope that the rebels would be quelled, it warned that England might itself become the 'other side of Jordan'. It also mocked the anti-slavery activists who ignored their own poor, who were hardly better than slaves. The open radicalism of the ballad coupled with its use of somewhat obscure biblical imagery suggests the influence of the radical, heterodox Christianities that were known to thrive in the area. The *Relief for Lucknow* similarly called for 'India to be better governed' and 'Christian rule' to 'protect each as a brother the country prosper and the people bear good will to one another'.[35]

Finally the sentiment of brotherhood with the Indians may have resulted from long association with poor 'Indians' in Britain. Writing around 1857 Henry Mayhew mentioned several 'Indians' working as street-sweepers in London.[36] In March 1855 the journal *Notes and Queries* mentioned that, 'London is full of Lascars, Asiatic seamen who have taken to the trade of begging....'[37] Poor Indians had been in Britain since the early seventeenth century, living and working in close proximity with the native British poor. By the middle of the eighteenth century we hear of quite a few South Asians, especially Bengalis such as Augustine Darosario or John Morgan, living and working in London.[38] Some of them such as Thomas James had come as lascars, while others such as Deaner and Richard Smith had been brought over as domestic servants.[39] A few even married native white women in Britain and raised families such as John Hogan.[40] Ballads like the *Poor Indo* and possibly *Black Eyed Susan* spoke of these inter-racial relationships.[41] This proximity could have perhaps made a certain section of British society suspicious of the war-mongering stereotypes and racial hatred preached by the more polite sections.

John Hasenelly (Hasan Ali?), a resident of Calcutta who claimed to have been forcibly brought to England, was one such early British Bengali. He was also a broadside balladeer. As a Christian convert, Hasenelly used biblical quotations not only to critique profiteering and wealth as unchristian, thereby elevating poverty to the status of a Christian virtue, but also to argue for a common humanity that denied and defied racial distance. Hasenelly sought the empathy of his audience/reader by putting them in his shoes:

Natives of a land of glory
Daughters of the good and brave
Hear the injured Negro's story,
Hear and help the kneeling slave

Think how nought but death can sever
Your loved children from your hold
Still alive but lost forever,
Ours are parted, lost and sold.[42]

It was this proximity and empathy that may have inspired William McGonagall, the cotton weaver and autodidact balladeer of Dundee, to depict a loyal Indian sepoy as one of the heroes of British counteroffensive in 1857. In *The Hero ofKalapore: An Incident of the Indian Mutiny*, McGonagall tells of the brave deeds of Lieutenant Alexander Kerr at Kolhapur. Significantly, he dwells in great detail also on the bravery of one of the loyal sepoys, 'Gumpunt Row Deo' in the ballad, going so far as to even attribute the same surname—'Kerr'—to Ganpat Rao. In fact till the very last stanza when we are informed of Lieutenant Kerr receiving the Victoria Cross, it is not quite certain who exactly is the 'Hero of Kalapore', Ganpat or Alexander Kerr. In another even more famous 'Mutiny Ballad', *The Capture of Lucknow*, McGonagall also depicts Indians and British forces fighting the rebels together and contributing in equal measure to their success.[43] McGonagall was the son of impoverished Irish immigrants, and despite being a prolific writer, as well as a weaver, he remained impoverished throughout his life and was buried in a pauper's grave. Interestingly, ridiculed by the polite press at home as the 'worst poet ever', McGonagall had at one time claimed to have been made a 'Knight of the White Elephant' by the King of Burma![44] The 'spoils of empire' clearly did not affect all sections of British society in the same way. The impoverished existence of the ex-soldiers, radical religions and proximity to poor British Asians created an oppositional consciousness that led sections of the Victorian poor to view South Asia and the 'war' there very differently.

Despite the above-mentioned divergences, the relationship of this world of subaltern literature should not be seen to stand in complete isolation or absolute opposition to that polite literature. McGonagall, for instance, loved Shakespeare and even tried to play Macbeth in a penny theatre. Another street-poet that Mayhew interviewed spoke of his admiration of Oliver Goldsmith. E.P. Thompson has pointed out, for a slightly earlier period, that polite and subaltern literature often used the same images,[45] while Partha Chatterjee has argued that subaltern autonomy was founded on oppositional consciousness that allowed them to negotiate a different set of meanings for these shared images.[46]

Suffering, Violence, Sacrifice and the National Religion

Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle, in their study of nationalism and group identity, have stressed the role of violence and blood sacrifice in the constitution of modern nationalisms. Though their work is based principally on the American experience, they have suggested that their conclusions are more generally applicable. They argue that, 'What is really true in any community is what its

members can agree is worth killing for, or what they can be compelled to sacrifice their lives for.'[47] This resonates with Linda Colley's argument that Britain's mid-century wars, including the mutiny, had actually fostered, for the first time, a British national identity.[48] The question that we ask here is: did people really 'agree' on what the killing and dying were about?

Suffering was central to a good many of the ballads, *but* the way this suffering was organised in the ballads differed significantly. The principles for which the victims were shown to be willing to suffer violence varied widely. There are, indeed, some ballads that relate the suffering to nationalism and the nation's glory, revenge, etc. In a ballad titled *Massacre in India* it was claimed that 'there is glory for him who for his country bleeds'. The ballad went on to narrate gruesome tales of suffering and violence:

> Our women that were pregnant, were cruelly cut open
> They ravished our fair daughters and to pieces cut our sons
> Then forward, brave hearts, we've sworn by the God that made us
> That we'll blow the cov/ardly devils away from the British Guns[49]

The suffering and violence are all justified since the 'standard of our country doth proudly wave'. National glory and the need for vengeance justify continued, suffering and the willingness to kill and be killed in the process. However, there are also numerous ballads that do not relate the suffering and the blood-thirst to imperial or national glory. One such ballad, for instance, bearing the same name as the above quoted one, justifies the military campaign not for glory or revenge, but rather for the restoration of peace. Having once again spoken of the bloody violence inflicted upon the hapless innocents such as a Mr Archer and his wife whose 'arms and legs they [the Indians] did cut off and their bodies mangled sore/And burnt they were to ashes on India's distant shore' or the children in Delhi whom 'naked did they keep 'neath the sun till they went mad', it goes on to then promise revenge, but also to hope for a speedy restoration of 'blest peace' by the brave Sir Colin Campbell.[50] A third ballad, *The Massacre of Four Catholic Clergymen*, speaks of the unspeakable violence wreaked on four Irish priests, Rev. James Fitzgerald, Rev. John O'Hare, Father Thomas Morgan and Father Smith. The ballad tells the harrowing tale of how these 'poor and holy clergymen' who had left 'sweet Erin's land' to 'preach and to teach all the nations as was by heaven decried' were slaughtered by the Nana's men in Kanpur in the midst of celebrating mass. Their suffering is therefore equated to that of the 'blessed redeemer Upon Mount Calvary'.[51] Another Belfast broadsheet speaks of *The Massacre of Five Catholic Clergymen* and adds the name of Father Thomas Power to the previous four.[52] This too speaks of willing suffering for the sake of God's work. Marvin and Ingle have warned us not to be taken in by the apparent non-violence of certain religious

tenets, for in them lie un-stated the willingness to sacrifice one's own to violence in the form of ritualised sacrifice. The clergy, while praying for forgiveness for their enemies and 'not seeking retribution from the murderous sepoys', clearly legitimise and valorise the concept of Christian martyrdom, thus coding suffering not on the register of the nation, but on that of the Catholic faith. The fact that these broadsheets speak of 'Erin's land' (Ireland) rather than all of Britain is also significant.

The sacred secret that Marvin and Ingle mentioned was not, as they thought, the silent compact to kill and die for a fixed set of reasons considered holy, but the non-existence of any such agreement. The role of ritual, as Slavoj Zizek has recently pointed out, is not to structure personal belief, but rather the staged enactment of faith for the benefit of others.[53] The ritual violence of war, that Marvin and Ingle thought represented the agreement, of a society to kill and die for a certain set of principles, was in fact a clever ploy to convince everybody else that there was such an agreement, when indeed there was none. People participating in the violence of war did so for a host of different reasons. There is no reason to consider one person or group's reasons to be any more valid than those of another.

In fact, different ballads often spoke for different nations. Ballads like the *Catholic Clergymen* ballads quoted above, or the *Late Indian War*, spoke in the name of the Irish nation, while those like the *Bonnets O Blue* or the *Lads That Were Raised (Mang the Heather* recall Culloden, Bonnie Prince Charlie, Bruce of Bannock and speak clearly for a Scottish nation.[54] Graeme Morton has argued that the Victorian state in the mid nineteenth century was sufficiently localised at the peripheries to allow more than one nation to identify with the state, while maintaining their distinct national identities. According to Morton this gave rise to the rather unique circumstance of 'unionist nationalism'.[55] A ballad entitled *Thistle and Shamrock* thus says:

> Old England is proud, but what would it have been,
> Were it not for the thistle and shamrock so green.[56]

Another set of ballads represents sexual attraction and love as motivation for enlistment. The numerous ballads in this category speak of young love-struck women, who, unwilling to be parted from their beloved soldier, dress as men and enlist in the army and fight against the rebels. These ballads may actually be coded references to homosexual lifestyles that may have attracted many to a life in the army. Some of the more prominent examples of this motif are to be found in the ballads called *The Paisley Officer*, *William and Mary Or The Indian War* and *The Undaunted Female*.[57] Barring the first of these, in which both the lovers are killed in battle, the others end happily.

Scholars such as Judith Butler have argued that gender is performative; that is, that gender identity is constructed socially, not through definite biological essences, but through the playing of culturally designated social roles.[58] Since the women in these ballads play out masculine roles, including that most manly of roles in Victorian society—soldiering—the love and attraction that is depicted between these characters can easily be seen as a representation of homoerotic love. The following lines from *The Paisley Officer*, for instance, are clearly suggestive of homoerotic attraction:

> He took her onto Paisley town, and much they wondered there,
> To see the new recruit that look'd so gentle, slight and fair.

In fact, Pauline Greenhill has argued that cross-dressing ballads can be read as both heterosexual and queer narratives. As parts of a performative oral repertoire, these texts are especially well suited to produce a range of different meanings while being performed or heard by diverse communities of audiences or performers.[59] To reject such queer readings as 'alternative', 'connotative', 'subtextual', etc., is to remain trapped within what queer theorist Alexander Doty has dubbed the 'heterocentrist paradigm'.[60] Such a reading is also confirmed by another song that Reginald Wilberforce recounted in his memoirs of the events of the Indian War. Wilberforce mentioned the song as one that was popular amongst the soldiers in India. The song went thus:

> Away go those brave heroes
> The likes we never see more
> And with them goes the light bobbee
> And the lad that I adore[61]

Scholars such as Graham Dawson and Matt Houlbrook have recently suggested there may be a queer reading to the Victorian fascination with military heroes.[62] In ballads such as *William and Mary*, for instance,

> William then one morning, to Mary he did say
> I am going with Sir Colin Campbell to cross the raging sea

Just as Mary, on hearing it tells William a little later that,

> O William, lovely William, Oh! Do not leave me here,
> For I will join along with you, where the loud canons roar…

The structural homology between the two statements might well signal a similarity of the nature of the attraction in both cases. Following on Houlbrook's study of the fascination for Victorian heroes being a kind of homoerotic attraction,

we might notice here that William's desire to cross the raging sea 'with Sir Colin' is very similar to Mary's desire to 'join along with' William where the canons roar. Both undertake danger simply because they want to accompany someone particular.

Such a queer reading is further affirmed by a brief look at the visual depictions of soldiers at the time. Houlbrook has read scenes of soldierly homosociality depicted on cigarette cards and other Victorian ephemera as coded depictions of 'homosex' (to use his term); similar scenes are also seen in the artwork on some of the broadsheets. The print on top of the sheet titled *The Merry Little Soldier* (Figure 6.1) shows one such scene. Two soldiers in the foreground stand engrossed in each other, as a couple of black soldiers chase two ladies around the corner, while another sepoy plays a drum. The two in the foreground seem lost in each other's company and not the least concerned about the goings-on around the corner.[63] A commemorative Staffordshire ceramic figurine entitled *The Injured Soldier* made in 1860 (Figure 6.2) also bears strong sympathies with the woodcut. The postures of the soldiers depicted in both the figurine as well as the woodcut are very similar to those studied on the cigarette cards by Houlbrook.

Figure 6.1: The Merry Little Soldier

Source: P. Mukharji, Woodcut on Ballad entitled 'Merry Little Soldier', printed by T. Batchelar of Hackney, London, n.d.

Figure 6.2: The Injured Soldier

Source: 'The Wounded Soldier', Staffordshire Figurine c. 1860 (P.B. Mukharji).

Heroes and Heroines

Morton's work on 'Unionist Nationalism' rightly draws attention to the image repertoire of nations. While 'nations' are unquestionably modern inventions, they draw upon an older pool of images, myths and cultural memories. The national bourgeoisie selectively appropriates, reworks and positions these for the consumption of the masses. Partha Chatterjee's rhetorical question to Benedict Anderson—'Whose imagined community is the nation?'—also makes a similar point using the South Asian experience.[64] While it is, as we have seen, patently incorrect to suggest that everybody in Britain held similar views about the events of 1857, the success of these events from the point of view of British social cohesion lay in the ability to establish a set of iconic symbols which could be valid across social divides. The events of 1857 threw up a number of recognisable heroes and heroines who achieved wide popularity and became icons of the British experiences of 1857, though what those experiences were and how they were judged varied widely. In this final section we will try to locate how these icons were negotiated in the broadside ballads.

Among the military heroes, Sir Henry Havelock and Sir Colin Campbell were undoubtedly the two biggest icons of the war. Of the two, Havelock was by far the more popular, ending up with a statue in Nelson's shadow on Trafalgar Square, from whence he continues to preside over controversy, while Campbell's popularity seems to have waned in the years after the war.[65] What is curious is that it was actually Campbell who finally relieved Lucknow, while Havelock ended up being cornered by rebel forces and dying ingloriously of dysentery. Scholars such as John Mackenzie suggest that the Havelock cult was a result of the dominant Victorian ideology of the time and the consequent fascination for Christian soldiers.[66] Max Jones has faulted this approach dubbing it 'instrumentalist' and querying how the dominant ideology came to be imposed upon the rest of society.[67] I would suggest that one of the reasons for the difference between the public reception of the two men lay, in part, in the ability of the public image of Havelock to accommodate ambiguit/ and therefore to allow different sections of society to impute different meanings to it. Thus *Reynold's Newspaper* could participate in the Havelock mania, while opposing the events in India and maintaining that Havelock was a 'hero in an unjust cause'.[68] Similarly Dawson has pointed to contradictory framings of Havelock's life, hinting at both the figure of the *pater familiaris* and the adventure-hungry, wandering soldier hero.[69]

A similar ambiguity can be seen in the ballad portrayals of Havelock. In *Havelock to his Warrior Band*, he is shown as a merciful and peace-loving soldier who fights only in order to establish peace.

No quarter we'll give to these tigers...
But as heaven's soft voice is mercy to the helpless be clement and mild...
When England again rules the Ganges let a tear for the fallen be shed
And the widow and orphan be sheltered...

In stark contrast to this, another ballad which compared Havelock to Wellington, asserted that, to 'conquer he tried and he fought till he died'. It went on to state in no uncertain terms, that,

He died like a true British soldier
While fighting for vengeance on India's plains
Where the butchering tyrants in thousands were slain.

Surprisingly perhaps, none of the Havelock ballads make any direct reference to his devout evangelical faith, which has often been suggested as being the main reason for his popularity at the time (by John Mackenzie, most recently). Mackenzie, among others, has claimed that the Havelock cult was the result of Victorian Britain's fascination for Christian soldiering. While 'muscular Christianity' as it has come to be called by academics, was an indubitable force in Victorian Britain, it may have been limited by its class origins. The ideology after all was propagated pre-eminently through the Public Schools, institutions notorious for their exclusive class affiliations. Instead the virtues that are praised in Havelock's character as represented in the broadsheets are boldness, courage, daring, etc.

While Havelock was definitely the bigger of our two heroes in Victorian Britain, even eventually ending up as something of an industry in himself with his face appearing on matchboxes, cigarette cards, cheap wall hangings, etc., Sir Colin Campbell was undoubtedly the more popular broadside character. There are a whopping twenty-four different ballads that mention Campbell, to Havelock's eleven. Yet strikingly Sir Colin is persistently depicted as a Scottish hero, while Havelock is a British hero. While Havelock is compared to Nelson and Wellington, Campbell is compared to Wallace and Bruce. Campbell was not called a 'true British soldier' like Havelock; instead he was referred to as a 'noble Scot' and 'Hibernia's gallant son'. He was said to have been called upon by England for help and to have 'made himself a peer'. *The Bravest Fellows Out* hence said,

Our noble Campbell he was sent, his name we long revere,
He brought the Queen an empire back and made himself a peer,
He was a noble Scot his memory long we'll cherish,
Our fear defying citizen his name will never perish,
Always foremost in the fray, and is beyond a doubt,
What history will immortalise as the noblest Scotsman out.[70]

Yet ironically, while Havelock's fame kept increasing after the war, Campbell's did not. Havelock's name and memory lived on in a host of Victorian advertising ephemera, not to mention the bronze statue in Trafalgar Square erected by a public subscription. There were Havelock trading cards such as the ones distributed by John Player's Cigarettes, there were Havelock Cigars (whose advertising campaigns bore the legend 'Defenders of Britain'), there were Havelock matches, there was even a coat for young men marketed by HJ & D Nicolls & Co. called the Havelock.[71] Most importantly, he lived on through future Britons being named after him. The censuses of 1861 and 1871 together returned over a hundred boys born after 1857 with the Christian name 'Havelock', or 'Henry Havelock', among which was the eminent sexologist, Henry Havelock Ellis. By 1859 we even hear of prominent, old pubs being renamed after Havelock, such as the Fox's Head on Gray's Inn Road in London.[72] Havelock even had towns named after him in far away Australia, America and Canada, not to mention the numerous streets in Britain. Sir Colin, on the other hand, lived on with his doting and much younger wife as Baron Clyde until his death of old age, without even having a single trading card with his name on it. His statue, too, was significantly put up in Glasgow and not London. What was it that led to Havelock's elevation as the pre-eminent icon of the events of 1857?

Since the historical facts of his life were significantly over-written, his popularity does not seem to depend upon the accidents of his biography. Incidents such as his inglorious death by dysentery had, for instance, been simply erased from the popular memory. The trade cards distributed by Price's Candles for instance said, 'Heroic Havelock died, worn out with the anxieties and exertions of the siege.'[73] The *Massacre in India* similarly exhorted:

> Mourn, England, Mourn!
> For the death of General Havelock,
> He nobly fought and conquered,
> And died upon the field.

Historical time and space are both collapsed in the popular psyche. The infinite complexities and particularities of specific battles are replaced by a simple contest between 'us' and 'them' in a far away, but non-specific set of geographic signifiers. The simplified popular reality of the events can be seen in a re-enactment in a Christmas mummer in south-west Hampshire in 1862,

> ...the dramatis personae wore white trousers, and coats like tunics of printed calico, with scarves, wooden swords, and hats covered with ribbons and artificial flowers. They represent[ed] Sir Henry Havelock (who kills) Nana Sahib, and Sir Colin Campbell (who kills) Tanty Tobes (Tantia Tope) and the physician who was distinguished by a horse-haired plume in a pointed cap.[74]

This narrative compression is witnessed in the ballads as well. The ballad *Fall of Delhi*, for instance, mentions Campbell and Havelock urging their men on to arrest the Mughal princes as they escaped Delhi after its fall, despite the fact that neither of the two generals saw any action in Delhi during the campaign. Campbell arrived in India after the fall of Delhi, and Havelock was already besieged in Lucknow by then. *Lament for Gen. Havelock* similarly represents the general gaining victories at Kanpur, Lucknow and Delhi.[75] The question then is, if the names functioned largely as hollow signifiers, why was it that Havelock emerged as the bigger of the two heroes?

I would argue that it was precisely the name that was important for Havelock's greater fame. Campbell was a common Scottish name and its association with Scottish identity was only accentuated further by Campbell's own Scottish chauvinism. In Havelock's case, the name was not one commonly met with in Britain. As early as on 24 October 1857, a certain C.W. Bingham wrote to the *Notes and Queries* on the subject.[76] Bingham mentioned that 'many have of late' recalled the ancient legend of Havelock the Dane due to the general's name. He then proceeded to vehemently deny any possibility of Henry Havelock actually being of Danish descent, but enquired if anybody knew the name's origins. On 7 November 1857, another letter appeared in the same journal from one F.L. who mentioned that the local history of Lincolnshire mentioned a certain *Havelock Stone*, placed between the villages of Grimsby and Wellow and said to have been brought over by Danes in the ancient past.[77] The author did not make a direct connection with the general's name, but said he published the note as it might be of 'interest to the General's friends'. By 22 May 1858 Havelock's name was being debated not only by the occasional enthusiast, but also by those of more scholarly inclinations. George Sexton, M.D., wrote in response to the query of one Mr Charnock that he had discovered in an MS of a minor poet, Alfred Johnstone Hollingsworth, a short note on the derivation of the name Havelock. In the purported note Hollingsworth criticised the tendency of Britons to seek all etymological origins in the classical languages. Instead he proposed that the name Havelock (in which he was interested by virtue of having a school fellow of that name) may have three different roots in old Danish and may have come over to England along with the ancient Vikings before being corrupted by modern English. Of the three, the one Hollingsworth thought the most probable meant in Old Danish 'to have luck'. Sexton, the author, felt that if this indeed were true it might be a source of further confidence in Havelock's troops.[78] By January 1861 a certain Tomlin Smith, a barrister who was seen to be something of an authority on Havelock, claimed to have discovered conclusive proof that Havelock's ancestors were indeed from Grimsby in Lincolnshire. He claimed that definitive evidence of this was to be found in the ancient seals in possession of the town council that mentioned the name Havelock. Unfortunately though the seals were no longer in use and had disappeared somewhere. Soon after this

a certain Mr Carritt, a solicitor and a friend of Mr Smith, told the latter, after attending a lecture by him on Havelock at the Islington Literary Society, that the seals were in Mr Carritt's possession through an inheritance, and he was willing to return them to the town council. Soon the seals were returned and the council, after thanking both Carritt and Smith profusely, deposited the seals with the ancient charters of the corporation.[79] Havelock's ancestry was established as authentically British and, in fact, it was even asserted that his ancestors had lived in Grimsby since before the Norman invasion and were therefore true Saxons. Having thus successfully severed all possibility of Danish or even later Norman/French inheritance, Havelock was now represented as the authentic British hero. A subsequent attempt also sought to project him as a British answer to the French Napoleonic cult. In 1860 it was suggested that Havelock's pet name was 'Napoleon'. One Rona wrote to say that he had seen one of Havelock's books published from Baptist Mission of Serampore, with the word 'Napoleon' pencilled just beneath the author's name. Rona felt either Sir Archibald or his son James Campbell, who were Havelock's superior officers in early years, gave him the name.[80]

Unlike Campbell then, Havelock had a name that did not evoke historic rivalries and yet was sufficiently uncommon to strike British ears as being worthy of comment and reflection. Thus Havelock's name was sufficiently hollow of historical associations with any particular British nation or Scottish clan to be able to appeal to all quarters. That ethnicity and family names were instrumental in the construction of mutiny icons can be seen in the case of the pre-eminent non-military icon as well. The figure of 'Jessie', said to be the wife of one of the besieged private soldiers at Lucknow, was unquestionably the most significant non-military icon of the mutiny. She was the theme of a number of reports and eventually also became the eponymous heroine of an immensely popular play by Dion Boucicault, which was performed to full houses in New York and Melbourne, as well as in London.[81] She is usually depicted as a pious woman, whose piety and faith become a source of strength for the rest. Eventually, just as even her faith is about to break, she dreams of Campbell entering Lucknow with his highlanders playing bagpipes and wakes up to find her dream a reality.[82]

Jessie surfaces in at least three ballads. Two of these, *Jessie's Dream at Lucknow* and *Dinna ye Hear it?* portray Jessie as a Scot, while the other, *Jessie Brown The Heroine of Lucknow*, speaks of her as being British.[83] In the first of these Jessie recalls the McGregor slogan at her wedding and says, ''Tis the grandest o' them a'.' She later hears the same slogan at the moment of her deliverance. A certain R.S.F. wrote in the *Notes and Queries* of 20 February 1858 to protest against this element of the popular story. 'I am quite certain that war-cry of the Clan Gregor is not the grandest of all Highland slogans.' Instead R.S.F. tends to believe that the narrative confuses a 'slogan' with a 'pibrach' [sic]. A pibroch is

a type of Highland music that is not specific to any of the clans and therefore more acceptable. The ethnicity of names clearly influenced their acceptability.[84] The Jessie figure is also interesting since no corresponding historical personage has ever been identified. In fact, one contemporary correspondent from Calcutta wrote to the *Nonconformist* to protest against the wide circulation of the story, pointing out that there were grave factual inaccuracies; crowned by the facts that there was no one called 'Jessie* among the besieged and that Campbell's troops did not play bagpipes when they first entered the city as a rebel counteroffensive was expected at anytime.[85] Since the story reworked certain common folk themes found in old ballads such as the *Soldier's Wifey* it is highly likely that the story was originally created by a balladeer, from whence it entered more polite registers.[86]

Conclusion

While our understanding of Indian participation in the 'Indian War* of 1857, like so much else in Indian history, has been immensely enriched by subaltern historiography, it is perhaps a marker of the lasting imperialism of 'western* intellectual traditions that the analytical tools developed by the subaltern studies project have so seldom been used to understand any aspect whatsoever of British histojy. Using subaltern techniques I have sought to develop in this chapter a set of interruptions and interventions in the received wisdom that marks the moment when empire became a matter of universal enthusiasm. By marshalling hitherto ignored archives, as well as by focusing on the consumption/reception of narratives side by side with their production, we have sought to highlight that while the mutiny narratives did indubitably popularise a set of common icons, the sentiments and solidarities these icons evoked remained widely varied. It is not our intention to once again weave these interruptions into another homogenised and uniform counter-narrative. Indeed that may well be intellectually impossible as well as politically undesirable.

Dipesh Chakrabarty has suggested that two kinds of histories exist. The first, History 1, is both a project as well as a tool of the 'rule of capital*, and therefore seeks to promote an increasingly abstracted, general, homogenous and non-local view of the past; whereas the other, History 2, is often appropriated by the former, yet retains its quality of interrupting homogenisations.[87] If we accommodate reading praxes as a component of this definition it allows us to further explore how History 1 and History 2 might remain dialectically implicated with each other. As narrative elaboration constantly seeks to transform History 2 into History 1, the latter in turn is also constantly re-imagined into new, localised registers of meaning. Chakrabarty recognises this flux when he explains that the

two types coexist. Yet, while one, by its sheer nature and resources, is capable of longevity, the other—momentary and fleeting by its very nature—has largely been erased from the historical record. It is impossible to retrieve History 2 as an alternative narrative to History 1, for the subaltern, by definition, lacks the independence to constitute his own narrative identity, but it is possible to invoke it as a series of interruptions to the dominant and uniform narrative of History 1. This is precisely what I have been seeking to do in this paper: to invoke a non-linear set of interruptions to the dominant narratives of the history of the mutiny.

Notes and References

1. 1 have chosen to use the phrase 'Indian War* as this is indeed the term used most often in the sources consulted here. The term 'mutiny* has only been used when referring to the polite/elite writings on the subject, once again following the actual sources.
2. For a good discussion of this point see Sumit Sarkar, 'Post-Modernism and the Writing of History*. *Studies in History*, vol. 15, no. 2, (1999), pp. 293-322.
3. Gautam Chakravarty, *The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
4. For a discussion and critique of this tendency see Projit Bihari Mukharji, 'Tessie*s Dream at Lucknow: Popular Memorializations of Dissent, Ambiguities and Class in the Heart of Empire*, *Studies in History*, vol. 23, no. 2, Forthcoming.
5. Rudrangshu Mukherjee comments on this issue in Rudrangshu Mukheijee, "'Satan Let Loose Upon Earth'*: Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857*, *Past and Present*, vol. 128, (Aug. 1990), pp. 92-116.
6. Lilian Nayder, 'Class Consciousness and the Indian Mutiny in Dickens*s "The Perils of Certain English Prisoners'**, *Studies in English Literature 1500-1900*, vol. 32, no. 4, (Autumn 1992), pp. 689-705.
7. Claude M. Simpson, *The British Broadside and Its Music* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966).
8. On the politics of inventing a ballad tradition, see David Atkinson, 'The English Revival Canon: Child Ballads and the Invention of Tradition*, *The Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 114, (2001), pp. 370-380.
9. *Banbury Guardian*, 22nd October 1857, p. 1, quoted in Roly Brown, 'Nena Sahib*, *Enthusiasms*, 50, (2005).
10. Leslie Shepard, *The Broadside Ballad: The Development of Street Literature from Traditional Song to Popular Newspaper* (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1962).
11. Henry Mayhew, *London Labour London Poor* (London: Griffin, Bohn & Co., 1861), p. 220. Louis James, 'Catnach, James (1792-1841)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004). Available online at www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4897 (accessed 11 March 2008).
12. Walter S. Collins, 'Review of Claude M. Simpson's The British Broadside Ballad and its Music', *Renaissance Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3, (1967), pp. 387-388.
13. This was an oft-repeated aphorism in the mid nineteenth century, attributed to various people including William Wallace, C.U.B.E.R., 'Let Me Make A Nation's Ballads, Who Will May Make Their Laws!', *Notes and Queries*, 22 December 1849, p. 124. Later scholars have attributed

its origins to Fletcher of Saltoun. Collins, 'Review*. Yet it is not clear if Fletcher himself had merely quoted Sir Christopher Musgrave. See G.L.C., 'Ballad Makers and Legislators', *Notes and Queries*, 5th January, 1850, p. 153.
14. Anthony Bennett, 'Sources of Popular Song in Nineteenth Century Britain: Problems and Methods of Research*, *Popular Music*, 2, (1982), p. 71.
15. James, 'Catnach'.
16. John W. Ashton, 'Folklore in the Literature of Elizabethan England*, *Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 70, (1957), pp. 10-15; Robert A. Schwegler, 'Oral Tradition and Print: Domestic Performance in Renaissance England*, vol. 93, (1980), pp. 435-441.
17. William Cameron (John Strathesk ed.), *Hawkie: The Autobiography of a Gangrel* (Glasgow: David Robertson & Co., 1888), Chapter IV.
18. Cameron, *Hawkie*, Chapter VI.
19. Edwin Roffe, 'Songs*, *Notes and Queries*, 3 September 1864, p. 192.
20. The other printers and publishers mentioned by Mayhew are: Mrs Ryle, Mr Birt and Mr Paul, all of whom had worked with Catnach at Seven Dials; Mr Powell, formerly of Lloyds and then Brick Lane, Whitechapel; Mr Good, Aylesbury Street, Clerkenwell; Mr Phiars of Westminster; Mr Taylor of Waterloo Road; Mr Sharp of Kent Street, Borough, Mayhew, *London Labour*, p. 220.
21. Mayhew uses the term 'patterer', but it is not clear if all 'patterers* wrote their songs as well. They definitely did not sell solely their own works. Mayhew, *London Labour*, pp. 220-221.
22. There seems to be some confusion regarding Anne Ryle's exact relationship to the Catnachs. Bennett calls her a sister while Mayhew claims she was a 'niece and successor*. Bennett, 'Sources of Popular Song*, p. 72; Ma/hew, *London Labour*, p. 220.
23. HardingB 20(221), Bodelian Library, Oxford (hereafter Bod.) and HardingB 11(178), Bod. The first of these bears a double imprint of both Ryle and J. Catnach and is decorated with a woodcut that borrows from Indian textile print-blocks. The latter is imprinted to Moss of Doncaster.
24. Firth c.14 (174), Bod.
25. Johnson Ballads 302, Bod.
26. Harding B 28(87) & Harding B 36(2), Bod.
27. HardingB 26(348), Bod.
28. Mayhew, *London Labour*, p. 43 and p. 321.
29. John Camden Hotten, 'Jack the Giant Killer*, *NQ*, 7 November 1863, pp. 377-378.
30. 'The Company's Raj*, *Edinburgh Blackwood Magazine*, November 1857, p. 618.
31. C.A.W., 'Class', *NQ*, 2 November 1867.
32. RB.m.143(040), National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS).
33. The earliest versions of this ballad pertain to the Sikh War and were printed by Ryle and Co. Harding B 20(221) Bod. These were later re-printed during and after 1857 possibly by someone else since the name 'Ryle* has been scratched out from the block while retaining all else including the address. Harding B 15(169a), Harding B 11(2083) and Johnson Ballads 1099, Bod.
34. HardingB 15(153b), Bod. Imprint: Taylor's Song Mart, 93, Brick Lane, Bethnal Green.
35. Firth c.14(90).
36. Mayhew, *London Labour*, p. 107.
37. J.O., 'The Blind Lascar', *NQ*, 31st March 1855, p. 241.
38. The Proceedings of the Old Bailey Ref. (heareafter 'Bailey') tl7460226-l & tl 7650227-5.
39. Bailey 1 17671021-23 & tl 7700912-85.
40. Bailey 1 17851214-44.
41. 2806 c.18(255), Bod. Imprint: C. Croshaw, Coppergate, York, but other ballads on the same sheet have different imprints. Another variant Harding B 25(1521), Bod. is printed by T. Weightman, York; Harding Bll(304), Bod. Imprint: W. Dixon. The latter is the only ballad

cited here available in Child's collection and race of 'Susan* is not as clearly defined as in the former, leaving it open to less subversive meanings.
42. Harding B 45(22) 2/3, Bod.
43. William McGonagall's Complete Writings can be accessed at McGonagall Online: http://www.mcgonagall-online.org.uk/ (accessed 1 July 2007).
44. William Donaldson, 'McGonagall, William (c.1825-1902)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/40706, accessed 11 March 2008] and McGonagall Online.
45. E.P. Thompson, *Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
46. Partita Chatterjee, 'Bhumika: Nimnoborger Itihaash Chorcha-r Itihaash* in Gautam Bhadra and Partha Chatterjee ed., *Nimnoborger Itihaash* (Ananda Publishers: Kolkata, 2004), p. 8.
47. Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, 'Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Revisiting Civil Religion*, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. 64, no. 4, (1996), 767-780.
48. Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837* (London: Yale University Press, 2005) and *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World* (London: Anchor, 2004).
49. Firth c.14(95), Bod. Imprint: W. Pratt, Birmingham, Performed by Michael Hart.
50. Firth c.14(81), Bod
51. Harding B 26(423), Bod. Imprint: J. Moore, Belfast.
52. Firth c.14(82).
53. For Zizek 'others* include the presumed all-seeing divinity for whose benefit ritual enactment of faith is seen to be positioned. Slavoj Zizek, *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 1995).
54. Harding B26(423); Firth c.14(82); Harding B26(348), Bod. & L.C. Fol.70(22a) and L.C.Fol. 178.A.2(107), NLS.
55. Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830-1860* (East Linton: Tuckwell, 1999).
56. L.C.Fol. 178.A.2(107), NLS.
57. L.C.Fol.178.A.2(198), NLS; Firth c.14(174); 2806 c.15(196), Bod. The last was published by W. Birmingham, Dublin.
58. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).
59. Pauline Greenhill, '"Neither A Man Nor A Maid": Sexualities and Gendered Meanings in Cross-Dressing Ballads*, *The Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 108, no. 428, (Spring, 1995), pp. 156-177.
60. Alexander Doty, *Making Things Perfectly Queer: Interpreting Mass Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
61. Reginald G. Wilberforce, *An Unrecorded Chapter*, p. 82.
62. Graham Dawson, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities* (London: Taylor & Francis/Routledge, 1994); Matt Houlbrook, 'Soldier Heroes and Rent Boys: Homosex, Masculinities, and Britishness in the Brigade of Guards, circa 1900-1960', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 42, (2003), pp. 351-388.
63. Firth c.14(240) Bod., Imprint: T. Bachelar, Hackney Road, London. The imprint also informs that Bachelar sells it opposite to the 'Refuge for the Destitute*. Other prints such as the one printed by W. Armstrong, Banastre Street, Liverpool do not have the wood-cut. 2806 c.17(277), Bod.
64. Partha Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
65. For recent controversies over Havelock memorials in the UK see 'Rage Over Road Name*, BBC News, 22 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/england/2003119.stm accessed on 11th March 2008.
66. JM Mackenzie, 'Heroic Myths of Empire*, in J.M. Mackenzie, ed., *Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

67. Max Jones, 'What Should Historians Do With Heroes? Reflections on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Britain*, *History Compass*, vol. 5, no. 2, (2007), pp. 439-454.
68. Quoted in Dawson, *Soldier Heroes*, p. 110.
69. Dawson, *Soldier Heroes*, p. 141.
70. Firth c.14(281), Bod. Imprint: Poet's Box, Glasgow. Dated: Saturday Morning, July 9, 1864.
71. The coat was advertised in the classified advertisements section in The *Times*, 16th November 1858, p. 14.
72. Gray's Inn, 'Richard Savage*, *NQ*, 1st January 1859, p. 7.
73. The Trade Cards distributed by the company bore a reproduction of an oil painting of the charge on Lucknow in the front along with Havelock's picture in an inset. Personal Collection.
74. Mackenzie E.C. Walcott, 'Hampshire Mummers', *NQ*, 25th January 1862, p. 66.
75. Firth c.14(83), Imprint: Rial, Seven Dials, Monmouth Court (possibly the same as Ryle); Firth c.14(87), Imprint: W. Dever, Bloomsbury, Bod.
76. C.W. Bingham, 'Havelock*, NQ, 24th October 1857, p. 327.
77. F.L. 'Havelock Stone*, NQ, 7th November 1857, p. 365.
78. George Sexton, 'General Havelock', 22nd May 1858, p. 422.
79. Grime, 'Singular Restoration of the Ancient Seals of Grimsby*, NQ, 19th January 1861, pp. 46-47.
80. Rona, 'Sir Henry Havelock*, NQ, 27th October 1860, p. 327.
81. Dion Boucicault, *Jessie Brown or the Reliefof Lucknow*, New York: Samuel French, 1858. For the part this play played in imperial politics see, J.S. Bratton, *Acts of Supremacy: The British Empire and the Stage, 1790-1930* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), Introduction.
82. Mukharji, 'Jessie's Dream*.
83. L.C.Fol.70(120b); Firth c. 14 (88); Harding B 15(147b), Imprint: T. Taylor, Taylor's Song Mart, Brick Lane, Spitalflelds, NLS.
84. RSF, 'Dinna Ye Hear It?*, NQ, 20th February 1858, p. 147.
85. The report from *The Nonconformist was* forwarded to *Notes and Queries* by RSF as further proof that the 'story b[ore] upon the face of it the stamp of fiction.' RSF, 'Dinna Ye Hear It?*, NQ, 22nd May 1858, p. 425.
86. Harding B11(3584), Bod. Imprint: C. Neesom, Neesom's Song Mart, 93 Brick Lane, London.
87. Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Universalism and Belonging in the Life of Capital*, *Public Culture*, vol. 12, no. 3, (2000), pp. 653-678.

7

BEING INDIAN IN BRITAIN DURING 1857

Michael H. Fisher

AS the sudden and shocking news of the bloody events of 1857 in north India reached Britain, the thousands of Indian men and women of all classes living there faced new challenges in their ongoing negotiations with the surrounding society. Lurid rumours and reports poured into the British media and popular discourse, about mutinous sepoys and treacherous oriental princes, who were both suddenly notorious for betraying, assaulting and assassinating British women, children and men. In this heated atmosphere, Britons expected Indians living among them in the metropole to proclaim and demonstrate their submission to Britain and to distinguish themselves in word and deed from their disloyal countrymen in the colony. Most of the diverse Indians in Britain, whatever their personal feelings towards the anti-British fighting back in India, felt compelled to protest their loyalties to the British crown, but nonetheless endured considerable hostility from the host society, with long-term repercussions. Thus, 1857 marked a key moment in the history of Indians in Britain.

Certainly, the tens of thousands of people from India living in Britain over the preceeding 250 years had experienced—and partially shaped—many shifts in attitudes toward them. While some Britons had regarded all Indians as collectively 'Black', like people from Africa and the Caribbean, many other Britons had differentiated among them. In particular, the social class, religious community, gender, individual circumstances and historical era of each Indian in Britain shaped his or her possible roles there. European fantasies about the exotic 'Oriental woman', especially the members of the regal harem, as sensually desirable but enticingly inaccessible, added a gendered aura to these images. Overall during the early nineteenth century, British attitudes towards Indian women and men had hardened as the British Empire asserted authority and gained cultural confidence over colonised Indians collectively. The events of 1857 accelerated and altered these patterns, catalysing new British formulations that combined all Indians together based on hereditary race. In particular, the Indian man became perceived as threatening to the putative purity of white women.

Conversely, living in Britain had provided particularly perceptive Indians with the vantage point to apprehend the larger patterns of global imperialism, something more difficult to do from India. Overall, a sense of themselves as collectively Indian and an early patriotism had developed among some as they bonded to their fellows from different regions and/or religious communities. Yet, when word of the 1857 conflict reached Indians \in Britain, virtually all recognised that they had to make visibly pro-British gestures, whatever their private sentiments. Some vainly hoped to use this crisis to their own political or personal advantage, or at least to mitigate its disadvantages. Some, on returning to India, faced accusations of treason and arrest and interrogation by British authorities. Indeed, some of the most prominent insurgents who fought against the British in India had been embittered by prejudice and injustice that they personally experienced while in Britain.

After the immediate crisis of 1857 ended, British attitudes towards Indians in Britain softened somewhat, but did not completely revert to earlier modes. Subsequent British stereotypes largely rendered all Indians as unalterably alien, reinforced by popular understandings of biological 'race', pseudo-scientific 'social Darwinism' and 'Black-White' conflicts'in Jamaica in 1865 and in New Zealand lasting until 1872. Yet, British Raj policies favouring Indian princes as the 'natural leaders' of India actually gained for them more favourable policies and guaranteed access to the British monarch. Hence, the later lives of Indians remaining or newly arrived in Britain continued to be affected by the reverberations of 1857.

In order to trace changes in Indian roles in British society during the mid-nineteenth century, this essay concentrates on the especially significant mission sent to London by Wajid Ali Shah (r. 1847-1856, d. 1887), the recently deposed King of Awadh. Over the years, this dynasty, more than any other, despatched diplomatic delegations to London—in 1822-1823, 1824-1825, 1835-1837, 1837-1838 and 1856-1863. Awadh had been one of the largest and wealthiest Indian princely states; the British annexation of Awadh in 1856 proved to be the last major act of British aggression ever in India and one of the most controversial; hotly debated at the time and subsequently on legal, political and moral grounds by Indians and Britons in both India and Britain. Immediately thereafter, this final diplomatic delegation from Awadh went to London to try to reverse the annexation. The largest and arguably most significant of the thirty Indian embassies to London to date, it included 113 Indian men and women of all classes, from the Queen-Mother and heir apparent, through courtiers and translators, to servants and slaves. Various Indians of each socio-economic class already in London bonded in solidarity with their counterparts in this mission. Britons viewed it, and particularly its female leader, variously sympathetically, sceptically or voyeuristically. Following news of the outbreak, however, the Awadh delegation suffered Assuring stresses.

In India, Awadh emerged as a crucially central cockpit of the conflicts of 1857. Virtually all schools of historiography—including British imperialist, bourgeois Indian and Pakistani nationalist, Marxist and neo-Marxist Subaltern Studies—have found in Awadh a class to highlight, condemn or celebrate. For many Britons, the British defence of the besieged Residency in Lucknow, Awadh's capital, remains a prime and enduring symbol of their heroic pluck against almost overwhelming assaults by Indians. The landholding taluqdars of Awadh were seen by the British as among their fiercest opponents during the conflict and among their staunchest supporters subsequently. Indian and Pakistani nationalists have remembered Wajid Ali Shah's wife, Hazrat Mahal, and young son, Birjis Qadr, as heroic leaders who roused and led the people against British colonialism. Many of the sepoys who formed the core of the Bengal Army, but then fought the British across north India (as "mutineers', "freedom fighters' or "peasants in uniform') were born in Awadh. The rise of Awadh peasants as a class, of and for themselves, formed a major part of the resistance against both feudal elite landholders and royalty as well as the British; fighting persisted in the Awadh countryside long after most other areas had fallen back into British control. Gramsci-inspired scholars have identified various rebels among the peasants, bandits and other *lumpenproletariat* of Awadh.1We can extend understanding of the significance of 1857 by considering closely the dynamics and history of this particularly prominent embassy as revealing many of the experiences and attitudes faced by virtually all classes of Indians in Britain during the transitions around 1857.

Awadh's Last Royal Diplomatic Delegation

The unrealistic goal of the final diplomatic mission from Awadh was to convince the authorities in Britain to reverse the recent annexation of their kingdom carried out by Governor General Dalhousie in India. In 1856, after being dethroned, Wajid Ali Shah determined to go to London personally to petition Queen Victoria, Parliament and the East India Company Court of Directors, protesting this immoral and illegal act, which violated longstanding treaties. As did many Indians, he believed that he could obtain redress for injustices suffered in India if he could only present the truth of his position in London. When the British blocked him from travelling, he diplomatically reported illness and instead despatched a delegation officially headed by his mother, dowager queen Janab-i-Aulia Taj Ara Begum (1795/1803-1858), supported by his son and proclaimed heir, Mirza Muhammad Hamid Ali Mirza Bahadur (1836/38-1874), and one of Wajid Ali Shah's younger brothers, General Mirza Sikandar Hushmat Bahadur (1822-1858). As British newspapers frequently reported, the Queen-Mother was personally attended by nine of her "daughters' (probably including younger relatives and ladies-in-waiting); twenty-one

other female servants and slaves; seven eunuchs (including a nearly seven-foot tall 'Nubian* slave); her personal interpreter, Englishman Captain John Rose Brandon; her personal hakim (doctor); and numerous other aides and courtiers. Similarly, the heir apparent and the general each had entourages. Most prominent among the diplomats assisting the Queen-Mother was Maulwi Muhammad Musseehood-Deen Khan Bahadur (b.1804), whom Wajid Ali Shah appointed to carry out the actual negotiations with the British on behalf of the royal principals.

Musseehood-Deen's family had long served the Awadh rulers, but for the last three generations had worked for the British as intermediary officials and judges.2 Musseehood-Deen himself had been employed by the British for twelve years, receiving from them the title 'Khan Bahadur* and rising to the high office of Mir Munshi (chief secretary) in the Persian Department in Calcutta, the peak in his profession. After someone leaked a confidential British document to the Awadh ruler, the British accused and fired him in 1844, with none of the charges against him ever proven, or even made explicit. After this dismissal, he found employment with the Awadh ruler, despite British insistence that he be dismissed.3 Similarly, other Indians, expert in British ways, but resentful of their mistreatment at British hands, supported this mission.

Even before the Awadh envoys disembarked in Britain, Wajid Ali Shah*s hired British agent there, Major Robert Wilberforce Bird, the former Assistant Resident to Awadh who had been transferred for allegedly supporting the Awadh dynasty against the policies of his superiors, made sure that news of this distinguished embassy circulated in Britain. This news excited both Indians and Britons because of the nature of the mission, its size and opulence, and its composition. For example, the thirteen-person delegation headed by the claimant as Nawab of Surat, Mir Jafar Ali Khan Bahadur (which had already been in London since 1854 on his second visit), reportedly enthused at the prospect of their arrival; its diplomats later conveyed to the Awadh mission their hard-earned experience dealing with British authorities and the British public. An English missionary, Joseph Salter, who had attached himself to the Surat embassy, echoed their anticipation by hyperbolically declaring, 'The visit of a Mohammedan Queen to London was the most extraordinary event our Indian empire had ever witnessed.*4 Similarly, an Indian scholar, author and official, Syed Abdullah of Pushkar (who had married and settled in London), reported himself delighted that there were 'upwards of 12 learned Moulvees, Moonshees, Poets, Authors, etc. in the suite of H.M. the Queen Dowager of Oude.*5 He had already presented the East India Company's Directors with his translation of an Urdu poem by'Wajid Ali Shah, called 'Ocean of Love*.6 Later, Syed Abdullah met with and advised this mission (as he did others), serving as a translator for it; his appeal to Wajid Ali Shah for a regular salaried position, however, failed.7 Thus, when the Awadh delegation reached Southampton via Alexandria on 20 August 1856 with a grand display, it attracted fascinatioh from other Indians already in Britain and also the British public.

By this point, British popular opinion had well-established, but not consistent, expectations about 'oriental' royalty, especially royal women, and how they should be regarded. In this environment, the British press reflected competing efforts by supporters and opponents of this mission to put their own 'spin' on its particular significance. Initially, in the tone of a British royal court calendar, for example, the *Times* listed by name and title the mission's leading dignitaries.[8] This early article assured the British public that these dignitaries would receive 'every accommodation' and noted that as its ladies observed seclusion, the embassy would therefore hire entire hotels so as not to have to share with other guests. A subsequent *Times* article announced:

> The disembarkation of these illustrious individuals has excited the greatest curiosity, and a vast number of people congregated in the docks to witness it. The *suite* and attendants are most gorgeously attired in the Oriental costume. The Queen-mother was brought on shore in a sedan-chair, closely veiled, and the same seclusion was observed in reference to the landing of her daughters.[9]

This article also indicated their vast and easy wealth by recounting that jewels worth £50,000 had fallen overboard in the Red Sea. A few days later, the *Times* publicised some of the many British personages who paid their respects to the delegation: 'the Earl and Countess of Hardwicke, Lady St. John, the Ladies Yorke, Sir George Pollock, Sir George Wombwell, Admiral Ayscough, Viscount Royston ...'[10] While not even these aristocrats could approach the Queen-Mother, Southampton's Mayor Andres was permitted by the delegation to shake a female hand extended from behind the purdah; British newspapers debated whether this hand was truly that of the Queen-Mother or else merely that of a servant, who had sacrificed her modesty as a concession to British importuning.[11]

Some British sentiment soon shifted against this final Awadh delegation, however, despite the lobbying of its hired British publicists. The *Times* marked the Awadh nobles for their exotic display, but depicted their attendants as dirty drugged loafers who alienated the space in Britain that they occupied:

> Although the appearance of the Princesses and principal attendants is most superb by reason of the elaborate and costly dresses with which they are attired, the mass of the inferior servants present an unusually filthy and unsightly group. Ranging on the basement floors of the hotel are large numbers continually to be seen lounging in the most careless manner, or squatting before a charcoal fire either cooking some article of food or indulging in the fumes derived from a dirty opium pipe. The entire floor of this portion of the hotel is strewed with the clothing of the inhabitants, and in appearance much resembles the back premises of an extensive rag merchant, the whole being rendered more unpleasant by the quantity of dirt which each article of dress apparently contains.

We can contrast these mid-nineteenth century images with those of earlier periods, when even Indian servants were considered exotic rarities by most

Britons. At the same time, the *Times* described British commoners as mesmerised by this insubstantial oriental luxury and veiled sexuality:

> [A]t present the interest excited is one of mere vulgar curiosity on the part of the multitude, who desire only to see the dresses and appointments of the servants and followers, and greedily drink in the absurd tales of the fabulous wealth and jewels belonging to the Royal party, which have been industriously circulated. Besides the usual rabble of boys consequent on such occasions, numbers of respectably dressed persons, with now and then a carriage filled with occupants, are to be seen intently gazing at the exterior of the Royal York Hotel, where the illustrious party is located, and great pains are frequently taken to secure a sight of the ladies of the Royal party, who sometimes take a sly peep from the upper apartments upon the congregated numbers assembled in the streets below.

Thus, some British newspapers recorded the British masses and Indian visitors observing each other.

The *Globe* newspaper depicted vulgar British delight in the Awadh delegation as a 'raree-show'.[12] This newspaper also ridiculed the obsession with seclusion by its women. It compared the members of the mission to the Shakespearian monster Caliban, and called them 'charlatan'; the mission's goal was 'ill-advised and preposterous'. It debunked Major Bird's rhetorical efforts to sway the British mob. The *Times*, which had initially published more favourable representations of the delegation, echoed this scathing article. The *Times* thus shifted against the mission within ten days, now portraying it as a nuisance to the British rather than a source of pride, profit or even entertainment:

> The strangely dressed natives stroll and lounge about the street without apparently the slightest notice being taken of them.... Altogether the natives appear a very good-tempered race, and amuse themselves principally by troubling shopkeepers to explain the quality and use of the articles exposed for sale, but in few instances making purchases at the prices which they are called upon to tender for the transfer of die goods.[13]

In addition to their reluctance to spend money, the *Times* attributed unpleasant odours to them as a 'race' apart. Indeed, the hotel that they rented would allegedly be unfit for respectable people (i.e., Europeans) for some time: 'Mr. White, the proprietor, received £100 for the use of his premises during the 10 days they have been occupied; and we do not doubt that it will be at least as many more days before the establishment will be again rendered fit to be used as the residence Qf a European.'[14]

By the time of its departure by train from Southampton for London, the delegation retained mainly its curiosity factor. The *Times* stressed the childish disorganization and impracticality of these 'natives' and 'Orientalists'. (Such language meant Indians were 'natives' everywhere, but Britons were not 'natives'

even in their homeland.) Again the press highlighted as comical and ineffectual the efforts of the eunuchs and other servants to follow 'the customs of their race1and protect the modesty of their queen, 'this curious specimen of Eastern royalty', as she moved from covered carriage to the train.15 Yet, the eunuchs were defeated by plucky Britons who climbed onto the roof of the railroad carriage to peer over the inadequate screening:

> [0]ne or two [British male] persons, availing themselves of the opportunity afforded owing to the attention of the officials being directed to the importance of the proceeding, climbed to the roof of the Royal carriage, and by that means witnessed the Queen's progress between the two lines of drapery placed to secure privacy. However, the gratification could not have been very great, as Her Majesty was closely veiled.

Nonetheless, after the mission established itself in London, the *Times* later described the physical features of the Awadh dowager queen for the edification of the British public: 'The Queen-Mother is between 50 and 60, and of a somewhat corpulent figure, of a light copper colour complexion/16

Some in British society admired her devotion, but presupposed her incapable of effective action or even of understanding of British politics:

> This journey of the widowed Queen to Europe, to solicit the restoration of her son to the throne of Oude [Awadh], displayed such an unusual energy of maternal affection as could only excite admiration. But, alas! what influence could she expect to exert in England; confined as she had been to her harem in Lucknow, ignorant of the usages of civilized life, with no one to plead her cause, or interested in her son's welfare?17

In London, the embassy rented the Duke of Brunswick's Harley House on New Road (now Euston Road) for a year at £550. It was not very secluded nor was it large enough for the entire entourage; they also hired nearby houses for the rest. Newspapers pictured their moving in as a great bustle of effeminate activity and expense:

> The [British] mob ... gaze and laugh at the barbaric crowd in feminine garb, who, with their semi-virile chiefs, throng the ante-rooms of the New-road harem, or cluster on the tops of the neighbouring cabs__The wrongs of the Oudean [Awadh] dynasty have produced a less intense effect than the number, the costume, and the dirt of the Oudean domestics.18

This delegation thus was portrayed not as a great honour to Britain, but as a comic Oriental farce.

For some Indians in Britain, however, this lavish delegation appeared both as a source of pride and also of employment and social support. Among them

was Mirza Ali Ackbar Khan Bahadur (b. 1817). Until his sudden dismissal in 1848, he had achieved the highest levels of his profession, rising to the post of Chief Munshi, confidential secretary and Persian translator to Sir Charles Napier in newly annexed Sindh. Charging him with accepting bribes, the Bombay Government dismissed him without a pension. He fought this in Bombay and, when unsuccessful there, went to Britain to continue Jiis cause, officially as Persian Secretary in the suite of Mir Jafar of Surat.[19] Once in London, Ali Ackbar supported himself by working as advisor to the Awadh and other missions, as he explained, 'writing pamphlets and taking opinions*.[20]

The Awadh mission's many nobility, scribes, and servants also interacted socially with the growing number of other Indians in London, according to their respective classes, and also with curious or interested Britons.[21] A British missionary (who often visited the Surat mission seeking converts) described interactions among servants of the Awadh and Surat missions and other working-class Indians:

> The inmates of Harley House, however, were not long in discovering that a colony of Orientals was already established in London, and their number was soon increased by deserters from ships, and the Asiatic vagrants of the metropolis, and all soon made acquaintance with the suite of the Nawab of Surat. Some of them came into the kitchen of the Nawab...winter was then approaching and the cold autumnal winds blew with terrible effect on the naked legs of the visitors. English boots and stockings were produced by the servants of the Nawab; the boots were examined and approved of, but the stockings excited deep curiosity, and were the subject of much discussion as they were handed about for Inspection.[22]

This observer also depicted their evening's socialising:

> After dinner, which generally took place about seven o'clock, cards and tea were always placed on the table, visitors from other families would drop in ... the dhol or native drum would be brought forward, a series of native songs sung ... a long table, capable of seating about fifteen persons ... was occupied by the card-players, the interval being usually filled up by tea and coffee drinkers and smokers.[23]

Thus, shared experiences in London bonded these working-class Indians; the accumulated knowledge of earlier visitors passed to later ones. Further, many of these servants joined other working-class Indians in east London's Oriental Quarter, finding there fellowship and pleasure. For example, during the fast of Ramzan, which the Awadh and Surat delegations officially respected, non-observing attendants went there to eat and drink.[24]

While the members of this embassy met socially with their fellows, the Awadh emissaries officially mobilised their campaigns to persuade the Directors,

Parliament, Queen Victoria and the British public. But, in these mid-nineteenth century years of burgeoning British imperialism, they met with largely unsympathetic official responses. The Awadh Queen-Mother wrote formally announcing her arrival and submitting her son's appeal to reverse the annexation; the Directors and Board of Control rejected these. She hired British lawyers to formally request all the relevant papers in the company's files, unavailable in India. At first, the Directors refused to provide them. The delegation, however, induced Parliament to demand them, which made these accessible for the Awadh mission to refute. Not until early 1857, six months after their arrival, were they received at the company's headquarters, and then only as a courtesy, not as ambassadors.[25] Indian members of the delegation and supportive Indian settlers in Britain also wrote letters to prominent British authorities and newspapers.[26] Their hired lobbyist Bird published a pamphlet outlining the wrongs perpetrated against them, *The Spoliation of Oudh*,[27] which he then expanded under the pseudonym, Samuel Lucas, into *Dacoitee in Excelsis*.[28] Further, Musseehood-Deen published his own book, *Oude: Its Princes and Its Government Vindicated*.[29]

By this time, however, some in the British press regarded the mission as a contest between British purity and Oriental debauchery. The *Times* now proclaimed the delegates "parasites ... lapped and nurtured in an atmosphere of venality, and hardened in the routine of those vile arts by which Eastern courtiers rise and fall.'[30] Frustrations led to internal dissention. As described by a British observer:

> One day, on entering Harley House, all was astir and in a state of commotion; eight of the inmates had been poisoned, and narrowly escaped with their lives.
>
> Such was the state of anarchy, jealousy, and deadly enmity towards each other in which they lived, ever plotting one against another! so that whilst the royal household was conflicting with Parliament, they were at war amongst themselves, till law-suits and counter claims disorganized the whole establishment. But a shock was about to come, that would paralyze their secret counsels and blight their sanguine hopes; the astounding news of the Indian Mutiny blasted all their prospects and rendered their further residence in England useless.[31]

Indeed, the sporadically arriving news of the outbreak of the 1857 fighting destroyed most remaining public and official sympathy for the Awadh cause.

Nevertheless, the Awadh mission in London persisted. Yet, they, like other Indian delegations in London, now had additionally to protest their loyalty to the British, including through a petition to the House of Lords.[32] In this they expressed their c.. sincere regret [at] the tidings which have reached the British kingdom of disaffection prevailing among native troops in India'. They

assured that they themselves were 'a Royal race, ever faithful and true to their friendship with the British nation'. The Lords, however, rejected their petition on a technicality, since it omitted the required term 'Humble' in places where protocol repeatedly demanded it. Even the petition's sponsor, Lord Campbell, excused himself for having submitted it, which he said he did out of duty alone.

In November 1857, the delegation unrealistically offered to reconquer and rule India for Victoria:

> We propose that the Prince Mirza Md. Hamid Allie Bahadur Heir Apparent to the King of Oude now resident in England should immediately proceed to India supported by a British Force and in the name of the King of Oude should assume the Government of the Country and call upon the People to rally round the Standard of the Sovereign against the revolted Sepoys.[33]

They cited the precedent of Dost Muhammad, ruler of Afghanistan, whom the British had once imprisoned in Calcutta, but then installed on the throne, who was supporting them in 1857. This proposal met no encouragement from the British. British authorities in Britain and India seized all the copies they could of Musseehood-Deen's recent book, *Oude: Its Princes and Its Government Vindicated*.[34] In India, to distribute or even posses a copy of this work became evidence for treason, although it was circulated in German translation.

Other Indian diplomats in London likewise had to adopt the same position of protesting loyalty to a disbelieving British public even as the British government and directors increasingly pressured them to leave. For example, as news of 1857 in India began to reach London, making the environment more hostile for Indians there, Mir Jafar of Surat settled for what he could get and abruptly returned home in August 1857, ending his campaign of two visits and five years of negotiations in London.[35] Similarly, Mehdi Ali Khan Bahadur (d. 1863), who had gone to London in 1856 in order to gain the title and estate of his late father-in-law, the Nawab of Rampoor, initially proved able to obtain the support of Parliament. News of 1857, however, put paid to his chances, and left him in a dilemma. To return to India might appear disloyal to the British, so, whatever his true personal feelings, he wrote the Directors assuring them of his loyalty and begging them not to misinterpret his departure for home which was solely on the basis of his 'health'.[36] The Directors also instructed Ali Morad of Sindh to abandon his lobbying campaign for restored sovereignty and go 'manifest your zeal and fidelity in the service of the British Government' back in India.[37] Likewise, Syed Uckbur Ally and Khirat Ali Khan Bangash had been in London since 1851 representing Raja Tuckt Singh of Jodhpur. In September 1857, they submitted petitions to the Company's Directors and to the House of Commons which proclaimed 'the devoted friendship and zeal displayed by the Prince my master upon the breaking out of the deplorable occurrences that now convulse the portions of India contingent to his possessions and the promptitude with

which (as I learn from the Public Press) he came to the assistance of the British Government ... [showing] his unwavering loyalty' by sending 5,000 troops to support the British.[38] These diplomats, however, left London at the end of 1857 for Bombay, where they and their English attorney were arrested on charges of treason. The British ship's captain testified:

> the Mahommedan secretary [Khirat Ali Khan Bangash], in my presence and in the presence of the passengers, said that he could murder [Governor-General] Lord Dalhousie without remorse, and throw his body to the vultures, or something to that effect.... He frequently expressed his sympathy with the rebels and mutineers, and expressed his wishes for their success. He frequently stated that the country would be much better governed under native princes and rulers than by the English.... I now produce a book, entitled, 'Oude, its Princes and its Government Vindicated.'... I understand that a case of these books is on board intended for circulation here....[39]

The captain added for good measure that one of their servants, Mirjan, had abandoned his English wife back in London.

Even working-class Indians encountered the sudden opprobrium of appearing as hostile'. For example, a Bengali named Joaleeka had come to London with Gholam Mohamed, the youngest son of Tipu Sultan, in 1854. While staying at the Oriental Hotel, Joaleeka fraternised with British women of his class, although he was in his forties. He reported: 'I formed a connection with a white woman. She was a servant in the hotel. I broke my caste and from that moment I knew that it would not do for me to go back to India. The girl fell in the family-way....'[40] Rather than return to India, Joaleeka stayed on in London (although he abandoned his first English lover and their child), living with a series of other English and Irish women, fathering at least four more children with them, and nominally converting to Christianity (although, he said, 'I turned Christian. I do not know what it means, but I am a Christian, and have been for many years'). Despite having thus settled in London for years, earning by interpreting for other Indians, begging from Britons, and doing odd jobs, British attitudes toward him radically changed during the fighting of 1857: 'After the mutiny... I did very badly. No one would look at a poor Indian then—much less give to him.... All that knew me used to chaff me about it, and call me Johnny Sepoy.' Thus, Indians of all classes faced new difficulties during that period.

To add to the problems of the Awadh delegation in particular, its funds dwindled as Wajid Ali Shah remained in close confinement in Calcutta throughout the 1857 conflict.[41] They wrote: 'The expenses in London [were] so much greater than what Her Majesty and the Princes could possibly have expected'; with much difficulty, the Awadh ex-King sent them £4,783 in October 1857.[42] The Awadh delegation's appeals to the Directors for financial assistance

received a cold shoulder.[43] They gave up Harley House as inauspicious (after two women servants died there) and rented four attached houses on Warwick Road (one leased by Jafar Ali of Surat), plus a country home in Richmond for the Queen-Mother.[44] Finally, they received another £7,156 from Wajid Ali Shah in January 1858.[45]

In the face of the intensified British hostility, financial pressure and internal conflicts within the delegation, it broke apart. In September 1857, Musseehood-Deen wrote to the Directors requesting that they ignore any communications that came directly from the Queen-Mother, since she had come under the influence of Indians opposed to him.[46] Some of the Awadh mission, finding no support in London, decided to go to Paris and from there to Mecca and back to Calcutta.[47] Although the British government rejected their request for passports, the French government issued them.[48] In Paris, the Queen-Mother died (24 January 1858), as supporters in Parliament said, 'of a broken heart'.[49] Next month, her son died in Paddington (25 February 1858). Then the young Awadh heir tried to take leadership of the mission away from Musseehood-Deen, who had control over whatever funds remained. The heir (who was a minor in British law) therefore, acting in the name of his father, used the mission's British lawyers to sue Musseehood-Deen, who counter-sued. Musseehood-Deen had one of the prince's supporters jailed for forgery, although the courts dismissed the charge. Musseehood-Deen was eventually compelled by British courts to turn over the remaining £4,000 of the mission's funds.[50] Several of the servants of the Awadh mission then sued to get their unpaid wages.[51] Several stayed on or went home separately, often in dire financial straits.[52] Several were arrested on their arrival back in India.

Musseehood-Deen blamed the youth of the heir and the 'unworthy and self-interested intriguers [in margin] Mehdi Koolie and Allie Ackbar'.[53] The former was a Persian who claimed to be the great-grandson of Nadir Shah. The latter, Ali Ackbar, (discussed above) had also advised three other delegations in London.[54] In response, the heir asserted that Musseehood-Deen 'was ready to betray us'. This internecine conflict divided many other Indians in London. After a further vain petition to Parliament, the heir then went via Marseilles and Alexandria back to India in 1861, taking the remaining valuables.[55] Although the Awadh ruler dismissed and replaced Musseehood-Deen in 1859, he remained in Britain, marrying an Englishwoman, Miss Bilk.[56] During the 1857 fighting, his two houses in Agra had been looted, and then confiscated by the British government. His request for employment or a pension from the British was rejected.[57] He finally retired to India in November 1863, leaving his young but estranged British wife behind with no means of support.[58] The solidarity among Indians in Britain initially generated by the arrival of the Awadh mission, therefore, shattered in the face of British hostility during 1857.

Aftermaths of 1857

The events of 1857 thus marked a transition in the experiences of Indians in Britain as British attitudes shifted against them collectively. Yet, 1857 was not an absolutely abrupt transformation. There had been precursors of these changes in both the Indian and the British attitudes. Many Indians there had developed a sense of class solidarity and trans-regional shared experience. Neither were British prejudicial stereotypes shared universally, nor did they apply equally to all classes of Indians. Gender relations between Indians and Britons particularly reflected these complex underlying patterns. Further, many of the changes catalysed by the 1857 conflict continued to affect the lives of Indians in Britain thereafter.

During the early nineteenth century, various Indians in Britain had articulated their growing resentment about British prejudices against them, both in India and in Britain. Most Indians recognised that British racism was worse iri India. One scholar-diplomat who had come on Mir Jafar's first mission to London in 1844, Lutfiillah (1802-1874), contrasted relatively welcoming British society with the condescending or contemptuous attitudes of Britons in India: 'The fact is, that the more you proceed on towards England, the more you find the English people endowed with politeness and civility....'[59] Yet, Britons in Britain could also be racist, as various Indians experienced there personally.

Indians' common treatment by the British as 'other' made some conscious of their shared condition. Mixing with Indians from many other regions often overcame traditional cultural and political distinctions. Particularly articulate both about such British discrimination and also about the need for a collective response to British aggression was a Maratha diplomat, Rango Bapojee, who spent over a dozen years in London (1839-1853). In 1842, Bapojee complained about slights he had personally received from Britons, and the 'oppression set upon our race and colour'.[60] Bapojee also delivered public speeches in London and published his insightful analysis of British global imperialism based on racial prejudice. He claimed to speak for 'the hundred and fifty millions of my fellow-countrymen'.[61] He also wrote a rallying letter to all the Indian rulers back in India, warning them against the insidious British practice of piecemeal annexation that was evident only from the perspective of Britain, the very annexationist policies that would depose Wajid Ali Shah.[62] Before he left London, Bapojee also passed on his understanding of these injustices to newly arriving diplomats, including Mohammed Ali Khan of Rohilkhand and Azimullah Khan (c. 1830-1858) who represented in London (1853-1855) the exiled Maratha prince Dhundu Pant 'Nana Sahib'.[63] After their alienating experiences in Britain, all three of these men evidently fought the British in 1857.

Mohammed Ali Khan, Azimullah Khan, and Bapojee's son were all summarily executed without trial; despite the £50 reward that the British put on Bapojee's head, he evaded capture.64

Indeed, to some of the avenging British officers in India, Azimullah's personal relationships with British women during his stay in Britain were particularly offensive. He had become protege of Lady Lucie DuffvGordon (1821-1869), an author and traveller who had married the prime minister's cousin, Sir Alexander Duff-Gordon.65 She educated Azimullah in British culture and politics, falsely believing she had convinced him to relinquish his anti-British sentiments. Although only about ten years older, she signed her letters to him your affect. Mother', and he addressed her as 'European Mother' in reply.66 Additionally, a young British woman in Brighton, 'Miss A.', wrote letters, partly in French, expressing her desire to marry Azimullah. Despite these women's affections for him, not all Britons accepted Azimullah. When Azimullah was introduced to John Lang (1817-1869, a British journalist and lawyer) as 'the Prince', Lang responded, 'Prince indeed! He has changed my plate fifty times in India [i.e., as a table-servant].'67 This had become a repeating pattern: Britons with experience in India denigrating Indians who were received as royalty in London's salons. Frustrated, Azimullah Khan and Mohammed Ali Khan left Britain in June 1855, travelling via Crimea, where they observed the British army ineffectively fighting the Russians.68 After rumours of Azimullah's participation in the Kanpur 'massacre' reached her, Lady Duff-Gordon hoped he could not have committed such 'atrocious conduct' and bemoaned, 'Who will pity the poor, helpless mass of people guilty of the offence of a dark skin and a religion of their own? What a vista of disaster & hatred is before us and them!'69

Conversely, later Indian and Pakistani nationalist historians have highlighted these men as freedom fighting heroes. For example, one Pakistani nationalist historian called Azimullah,

> the Master Brain who created consciousness among the Muslims and lead them to the battle field to restore their last grandure *[sic]* from the jaws of the great colonial power. This was the master brain of Azimullah Khan, a great personality behind the war of independence of 1857 which has left everlasting imprints on the history— in the Shape of PAKISTAN.70

Simultaneously, Indian nationalist commentators have also claimed him.71 Similarly, Basu argues Bapojee 'should be considered the first and pioneer Indian agitator in England, and his failure shows the futility of so-called constitutional agitation on the part of Indians for their rights and privileges'.72 In contrast, Sir Christopher Bayly of Cambridge identifies their ideas as 'old patriotism' rather than modern nationalism.73

Not all who came to Britain turned against the British in 1857. General Jung Bahadur Rana (1817-1877) of Nepal came to Britain in 1850.[74] There he was impressed by British military and industrial power. In 1857, he proved among the staunchest political and military supporters of the British.

Even during the crisis of 1857, some Indians in Britain managed to avoid being targeted by the government or public. Indian royalty, including Dalip Singh (1838-1893, r. 1843-1849) and two descendants of the Nawab of the Carnatic, Hafiz Lodroo Islam Khan and Hyder Jung, remained in Britain and eventually regained British favour, as did others.[75] Gholam Mahomed, a son of Tipu Sultan, had left Britain and spent 1857 in India, but, once the fighting was over, he returned to London with his son and grandson, receiving increased pensions and benefits and savouring London's high society. Overall, the Indian princes who did not egregiously oppose the British emerged thereafter as princely pillars of the Raj and were often welcome in London.

Increasingly appearing more of a social problem to many elite Britons was the growing number of working-class Indians in Britain, especially the community of the Oriental Quarter. *The City Mission Magazine* of August 1857, as first news of the fighting arrived, articulated British fears about promiscuous intercourse between Indian men and British women there:

> Men of all colours, and half a score of nations, are accompanied by a host of [White] women. Many are drunk, and all are riotous; the women have sailors* hats on their heads, and sailors' belts round their waists; they are quarrelling and pulling each other about; some have been robbed, and the police are amongst them; the language uttered is such as Satan only could suggest, and the whole scene calls up in the mind of the spectator an idea of the orgies of hell.[76]

Similarly, missionary Salter described with dismay the shift of an English public house, the Royal Sovereign (12 Blue Gate Fields), into a haven for lascars and British lower-class women:

> The skittles have long vanished, and the rough walls and roof have long ceased to echo with boisterous European voices— for Asiatics have taken possession of it, and twenty beds are spread out for the repose of the Lascars who seek shelter [in the skittle-ground]. The jagree dust, crazy hookas, and dirty lotas give evidence of the free use made of it. But, hark! what is that uproarious shout of discordant Asiatic and European voices mingled?— the sound of excited men and women together ... only a jollification and a spree these Lascars have with the [British] ladies of the neighbourhood ...,[77]

This house was still owed by a British man, but a Goan Indian, Francis Kaudery, operated it, much to Salter's dismay.

Also in Britain during the crisis, but often less directly targeted, were middle-class Indians including Syed Abdullah (discussed above) and a Parsi scholar and merchant from Bombay, Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917). Both taught Indian languages at University College London until 1866.78 The latter also became the second Indian elected to the British Parliament, and the 'Grand Old Man* of the Indian National Congress. Indeed, many later Indian nationalists also studied in Britain during subsequent decades, learning there about the larger patterns of British colonialism including B.R. Ambedkar, S.C. Bose, Mohandas Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, M.A. Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru, and V.D. Savarkar. As has been extensively studied, all these men found that their experiences in high colonial Britain helped them formulate their own political and cultural nationalisms. Additionally, Indian male and female social leaders—including Behramji Malabari, Saraswati Ramabhai and Cornelia Sorabji—also engaged critically with British society, opposing British efforts to control their lives and impressions. Nor did all Indians respond the same way. Some, including Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggree, M.P., remained staunch Tories.

Thus the events of 1857 marked a major shift in the lives of Indians in Britain, and in the British attitudes towards them. The experiences of the members of the Awadh embassy and the other Indians who associated with them particularly reflected many of these changes. Subsequent generations of Indians in Britain also lived under its shadow, although their personal experiences there varied by their class and background.

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8

MARGINALISED VICTIMS OF 1857

Rosie Llewellyn-Jones

THIS chapter examines some of the lesser-known casualties of the mutiny and uprising in India. When revolt spread from the sepoys to the civilian population and engulfed much of north and central India, large sections of colonial society were caught up in the violence. East India Company soldiers, officials and their families were, of course, the first targets, but many others suffered too, among them Eurasians,[1] Indian Christians, Indians working for the British, and women widowed in the conflict. Some were already victims of British and Indian prejudice, and the mutiny made their position even more vulnerable. Much emphasis in recent mutiny writing has been placed on the Indian protagonists—on their actions, their motives and the context in which they operated—but we are in danger of forgetting their victims, particularly the non-British groups who have, as yet, been largely without a voice in the dominant historical narratives. These were people who, because of race, religion, marriage or occupation, already lived at the margins of colonial society even in relatively peaceful times. This chapter examines the impact of the mutiny on these civilian groups.

Eurasians

Estimates of the number of British civilians killed during the year 1857 range from 1,000 to 1,500, a tiny number compared to the thousands of Indian civilians who were indiscriminately slaughtered. Although the mutiny has attracted more attention than almost any other event during Britain's three hundred year long involvement in India, and has been extensively, indeed, obsessively, annotated, we will never have a precise figure for the British civilian dead. The memorial tablets in All Souls' Church, Cawnpore, record 'more than a thousand Christian souls' who were killed, but these also include some 200 pfficers and men. Seventy-seven were killed at Jhansi, at least fifty in Delhi and thirty-one at Meerut. During

the four-and-a-half-month long siege of the British Residency at Lucknow about 167 died of illness or malnutrition, or were killed by the mutineers.

There were good reasons at the time why the number of British dead could not be exactly computed. Communications were disrupted, and where Britons were killed or died in isolated areas, accounts of their deaths were confused and contradictory. Some Britons were 'betrayed' to the rebels, after finding safety with minor rulers who had seemed friendly towards them at first.2 Others who had been given up for dead turned up, in some cases, in the autumn of 1857, having been protected by villagers.3 There was another reason why the figures did not always agree, however, and that is because there was no clear policy on whether Eurasians should be counted as 'British' or not in the lists of victims.

The history of the Eurasian community is well known, as are the restrictions placed upon it. The British attitude towards the community was ambivalent, to say the least. Eurasians could not, for example, serve in the East India Company army. This policy had been laid down by Lord Cornwallis in 1789, when he was both commander-in-chief and governor general in India, and was ratified in 1795. It was based on racial grounds and the supposed 'injuries' to discipline and reputation that men 'born of Black women' might do if they were admitted to the army.4 They could only be employed as regimental bandsmen and drummers, and in this capacity a number of them were killed during the uprising, both by the rebels and by the British. Major William Hodson, the founder of Hodson's Horse, is infamous for the murder of the three Mughal princes after Emperor Bahadur Shah fled to Humayun's tomb from the Red Fort, but less well known is that the Christian Eurasian bandsmen of the mutinous 28th Bengal Native Infantry, who had escaped with the emperor's party, and numbered about thirty men, were also killed by Hodson and his troops.5 Eurasians were also employed by the East India Company as signallers in the electric telegraph offices that were spreading out across northern India. It was two Eurasian men who tapped out the last SOS messages on 11 May 1857 to the British at Ambala, as the rebel sepoys entered Delhi. A memorial was subsequently erected to William Brendish and I.W. Pilkington on the site of the Delhi telegraph office. Although Eurasians were trusted to work as telegraph signallers, and, in fact, this latef became a reserved occupation for them, they were not trusted to encode messages sent during the uprising. A secret cipher code had been worked out by October 1857, and was issued to a few selected officials with the warning that 'it is necessary that contents of messages transmitted in Cipher should not be understood by the signallers'.6

When the Emergency Act of 20 November 1857 was passed relating to the importation, manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition in India, it was decided that certain classes of people could be allowed to carry arms without a certificate of exemption. These included Britons, of course, but also included 'European British subjects and the descendants of such subjects commonly known as East Indians, or Eurasians and European Foreigners'.7 It was

convenient to count Eurasians as honorary Europeans, if not actual Britons, in a time of crisis, and this is what the British did during the mutiny. But it also meant that the Eurasian community was regarded by the rebels as part of the enemy, and were treated as such. Joseph Skinner was the grandson of Colonel James Skinner, whose British father had married a Rajput noblewoman. Colonel Skinner had raised an irregular regiment, called 'Skinner's Horse', and had built St James's Church in Old Delhi, near the Kashmir Gate. The^arge Skinner *haveli* and gardens were just inside the city walls. In spite of, or more likely because of, his family's prominent background, and the fact that he was a Christian, Joseph Skinner was dragged out of the family home and killed in front of the main police thana in Chandni Chowk.

By the same token, Eurasians who joined the rebels, as some of them did, were regarded by the British as almost worse than the mutineers themselves. They were seen as doubly guilty—firstly of not supporting the British, and secondly of actively supporting the rebels. The chief commissioner of Awadh reported in October 1858 that an Anglo-Indian, Mr Felix Rotton of Lucknow, had 'remained with the Rebels until July last, to be the father of rebels and to labour under the strongest presumption of disloyalty'.[8] Felix Rotton's parents were an English officer and an Indian woman, whose name we do not know. Felix had served in the army of the deposed Nawab of Awadh for twenty years. He had fathered about twenty-two children by his Indian wives, and his sons had also served in the Nawab's army. Their loyalties were naturally with the Nawab, their employer. Seven of Felix Rotton's sons joined the rebels and fought with them against the British. Felix Rotton himself, at the age of sixty, joined Begam Hazrat Mahal's troops in April 1858 after she began her retreat north to Nepal, but he surrendered to the British three months later.

After the siege of the residency at Lucknow lists were made of the people who had been trapped in the large compound for four and a half months—or at least of some of the people.[9] No Indian soldiers were listed, or Indian servants, though both categories were present, supporting the British. Mysteriously, there appeared to be no Eurasians either. However, the names of people that we know to be from the local Eurasian community are listed (Campagnac, Gamboa, Catania, Derozario, etc.), but they appear in the category of 'European Women and Children in Garrison', having been given honorary, and probably temporary, European status. The assumption that Eurasians were inevitably Christians is generally, but not always, true. There were Muslims of mixed race, born of a European father and Indian mother; indeed, one of the men who carried olit the massacre of British women and children at Cawnpore, Sarwar Khan, was fathered by a soldier from an Irish regiment.[10] Children of such unions were sometimes given two names, one Christian and one Muslim, allowing them to slip from one category to another. This enabled some Eurasians to escape during the mutiny, by 'disguising' themselves as Indians, but at the same time meant that they were vulnerable if caught by the British, The idea of a Kim-like figure

who could suddenly fling off his Indian clothes and be accepted by the British belongs only to Kipling's story. Eurasians who were Christians are described at this period as wearing a distinctive dress of "smoking cap', like a soft fez with a tassel, a *chapkan* (the long Indian coat) and 'shoes with strings', that is, lace-up shoes.[11] They were thus easily identified and were killed along with the British at Delhi, Cawnpore and Jhansi. Regrettably there is virtually no analysis by Eurasians themselves of their status as a community during and after the mutiny. Their 'racial ambiguity' as it has been described, together with prevailing British attitudes to class, confined most Eurasians to low-income jobs, with little time for introspection or reflection on their position in society. While the majority aligned themselves with the British in 1857-1858, and were treated as British by the rebels, there were, as we have shown, some significant exceptions.

Indian Christians

A precise figure of 112,491 'native Christians' was given five years before the mutiny,[12] i.e., Indians who had been converted by missionaries during the preceding fifteen years. Twenty-two missions were recorded, with numerous 'stations' and out-stations. It was the famine years of 1837 and 1838 that had given an impetus to conversions. Children orphaned by the famine, or more often, simply abandoned, were gathered up by the missions, and settled in 'Christian villages' at Sikandra (north of Agra), Allahabad and Parrukhabad. The children were taught trades, including printing and tent-making. Twenty years later, in 1857, the Sikandra site housed almost a thousand Indian Christians in a self-supporting community..

As the rebellious sepoys from the Rajputana cantonments of Neemuch and Nasirabad approached Agra at the end of June 1857, the Europeans shut themselves up in Agra Fort. Several hundred Indian Christians attempted to follow them, but found the gates shut in their faces. According to William Muir of the Intelligence Department, a deeply religious and learned man, there was 'some doubt as to whether there was room for them in the Fort'.[13] The situation was only resolved when Thomas Valpy French of the Church Missionary Society, who later became Bishop of Lahore, threatened to remain outside the fort with the Indian Christians, a move which would certainly have ended in the deaths of everyone. Expediency won the day and the Indian Christians were allowed entry. The Europeans had not been allowed to bring their own Indian servants into the Fort, so, as Muir reported, 'in their absence the native Christians were of great use'. But he added that 'it required all the influence' of his wife and her friends 'to keep them from being harshly treated, for the unkindly feeling towards natives had already begun to spread'. Outside the fort, the printing presses, from which the Christian community had earned its living, were completely

destroyed, together with stocks of new books. At Farrukhabad the tents ready for sale were destroyed, and everything belonging to the Indian Christians looted. Eight American missionaries were murdered.

In Delhi, Dr Chaman Lai, one of the personal physicians to the Mughal emperor, had been converted to Christianity in 1852 by Rev. Jennings, the Delhi chaplain. At the time, the conversion of such a prominent man had caused some unease. Now, when the mutineers arrived in Delhi on 11 May, Dr Lal's neighbours pointed him out, and he was shot in front of his dispensary after confirming in his own words that he was a Christian.[14] There is a memorial tablet to him in St James's Church, near the Kashmir Gate, recording that he fell 'a martyr to his faith'. A fellow convert from Hinduism, Ram Chandra, had escaped from Delhi, and on its recapture by the British in September 1857 he returned and worked as an assistant to the dreaded Prize Agents who were looting the capital. But now he faced a different kind of threat, from the British, who beat him up. He wrote that his faith had sustained him throughout the uprising, but that was hardly any comfort 'when a native Christian is in danger from Christian officers themselves, merely because he was not born in England and has not a white skin'.[15]

Indians Working for the British

The question is still sometimes asked how a comparatively small number of Britons could rule over half the vast Indian subcontinent, that is, the non-princely areas. The answer is that even before 1857, when the East India Company was working as the 'local agent' for the British government, Britain could not have maintained civil power without the active assistance of Indians in administrative roles. The collection of land revenue, the most important source of income for the Company, was coordinated from the tehsils, the district headquarters, where the land records were held. The official in charge was the *tehsildar*. Law and order were maintained through the kotwal, a man who combined the offices of town mayor and chief police officer, and who was in charge of the thanas (police stations). Prisoners were locked up and overseen by the jail *daroga* (the superintendent) and the jail *naibs* (armed guards). All these administrators needed their own clerks and chaprasis. Some of these posts were replicated in the princely areas, but in states annexed or conquered by the British the post-holders were government employees, that is, employees of the British government and were part of the Bengal Native Civil Service.

When the mutiny started, these men reacted in a number of different ways. Some managed to escape, like the two extra assistant commissioners at Daryabad in Awadh; Ali Raza Beg and Abdul Hakim both fled to Lucknow when the 5th Oudh Infantry Force mutinied, and they were both trapped in the Residency during the siege. Interestingly Abdul Hakitn is reported as having hidden from his

'personal enemies' in the town of Daryabad for nearly two weeks, before reaching Lucknow, about forty miles away.[16] The chaotic milieu of the uprising gave many people a chance to settle old scores, which had nothing to do with expelling the British from the country. Other officials decided to stay and fight the mutineers. Devi Prasad, the *tehsildar* at Mandla, fortified his office and repulsed an attack by 300 rebel cavalrymen. The *tehsildar* at Chandauli in Benares persuaded a group of Rajput thakurs not to plunder British government property. Bakhtawar Singh and Ibrahim Khan, both *tehsildarsy* initially escaped from the mutineers, but were subsequently besieged by Gujars who had joined the rebels. Both men were murdered at Shamli in September 1857. Bhure Khan, *tehsildar* at Rohtak, was murdered by rebels 'while attempting to defend the treasury'. Ram Bakhsh, the tehsildar at Etah, died from wounds and injuries inflicted by mutineers. Nand Lai and Piyare Lai, both *tehsildars*, together with Kishen Singh, a lawyer, fled from Hissar and were murdered by rebel villagers the following day.

Men in lesser government positions were also in danger from the rebels. Lala Bhaokhun Lai was a clerk earning ?100 a month as translator and examiner in the Judicial Commissioner's Office in Lucknow. After the battle of Chinhat, where British troops led by Sir Henry Lawrence had been defeated and retreated to the Residency, Bhaokhun Lai shut himself up in his house and lay low. But a week later, his house was surrounded by mutineers, as he described them, and he writes: 'I was obliged to fly from a hind wall at 3 am and return to Allahabad. It took 37 days to reach this City because I was compelled to fly from one village to another for the sake of protection.' When he eventually got to Allahabad his troubles were not over. He reported to the British officials and asked for his back pay, because he had only been paid up to the end of May. Although the governor general had announced that people working for the government were entitled to pay during the months when they could not work, through no fault of their own, it was not until the end of September that wages began to be paid out.[17] This might seem a very trivial matter when so many people had lost their lives, but the sudden lack of wages, which were paid at the end of each month, did cause extra hardship, during a time of great disruption, to those who could least afford it. Girish Chander Banerjee was the fourth clerk in the deputy commissioner's office at Sitapur, and he told a similar story: T as well as other govt. Servants were obliged to rescue our lives in flight. On the night of 5 June last, disguising myself in the habit of a fukeer, *[faqir]* I departed from the town and roving continually with great difficulty for eight days arrived at Bittoor.' From Bithur he went through Allahabad and Benares, before arriving at Calcutta on 28 July. On the road, he said he was 'subject to frequent enquiries from the Budmashes ... but being penniless and in a very wretched condition, I was treated with coldness and indifference'.[18] Banerjee had been on a salary of ?50 a month, and he was also requesting his back pay for May, June and July. There are a number of petitions from people in similar circumstances. A fellow worker in the judicial commissioner's office was a Eurasian, Joshua Francis.

He managed to escape at the same time as Bhaokhun Lai, 'in the disguise of a Mohamedan with my mother'.[19] Francis walked from Lucknow to Raniganj and then travelled to Calcutta, which he described as 'this foreign place'. He had been given some money from the Relief Fund, an appeal that had been set up in London by the Lord Mayor.[20] But Francis said he had used this money to buy clothes and medical treatment for his swollen legs. Hf asked humbly for his back pay of ?40 per month. Kali Charan, a treasury officer, writing from Allahabad, also escaped from the mutineers at Lucknow. He said he did not want to enlarge on 'the manner in which I was treated by the ungrateful sepoys of the 22nd Native Infantry and of 1st Oude Infantry by whose rapacity I was robbed of all I had.' The sepoys took some of his money, and the rest was confiscated by the kotwal of Lucknow, on behalf of Birjis Qadr, who had been crowned as the boy king of Awadh. Kali Charan had also been robbed of his school certificate, and certificates given to him by the former British Residents. Without these, he was helpless. He could not prove his identity, and he could not draw his salary until he could prove who he was.[21]

British officials were caught off balance by the speed of the uprising, and while this had serious military implications for them, it also led to a collapse in civil administration. There was no contingency plan, and it is clear that the desk-bound British officials in Calcutta were quite unable to comprehend the scale of the breakdown for several months, in spite of the number of refugees who managed to reach the city. There was an extraordinarily unsympathetic reaction from company officials to people like Bhaokhun Lai, Joshua Francis, Kali Charan, and other government servants who did manage to escape and went to report back for duty at temporary headquarters. Perhaps it is not surprising that other officials simply threw in their lot and joined the mutineers. Safdar Ali was a pleader at the Sadar Diwani court and the Nizamat Adalat in Agra. He joined the rebellious armed police and 'raised the green flag' of Islam. He took part in the looting and burning of the civil station on 5 July 1857. He was probably one of the men involved in destroying the Christian village at Sikandra. In November 1857 the governor general ordered descriptive rolls to be drawn up of people who had taken part in the uprising, and this was published the following April, before the revolt had been fully put down.[22] Among the civil officers who were named in these descriptive rolls as 'rebels' were senior and junior judges, a head police chief, law court aides, lawyers, stewards, jail *darogas*, and a draughtsman in the government survey department at Jhansi who, it was said, 'with his subordinates in office joined the mutineers and opened the fort gate where the Christians had taken refuge'.[23] Thus personal experience of British administration through their employment, had not only given these men the means to subvert their employer, the East India Company, but had given them the reason to rebel too.

Minor European employees were treated equally badly. The story of Charles Elliott, who had been the head assistant in the deputy commissioner's office at Jalaun, is one of several sad cases. Having reached Calcutta, Elliott wrote to

the under secretary to the Government of India and asked for his back pay. He was told to submit proof of having held his appointment and to produce his last pay certificate. He replied that he was unable to do so, having lost everything when he and his wife had fled on hearing of the uprising at Jhansi, only 36 miles away. 'Had the other European residents taken the same precaution and acted as I did very likely they would all have been in the land of the living today!!! I and Mrs Elliott are the only survivors from the ill-fated District, the office records are destroyed, [and] the officers killed.' Elliott added that he was 'quite a stranger in Calcutta, and living in one of the Refugee houses supported by the Relief Fund and if government would grant me my arrears of pay due it would be of great Service'.[24]

Widows of Soldiers and Civilians

Pensions and compensation for widows whose husbands had been killed fighting in the uprising differed widely. On 13 Zulqada 1273 hijri (equivalent to 5 June 1857), Dhondu Pant (better known as Nana Sahib) issued a proclamation stating that the female relations of men killed in battle would be entitled to a lifetime pension for one generation.[25] Obviously he was not in a position to make good this promise and the mothers, daughters, sisters and wives of the Cawnpore rebels must have led wretched lives after 1857. Some are likely to have fled northwards towards Nepal, where they were described in the summer of 1858 as in 'terrible distress ... the road strewed with the dead and dying women imploring mercy... almost all their animals are dead'.[26] These were women whose menfolk had been fighting on the side of the rebels, but the women of those who fought for the British did not seem to be much better off either.

The Malwa Bheel Corps, an auxiliary infantry regiment that had been raised in 1840, remained loyal to the British during the uprising and had fought with them when the Residency at Indore was attacked on 1 July 1857. A *havildar*, a bugler and nine sepoys were reported killed. Because the Malwa Bheel Corps was an irregular corps, that is, not part of the East India Company's regular army, its soldiers and their dependants were not entitled to pensions. The governor general admitted: 'Neither the men of the Corps or their families being entitled to the benefits of the pension establishment, these poor women and children are now left destitute.'[27] The soldiers had been killed fighting against rebellious troops from Indore, Dhar and Ajmer, and the officer commanding the corps, Colonel Stockley, thought that these states should be made to pay compensation in the form of pensions or a donation.

Encouraged by the support of the commanding officer, the families of the dead soldiers put in a claim for compensation to the company. However, the military auditor objected to this, saying that 'the Corps were ineligible for family pension' and that during the action of 1 July 'the Corps did not apparently

render such service as to deserve the boon of family pension', because nearly 200 officers and sepoys had deserted or run away. It could be argued that the men who 'hadn't' run away, and who had died defending the British Resident, Colonel Henry Marion Durand, were entitled to some recognition and that the actions of the deserters should not detract from those who stayed to fight. This was a difficult argument for company officials,[S] and in the end, six months later, the governor general decided that although there was no report from the commanding officer that the *havildar*, the bugler and the nine sepoys had 'behaved with becoming gallantry' nevertheless, as a 'special case' he was authorising a gratuity of six months pay to the widows of these soldiers. But how many other cases there must have been where the widows and children of volunteers to the irregular units received nothing when their menfolk were killed fighting for the British.

It often took a determined petitioner or petitioners to change company rulings, which in turn had been handed down from the Court of Directors in London. The last case in this chapter is that of the widow Mrs Bell, who was seeking 'pecuniary assistance' from the company after the death of her husband, Mr J.E. Bell, head clerk in the Allahabad Arsenal.[28] He had been on sick leave in the hill station of Landour, when the mutiny broke out, leaving his wife and four children in Allahabad. The family house was plundered and burnt. Mr Bell tried to get home, but died at Meerut in November 1857, from 'grief and anxiety aggravating his complaint,' said his widow. Without his monthly salary of ?200 the family were reduced to a state of destitution, and she requested a pension for herself and her three younger children. (Her eldest son had joined the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry, a volunteer group set up in 1857 and disbanded in 1861.) The military department decided that as Mr Bell had died from natural causes, the family were not entitled to the 'pecuniary advantages authorised in the cases of Uncovenanted Servants who had lost their lives in consequence of the mutinies'. Uncovenanted servants usually occupied the lower levels in the company's service, and were recruited from people born in India, i.e., Eurasians or people of European descent. Mrs Bell was, however, a determined woman. She thought that her husband's death had certainly been hastened by the mutiny, and that if a pension was not to be awarded, then at least the company ought to pay for the education of her younger sons. Back came the answer that this was inadmissible, and under the rule of 1837 the family were not entitled either to a pension or a donation. Again the matter was referred up to the governor general, who ruled that destitute families like Mrs Bell's should be given some financial relief. An additional rule was made allowing that, '[g]rants of money will be given to the destitute families of persons who though they did not lose their lives in consequence of the mutinies, have died after the loss of all or nearly all their property by the mutinies.' Again, the governor general had overturned the company regulations and the unbending military department who interpreted their orders in an inflexible manner.

One thing is particularly noticeable in many of the cases related above and that is the rigid and hierarchical nature of the East India Company in its dying days. The spirit of adventure and innovation, whether you like it or not, that characterised the earlier years of the company, had gone. This led to absurd situations where few civilian officers seemed prepared or able to take decisions or issue orders, when faced with the extraordinary events of 1857. Even quite petty matters were referred up to the governor general and his Council, which is why trawling through the India Political Consultations at the British Library and the Home and Foreign Department Consultations at the National Archives in Delhi are such fruitful sources of mutiny related stories. Decisions affecting the lesser known victims of 1857 were generally ad hoc decisions, because nothing on the scale of the 1857 Uprising had been seen before. But it was certainly not the Company's finest hour, and no one could accuse it of being sympathetic towards the people whose livelihood and often life itself had been sacrificed to Company policies instigated during the decades preceding the mutiny. Although some claims for compensation for loss of property during the mutiny were accepted, others were often disputed, and sometimes rejected. The company's attitude to civilians who suffered in the uprising meant that there were many 'hidden' victims, not only among those fighting against the British, but among those fighting for the British too.

Notes and References

1. The term 'Anglo-Indian' to describe people of mixed race was not officially adopted until 1935. Eurasian or East Indian or 'country-born' were the usual descriptions in the mid-nineteenth century. East-Indian had originally meant British-born white men who worked for the East India Company, but subsequently came to mean those born in the Indian subcontinent.
2. Sir Mountstuart Jackson, Captain Patrick Orr and Sergeant Major Morton fled from Sitapur when troops mutinied at the beginning of June and they were given shelter by the Raja Loni Singh of Mitauli. When Sir Henry Lawrence's troops were defeated at Chinhat on 30 June, the Raja arranged for the Britons to be taken to Lucknow, where they were killed on or about 16 November supposedly on the orders of Ahmadulla Shah, the Faizabad maulvi. After the Raja was eventually captured by the British, he said he had 'sold' the refugees to Begam Hazrat Mahal for ?8,000. The Lucknow memorial to the murdered men, and others, is inscribed 'Victims of 1857', and it is from this inscription that the title of this essay is taken.
3. Captain Holland escaped from Delhi on 11 May 1857 and was discovered by Ahir villagers the following day. He was fed and sheltered in various villages including Jahangirpuri, which is now a suburb of north Delhi. Holland wrote, 'I had nothing to reward these poor people with and though at that time every thing seemed going against the English still they stuck by me and behaved most kindly.' He was eventually helped by the villagers to reach Harchandpur, where the Anglo-Indian Cohen family got him to the safety of Meerut at the end of May. (Captain W. Holland's statement to G.F. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government. Home Department 4 June 1857 Nos. 28-29. National Archives, Delhi.) Captain Gowan, who had escaped from Bareilly at the same time, did not come out of hiding until 1 October 1857.
4. Christopher Hawes, *Poor Relations: The Making of a Eurasian Community in British India 1773-1833* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996), p. 64.

5. Major Kendall Coghill wrote to his brother from Delhi on 22 September 1857: 'Hodson pursued the princes; (he) had only 100 men and they had 10,000, but they gave up their arms—the three princes, the band of Christian (Eurasian) drummers of twenty-eighth NI and the English sergeant-major of 28th NI .... The (Christian) band were all killed on the spot, but the three princes were brought with the sergeant-major to an open spot... and [the princes] were mercilessly killed and stripped and laid flat on the open ground till the dogs and jackals walked off with them/ Quoted by Lt. General S.L. Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour. The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, third edition, 2004) p. 177.
6. The secret cipher code had been compiled by Sir William O'Shaughnessy, who was appointed Superintendent of Telegraphs in India in 1853. The cipher books were apparently compiled in Britain and distributed to the commander-in-chief, the two secretaries to the Government of India and various chief commissioners. India Political Consultations, 2 October 1857 No. 21. India Office Records, (hereafter IOR), British Library (BL).
7. It was presumed that East Indians or Eurasians and European foreigners would be found 'on the side of order and not of rebellion* and that they would not need certificates of exemption 'their appearance being always reasonable proof'. A.R. Young, secretary to Government of Bengal to Cecil Beadon, secretary to Government of India. India Political Consultations, 20 November 1857. No. 232. IOR, BL.
8.1 first came across the Rotton family while researching European families in Lucknow and have subsequently met a descendant of the family. Felix Rotton's father was Major Richard Rotton, who had served in the Maratha army until 1803. His grandsons all had names starting with the letter J. They were described as 'illiterate and perfect natives in every sense of the word*. T.D. Forsyth, secretary to the chief commissioner. India Political Consultations, 29 October 1858. IOR, BL.
9. The lists are given in *The Defence of Lucknow* (London: Smith, Elder & Co, London, 1858). The author, a staff officer, who chose to remain anonymous, kept a diary from 31 May to 25 September 1857. The lists, in Appendix V of the book, are described as: 'A complete nominal list of the officers, members of the uncovenanted service, and women and children of the Lucknow garrison, and as the return proceeded from an official source the authenticity may be fully relied on/ Separate lists are given for the 'Ladies and Children in Garrison* (the officers' wives, sisters and children), and the 'European Women and Children in Garrison*. As soldiers were strictly divided into officers and men, so their female relatives were divided into 'ladies' and 'women*.
10. Andrew Ward, *Our Bones are Scattered: The Cawnpore Massacres and the India Mutiny of 1857* (London: John Murray, 1996) pp. 415-416.
11. J.W. Sherer, *Daily Life during the Indian Mutiny: Personal Experiences of 1857* (London: Swan Sonnenschein 8c Co., 1898) p. 30. Sherer was the magistrate and collector at Fatehpur. One of his neighbours was a man called Joseph Emmanuel de Bourbon, described as a French half-caste with an Armenian mother 'now very old, apparently infirm, and capable, moreover, of passing as a native without difficulty*. He was dressed in 'that curious compromise affected by native Christians* of smoking cap, etc.
12. Reverend William Butler, *The Land of the Veda; being Personal Reminiscences of India; its People, Castes, Thugs and Fakirs; its Religions, Mythology, Principal Monuments, Palaces and Mausoleums; together with the incidents of the Great Sepoy Rebellion, and its Results to Christianity and Civilisation* (Cincinnati: Walden 8c Stowe, 1871), p. 530.
13. Sir William Muir, ed., William Coldstream *Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North West Provinces during the Mutiny of 1857 etc.y*vol. I (Edinburgh: T8cT dark, 1902) pp. 14-15.
14. Noah Chick, *Annals of the Indian Rebellion Containing Narratives of the Outbreaks and Eventful Occurrences, and Stories of Personal Adventures, During the Mutiny of 1857-58* (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones 8c Co, 1858), pp. 210-211.
15. William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi 1857* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), pp. 414-416.

16. The information about Ali Raza Beg, Abdul Hakim, and the *tehsildars* is taken from a list of men in the Bengal Native Civil Service, in the Mutiny Scrapbooks at SOAS Library. The compiler of these extensive scrapbooks is unknown. The scrapbooks were presented to the Library in 1990 by Sir Cyril Philips, former director of SOAS, but he gave no provenance for them and there are no internal clues.
17. Bhaokhun Lai, clerk, to Cecil Beadon, secretary to Government of India, India Political Consultations, 2 October 1857 Nor. 149. IOR, BL.
18. Girish Chander Baneijee, clerk, to G.F. Edmonstone, secretary to Government. India Political Consultations, 20 November 1857 No. 241. IOR, BL.
19. Joshua Francis, assistant to judicial commissioner, to G.F. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government. India Political Consultations, 6 November 1857 No. 177. IOR, BL.
20. The India Relief Fund was set up on 25 August 1857 by the Lord Mayor of London, after a meeting at the Mansion House. By January 1858 the sum of £24,995 (equivalent to nearly £2 million today) had been raised from donations. It was sent in boxes as silver bullion Tor the relief of sufferers from the Mutiny*. Money was also donated to the Fund from the mayor of Port Louis, Mauritius; the colonial secretary, Cape of Good Hope; the governor of St Helena; the consul at Batavia, and the New South Wales Committee. The Shah of Persia indicated his intention to contribute to the Fund. Home Department, 8 January 1858 Nos 82-86. National Archives, Delhi.
21. Kali Charan, former treasurer at Lucknow, to R. Simson, under secretary to Government of India. Two of Kali Charan's brothers, also working for the government escaped from Lucknow to Allahabad. India Political Consultations, 6 November 1857 No. 179. IOR, BL.
22. A request went out from the Foreign Department of the Government of India in October 1857 to the Government of Bombay, and the lieutenant governors of the North-west Province, and the Central Province that each should provide 'descriptive rolls of the leading persons concerned in the present rebellion, whose apprehension maybe desirable* and 'indicating at the same time, the parentage of the parties'. This is a highly useful resource, giving the 'Names, Designation, Parentage, Place, Remarks' for the rebels, by city or district. A manuscript list of 406 people was drawn up. Of the people whose 'designations' are given, 25 were rajas, 80 were zamindars, 12 were taluqdars and 11 were military men. Foreign Department, Foreign Consultations, 30 April 1858 Nos. 355-362. National Archives, Delhi.
23. Foreign Department, Foreign Consultations, 30 April 1858 Nos. 355-362. National Archives, Delhi.
24. Charles Elliott, head assistant deputy commissioner's office, Jalaun to R. Simson, under secretary to government. Punctilious to the last, the Civil Auditor's Department finally agreed to pay Charles Elliott the money due to him, but insisted that he either produce his last pay certificate, which he had already said he could not do 'or a sufficient guarantee of refund in case of overpayment.* India Political Consultations, 16 October 1857 No. 54. IOR, BL.
25. 'Copies of three proclamations in Urdu issued by Nana Sahib of Bithur to incite the civil population to rebellion and troops to mutiny' were sent to G.F. Edmonstone, secretary to government, from the magistrate at Allahabad on 26 July 1857. He had got them from a Mr Wilcock at Cawnpore. Two of the proclamations are in the National Archives file, printed on thin glazed paper and in remarkably good condition. They are headed Tshtiyar' which means 'Proclamation* or 'Notice*. Foreign Department, Secret Consultations 31 July 1857 Nos. 86-89. National Archives, Delhi.
26. Report from the Calcutta correspondent of *The Times* on 18 June 1858. The number of soldiers and their families who had fled towards Nepal was estimated at the time to be 6,000 strong.
27. Colonel Stockley, commanding the Malwa Bheel Corps to G.F. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government. India Political Consultations 15 January 1858 No. 52. IOR, BL.
28. Office Memorandum issued by the Home Department, Government of India from the Proceedings of the Military Department, dated 7 June 1858. No. 229 requesting 'pecuniary assistance' by Mrs Bell. India Political Consultations 25 June 1858 No. 81. IOR, BL.

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MARGINAL WHITES AND THE GREAT UPRISING
A Case Study of the Bengal Presidency1

Sarmistha De

LET me state from the very beginning that I am rather an intruder in the arena of the rich historiography of the 1857 Uprising. My interest is in the history of the 'low Europeans' and their various derivatives in the colonial era. They played a significant role in the tumultuous events of 1857 and conversely the uprising played a significant role in their lives. This encouraged me to record their role, which has not, as yet, been adequately represented in the history of the uprising. Significantly, Bengal and Eastern India have largely remained on the margins of the history of 1857 and have hitherto been relatively little explored. It is true that this region was not at the epicentre of the upheaval, but, contrary to common perceptions, it was not immune from its shockwaves either, and the uprising had a significant impact on the lives of the ruling elite, marginal Europeans and Indians in this region.

The news of the uprising flew around Calcutta, the seat of the empire, while direct and violent actions took place in different parts of the Bengal Presidency. All these had deep and abiding impact on the administration's mindset, all the more because 'hardly a single district under the Government of Bengal has escaped either actual danger or the serious apprehensions of danger'.2 Actual incidents of rebellion occurred in some parts of western, southern and eastern Bengal and Assam, and the dark cloud of fear, distrust and anxiety shrouded the entire Bengal Presidency. This rebellious environment had generated fear and apprehension. The Uprising of 1857 was not an organised affair and the rebels did not have the benefit of modern military organisation, or control over the administrative and communication network that the empire had at its disposal. But if we scratch the surface and read between the lines of the communications among officials, as well as numerous reports and petitions, the most intimate thoughts of the administration and the European population are revealed.

Fear, desperation and a sense of disorientation were part of that mindset. In the mindscape of the Bengal Presidency, 1857 was unfolding in all its menace.

In order to allay their sense of insecurity, the British authorities brought in a large number of European soldiers and sailors who were generally considered almost as outcasts by the core of the ruling community, but who played an important role in saving the fledgling empire. After the outbreak of the revolt imperial military policy changed dramatically, as instead of depending on the sepoys, a greater role for European soldiers, both in terms of leadership structure and number, was emphasised. English labouring classes and poor Scottish and Irish peasantry were the source of this huge intake of mainly British soldiers. The changed situation affected the composition of the European community in India and the attitude of the rulers to its own 'underclass' in the colonial context. Members of the European underclass were no longer viewed as avoidable 'intruders', but counted as a necessary reserve force for protection of the empire. Their increasing presence undermined the aristocratic countenance and the claim of racial superiority of the rulers. On battlefields across India these soldiers and sailors knowingly saved the empire; off the battleground they unwittingly damaged the image of the superior ruling race. This essay will try to highlight how the churning of 1857 accentuated this inherent contradiction and brought it to the fore in an unprecedented manner.

The British imperial authorities used the multifaceted machinery of the state to control the revolt. A series of coercive acts were imposed on the native population, restricting their free movement and disarming them. Indians were not even allowed to keep the 'long knife' used for religious sacrifices. Through the Act XIV of 1857, martial law was introduced. Native officers and soldiers were tried under the Act XVII of 1857 for 'mutiny and desertion'. The Press Act (Act XVI) was introduced by Lord Canning, for the first time restricting the freedom of expression. This act, which was also called 'the Gagging Act', was given 'prominence' and was 'required more for Bengal and Calcutta than for Upper India'.3 This was because Bengal already had an articulate middle class and a nascent modern press that dared challenge the excesses of the empire and its servants.

Another measure adopted by the administration in order to bolster their position was to increase the number of Europeans in the armed forces and the police. The administration was haunted by the thin presence of Europeans, which was identified as a major source of weakness. Charles Metcalf's call to European settlers to 'give us a hold in the country which we do not at present possess. We might now be swept away in a single whirlwind. We are without root'4 gained a new importance during the revolt. The commissioner of Patna, Mr Taylor, wrote on 22 August 1857, 'I have told Government that I conceive the present moment to be a war of extermination and that the presence of small bodies of English is an actual source of weakness', as every defeat of these small bodies Was counted

as a serious setback to the empire's power and prestige.[5] The governor-general-in-council on 19 May 1857 had drawn the attention of the Court of Directors to the fact that the relative strength of European compared to Native Infantry in the company's Bengal army was 'disproportionately small'. For each European in the force there were more than nine Indians in Bombay, m<^re than sixteen Indians in Madras and more than twenty-four Indians in Bengal. According to one contemporary magazine, 'In May 1857, the mutiny broke out. At that time the Bengal Presidency contained less than twenty thousand European soldiers, with above ten times that number of Indian troops: the intruding dominant race were not in all above a quarter of a million, while races they had conquered and ruled numbered nearly one hundred millions.'[6] A proposal was adopted to enhance the proportion of Europeans in the Bengal army to the level of one European for eleven Indians.[7] While the empire was flourishing, members of the ruling elite had divergent views regarding the place of the marginal Europeans under the imperial sun. The uprising brought everybody around to the view that they were needed, and in large numbers, to suppress the revolt or to take protective measures against apprehended danger.

The European residents of Calcutta feared that the flames of revolt that had spread in upper India might 'soon extend in all their horrors over the yet quiet portions of Bengal even to Calcutta itself'.[8] On 14 June 1857 Calcutta was firmly in the grip of panic. The Europeans in Calcutta believed a rumour that an uprising had actually taken place in Barrackpore the previous night and that the rebels were marching towards Calcutta. The 'panic Sunday' of 14 June was followed by another panic in July. It was believed that a large amount of arms had been purchased by the natives and concealed in the city. The panic was so pervasive that even the grand jury of the Supreme Court, through its judges, asked the government for the native population of Calcutta and the suburbs to be disarmed.[9] *Friend of India* commented snidely, 'The people of Calcutta have not forgotten the ridiculous fear shown by men who should have been the first to discountenance groundless alarm and it was to restore confidence, that they deemed it a political measure to deprive the native population of the arms.'[10] While Indians were being disarmed, it was proposed that European planters who were residing in the interiors of north Bengal be supplied with sufficient arms.[11]

In a situation of panic and anxiety, natives with arms were considered unsafe, and European inhabitants no longer kept faith with the native police. The European residents of Calcutta and its suburbs submitted a petition to the authorities praying for a European police force. They emphatically stated that they had 'no confidence whatever in the Native Police, either of the Muffusil or of Calcutta'. The governor-general-in-council assured 'the inhabitants of Calcutta that in order to keep the peace he will station larger bodies of European troops in various quarters of town.'[12] Immediately, sixty 'able bodied' Europeans were

recruited in Calcutta Police. This process of arming the *sahibs* was not confined to Calcutta alone. The police forces of Howrah and Sulkea were organised 'quietly on the footing of the Calcutta police'.[13] Similar appeals were coming from Europeans residing in the smaller towns that were centres of commercial and trade activities. European inhabitants of Serampore prayed for 'a company of European soldiers to guard the town'. They even assured the authorities of the possibility of accommodating the troops in 'the lower apartments of Serampore College'.[14] In August, 200 European sailors were sent to Dacca as a safeguard against any possible disturbance. Pubna and Seerajgunge also appealed for similar contingents of European sailors, whose presence seemed to be of 'immense use in keeping quiet the line through which they passed'.[15] This spell of fear and doubt also affected the Indian population and a sense of mutual distrust predominated. The administration was so apprehensive regarding the native community that special measures were adopted to confront any disturbance during Mohurram, while, on the other hand, the Muslim inhabitants became so panicked that many had interviews with Lieutenant Governor to express their fears. The administration tried to reassure them, and the police were instructed 'to make it publicly known that they would be permitted as usual to perform without hindrance or annoyance all their ceremonies during the festival which is approaching'.[16] Similarly, a rumour spread in Dinagepore that the government 'were about to make Christians of the children by compelling them to eat pig' and 'many of the boys attached to the government Bengalee school' were quitting.[17]

Disbanded sepoys were considered a very great source of danger, capable of disseminating the spirit of revolt to the wider community. To prevent disbanded sepoys from procuring weapons, the villagers in the neighbourhoods of Barrackpore were disarmed. In Calcutta it was believed that Nawab of Chitpore would help the disbanded soldiers in procuring arms to lead another revolt, though an intensive search revealed no significant proof. In Murshidabad a rumour spread all over the city that disarmed soldiers were making secret enquiries and were exploring the possibility of acquiring arms. In Serampore the badmashes and 'disbanded sepoys' were marked together, and it was believed that they would create trouble during the *Rathyatra* festival. The arrested rebels, even while confined in Alipore jail, were a source of concern for the imperial authorities. The superintendent of Alipore Jail stated, 'Militia sepoys, being from the same villages are nearly certain to have friends among those convicts also with whom they are naturally friends … I have been lately informed that when the men of H.M.'s 59th were sent to guard the jail some militia sepoys were heard openly boasting that their regiment even without arms was more than a match for such a small number of Europeans.'[18]

A European force was considered necessary for preventing the spread of the mutinous spirit, but they were more urgently required to confront the rebels in

the theatres of action. In August 1857, the sparks of revolt reached the southern districts of Bengal. The troops of thirty-second Native Infantry had mutinied at Purulia and destroyed the station. The magistrate of Bancoorah (Bankura) informed the government of Bengal that a small troop of Europeans arrived there to 'save the Railway Terminus and the mines of that important place from destruction'.[19] Sensing the possibility of danger, the manager of Raneegunge colliery, Stuart Gordon, pleaded for a 'party of twenty tb thirty Europeans for the protection of the Raneegunge Collieries', though the joint magistrate of Raneegunge had already appealed for the one hundred Europeans that seemed to be 'absolutely required'.[20] Raneegunge was an important station for the Company because of the newly built railway terminus and the coalfields. The Company administration became alarmed when incidents began to take place in the nearby districts. The state of mind was expressed in the following correspondence: 'The Lt. Governor has for sometime felt great apprehension regarding Raneegunge... and to solicit the dispatch of even ever so small a number of European troops were it only for a time to save the Railway Terminus and the mines of that important place from destruction....'[21] Again, in late October and early November, the second and third parties of sepoys from the thirty-second Native Infantry mutinied and destroyed public property. They left Ramporehat and moved towards west without facing much resistance. The government of Bengal felt the urgency of chasing the mutineers, but as Bengal saw fewer violent actions, it was not given priority over north India. This resulted in the unchecked and uninterrupted movement of the mutineers and undermined the imperial authority. The local administration felt that if these districts were 'left without European troops' they would 'see disturbances'. The government of Bengal wanted to mount pressure on the military department of India—charged with emotion it highlighted the 'effects of these repeated progresses of unchecked mutineers through the richest and most valuable districts, the sufferings they must cause to the people and the unavoidable humiliation to which they reduce the authorities of Government'.[22]

Revolt at 'the late time' when Delhi and northern India had been pacified and brought back under control, caused the lieutenant governor of Bengal to 'renew his anxiety'. Lt. Governor Halliday wrote in his minutes of 27 October:

> The base and brutal murders which they have committed and the impunity so humiliating the authority of Governments had the discouraging effects in the mind of our subjects, illustrated by the taunts recently offered by the representative of one of the greatest and till now most loyal zamindars of Behar at our inability to defend the people from massacre.[23]

Halliday honestly stated that it might turn out to be a 'very needless anxiety', but he 'could not suppress' his desire that some precautionary measures should be adopted, given the situation.[24] The state of the Jalpaiguri regiment was not

very positive either—the regiment was said to be 'stationed in a very doubtful and uneasy state, posting of themselves as it would appear extra sentries in their own lines, giving out that disturbance is at hand and at the point of break out'.[25] It was apprehended that if the flames of the revolt reached Jalpaiguri it would spread towards northwest like wild fire. From Jalpaiguri they would march towards west through Kissengunge and Purneah, plundering the civil stations and devastating 'a large extent of rich and populous country studded with Indigo factories and thriving towns and markets'.[26] The large stations of Rungpore, Dinagepore, Purneah and Maldah were also considered to be vulnerable in case of revolt at Jalpaiguri. Halliday thought that European sailors could be recruited for the defence of these places: 'I have found lately that European sailors, who were formerly so few in numbers and in such request as not to be procurable ... can now be hired with much greater ease than formerly and I have actually engaged within these few days in anticipation of my present solicitation to the Government of India'.[27]

On 18 November, the 34th Native Infantry at Chittagong revolted. They plundered the treasury, released prisoners, burned down their own lines and then left the station along with the whole wealth of the treasury. The European inhabitants of the town were petrified. The ladies of the station were placed on board river vessels for two nights, while the gentlemen slept in the commissioner of circuit's house. The administration tried to reassure them, but as they barely managed to 'escape with their lives', they were 'consequently in some dread and every rumour tends to increase it'. The Europeans urged the fortification of an emergency shelter and the speedy arrival of European troops in order to 'settle down' the area. The administration, which initially appeared reluctant, finally woke up to the seriousness of the situation: 'The whole Christian residents begged me to allow of one into which they could retreat in case of danger and as the government had sanctioned a fortified place for the Dacca people, I did not see how I could refuse one for the Christians of this place.'[28] Local inhabitants worked hard, and the fortification process was finished at the cost of two to three thousand rupees. In the absence of European troops, the mutineers could not be properly dealt with. The local administration confessed that they had no men on whom they could depend, 'some eleven or twelve understand the musket drill and about thirty probably be able to load a gun' and such insignificant force was considered to be 'worse than useless against so much larger a body of men and thoroughly trained'. The movement of the rebels was also quite confusing and misleading. They made a forced march beyond Seetacund where they halted and the following day, instead of continuing on the straight road to Tipperah (Tripura), they entered the Barriah Dholla and crossed the hills. The administration tried to assess their possible route, it was thought that either they intended to visit Nepal, after plundering Sylhet, or would proceed to Tipperah. Immediate administrative action only succeeded in recovering two government elephants and some other property taken by the sepoys and in recapturing thirty

prisoners. European troops were 'greatly needed' for the defence of this frontier station; otherwise it was thought that the hill tribes would take advantage of its defenceless state. The local administration was anxiously waiting in the hope that the government could send a European force, a portion of which could be used to chase the mutineers. The remaining part could be engaged in maintaining peace and order in the frontier station. Without getting any response from the central authority, the commissioner of revenue and circuit, Chittagong division, communicated to the lieutenant governor of Bengal their frustration:

> I trust His Honour will approve of my proceedings. I am acting for the best and I must add I feel quite at a loss to understand how so many days should have elapsed without my hearing from the Government or being told what arrangements were proposed in regard to the troops. Some of the natives of this place have received letters saying that the European troops are coming round here. They apply to me to know whether such is the case and I am obliged to confess my total ignorance on the subject.[29]

Being a remote area with hills and jungles, it was hard to trail the mutineers and lack of communication hindered the receipt of actual information about their movements. The roads through the hills were 'known to few in this Zillah and those who are sent out are generally afraid of getting too near the sepoys; consequently the intelligence received has never been very certain'. However, the information received revealed that the mutineers headed towards Tipperah. A few of the Chittagong convicts whom the administration was able to recapture were questioned, and it was discovered that the mutineers were marching towards Agurtallah and that they would offer Rajah their service; if the Rajah declined their offer they would plunder his palace .and would ill-treat him.[30] It was also apprehended by the administration that the rebels would be able to get help from the local Kookie people. The judge of Tipperah corresponded in the same tone, 'I have no idea that the Maharaja, who is as timid as a girl, will communicate with mutineers, but I think his Kookee subjects may give us trouble.'[31] The Rookies were actually aiding the mutineers by supplying them with food, carrying baggage and cutting paths through jungle. It was further reported by the magistrate of Tipperah that 'the mutineers are marching as rapidly as their route will allow, they are most lavish with their money, but still are short of food. The prisoners with them are daily escaping, for not only are they nearly starved, but in one or two instances they have been bayoneted for lingering with their loads.'[32] The report delivered by the magistrate of Tripura added to the anxiety of the administration. Mr Chapman, the commissioner of revenue and circuit division, again explained the gravity of situation in his report:

> The mutineers have been trying to conciliate the natives by giving them money and hitherto have been successful in their endeavburs tp procure food by

> paying most liberally for whatever they would get A small body of troops sent round without delay would at once (to) check all attempts at disturbances, and enable me to keep the part of Bengal quiet, but any delay now in affording aid will in all probability reduce three districts to a state of disorder and confusion; to remedy which a much larger force than is at present requisite would have to be employed.[33]

In the northeast region of Bengal, Dacca, Chittagong and Dinagepore were closely linked, and all these districts were hilly and riverine, making physical access problematic for the administration; without the help of local people the British could not think of proceeding into this remote space. This weakness made them even more nervous. However, one hundred European sailors were recruited to defend the Chittagong town and to chase the mutineers. The sailors arrived in the steamer 'Dalhousie', were given proper medical aid and the marine superintendent was ordered to provide 'the best means of conserving them by steamer to their destination'.[34]

As Dacca had a considerable Muslim population, a band of European sailors had been stationed there since August 1857. The British administration was very suspicious about the Muslim community and marked them as chief conspirators in the whole episode of revolt. In Dacca, too, they were extremely apprehensive of them. The administration wanted to place their apprehension on a logical ground: 'If the Mahommedans of Behar are successful in disturbing even temporarily the peace of that province, the same class of people in around Dacca will thereby be excited, in a moment of madness, to acts of violence and disorder if not of open rebellion against the state.' As the country was in a disorderly state, it would not be difficult for the sepoys to win over many of the disaffected to their side. They could easily raise a force by freeing the prisoners from confinement, and this unruly force would plunder the town and the station, disrupting law and order. The local Christian population anticipated that the 'apprehension' could any day become reality and even they 'look forward towards its probable recurrence, especially during the approaching Muhurram'.[35] The commissioner of the Dacca division was quite confident that 'the presence of the party of the seamen would prevent any outbreak',[36] but on 21 November 1857, the seventy-third regiment of Native Artillery offered strong opposition when European sailors went to disarm them at Lalbagh. 'The determined resistance of the sepoys, their strong position and the fact of their raising guns at their command prevented unfortunately the complete success to disarm them and enabled a considerable number of them to escape with arms in their hands.'[37] The presumption was that they would join the main body of their corps at Jalpaiguri, when probably there would be another mutiny. In Dacca the fortification was approved as an excellent emergency shelter for the European inhabitants. The local Christian inhabitants of Ferringee Bazar worked hard to finish the fort within two to three days. An extreme feeling of insecurity engrossed the minds of the Europeans. In the absence of an adequate

force the commissioner of revenue and circuit held the government vessel 'Megna' as a symbol of security. He stated, 'We are so unprotected I have been taken on myself the responsibility of retaining the Government Brig 'Megna' for a short time ... The presence of a Government vessel on the river is of itself likely to cause much good/ A small detachment of seamen proceeded in one of the pinnaces (a small country boat) to Megna (Megljna) to intercept the mutineers. The plan was to stop the progress of the rebels so that they could not cross the river near Dawdkandee. Moreover Indian *peiadas* (strong men, usually wielding bamboo sticks and spears) were recruited for watching the movements of the rebels. Government spent 5 Rupees 8 annas for food for the recruits.38 The administrations of Dinagepore, Rungpore and Rajshahi were keen to ensure the arrival of European seamen before the rebels could reach Jalpaiguri. Mr Stuart, who owned a factory at Kaligunge in Rajshaee division, left his place and took shelter in Prosonno Kumar Tagore's House at Gobindagunge when he heard the progress of the Dacca rebels.39 In Barisal too, uneasiness prevailed. The European residents were sending away their families to the interior of the district and burying their valuables. They were 'hastily fortifying a home in the station' to defend themselves 'until a force arrives from Calcutta'.40

European sailors were recruited to augment the European component in the armed forces. In December 1857, the governor-general-in-council sanctioned the proposal of the lieutenant governor to raise 'a body of 200 or 250 European Seamen for service at Purneah, Dinagepore and Rungpore on the same rates of pay as those allowed to the men of the Assam Detachments and officers were also employed to command European sailors in the proportion of three to one hundred'.41 Many parts of east and north Bengal were riverine, remote and inaccessible. Considering the geographical and political situation, sailors were recruited without taking into account their usefulness; the need to give them basic military training was almost an afterthought: 'it is evident that unless to some extent drilled and instructed before they leave Calcutta bodies of seamen picked up indiscriminately out of the merchant ships in the port could not be much relied on....'42

After the upsurge of 1857 the British authorities recognised the need to enhance in the armed forces 'the European element, if their Empire in the East is to be maintained at all'. The immediate effect was that the number of European troops in India became far greater than it had been so far; a development that was considered as the 'first change in the new era of Indian history, lately inaugurated with so great a sacrifice of life'.43 In order to strengthen the empire, the armed forces were extended significantly, which in turn drew more poor men from the British Isles, especially from the labouring classes and the Scottish and Irish peasantry. The harsh lives of the social groups from which they were recruited may have made the hardships of army life a kttle less severe for these men than they were for some others. During the revolt, a large number of soldiers were

recruited to suppress the rebellion. Poor Europeans of every description from England and India—servants, shoemakers, smiths, tailors, labourers, brick layers, bakers, butchers, carpenters, clerks and farriers—were recruited to the army in large numbers. One contemporary Bengali writer commented that the low Europeans joined the ranks of the army in the hope of getting two square meals.[44] An interesting limerick published in *London Charivari* on 3 October 1857 perhaps most convincingly explained the situation.

> Over the counter, my skippers!
> Spurn the effeminate shop,
> Kick off the carpeted slippers,
> And the cheating yard-measurement let drop,
> Sergeants are busy recruiting,
> England invites volunteers,
> Surely you'd better be shooting
> Sepoys, than shaving our dears.[45]

After 1857, 50,000 men from Britain were added to the imperial army in India and, to maintain the strength of the European group, a further 10,000 were recruited every year from Europe, especially from Britain. The navy also was strengthened in a similar way. The military force of 220,000 men did not include the European troops of His Majesty's Indian forces or the large numbers in the navy and in the mercantile marine, who were also withdrawn from the labour force of Britain. It was not easy to make members of a superior ruling race out of these men, scraped from the bottom of their respective societies. In spite of imperial indoctrination in the duties involved in representing a superior race, and preaching by the army and naval chaplains, often these soldiers and seamen were perceived as 'mindless brutes governed only by drink and the lash', who should have been 'banished from responsible historical writing'.[46]

It was only natural that there was debate regarding the recruitment of British men for the Indian army. Sir James Outram, concerned about the 'moral standard' of the British Indian army, advocated the recruitment of soldiers from the 'steady sober moral and intellectual men of a still higher parentage and education'. Unsurprisingly many of his compatriots argued that England 'can not give to the Indian service alone 100,000 of her industrious peasantry and artisans, retaining, instead, the dangerous classes who now enter the Axmy' who were 'withdrawn from the productive forces of Britain. It were better to recruit, still, from the loose population of the towns and counties, eventually returning a portion to the country as good citizens'.[47] The labouring poor of Britain were also aware of the consequence of coming to India. After all, the lives of common soldiers and sailors could never be comparable to those of the ruling elites in India. The grievances of the poor whites were expressed

sarcastically, 'We are not to calculate how many are required, whether 50,000 as some think, or only 40,000 for the Bengal Presidency alone, but assuming that there will be many thousands of our countrymen annually brought out to live (perhaps die) in this country!' It was clearly demanded that measures must be taken both to attract more men to the service and to take care of them when they were in it. Proper accommodation, sanitation, clothing, food, permission to marry, etc. were needed to make their service in India more attractive and less harsh. The mechanical, mindless attitude of the authorities to its own underclass was laid bare in the following comments: 'it is true that the soldier is a valuable commodity, we hear him calculated as worth £100 by the time he reaches the country, and very often he is regarded only in this light of £100's worth of bone and muscle, and endeavours are made to preserve him because it will cost that same to replace him.'[48]

Extensive recruitment of European soldiers and sailors in the imperial force, their displays of arrogance and their atrocities against Indians created alarm and insecurity in the mind of the native population. David Kincaid described the scandalous behaviour of the soldiers during the revolt:

> Troops were pouring into Calcutta, but while the ardour of the soldiers was inflamed by numerous and often untrue atrocity stories, no one seems to have thought it necessary to tell the soldiers that the war was against certain rebels and not just against the population of India. In consequence of this omission there were some regrettable incidents in the streets of the capital.[49]

Kincaid mentions that the British troops were made up of different nationalities:

> [T]he arrival for the first time in a strange country of so many British troops gave rise to as many jokes among the civilian population as in the early months of the last war. Foremost among the heroes of these amusing stories was of course, the Irish soldier, 'worthy son of Erin', who is shocked to find in the Indians a race as loquacious as his own.[50]

The soldiers, whose behaviour contrasted uneasily with that expected of a superior ruling race, were excluded indirectly from the core of the ruling community. To their utter relief they seemed to discover too much of a resemblance between the 'unruly' behaviour of Irish soldiers and that of the Indians!

Eminent writer Amritalal Bose wrote in his autobiography that just after the suppression of.the 'mutiny' in north India, Calcutta was crowded with many European soldiers who were called 'highlander Gora' by the local people. When Fort William, Dumdum cantonment and Barrackpur were overcrowded, they were given shelter in the buildings of the Queen's College, Hindu College and

Free School. In places like Sham Bazar Street, Cornwallis Street, etc., these soldiers were often seen doing drills with a band. Most of them were drunkards, and the native populations of those areas were so afraid of their disturbing activities that they used to close the entrances of their residences, even during the day. Sometimes their presence became intolerable. One group of soldiers, for example, forcibly entered the house of Rani Rasmani, a well-known landlady. The gatekeepers and other male members fled in fear. Rani herself confronted them, and the police and Fort William authorities were informed, so that finally the police relieved Rani's residence from these soldiers.[51] The commissioner of Nadia division reported that the troops stationed at Barrackpore were creating a very uneasy feeling amongst the respectable natives by entering *zenanas* and insulting females, whilst in Calcutta some serious affrays took place. On the night of 29 November, a fight occurred in Bowbazar between several hundreds of soldiers and sailors.[52] In Dacca, sailors openly confronted disbanded sepoys. The government was at a loss to identify a place where the sailors could be kept. They decided, 'The sailors ought to have been removed to the old convent which is at present empty or what would be better still the sepoys removed from Dacca altogether.' The European soldiers engaged in suppressing the revolt often themselves violated law and order. After the outbreak of revolt at Barrackpur cantonment, the native force was disbanded and European troops were recruited for the first time there. It was feared that the European soldiers would have 'opportunities of frequenting the Burra Bazar shops during the Daroga's absence', which led the brigadier to withdraw the licenses of shops selling cheap liquor. Special arrangements were made to prevent the looting and plundering of shops in the Burra Bazar area by European soldiers. An additional *mohurer* was recruited to guard the shops at the cost of approximately ?100 per month, whereas the withdrawal of the licenses would cause the 'consequent loss of 6000 Rupees'.[53] It is interesting that efforts and expenses were needed to save public and private property from the saviours of the empire! In Rangpore the house occupied by the marine brigade was severely damaged by the sailors; for instance 'two fine large marble slabs before the fire places in the Dining and Drawing Rooms [were] broken to pieces, apparently by the butt ends of the muskets having been hammered on them'. Mr Longmore, the owner of the house, presented a long list of damaged items before the government with a humble prayer for repair, which altogether cost 200-300 rupees.[54] Often these sailors spent their money in grog shops, and their activities put the authorities in an awkward position. In Rungpore, the officiating commissioner stated that 'the sailors have received too much money which they have not spent in a proper way'. It was decided to give these people as little pay as possible, as by keeping them in arrears of wages, greater control could be imposed upon them.[55] Superintendent of marine brigade wrote to the lieutenant governor of Bengal that a considerable number of petty officers needed to be recruited, otherwise it would be extremely

difficult to control and maintain proper discipline among the sailors. Five petty officers per brigade were sanctioned.[56]

The administration had to admit that 'it was difficult to exercise an efficient control over the troops, scattered as they were'.[57] The increasing presence of the European underclass was not in tune with the aristocratic mien of the rulers. The desire to make India a land of white aristocrats anU swelling the British Indian army with members of their own marginal classes were inherently contradictory projects. Concerns over such issues were not new; even before the Charter of 1813, when the East India Company severely restricted the entry of Europeans into India, the demand for European skills and capital was

> often supplied from the most anomalous and suspicious sources— from runaways from the East India Company's ships— from British subjects who had found their way to India by defying the laws— from runaway or emancipated convicts from New South Wales and— French, Dutch, and Danish adventurers from the Indian settlements of these nations: in many instances, persons destitute of the necessary character and education.[58]

The Crown government's modified policy encouraged the presence of a considerable number of Europeans as a necessary reserve force in India. The poor white people who could not go back to their own countries stayed in India and produced subsequent generations. Invalid soldiers from British regiments were permitted to receive their pensions in India without having to report in person to Chelsea Hospital and soldiers and sailors started taking discharge in India.

During the revolt there was a huge intake in the company's army and these men were eventually discharged after the suppression of the revolt and proclamation of the direct Crown rule. The army was amalgamated with the Royal forces and the naval force was disbanded. As a result, a large number of soldiers and sailors who were working under the company lost their jobs and swelled the rank of unemployed and eventually those of the destitute and vagabond. The ex-soldiers or ex-navy men contributed significantly to the crowd of pauper Europeans in Bombay and Calcutta. 'Many, if not most, of the persons who come begging, are discharged soldiers.' The report of the Committee on European Pauperism in Bombay, 1867, showed that the huge intake during the revolt in both the army and the navy was followed by a huge discharge after the revolt was suppressed and the armed forces were reorganised. Between 1855 and 1861, 421 Europeans from army and 3320 from navy were discharged (Table 9.1). Moreover, in 1862, when Indian navy was finally disbanded, a total of 1474 employees lost their jobs.[59]

Most of the discharged soldiers and sailors chose to remain in India rather than join a British regiment or be sent home. Tempted by offers of lucrative and secured employment in India, non-commissioned officers and privates

Table 9.1: Discharge Figures from the Army and Navy, 1855-62

Year	*Dischargedfrom Army*	*Dischargedfrom Navy*
1855-1856	25	226
1856-1857	28	147
1857-1858	17	244
1858-1859	22	436
1859-1860	162	1313
1860-1861	122	396
1861-1862	45	558
Total	421	3320

Source: *Report on European Pauperism*, 15 December 1863, Maharashtra State Archives Judicial Proceedings, 1867/Vol. 13/Comp.l40.

purchased their discharge. In doing so, they forfeited their entitlement to a passage home. In the words of a soldier who served during the mutiny:

> After the Mutiny was over I left the service with a pension of a shilling a day for life. I had been so long in the country that I decided to stay in it, and quite a number of us old John Company soldiers who were entitled to a pension did the same. For six or seven months of the year I wandered about the country, visiting different military stations. I generally stayed a few days with each battalion and when I left a collection was made for me. After living like this for twenty years I thought it was about time to setde down and take unto myself a wife. I married the daughter of a couple of half-castes, who had a bit of money, gave her a dowry of a thousand rupees. With this money I started a piggery in a small way, which soon got much larger.60

Unfortunately this happy ending was not common among the other discharged soldiers, and in most cases their situations were pitiable. They were frequently seen loitering on the streets of Presidency towns and also in the *moffussily* begging from door to door. Some in the administration were anxious that they had become 'a pest to the community at large'. It was felt that \ ..something should be done to make these men return to Europe as they bring great disrepute to the European character. Many of these men have done good service for the British government, but in their present position they were quite unable to take care of themselves'.61 The *Friend of India* was also unsparing, noting, 'European vagrancy in India did not assume alarming propositions till the close of the Mutiny campaigns.... The indecision of Lord Canning who declined the responsibility of adopting Lord Clyde's vigorous counsels, led to discharge in India for many hundred soldiers who had fought the company's battles with a heroism which deserved very different treatment.'62 European colonisation was

increasingly considered as a remedy to the insecure and unsound foundation of the Indian Empire. William Ewart argued that, with the aid of the railways, British troops stationed in the hills could, in an emergency, 'pour down upon the plains in fewer hours than it had hitherto taken days to assemble them'. When not occupied with military duties the troops might, 'like the Roman soldiers of old, be employed in the cultivation of land'.[63] \

On battlefields across India, lower class soldiers and sailors knowingly saved the empire, but off the battleground, their unruly behaviours eroded the image of the empire-builders. The imperial authority perhaps needed some other ways to exercise their mastery over their own 'underclass', the existence of which otherwise undermined the superiority of ruling race. The ex-soldiers or ex-navy men contributed significantly to the crowd of pauper Europeans in Bombay and Calcutta for the next few years. After the suppression of the revolt the administration made efforts to disarm the overconfident European sailors. Police commissioner of Calcutta S. Wauchope stated, 'Wherever a seaman is discovered with a knife in the bazaars or other parts of Calcutta, when I have a European Police force, he is immediately disarmed under the provisions of section 47, of Act XIII of 1856, and the knife or other weapon be confiscated; of course, the Native Police are not allowed to interfere in such matters.'[64] The upsurge of 1857 created fear in the imperial mind and a sense of insecurity and distrust of Indians that led the British to trust and depend on their own people instead, including the 'underclass'. Thus the construction of a homogeneous and discrete body of,the ruling race had been undermined by the impossibility of restricting the entry of the marginal and hence 'not so desirable' elements into India. These elements had to be accommodated in the imperial project, and the colonial authorities wanted to salvage some amount of usefulness out of them and make them a reserve force for the empire and the buffer between the ruling elite and the ruled.

Notes and References

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10

BESIEGED IN COMMON
Shared Narratives of British Men and Women in 1857

Ira Bhattacharya

WRITINGS on the Indian Mutiny by ordinary British men and women differ significantly from the official reports of it commissioned by the British government and from later accounts written by historians. They include casual notes taken during the events and later expanded into a volume for the perusal of friends and relatives back home, private letters written on the spot, daily entries into diaries and journals kept for the purpose, reminiscences and recollections, and impressions provoked by a return to the scenes of war. Thus the descriptions are varied, heterogeneous, plentiful and fall very much within the tradition of non-fictional narratives by the British in India going back a hundred years and more. They depict both the excitement of fresh encounters with the East and the hardships of living in a hot country where Europeans were susceptible to all kinds of diseases previously unknown to them. Eliza Fay's *Original Letters from India*[1] is a good example of this genre of writing, where the form of the letter and the journal is used to unfold a personal narrative. Though such letter-journals continued to be written during the entire period of British presence in India, they are progressively supplemented in large numbers by other kinds of writings, ranging from personal narratives like diaries, memoirs, and reminiscences, to formal literary texts like poems and novels. Early texts abound in picturesque descriptions and rich documentation of Indian life and character. In them, a search for the picturesque coexists with revelations of life in the *zenana* (women's quarters) and with 'random sketches ... interspersed with legends and traditions'.[2] Most of these accounts begin with a description of the almost legendary voyage from England to India that marked the transition from a known world to an unknown one. Landing at the port of Madras, or Bombay, or Calcutta, most of them were impressed by the ..Asiatic splendour, combined

with European taste exhibited around you on every side under the forms of flowing drapery, stately palanquins, elegant carriages, innumerable servants, and all the pomp and circumstance of luxurious ease, and unbounded wealth.'3

The value and interest of these personal narratives lies not only in the vast range of experiences and feelings which the writers incorporate, but also in the specific viewpoint from which the observations are made^ Their perceptions are seldom devoid of ideology. Inscribed in their descriptions is a subtle subtext of superiority, domination and power. The centrality of England in the scheme of things was the unspoken assumption behind all these texts, and India is never seen as anything other than a possession, a jewel to be jealously guarded and polished from time to time so that it does not lose its lustre. Their creative productions are but mere reproductions of their beliefs and prejudices. 'Images were not changed by the Indian reality', writes Allen Greenberger, rather 'the images have influenced the way in which the reality was seen.'4The chroniclers, diarists and memoir-writers have a tendency to dwell upon the ordinariness of their accounts and many deny all claims to real authorship. John Beames in the preface to his book entitled *Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian*,5writes:

> If it should be asked why so obscure a person should think it worth his while to write the story of his life at all I reply that it is precisely, because I am an obscure person - an average, ordinary, middle-class Englishman - that I write it. There is an abundance of biographies of eminent and illustrious men, but the very fact that they were eminent takes them out of the category of ordinary mortals. Their lives, therefore, though deeply interesting on account of their great deeds, are different from the general run of men who were their contemporaries.

It is generally believed that the lives of great men contribute to the making of history, but in a different way, the subalterns' lives unfold another dimension of history, giving us the texture of the fabric of daily life. Despite the rhetoric of self-disavowal, some of these writers do have a literary self-awareness, a consciousness of speaking to an audience. They do see themselves as witnesses to history and interpreters of an alien culture—a role that makes the task of writing an important and responsible act. 'In varying degrees', writes Ketaki Kushari Dyson, 'the authors of these books are conscious that they are participating in the respectable activity of producing "a new account" of "the East Indies".'6

The events of 1857 formed a watershed in the British relationship with India. The mature fruition of the grand imperial design in the first half of the nineteenth century had made the British confident of their superiority. But what happened in 1857 jolted their complacency and made them cautious and alert in their dealings with Indians. This is reflected in their writings as well. To quote Dyson again:

> As-wermove through the journals written in the first half of the nineteenth century, we can,* of course, see the Mutiny coming. Not only does the literary style 'move from the grandiosity of the eighteenth century, through Romantic exuberance, towards the crisper idiom close to the present century, but racial and cultural attitudes change, while threads of continuity with the preoccupations of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are never altogether lost.7

The early nineteenth century saw the emergence of a highly structured English society in India. More and more women came over from Britain and, as a result, the fabric of British social life tightened around the club and the church, excluding the Indian participation that might have occurred in the eighteenth century. The British entertained little social intercourse with the Indians. They lived a life of seclusion in their up country stations or 'hybrid cantonments'—'that place which was English, and yet not English, Indian, and yet not India'.8 While men had a task to perform in the empire, women found their uprooted lives much more difficult. Barriers of race, language, a sense of social superiority and habits of behaviour kept them totally cut off from the Indians. To them, the events of 1857 were all the more shocking and their writings reflect their horror.

The British men and women writing their accounts of the mutiny were common people—wives, widows, soldiers, chaplains, judges, magistrates and the like—unremarkable except in the extraordinary nature of their circumstances. Colin Welch9 in his introduction to Maria Germon's journal writes that after reading it, one does not get any idea of what the mutiny was about or what lay beneath the surface she records. In Germon's journal, the trivial and the epoch-making are all mixed together. According to Welch, her rare gift was that she could write exactly as she spoke; thus an'enormous rat in the bedding coexists with the agony of waiting for relief or anxiety for the safety of her husband. To quote Welch:

> By eroding detail time gives to events like the siege of Lucknow an impersonal, stylized quality. Big words like "heroism"'and "privation", though just, do not help. Mrs Germon makes us live with her through the siege and see it as she saw it: an affair of dirt and over-crowding; of hideous boils, lice and the death of friends ... of small pleasures like a cup of tea, or singing in the evening, of petty squabbles as to who fetches water for whom, who cooks what food there is and who does the washing up, all conducted to the accompaniment of shots whistling through the windows and walls.10

Localised in nature, mutiny texts by women who were besieged and did not get to see much, or any, of the outside world contain a detailed account of the daily events and the domestic chores that these women performed during the course of the rebellion. The details become interesting when we consider that

an English family would employ no fewer than two dozen servants, and women were not required to do any household work at all. Compared to their Victorian middle-class existence in England, this was a life of ease and luxury. Their present life then has to be seen in the context of the Victorian society of which they were a part. In the nineteenth century, England saw the rise of many women novelists, the better known among them were the Bronte sisters, Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Eliot, and the lesser known were writers like Dinah Mulock Craik and Elizabeth Sewell. The belief commonly held in those days regarding women was that they possessed certain feminine qualities (of sensitivity, delicacy, etc.) that were best utilised in writing a certain kind of fiction, in which the depiction of family and domestic life was predominant. In other words, women could write best about what they knew best—the sphere of the home. This kind of division of spheres between men and women writers, and the strict definition of what a woman's sphere ought to be, was recognised by many women novelists to be a means or a weapon for limiting and curbing their literary skills. Even writers like George Elliot or the Brontes had, on the face of it, to conform to the parameters provided by Victorian society, although they used various covert strategies to subvert these expectations and there was a secret subtext in their work in which such expectations were being challenged. Southey's pronouncement to Charlotte Bronte that 'literature cannot be the business of a woman's life, and it ought not to be' reflects the attitude men had towards women's writings in mid-Victorian England. As the diarists and chroniclers of the mutiny belong properly to the mid-Victorian era, they too had internalised these attitudes and put self-imposed limits on their writing. The women could not conceive of writing about events that were taking place outside the domestic sphere; they thought it best to limit themselves to what was happening within the four walls of their home. Hence, inexperienced and amateur that they were, they resisted being called writers.

Structurally, mutiny journals take a variety of forms depending on the aim and purpose of the writer. Where the intention is a simple coherent day-to-day record, we find the journal neatly divided into chapters, and each day's activity unfailingly recorded. Maria Germon's and Katherine Bartrum's texts are examples of the above kind, except that Bartrum's narrative is profusely interspersed with letters she wrote to her family and friends in England during the mutiny. In these writings what we get is not an account of the events of 1857 as history, but rather, the writer's private experiences as the one besieged. For instance, Maria Germon tells us of an occasion when she sat down at dinner with the others, 'laughing and talking, quite a merry party, when about nine of the servants came running in saying there was a great deal of firing going on in the direction of cantonments. We all started up—Dr Fayrer and Mr Harris went to see and sure enough there was artillery and musquetry to be heard and then tremendous fires seen blazing up.'[11] Mrs Adelaide Case in her journal describes the 'scene of ruin, devastation, and misery which presented itself to our eyes when we got to the Residency and

I never, never shall forget ... the horrors of war presented themselves with full force in the mass of shattered buildings and dilapidated gateways through which we passed.'[12] Or, for instance, Katherine Bartrum writes:

> I was so glad to hear he (her husband) had had a good tiffin, for the day before when he came he said he had had nothing but 'dal bat* for some days. We happened to be at dinner and I gave him a piece of meat but he seemed too much done up to eat and actually carried it away in a piece of paper to other gentlemen who could get none.[13]

Mrs Coopland mentions a wedding that took place within the Agra Fort while they were besieged there. She writes: Tt was a very gay wedding considering the circumstances and after the ceremony, they pitched a tent on the terrace, and had a dance and supper to which they invited all the officers.'[14] She also mentions other kinds of entertainment that went on inside the fort such as balls and musical parties in the arsenal. This is the human side of the mutiny as recollected and retold by these women.

The text most representative of this genre of journal writing is the one by Maria Germon. When asked to evacuate Secundarbagh and proceed along with the other ladies to Allahabad, she decided to salvage as much of her earthly possessions as she possibly could. It makes interesting reading. In her journal she recalls:

> I dressed in all the clothes I could, fearing I might not be able to get the others carried on from Secundarbagh. I put on four flannel waistcoats, three pairs of stocking, three chemises, three drawers, one flannel and four white petticoats, my pink flannel dressing-gown skirt, plaid jacket and overall my cloth dress and jacket that I had made out of my habit - then tied my Cashmere Shawl sash-fashion round my waist and also Charlie's silver mug and put on a worsted cap and hat and had my drab cloak put on the saddle. I forgot to say I had sewed dear mother's fish-knife and fork in my pink skirt and had put a lot of things in the pocket of it. I had also two under-pockets, one filled with jewellery and card-case, the other with my journal and valuable papers. I then, fitted my cloth skirt pocket with pencil, knife, pin-cushion, handkerchief, etc. - all my lace was sown up in a bag which I wore also.[15]

Finally, when, with her husband's help she managed to mount the horse, the poor creature, she writes, nearly fainted.

The diaries and letter-journals written by women form a contrast to the non-fictional narratives by men who saw themselves as active agents of the empire and wanted to play a part in actuating Britain's imperial design in India. T. Henry Kavanah, in his reminiscences entitled *How I Won the Victoria Cross*, writes of the Englishman's mission in India:

> The white and the black men are dissimilar as day and night. There is no communion of feeling, and little of thought. The house that needs a thousand brooms cannot be swept by fifty: the gem of the East cannot be shaped and polished by the present number of artificers. Its lustre is obscured by the dust of ages, and it is certain that we have too few, and possibly too little time to cleanse it.[16]

Words like 'broom', 'cleanse', 'gem', 'artificer', and 'lustre' suggest how the white man perceived India in the mid-nineteenth century. Records of personal experiences of the mutiny left by Englishmen are varied, heterogeneous and plentiful. They enjoyed greater mobility and freedom; as agents of action they participated in military manoeuvres and met with innumerable experiences. Their texts are conceived in a larger geographical and conceptual space. The men, as a result of their direct involvement in 'the action', are able to give a picture of the mutiny as a series of events in flux, rather than as static, as often found in the writings by women. Moreover, the men usually see the mutiny in the larger context of history. It is a rebellion that they must be able to quell by their superior skills and also an opportunity for furthering their military careers in India. They are aware of making history, of winning what they considered a just war. Michael Edwardes is of the opinion that for these men, the mutiny was a battle 'between the forces of Christianity and the outer darknesses of the Moslem and the Hindu'.[17] In their eyes, India was nothing more than one of their 'Eastern Dominions'. Belief in the racial, cultural and military superiority of Britain was not just a subtle subtext in these writings, but the most obvious preoccupation. W.H. Russell in *My Indian Mutiny Diary* notes:

> [T]o the intelligent Briton, they are as the beasts of the field. 'By Jove! Sir/ exclaims the major, who has by this time got to the Walnut stage of the argument, to which he has arrived by gradations of sherry, port, ale, and Madeira, 'By Jove!* he exclaims, thickly and fiercely, with every vein in his forehead swollen like whip cord, 'those niggers are such a confounded sensual lazy set, cramming themselves with ghee and sweet-meats and smoking their cursed chillumjees all day and all night, that you might as well think to train pigs'.. The fact is, I fear, that the favourites of heaven - the civilisers of the world - *la race blanche*,... are naturally the most intolerant in the world.[18]

Another British resident records: '...the sepoy is an inferior creature. He is sworn at. He is treated roughly. He is spoken as a "nigger". He is addressed as "suar" or "pig", an epithet most opprobrious to a respectable native ... [British officers] regard it as an excellent joke, as an evidence of spirit and a praiseworthy sense of superiority over the sepoy to treat him as an inferior animal.'[19]

The nineteen-year-old Wilberforce, a soldier in one of the regiments at Delhi, thought that the war they were engaged in was no civilised war. In his diary, entitled *An Unrecorded Chapter*, he writes: 'We had to deal with a race whose

interpretation of the word mercy is "the fear that kills"/20 Years after the mutiny he recalls:

> ...in a shooting expedition in the Himalayas, I came across some of the sepoys who had escaped. In conversation with them, I said, 'If Lord Dalhousie had been Governor-General, would the Mutiny have broke out?' The man to whom the question was addressed turned as pale as his brown skin would allow, and visibly trembling even at that distance of time, at the thought of what would inevitably have happened, answered 'God forbid! He would have swept us off the face of the earth/21

All these young men were steeped in the ideology that placed England at the apex of power in the world, and they regarded India merely as a site for advancing their career and attaining glory. General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, for example, in his book *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* writes:

> My Indian career was the result of a conversation which I casually over-heard, in which a lady visitor, who had been in the East, depicted in glowing terms all the pleasures of an Indian life, and descanted upon the opportunities for advancement which the East India Company's service offered to the soldier.22

To the young Englishmen India was a land of immense opportunities and adventure. The personal narratives of men create the knowledge of the Orient as \ ..almost a European invention ... a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences>.23

The authors of the mutiny texts represent a cross section of the British community in India. Amongst them we have both soldiers and civilians, the latter consisting of magistrates, judges and chaplains. John Beames of the Bengal Civil Service and a well-known scholar, grammarian and philologist, wrote in his memoirs:

> The Civil Service was in those days an aristocracy in India, and we were the jeunesse doree thereof. We were invited everywhere and dined out three or four times a week besides numerous lunch and garden parties. Mamas angled for us for their daughters for, as the phrase then went, we were 'worth three hundred a year dead or alive/24

Three hundred pounds was the widow's pension! The texts incorporate innumerable experiences including, for example, one chaplain's journey from London through Spain, Alexandria, Egypt, the Red Sea, Aden, Sri Lanka, Madras, and finally to Calcutta across deserts, rivers, hills and plains. This particular text also outlines the events of 1857 in Barrackpore, Delhi, Agra, Kanpur, Lucknow, Allahabad, and Benares, giving us, at the same time, a picture of English life in these small towns or cities. Texts, such as this, are not attempts at recording the

facts of 1857 as history. Rather, these are personal narratives, combining the scenic, as well as the humane and social aspects of life, with the sudden uprising that caused a rupture in British existence in India.

While the men were out there fighting, dreaming of 'blood and battle', of Victoria Crosses, brevets, and other chances, and reliving Thomas Campbell's 'Soldier's Dream', women were engaged in mock mutiny Battles and games with their children, trying to keep them away from the shells and bullets. Harriet Tytler, the lone woman to witness the siege at Delhi records her experiences in a touching narrative. On how she kept her little daughter engaged so that the girl did not run out of the bell-of-arms where they were hiding, Harriet writes:

> At last a bright idea entered into my head. It was rather a unique one, which was to scratch holes in my feet and tell her she must be my doctor and stop their bleeding. This process went on daily and for hours. No sooner did my wounds heal, than she used to make them bleed again for the simple pleasure of stopping the blood with my handkerchief. But it had the desired effect of amusing her for hours.[25]

Such were the ways in which the blood and violence outside crept into the lives of women and children. Julia Inglis describes in her journal the games her little son would play. She writes:

> Johnnie's quick ears detected immediately when a bullet fell, and he would run and pick it up whilst it was warm. It was curious to see how the children's plays and amusements harmonized with what was going on around us. They would make balls of earth and, throwing them against the wall, would say they were shells bursting- Johnnie fell down one day and getting up very dusty, said: 'They'll say, I have been mining.' He often asked, 'Is that the enemy or us firing?'[26]

Upon examining the texts we understand that they are important because they record the more human and ordinary aspects of a popular uprising dismissed by the British historians as a 'sepoy mutiny' and eulogised by the Indians as the first 'war of independence'. Trivial though they are as literature, these first person accounts give the experiences of the mutiny a solidity of specification and aid us in perceiving the horrors of war and 'the scenes of ruin, devastation, and misery'.[27]

The mutiny of 1857 exposed scores of British women, hitherto sheltered by their protective menfolk, to dangers and deprivations unknown to them. Mowbray Thomson in his narrative of the outbreak at Kanpur entitled *The Story Of Cawnpore* (1859) wrote that, '[M]any of these were wives and daughters of officers, who had never known privation in its mildest form.'[28] Rendered homeless by the mutiny and occasionally bereft of family, the women and children had to suffer many hardships and miseries. That the women could think

of and accomplish the task of writing their day-to-day journals and diaries is indeed an astonishing phenomenon! Pat Barr writes, 'They suffered extremes of thirst, hunger, fatigue; they shuddered at the close whine of bullet, the crump of shell and they remembered those dreadful days for the rest of their lives—and so wrote of them partly to neutralise and contain their terror of it all, as people do.'[29] For the women who were accustomed to a large house manned by innumerable domestic servants and situated far away from the humdrum of the local bazaar and the noisy 'natives', life during the mutiny, compressed in a corner of a room or even outside in the veranda, and surrounded by a continuous volley of shots, was difficult to bear. Moreover, 'if the men could not conceive of it, how much less could the women who experienced the country mainly through their husbands, who were cosseted and debarred from most real investigations of their own, who relied by upbringing and custom, on the infallibility of the masculine judgment?'[30]

As a reading of British mutiny diaries and journals reveals, the British attitude immediately before the uprising was one of complacency, characteristic of a power that had gained ascendancy. This to some extent explains the expressions of surprise, at both the suddenness and the enormity of the violence that erupted. The mutiny broke out in Meerut on 10 May 1857 and within a fortnight it spread like wild fire to vast regions of northern India. Confident of their mastery over India, the British ignored all signs of the approaching storm. 'We laughed', notes Charles Griffiths, a captain in the 61st Regiment stationed at Ferozepur near Delhi, 'at his [their billiard-marker, a high caste Brahmin] fears, and dismissed from our minds all alarm, vaunting our superiority in arms to the dusky soldiery of Hindostan, and in our hearts foolishly regarding them with lordly contempt.'[31] J.E.W. Rotten, the chaplain of Meerut, who was proceeding in a carriage along with his wife to St John's Church in the afternoon of 10 May 1857 did not heed the warning of his domestic help who told them not to go to church 'because there will be a fight'.[32] The chaplain's carriage had not gone far from the compound when he saw 'above the feathery drifts of sugar-cane, a slender black shaft of smoke climbing to the yellow sky…'.[33] On the evening of the same day, St John's Church was deserted while the city bazaar was in flames. From Meerut the soldiers proceeded to Delhi where Robert and Harriet Tytler had begun the day (11 May 1857) with their usual breakfast. Later, Harriet was to recall every moment of this last meal in vivid detail—the household tailor stitching busily on the veranda outside, the sweet orange pulp of the musk melons which made up the last course, Robert grumbling over the untoward events of the past twenty-four hours. He told Harriet that while he was reading out the orders, the sepoys were 'hissing' and making such a sound as an exclamation of derision or contempt; they refused to stand at attention while the orders were being read out. Soon after, news reached Robert that the sepoys in Delhi had mutinied. This breakfast scene that the English woman recalls is evocative of Anglo-Indian life in general; a life so particularly dull for women that it made Florence Marryat

write: '…every sun set as it rose, and left a feeling behind it of an utterly wasted day, the description of one of which will serve for all'.[34] But in her memoirs, Harriet rues the absence of that very orderly life.

In Kanpur (Cawnpore), the mutiny broke out on 24 May 1857, the day of Queen Victoria's birthday. Usually this event occasioned a big celebration, but on account of the unrest, 'the bells in Christ-Church belfr^ remained alarmingly mute'.[35] Not very far from Kanpur was Lucknow, the city of 'guilded mosques, and minerats, and towers'.[36] The commanding officer of the forces at Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, was a man endowed with wisdom and foresight, and he had begun all preparations for war. While the mutiny affected large parts of northern India and the English were being massacred in Kanpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Agra and Delhi, in parts of India unscathed by these events, such as Bombay, Poona and the south, British social life continued undisturbed and we have accounts of British men and women attending balls, parties, and occasionally, a Hindu wedding.

To the civilians besieged in the forts and residencies, the mutiny symbolised a strange coming together of people, Englishmen and women, from all parts of the country. Mark Thornhill, who belonged to the Bengal Civil Service, describes the scene at the Agra Fort thus: 'We met like travellers in a fairy-tale, like them we told our past adventures__ As we talked, our conversation, our surroundings seemed to lift us above the petty cares, the dull routine of ordinary life, into a region of poetry and romance.'[37] Charles Raikes, a judge of the Sudder Court at Agra describes the mutiny as 'a belt of fire' that had engulfed them by early July 1857. Raikes, a civil servant accustomed to authorise and dictate, found himself 'on the verge of barbarism'. He writes: 'Hitherto, we had been the lords of the nation, flattered, courted by the people, caressed by fortune, confident in our own strength.'[38] This reiterates the point made earlier in this essay regarding the suddenness of the attack and the unpreparedness, both physical and psychological, of the British to face the events of 1857. James Mackay, a chaplain describing the events in Meerut, writes: 'The writer arrived in Calcutta at the beginning of the outbreak; and in passing from London to Lucknow he was interested, amused, surprised, shocked, and instructed, by various things which he saw and heard.'[39] It is important to note that even in the midst of crisis, class distinctions amidst the very structured British community in India were not forgotten. Not only were the high ranking officers and their families housed differently, but also food and drinks were apportioned according to rank and status. It was not uncommon for two women facing the same crisis and staying in the same fort or residency not to have met at all. Compared to the more ordinary Maria Germon, Katherine Bartrum and Mrs Coopland, Julia Inglis, who was the wife of a brigadier, enjoyed a lot of privileges even amidst acute privation. T. Henry Kavanagh, Assistant Commissioner in Oudh writes in his book *How I won the Victoria Cross* (1860): '...private stores were wastefully used, especially stimulants which would have sustained the sick and wounded afterwards

English provisions were remorselessly plundered, regardless of the morrow; and whilst anything dainty lasted, it was greedily consumed/[40] Julia Inglis met Katherine Bartrum only at Allahabad aboard a steamer that was carrying them to Calcutta. After listening to Bartrum's tales of horror and suffering, Inglis writes:

> Mrs Bartrum (and other ladies) came into the Residency without any servants, and consequently had to do everything for themselves. All they ate was cooked by their own hands, and they had even to collect and chop wood to make their fires, and each had a young baby to attend to. These poor women must indeed have endured great hardships, at the same time, I cannot understand how, surrounded as they were by others who were certainly better off, a little help was not given to them.[41]

Denis Kincaid in *British Social Life in India* observes that even during the crisis of 1857, the etiquette of Anglo-Indian life remained rigid. While some were drinking Champagne and Moselle the rest were drinking 'the most unpleasant beverages' and eating the most unwholesome food.[42]

The mutiny texts highlight the disorder brought to the lives of British men and women in parts of India effected by the uprising. Many of the writers described with equal intensity both the daily life of the British in these small towns and the temporary disbanding of that life as a result of the mutiny. Mark Thornhill was stationed at Mathura near Agra as a magistrate when the mutiny broke out. In his book, he narrates the story of his flight to Agra along with his family. His primary concern is to capture the moment of transition from order and decorum to anarchy and bedlam, symbolised in 'the blackened walls and the charred fragments ... broken furniture, scraps of clothing, pieces of glass and china'.[43] His 'large and handsomely furnished'[44] house, which stood by the river, was a symbol of authority and harmony and its destruction is recalled with wistfulness.

British soldiers largely saw the mutiny as an opportunity for adding stars and laurels to their military careers in India. A soldier named Hugh Gough writes of the day he was selected as part of the relieving force for Lucknow under Sir Collin Campbell: 'I slept that night the sleep of the justly happy, and dreamed of Victoria Crosses, brevets, and other chances, which I had thought were closed to me for ever.'[45] Another soldier named Forbes-Mitchell, a sergeant in the ninety-third Sutherland Highlanders, also came for the relief of Lucknow. He revisited the scenes of the mutiny in 1892, and the visit triggered his reminiscences. The narrative unfolds, with nostalgia, the experiences that befell him as part of the relieving force at Lucknow. It delineates with sensitivity and a touch of humour, the multifarious life of a soldier during the crisis. He started o£ his journey with 'strongly mixed feelings both of pleasure and sorrow, not unmingled with gratitude ... by the mail train from Howrah in August 1892, to revisit Cawnpore and Lucknow for the first time, with the terrible scenes of 1857 and 1858 still vividly photographed as it were, on memory'.[46] Dispensing with what he calls

the 'formula of the amateur author' whereby the author reluctantly publishes his narrative 'at the solicitation of numerous friends', he declares his desire to write his recollections for his own pleasure, because, as he admits in his book: 'On revisiting the scenes of the mutiny, I have been forcibly impressed with the fact that like so many memories, the soldiers and civilians who were personal actors in the great uprising are fast passing away.'[47] His text is replete with anecdotes that describe camp life and the adventures of his regiment. He writes about the amusements the soldiers are engaged in when off-duty, for example, fishing in a nearby river with 'whisky balls'[48] that not only dulled the fish's senses but also attracted more fish! Written in a simple narrative style, Forbes-Mitchell's book brings to life vivid pictures of the mutiny. Though he was no Scott or Tennyson, he describes scenes with a subtle evocative power, and his writing reveals, at times, his acute awareness of the gap between the richness of his material and the inadequacy of his verbal power. He writes:

> After all was quiet, the m,en rolled off to sleep again, and wrapping round my legs my newly-acquired quilt, which was lined with silk and had evidently belonged to a rebel officer, I too lay down and tried to sleep. My nerves were, however, too much shaken, and the pain of my burnt-hand kept me awake, so I lay and listened to the men sleeping around me; and what a night that was! Had I the descriptive powers of a Tennyson or a Scott I might draw a picture of it, but as it is I can only very faintly attempt to make my readers imagine what it was like … I dreamed of blood and battle, and then my mind would wander to scenes and I was a little boy again, kneeling beside my mother, saying my evening hymn. Verily that night convinced me that Campbell*s 'Soldiers Dream* is no mere fiction, but must have been written or dictated from actual experience by one who had passed through such another day of excitement and danger as that of the 16th of November 1857.[49]

Another interesting account of the events of 1857 is contained in a book by Charles Griffiths,[50] a captain in the sixty-first regiment stationed at Ferozepore, near Delhi. Describing the events, he writes that there was a humorous side to the desolate picture. The soldiers played 'mutiny games' to frighten their own officers at the dead of the night, and when off-duty, they spent time fishing in a nearby canal. The writer recalls:

> To see us on these occasions full of merriment, one would scarcely have realized the fact that the men employed in this peaceful occupation were part of an army engaged in almost continual warfare, and fighting for very existence. Laughter and jokes filled the air, and chaff reigned supreme; while ever and anon we were rudely recalled to a sense of the dangers around us. …[51]

An account of the mutiny in Delhi by Reginald Wilberforce gives us a picture of those 'stirring days' 'not as history, but,as they presented themselves

to the mind of a boy of only nineteen years old'.[52] Unclouded by ideology or experience, he writes with the exuberance of a young boy excited, for instance, after capturing a 'nine-pounder gun* from the Indian soldiers at night. When the colonel appeared the next morning on his usual visit, looking at the gun he confronted Wilberforce thus:

> "What is that?"
> "Please, Sir, it's a nine-pounder."
> "Who did it belong to?"
> "Her Majesty, Sir."
> "How did you get it?"
> "It came down the street."
> "Lose any men?"
> "No, Sir."
> "Humph! Don't do it again."[53]

With reference to the light-hearted attitude that prevailed particularly among the young soldiers, Charles Raikes notes: 'The men who cared least for all this were those most in danger, our young officers in the native regiments. They rode, swam, and played billiards with as much gaiety as though they had not nightly to sleep in the lines amongst a set of ruffians thirsting for their blood.'[54]

In contrast to Wilberforce's jauntiness we have some sharp images of violence, squalor, starvation and death provided by Mowbray Thomson in his account of the events at Kanpur. The writer iiotes in his preface, 'As our escape was effected in a state of nudity, it was impossible to have any writings to assist in the production of this book: it has been from the first to the last an effort of memory.'[55] He writes of artillery-bullocks being converted into stew; of stray dogs being tempted into soup-kettles; of the officers' children 'sucking the pieces of old water-bags, putting scraps of canvas and leather straps into the mouth to try and get a single drop of moisture upon their parched lips'.[56] It is a tale of extraordinary suffering and melancholy. He describes the mutiny at Kanpur, which started on 6 June 1857 when almost all the bungalows of the English were set on fire. 'The ping-pong of rifle bullets', he writes, 'would break short dreams of home or of approaching relief, pleasant visions made horrible by waking to the state of things around.'[57] He narrates how a shell landed inside the kettle and almost spoilt their meal:

> On one occasion, we were warily closing together to eat our evening meal, when the hissing shell kindly announced its approach towards us...that ten-inch missile had nearly terminated our entertainment, but as the ancients used to say, "the stomach has no ears", so we promptly returned to the kettle, and "shelled" out its contents.[58]

Describing the condition of men, women and children besieged without food or water for nearly twenty-one days, he writes: 'Tattered in clothing,

begrimed with dirt, emaciated in countenance, were all without exception; faces that had been beautiful were now chiselled with deep furrows; haggard despair seated itself where there had been a month before only smiles/[59] Thomson narrates how Havelock's force finally wrested the cantonments from Nana Sahib after twenty-one days of siege. He also describes the massacre in the boats and. how he, along with a few other men, swam into the friendly territory of a local zamindar.

The mutiny texts are the richer for the beautiful descriptions they contain of their environs. Griffiths, for instance, compares the 'live shells cleaving the air on a dark night' to 'so many brilliant meteors rushing through the heavens, or like lightning flashes during a storm'.[60] Describing the explosion of shells on a dark night, he writes: '...shells would burst high over the city illuminating the spires and domes, and bringing into prominence every object around.'[61] Of the old city of Delhi he writes:

> Tall and graceful minarets, Hindu temples and Mohammedan mosques, symmetrical in shape and gorgeous in colouring appeared interspersed in endless numbers among the densely packed houses inside the city, their domes and spires shining with a brilliant radiance, clear-cut against the sky...[62]

Forbes-Mitchell notes in his diary, 'From the heights of the Dilkoosha, in the cool of the early morning, Lucknow, with its numerous domes, mosques, minerats, and palaces looked very picturesque.'[63] Mark Thornhill talks about the beauty of Mathura when seen from the river: '... a succession of fine houses that rise like castles, bathing places, and little temples to whose fairy-like lightness no words can do justice.'[64] From the Agra Fort he observes his surroundings and writes thus: 'The Indian moonlight is always beautiful__ It bathed the marble hall, the trees, and the building around, concealing all the marks of the ravages of time, all the present disorder, hiding them in one soft mysterious glow.'[65] Mowbray Thomson gives us a picture of the city of Kanpur as it appeared when seen from the river side: 'Hundreds of bungalows, the residences of the officers, stand in the midst of gardens and these interspersed with forest trees, the barracks of the troops, with a separate bazaar for each regiment, and the canvas town of the tented regiments, give to the 'tout ensemble' a picturesque effect....'[66] These images of nature and of art not only lend beauty to these texts but also give to the events of the mutiny an exotic background, throwing into sharp relief the brutality of day-to-day existence of those caught up in the violence.

A close reading of British mutiny narratives reveals the involvement of various marginal 'groups in the uprising. An average English household in India in the nineteenth century could employ anything between twelve to thirty-two servants, with whose assistance the British were able to maintain a well-appointed lifestyle despite a hostile climate. In the mids^ of the hostility and violence of the mutiny these servants, in most cases, extended help and shelter to the British.

Equally important was the help rendered by soldiers who remained loyal to the British. Julia Inglis records the devotion of the loyal sepoys, describing how her son Johnnie 'passed most of his time in the square next to us with the Sikhs, who were very fond of him, and used to give him chappatis (native bread) though they could not have had much to eat themselves, poor men! I used rather to encourage this friendship, as I thought if things came to the worst they might be the means of saving his life'.[67]

At first glance, the non-fictional narratives of the mutiny appear like loose, unconnected pages from history than literary texts. Emphasis on documentary realism seems to overshadow the imaginative and personal dimensions of these texts. But as one reads them over and over, one begins to feel their impact. These accounts of 1857 form a rich body of writings that make the mutiny come alive before our eyes. We see and feel as the ordinary British men and women of the time saw and felt. Personal narratives on the mutiny continued to be published posthumously well into the first decade of the twentieth century. The close of the nineteenth century also saw the publication of one of the best known novels on the uprising—Flora Annie Steele's *On the Face of the Waters*—which Pat Barr calls 'a classic as long as the Indian Mutiny is remembered'.[68] Steele was a little girl when the mutiny broke out, but the impact of the events of that year was strong enough to have a lasting impression on her. She grew up playing mutiny games with her brother in their large country house in Scotland. In her autobiography written some sixty years after the uprising, Steele reminiscences that when she was little she 'burnt and hanged and tortured the Nana Sahib in effigy many times'.[69] From random notes to letter-journals to meticulously written daily accounts to reminiscences and recollections, mutiny literature forms a rich fabric of intricately woven narratives, all of which make interesting, if not sublime, reading. The shift of interest to another genre, namely, the novel, affords an added embellishment to this huge body of writing which never fails to arouse the reader's curiosity, even to this day.

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11

SIR GEORGE GREY AND H E INDIAN'REBELLION The Unmaking and Making of an Imperial Career*

Jill Bender

THROUGHOUT his professional life, Sir George Grey's livelihood was interwoven with the British Empire. He served with the eighty-third Infantry Regiment in Ireland, led two exploratory expeditions to Western Australia, acted as colonial governor in New Zealand and the Cape Colony, and enjoyed a career in New Zealand politics. His actions during the 1857 Indian Rebellion, however, generated the most lasting discussion and public debate. As governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa in 1857, Grey contributed regiments, horses and artillery to British efforts in India. Additionally, he reportedly redirected troops bound for China and mobilised volunteers from the German Legion stationed in South Africa to fight in India—all without waiting for the consent of officials in London. He has been both highly praised and heavily criticised for his actions. From his first dispatch during the revolt until well after his death in 1898, Grey's contemporaries sought to understand and explain his role in the suppression of the uprising.

Grey's decisions have continued to spark similar discussion among historians. As Leigh Dale has recently noted, 'Grey's reputation - and debates about it - span the English speaking world.'[1] Much of the scholarship examining Grey's response to the Indian Rebellion has judged his actions, either favourably or critically, in an effort to understand them. In 1961, J. Rutherford argued that Grey, when left to his own discretion, acted admirably and offered considerable assistance to the British in India. However, the eventual intervention of London officials put Grey on the defensive. As a result, according to Rutherford, when orders from London did not suit Grey's own ambitions, he was much less cooperative and did

* I would like to thank Simon Potter and Zo£ Laidlaw fof their comments on early drafts of this chapter.

not hesitate to be purposefully misleading in his communication with imperial administrators.2 In a critique of Rutherford's work, Donovan Williams argued that the inconsistencies in Grey's actions stemmed from the difficulty of facing a tight situation in the colonies, while also attempting to follow distant orders from London. Given the circumstances, Williams asserted, Grey's mistakes were excusable, and his 'eagerness to help India and protect the Cape Colony' was motivated by a genuine loyalty to the Empire that deserves 'more prominence than it has received in the annals of the British Empire'.3

Both studies recognise Grey's role in the suppression of the rebellion, and highlight the ways that nineteenth century methods of communication could complicate imperial control. Their reliance on official documents, however, leaves the impression that Grey's actions were of interest to colonial officials only.4 Even Williams, who explores the influence of the Indian 'Mutiny' on the Cape Colony, examines Grey's efforts to contribute troops and horses to India without exploring the impact of these contributions on the Cape settlers. In Part II of his article, Williams argues that the uprising shaped notions of 'black consciousness'.5 His dependence on official sources, however, raises the question whether it was 'black consciousness' that the Indian Mutiny influenced, or simply British fears of native cohesion. This article argues that Grey's response to the Indian revolt generated interest both inside and outside official circles, raising lasting questions of appropriate methods of imperial governance.

In recent years, scholars of imperial history have encouraged a 'networked' conception of the nineteenth century British Empire, emphasising the colonial connections that linked the disparate colonies to England and to each other.6 This article draws upon that literature, incorporating newspapers to examine reactions to the uprising and to Grey's response as they surfaced in London, South Africa and New Zealand. This is not to suggest that official documents should be cast aside. Rather, widening the lens allows us to move away from questioning whether Grey was 'an ambitious self-seeker' or 'a genuine humanitarian'7 and to examine the ways in which the role of mid-nineteenth century colonial governors was perceived in times of imperial crisis. As self government became an increasingly popular idea, imperial administrators and settlers alike questioned the best methods to unify and administer the various components of the British Empire. The 1857 Indian Rebellion highlighted the importance of these questions, providing an opportunity for the Cape Colony both to support the greater empire and to improve its own economic position. The uprising did not simply expose the need to revisit and reform British rule in India, but, as an event that required empire-wide assistance to suppress, it also generated empire-wide discussion regarding methods of imperial governance.

The Cape Colony and the 1857 Indian Rebellion

When the sepoys of the eleventh native cavalry mutinied the night of 10 May 1857, news of the rebellion traveled quickly by mid-nineteenth century standards. In addition to following more traditional* press routes (being reported to London first and then disseminated throughout the empire), news of the uprising also spread along communication lines connecting the disparate colonies. Within weeks of the rebellion's outbreak, the governor of Bombay sent a dispatch directly to the governor of the Cape Colony, requesting an urgent transfer of regiments.[8] As a result, reports of the rebellion reached the Cape in an unprecedented twenty-six days, arriving nearly three weeks before the London intelligence.[9] Thus from the start colonial connections shaped the impact of the Indian revolt on the Cape Colony and ensured that South Africa would be affected with or without mediation from London.

Residents of the Cape Colony immediately recognised their association with India, commenting that 'the Indian connection of so many years duration has linked many a Cape family with the distant East'.[10] By the time the first news from London reached the Cape on 26 August, the names of friends and relatives had begun to appear on the lists of missing and killed arriving from India, and the Cape Colony was consumed by 'consternation'. According to the *Cape Argus*, it was these familial connections that initially alarmed the Cape colonists and 'enlist[ed] their sympathies on the part of our suffering fellow-countrymen'.[11] In response, the colonists immediately rallied behind the British cause in India.

The colony's governor, Sir George Grey, seemingly wasted little time in providing the requested assistance. Without waiting for instructions from London, Grey immediately deployed the eighty-ninth garrison and members of the Royal Artillery, and also diverted troops *en route* to China to meet the growing disaster in India. Further, he initiated plans to contribute additional troops as soon as possible.[12] Initially, Grey's actions received widespread support and encouragement throughout the colony. The *Cape Argus* urged the governor to send regiments immediately, reminding its readers 'in such cases time is everything'.[13] The *Grahamstown Journal* reported that, given the current peace existing in the Cape Colony, no troops that could possibly be sent to India 'would be detained here by a single colonist'.[14] Further, should indigenous threats surface at the Cape, the colonists 'most nobly offered' to perform their own garrison duty, in order to spare all imperial troops for service in India.[15]

The denuding of troops from South Africa wrought more difficulties than reduced security; it also ensured a personal connection between those fighting in India and those left at home at the Cape. As a result, in addition to military support, the Cape colonists also contributed funds to assist those touched by the violence in India. In an opening address delivered at a public meeting to organise relief efforts, Grey recognised that the rebellion had placed the families

of soldiers in the 'utmost unfortunate circumstances'. Many regiments, rather than going home, were rushed off to India, leaving their wives and families 'scattered all over the face of the earth'.[16] Furthermore, Grey noted, many of these men would not return, '[f]or the loss of life amongst our soldiery in India will necessarily be very great'.[17] While precedent existed for the families of soldiers to receive relief while their loved ones were away fighting, no system was in place to assist the family should the soldier be killed in action. Given the large number of troops originating in South Africa, and the grave situation in India, Cape Colony officials proposed establishing a relief fund for widows and orphans with the hopes that 'the claims of this class of sufferers, here and elsewhere, will attract the notice of the charitable and humane throughout the empire'.[18] The meeting proved to be a success. The following day, the governor forwarded £1,000 to the Government of India, reporting, 'this Colony is not a very wealthy one, but such is the horror felt for the crimes the Mutineers committed, and such the admiration of the greatness of conduct which our countrymen have shown, that the deepest sympathy has been excited here.' He promised that the £1,000 was simply a 'first installment' and the colony hoped to contribute more soon.[19]

Despite the seemingly generous Cape donations to the Indian Sufferers Relief Fund, assistance did not always stretch to the far reaches of the empire. In January 1858, when reporting the deaths of members of the Royal Artillery, the *Cape Argus* assumed that the soldiers' wives, who lived at the Cape, would receive compensation. According to the newspaper, the widows' 'claims on the Fund are certainly as good as any of those who have suffered in India; and the application of the money to this object cannot but be regarded as perfectly legitimate'.[20] Weeks later, when relief still had not been provided, the Cape colonists formed a subcommittee to inquire into the matter. Local relief fund members announced the decision 'to forego sending any more money to Calcutta till it be seen whether any portion of the funds should be required by widows and orphans in this city'.[21] Withholding donations proved to be effective, and, by March, the *Cape Argus* reported that the widows had begun to receive weekly assistance from the Fund.[22]

In the meantime, however, other frustrations had materialised. As the rebellion crept on, Cape officials had received orders from the War Office to discontinue assistance to the families of soldiers still alive and fighting in India. In response, many of the absent soldiers had forwarded money home to their families. To the annoyance of the *Cape Argus* (and, most likely, the intended recipients), 'circumlocution' required that the money be sent to England first, 'to pass through the hands of the officials of the War-office' before being returned to the Cape and distributed to the 'rightful owners'.[23] Not only did such a show of bureaucracy slow the distribution of much-needed relief, but it also provided a reminder of the central role that London officials continued to play in the

administration of the empire. Grey had managed to provide assistance to India without first consulting the Colonial Office; it was the immediate nature of the crisis, however, that made his actions acceptable. Assistance did not always flow seamlessly from one colony to the next.

According to Grey, it was a desire to strengthen these colonial connections and unify the larger empire that had motivated him to assist India in the first place. Describing the empire as 'a great body corporate', Grey explained to the Colonial Office that in moments of imperial crisis, all parts of the empire needed, 'without communicating with the center', to 'simultaneously stir themselves to meet the emergency'. Such a response would generate 'a common pride in the greatness of the Empire,' which could only 'increase its strength, unity, and stability'.[24] According to W.P. Morrell, Grey's explanation implied a rejection of the idea that a centralised bureaucracy was necessary to administer the empire.[25] More recently, however, Zoe Laidlaw has argued that the information revolution of the late 1830s and early 1840s resulted in a conception of the British empire as a unified entity that could be 'governed (at least theoretically) as a whole'.[26] This notion of an empire with a potentially unified method of governance was comforting to metropolitan authorities in the age of increasing self-government in the settler colonies. Maintaining control over statistical information permitted London officials to retain a sense of 'imperial influence, if not imperial power'.[27] Grey, thus, may have been tapping into this insecurity to generate metropolitan support for his governorship, reassuring London officials that his autonomous actions had not been an attempt to supersede their authority. He had simply acted with the empire's best interests at heart.

The year 1857 provided an opportunity not only to unify the empire, but also to strengthen the individual colonies. In particular, India's desperate need for horse remounts promised to stimulate economic development at the Cape. The Cape Colony had procured horses for India in the past. The practice had been rare, however, and the number of horses limited.[28] No system existed to furnish cavalry and artillery horses annually or in large numbers. While Grey set to work addressing India's immediate need for horses, colonial officials also began to discuss the long-term economic prospects of encouraging horse breeding at the Cape. The head of the Remount Agency, Colonel Apperley wrote a letter outlining the demand for horses in India, which was translated into Dutch and 'circulated throughout the country, both by the Government and the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society'.[29] In December 1857, the auditor-general, Major Hope, drafted a memorandum on the subject. According to Hope, 'the great question now is, both for the interests of this colony and of the Indian Government, can the Cape supply a sufficient number of horses annually, and will it be for the interest of the Indian Government to obtain this supply?'[30] Hope answered his own questions affirmatively, asserting that not only could the Cape provide an increasing number of horses each year, but also they could do so at

a decreasing cost. Further, he argued that the Cape's resources were crucial to British success in India, now and in the future:

> The Cape may be regarded as the connecting point between England and India, and the turning of the tide in the affairs of India. If in this crisis proper advantages are taken of the position of the Cape, as a depôt for troops, as a source from which to draw horses, and other supplies, India may be vastly benefited,... as well as calling out the resources of this colony, to the advantage of both countries and governments.[31]

Grey forwarded Hope's memorandum to London officials, and the pamphlet was also the subject of a lead article in the *Cape Argus* in January 1858. The Indian Mutiny was the Cape's moment to shine. The violence provided the colony with an opportunity to play an integral role in protecting the empire. And, in doing so, the colony could mobilise and encourage the development of its own economic resources.

The matter of horse remounts for India became a widely discussed topic in the colony and the subject of two blue books, both published in 1858. Following the publication of the blue books, the subject was also taken up in a series of articles printed in the *Cape Monthly Magazine*.[32] In particular, in September 1858, T.B. Bayley published an article entitled 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts'. Similar to Major Hope, Bayley enthusiastically supported horse breeding in the Cape in order to meet the Indian demand. Bayley encouraged the Cape colonists to look beyond the current crisis in India and to plan for long-term economic development. He argued that the opportunity could extend 'far beyond the mere amount of money' generated by the sale of horses to create a demand for 'forage' and stimulate further agricultural production. The development of horse breeding offered lasting economic potential for the Cape Colony. With this in mind, Bayley asserted that, rather than simply taking advantage of the inflated prices stemming from the crisis in India, the Cape's horse breeders needed to request fair prices and focus on developing a regular and lasting market.[33] The long-term potential of horse breeding aside, Grey scrambled to meet the short-term demand and managed to ship 4,014 horses to India within two months of hearing of the rebellion.[34] When horses were not available, Grey sent 100 draft mules as an 'experiment', commenting that the animals would 'be found very valuable as Teams for the Artillery ammunition wagons'.[35]

Grey's prompt contribution of regiments and remounts was a source of pride in the Cape Colony, and drew attention throughout the empire. In London, the *Times* ran a lead article praising the response of various colonies to the uprising in India. In particular, the article emphasised that 'it is at the Cape ... as might be expected from the magnitude and resources of the colony, that the zeal and energy of the Governor and people have been most signally expressed'.[36] Similarly, newspapers in New Zealand, where Grey had formerly served as

governor, kept tabs on the activities of the colonial administrator. In April 1858, the *Taranaki Herald* commented on the prompt, response of the Cape colonists, reporting that, 'When it was known that assistance was required in India, every soldier in the western districts of the Cape was ready for 'marching orders' within 24 hours.'[37] According to the newspaper, the event filled Grey with pride in his colony, reminding him of the worth of his appointment--'a thing which he had before very often doubted'.[38]

According to both the *Times* and the *Taranaki Heraldy* the Cape colonists' support exemplified the magnitude of the emergency in India, as previous efforts to exercise imperial policy at the Cape had fallen short. Only a decade earlier, when the colonial secretary, the third Earl Grey, had proposed that the Cape Colony be used as a penal settlement, he was met with strong opposition. Forming an Anti-Convict Association, Cape colonists had pressured then governor, Sir Harry Smith, into refusing to allow the convict ship, the *Neptune*, to land and had later organised a boycott to block the supply of provisions to the ship once it had anchored off the coast. The event had demonstrated the ability of the colonists to organise and act as an effective pressure group, and the lesson was not forgotten by officials. According to the *Taranaki Heraldy* in 1858, the same 'energies' that once had been used 'during the memorable and never-to-be-forgotten "stand" against Lord Grey's plot' to introduce British prisoners to the colony were now being directed toward assisting India.[39] Similarly, the *Times* also recognised the ability of the colonists to support or obstruct official policies, noting that the 'ranklings' heard earlier against the Home government had 'utterly vanished before the demands of this painful conjuncture'.[40]

Critiques of Sir George Grey

While events in India provided Grey with an opportunity to increase his popularity, support for the governor was not offered unconditionally or without question. Many of Grey's suggestions in the wake of the uprising failed to come to any fruition. He considered transporting sepoys and their families to South Africa to take the place of British regiments, offered to organise the 'Fingos, Hottentots, and Kafirs' for service in India, and discussed the possibility that the King of Delhi be exiled to the Cape.[41] Those plans that were adopted often raised questions as to whether Grey had the Empire's interests at heart, the Cape Colony's interests at heart, or simply his own ambitions for power at heart. Grey's response to the violence in India became so interwoven with his efforts in South Africa that the 1857 Indian Rebellion became a means to debate his governorship at the Cape. In particular, Grey's 'native' policy drew significant attention, positive and negative, in London and the colonies.

Throughout the 1850s, Sir George Grey and the Cape colonists had experienced strained relations with the indigenous people of southern Africa.[42] Just months before Grey received word of the uprising in India, the Xhosa had suffered a famine following the widespread slaughter of their cattle.[43] The 'cattle-killing' tragedy of 1856-1857 occurred when a young girl, Nongqawuse, prophesied that the Xhosa should kill their cattle and destroy their crops in preparation for an ancestral resurrection. According to British interviews with Nongqawuse, the risen ancestors had promised her that, should their requests be followed, more Xhosa ancestors would appear to provide food and to 'drive the English out of the country'.[44] The Xhosa adhered to Nongqawuse's prophesy and the outcome was widespread starvation.[45]

The history of the cattle-killing has been explained as part of a Xhosa conspiracy to initiate war with the Cape Colony, the result of 'a trick by Sir George Grey to deceive the Xhosa into destroying themselves' and a millenarian movement driven by economic and political pressures.[46] Regardless of what sparked the disturbing events, for many colonists the cattle-killing and the Indian Rebellion, together, demonstrated the unreliable nature of colonised peoples and the need to tighten methods of imperial control. For Grey, the two events facilitated the implementation of his frontier policy. Since his arrival to the Cape Colony in 1854, he had sought to 'civilise' the Xhosa by integrating settlers and natives on the frontier, thus introducing the Africans to British cultural and political norms.[47] The cattle-killing allowed him to continue to advocate integration, while also introducing methods of direct rule. Following the tragedy, the Xhosa were moved onto sites selected by special magistrates, consolidated into villages 'not exceeding 200 huts' and required to pay taxes.[48]

As the Xhosa were being relocated, rumours that the Africans had received word of the rebellion in India and were planning a similar uprising flooded the Cape Colony.[49] In response, Grey held the Gcaleka Xhosa chief, Sarhili, responsible.[50] He accused Sarhili of using Nongqawuse's prophesy as a political tool to unite the Xhosa chiefs, before spreading stories of the Indian Uprising to incite rebellion.[51] Further, Grey argued that Sarhili's strength needed to be destroyed to protect the larger empire, commenting, 'I cannot aid India, as I ought to do, if such a thorn is left in my side here, I am therefore, going to settle the thing, once for all.'[52] He directed the Frontier Police, under the leadership of Walter Currie, to drive Sarhili and his people from British Kaffraria, and seized the territory for British settlement.[53] The 1856-1857 cattle-killing provided the opportunity to bring the Xhosa and their land under British control; the 1857-1858 Indian Rebellion provided the justification.

Just as Grey used the 1857 Indian Uprising to validate his policies, others pointed to the violence in India to criticise the governor's actions. Not everyone was convinced by the magnitude of the threat in Kaffraria, or the sincerity of Grey's response to the crisis in India. Rather, some accused the governor of

exaggerating the problems in the Cape Colony to avoid sending troops to India. In a letter to the editor, published on 26 August 1857, C.B. Adderley admonished the *Times* for understating the importance that the Cape Colony provided troops for India. As an MP for Staffordshire North, Adderley had a longstanding interest in colonial affairs. He frequently advocated colonial self-government as a means to unify the larger empire, and encouraged all parts of the empire to provide assistance in times of imperial crisis.[54] In 1857, Adderley argued that the Cape Colony had plenty of soldiers to spare and reminded readers that, in addition to British regiments, German settlers had been encouraged to immigrate to the region and were being employed as soldiers in southern Africa, at the expense of British taxpayers. Further, he asserted that there was no need for any troops to be kept at the colony, the mere possibility of a 'Caffre' war being 'absurd'.[55]

The *Times* followed up with a lead article criticising Grey's use of troops in the Cape Colony. According to the newspaper, troops were maintained in the colony not for protection, but to encourage economic prosperity.

> The produce of the Cape, consisting of hides, of good wool, and of bad wine, may serve to pay for hardware and cotton goods which are required for consumption; but the most profitable import consists in remittances for the service of the army.… Wherever an English force is stationed all markets rise, and it is not unlikely that even Cape Madeira may find a ready sale among the soldiers.[56]

The presence of troops in the colony allowed the Cape to draw funds from the imperial treasury and guaranteed a ready supply of consumers for Cape products. They were not needed for defence. As a result, the article encouraged London officials to draw regiments from the Cape for assistance in India. The newspaper also warned that 'no unnecessary discretion ought to be vested in Colonial Governors, who may exaggerate their own local wants' and fail to provide the resources and troops necessary for the imperial crisis.[57]

Imperial administrators were not alone in their frustrations with Grey's colonial policy. The Cape colonists, too, questioned the governor's actions, expressing doubt that he always had the colony's best interests at heart. In September 1857, the *Cape Argus* printed a letter to the editor by J.H. van Renen, the late captain of the Bengal army. Van Renen recommended that the 'least guilty' sepoys be transported to the Cape Colony to be employed 'on the public works, such as the harbour of refuge.'[58] Similar proposals had surfaced in correspondence between Cape officials and the Government of India, and, although Grey briefly entertained the suggestions, the stories coming out of India discouraged him from putting any into practice.[59] In October 1857, he notified the Colonial Office that 'the accounts, which have since been received of the revolting atrocities committed by the mutineers in India, have created such

a feeling in this colony that no sepoy regiments could now be received here'; at least, until he could consult the Cape Parliament.[60]

The very fact that Grey had even entertained the proposal, however, generated attention. The governor's initial belief that the colonists would 'gladly receive' and employ the sepoys proved incorrect. Not only did the colonists oppose the idea of transporting 'mutineers' to the Cape, but their opposition highlighted additional grievances with government policy. For those settlers located near the frontier, the introduction of sepoys would not solve the colony's labour shortage, but instead would discourage the immigration of more 'desirable' settlers. According to the *Grahamstown Journal*, the colonists were willing to see the 'Kaffirs' employed throughout the colony because 'honest labour' provided a means to bring the Africans 'within the pale of civilization'. The number of unskilled African labourers, however, needed to be offset by skilled labourers of European descent. The introduction of sepoys would discourage this much-needed 'white' or 'European' immigration by increasing competition and keeping the 'rate of wages low'.[61] For colonists in Cape Town, on the other hand, the issue was not so much that Grey had entertained the possibility of offering employment to 'ten thousand Sepoy cut-throats' (although that, too, concerned them). The real problem lay in the fact that Grey had originally ignored the role of the Cape Parliament in making the decision. His initial interest in the proposal had destroyed his 'reputation as a wise man' and exposed the need to reexamine the relationship between the governor and Parliament as well as the existing power structure in the colony.[62]

In April 1858, concern regarding Grey's use of colonial power was taken up by the Cape Parliament, and the *Cape Argus* later reprinted the debates in a special supplement. Discussion was sparked by the introduction of a motion to limit the use of the Frontier Police to conflicts within the colony's borders. In seconding the motion, Cape legislative member, Dr Tancred, argued that Grey's use of the police to expel Sarhili and suppress disputes in Kaffraria had been expansionist, aggressive, and had abused colonial resources. 'If you want to make an acquisition, you must send British troops there, and not the Frontier Police.'[63] In reality, Tancred did not agree with British acquisition of the region at all, asserting that the British had 'no right' to seize African land and that doing so would stretch British power thin and, consequently, threaten the strength of the larger empire. Although he focused on the governor's native policy, Tancred also pointed in passing to Grey's use of troops in India and argued, 'I don't want to go into that Indian affair, but you had no more right to conquer India than I had to take this book out of the hon. Member for Cape Town's hands.'[64] In opposing Grey's policies, Tancred not only raised questions about the Cape Colony, but also generated discussion of imperial policy. India, he suggested, represented one more example of British colonial exploitation.

The Cape Colony enjoyed representative institutions in the 1850s, but not full responsible government. While both the House of Assembly and the Legislative

Council consisted of elected members, crown officials were also permitted to participate in parliamentary debates (although they could not vote).[65] It was these crown-appointed officials that came to Grey's assistance, asserting that his ability to balance the crisis in India with the potential conflict at the Cape exemplified his strengths as colonial governor. The colonial secretary argued that once reports from India had reached the Cape, Sarhjli had eagerly spread the news that There were difficulties in India' and encouraged Xhosa chiefs to 'unite with him, and to renew their attempts against the British'.[66] The governor, recognising the possibility that the natives might attack during the colony's hour of weakness, simply attacked first. Similarly, the auditor-general argued that Grey had contributed as many troops as possible to India. To send more troops would have been unwise, adding to the 'confusion' in India and placing the Cape in danger by giving the 'Kafirs an idea that there was nothing left to oppose them'.[67] Further, he defended Grey's native policy, asserting that the governor had done all he could to assist Sarhili and had only fought when necessary. His decision to remove the chief from the colony 'was an act of pure defense, and not for aggression, or the acquisition of British territory'.[68] For many, thus, the 1857 Indian Rebellion exemplified the potential danger posed by colonised natives, be they Indians or Africans. Following debate, the Cape Parliament ruled that Grey had wielded his gubernatorial power responsibly and dismissed the motion to restrict the use of the Frontier Police.

Although the Parliament's decision was nearly unanimous, support was not entirely uniform among the colonists. The *Cape Argus* expressed frustration with the legislative decision, arguing that the support for Grey's native policy simply reflected his unrestrained political power in the colony.[69] The *Grahamstown Journal*, however, was pleased with the decision 'that the Kaffir tribes, "like the Indian mutineers, have drawn down swift destruction upon their own heads. That they are the aggressors, and the colonists have acted on the defensive."' According to the newspaper, for the past forty years, settlers on the frontier had been accused of provoking the Africans and had been held responsible for any unrest in the region. The recent 'judgment of Parliament' provided a much-desired 'final verdict' in favour of the colonists.[70]

Although Grey's frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili had received a stamp of approval from the Cape Parliament, his use of troops continued to face criticism from officials in London. From the outbreak of the Indian Rebellion in 1857 to June 1859, Grey and the Colonial Office consistently butted heads. In January 1858, the government published the official correspondence regarding the dispatch of troops to India. In a review of the blue book, the *Times* concluded, 'it appears from the papers before us that, although so much dependence was placed on him [Grey], the supply of reinforcements to India by him afforded was really very insignificant'.[71] A select committee of the House of Commons came to a similar conclusion. In its draft report, the committee praised the contributions of Lord Elgin (the British envoy to China), Sir* Henry Ward (the governor of

Ceylon) and Sir James Higginson (the governor of Mauritius), but found Grey's efforts severely lacking.[72] In addition to Grey's decisions regarding troops for India, London officials criticised his use of British regiments in the Cape Colony and opposed his proposal to federate the colonies of South Africa. In June 1859, citing Grey's tendency to disobey, his policy toward German immigration and his excessive expenditure of imperial funds, Colonial Secretary E. Bulwer Lytton announced Grey's formal recall.[73]

News of Grey's recall was met with indignation and considerable opposition by many Cape colonists. Petitions were submitted to the colonial government expressing support for Grey, and meetings were held throughout the colony, 'deploring his recall and in many cases asking for his reinstatement'.[74] The South African press closely covered the event, and the reports were reprinted in New Zealand. In October 1859, the *Taranaki Herald* reprinted an article from the *Eastern Province Herald* questioning Grey's removal as governor:

> Is it because Sir George Grey, when Governor of New Zealand, once postponed the promulgation of a constitution of Conservative origin, for which the Colony was not ripe... ? Or is it because his Excellency... introduced a number of German immigrants upon a guarantee of Kaffrarian debentures? Or is it because Sir George Grey had the hardihood to defend himself when his conduct was impugned in the matter of troops for India? In a word, is it because his Excellency dared to be independent - dared to sacrifice the good opinion of a Prime Minister to the interests of his charge - strong in the consciousness of his own integrity, and the ultimate justice and sovereignty of the English people?[75]

The *Eastern Province Herald* determined that, in reality, Grey had been recalled simply for doing his job and fulfilling his duty to the colony and the empire. While the newspaper was quick to note that it did not endorse all of Grey's actions as governor, it emphasised that he had proven to be the 'best qualified Governor' the colony had seen.[76] Similarly, at the time of his departure, the *Cape Argus* noted that the 'recall of Sir George Grey is deeply regretted by the whole colony'.[77] Despite the momentary frustration with his frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili, the colony supported Grey to the very end of his governorship and deemed his performance to have been far beyond satisfactory.

When notified of his recall, Grey defended himself by pointing to his actions during the Indian Rebellion, as members of the Cape Parliament had done earlier. Grey argued that he had warned the Imperial government that an increase in expenditure would be necessary if he was expected to both maintain peace in the Cape Colony and contribute troops to India. His actions should not have been unexpected. Further, Grey argued:

> In taking this course, I acted to the best of my judgment for the good of the service, and I still think I acted rightly; whilst the Indian authorities have

> gratefully acknowledged the importance of the assistance rendered. What would have been thought of me if, neglecting to act as I did, I had allowed a Kaffir war to break out here whilst the mutinies still raged in India; and if, consequently, instead of being able so largely to aid that possession of the Crown, I had called for increased assistance, and I had placed this country in jeopardy, whilst Great Britain required to put forth all her energies elsewhere, would it have been held a sufficient excuse to say thatNI could only have furnished the aid I did to India, and have prevented a Kaffir war, by spending 10,000 /., or 15,000 and that I feared to take the responsibility of doing so?[78]

Had he not acted in this manner, the British Empire may have faced much greater problems than an overextended bank account. Further, he argued, when ruling a colony, the occasional need for additional funds should be anticipated. 'In affairs, of such magnitude, and in finding suddenly such large re-enforcements for an empire in peril, the expenditure of some thousands of pounds cannot be sometimes avoided/[79] If imperial crises such as the 1857 Indian Rebellion could not always be predicted, nor could the expense and difficulties involved in their suppression.

Grey was an ambitious and headstrong colonial administrator, whose policies both generated nods of approval and eyebrows raised in opposition. Although his actions during the Indian Rebellion certainly fuelled discussion, at times, even Grey seemed a pawn in debates regarding the appropriate colonial response to large-scale imperial crises. Within weeks of Grey's recall, the Derby-Disraeli Ministry fell to a second Palmerston administration, and Lytton was succeeded as colonial secretary by the fifth Duke of Newcastle. Despite his disapproval of the governor's conduct, Newcastle recognised Grey's potential to establish 'peaceful relations' between the settlers and the natives.[80] As a result, after requesting Grey's assurance that he would adhere to the new government's policies, Newcastle reinstated him as governor of the Cape Colony.[81] Newcastle's dispatch notifying Grey of his reappointment arrived in Cape Town only days after the recalled governor had sailed for England. He was notified of the situation upon landing, and shortly after accepted Newcastle's offer.[82]

Sir George Grey and New Zealand

To defend his actions in South Africa, Grey had tapped into a British fear of 'restless natives'. In the wake of the sepoy rebellion, this fear was not limited to the British in London, South Africa or India. Rather it resonated with settlers throughout the British colonies, and granted Grey's 'native policy' a degree of

admiration. In New Zealand, where Grey had served as colonial governor from 1845 to 1853, fears surfaced that the Indian uprising might find sympathy among the Maori and reports of another 'Cawnpore' circulated among British troops sent to suppress Maori resistance.[83] As a result, when Grey expressed interest in returning to office in New Zealand, his reappointment appeared a hopeful solution to the burgeoning crisis.

In reality, strained relations between the British colonists and New Zealand Maori had existed prior to 1857. Since 1840, relations between British settlers and the Maori had been loosely regulated by the Treaty of Waitangi.[84] Although colonial administrators and native chiefs alike had signed the document, British settlers and courts frequently ignored the Treaty's authority.[85] During Grey's first administration, the number of British settlers in the colony had doubled, increasing Maori resentment of European settlement and bringing the question of land sovereignty to the forefront of colonial concerns. The tension in the colony only escalated after Grey's departure, and during the late 1850s, the Maori chiefs unified under the King Movement, creating a social and political organisation to reassert native control over the land.[86] The situation came to a head in 1860, when the Maori resisted Governor Thomas Gore Browne's efforts to occupy land in Waitara. Fighting took place in the region for nearly a year, reaching a stalemate by April 1861. Having lost the trust of the Maori chiefs, Browne was unable to establish peace in the colony and was recalled by London officials, opening the door for Grey's return.[87]

Although not everyone had approved of Grey's previous New Zealand record, for many, his reappointment seemed to signal that the imperial government recognised the serious threat posed by the Maori.[88] The *Taranaki Herald* expressed hope that London officials would put their 'full trust' in Grey to act appropriately and would not send him 'merely to retrace their steps for them'. In the past, the imperial government had intervened too heavily, and what was needed was a governor who would 'exchange the politician for the statesman' and simply get the job done without catering to every wish expressed by those in London. According to the newspaper, Grey, with the support of the imperial government, would provide 'every sort of means for an effectual settlement of the native question'. Additionally, the newspaper went on to predict, 'He will probably have *carte blanche* for all his demands. His policy may.be sharp at first, or it may be conciliatory; but we may reasonably expect it will not be weak, or weakly backed.'[89] Grey's work was cut out for him, but his recent success in balancing the needs of the empire in India with the local threat faced in the Cape Colony suggested that he was more than capable. London officials were equally optimistic. During his previous term, Grey had been noted for his strong working relationship with the Maori chiefs, and, in 1861, colonial officials were hopeful that he might re-establish this rapport to ease the present tension. The realisation that force might be required, however, was duly noted, and

Newcastle instructed Grey that, should his peace efforts fail, he was encouraged 'to wage war resolutely'.[90]

Grey's second term as New Zealand's colonial governor proved to be less successful than his first. James Belich has argued that Grey's conduct during the New Zealand wars 'is as confusing to historians as it was to his superiors at the Colonial Office'. Despite the confusion, Belich asserts that twp strands are evident in his actions: a 'peace policy' and a 'war policy'.[91] The 'peace policy' seemingly failed, and war broke out in Waikato in 1863. The New Zealand wars of 1863-1864 coincided with the Colonial Office efforts to withdraw British troops from the empire and place questions of defence and policymaking into the hands of the colonial governments. In the case of New Zealand, as long as the threat from the Maori persisted, the Imperial government agreed to provide troops and financial assistance to defend the settlers. The arrangement, however, resulted in disagreement regarding the necessary and appropriate role of British troops in the colony.[92] Throughout his second administration, Grey's methods of governance elicited significant official criticism, similar to that expressed during his South African governorship. London administrators accused Grey of failing to keep the Colonial Office informed, of continuing to draw on the commissariat to pay imperial troops, and of neglecting to return regiments to England when requested.[93] As a result, when his term came to an end in early 1868, Grey was not reappointed. With no Indian uprising to justify his decisions, Grey had little choice but to retire from Britain's imperial service.

Although Grey's career as a colonial official had come to an end, he did not disappear entirely. He briefly attempted a career in British politics, running unsuccessfully for a seat at Westminster, before returning to New Zealand. In 1874, he entered New Zealand politics, and served as premier from 1877 to 1879. Even after his death in 1898, Grey continued to be a subject of interest. In an obituary published on 20 September 1898, the *Times* remembered Grey as an independent and often controversial colonial administrator, who was not much liked by the ministers. Among the article's more positive recollections of Grey was his response to the Indian Uprising. The newspaper reported that it was Grey 'who really took the initiative in the generous course of action for which Lord Elgin has received deserved commendation … he sent everything he could spare from the scarcely pacified Cape—troops, guns, specie, & c., down to his own carriage horses'.[94] The comment elicited significant response from readers. Throughout October 1898, the *Times* published a number of letters to the editor—some argued that Elgin had been responsible for diverting troops to India, others agreed with the *Times* version of events, and one correspondent diplomatically asserted that 'both Elgin and Sir George Grey acted independently in sending troops to Calcutta'.[95]

With a career as long and as checkered as Grey's imperial service, why was it his efforts during the 1857 Indian Rebellion that generated such lasting debate?

The question surrounding his use of troops was never entirely about Grey as an individual. His actions during the uprising, and the responses they elicited, prove to tell us more than whether he should be remembered as the empire's greatest hero or its greatest villain. The crisis in India called into question the strength of the future empire and the role of colonial governors in administering it. The debate regarding Grey's part in the suppression of the uprising in India, and any potential uprising in South Africa, suggest that the appropriate role of colonial governors was not entirely defined in an age of increasing self-government. Grey's recognition of the Indian Uprising as an opportunity for the Cape Colony to assist the empire and to economically prosper generated significant support in the colonies. Even the Colonial Office, caught in the aftermath of the initial uprising in India, determined Grey to be a capable and efficient administrator and chose to overlook his faults. His use of troops to assist British efforts in India and to seize land following the defeat of Sarhili appeared necessary for the defence of the empire. The autonomy he exercised when making these decisions, however, threatened to compromise the position of the Colonial Office, the Cape Parliament, or both. In the immediate wake of the uprising, British officials and settlers alike were willing to back Grey's brand of governance. Once fears of an empire-wide rebellion had faded and threats appeared localised, however, his actions seemed to London officials to be less a defence of the empire and more a threat to imperial unity. The debate regarding Grey's response to events in India did not end with his recall or even his death. As late as 1933, the author of an article in the *Mirror* pointed to Grey's actions in order to criticise those of interwar imperial administrators. Praising Grey, Arthur Field questioned whether anything could 'form a greater contrast to the pusillanimous courses to-day being pursued by men in authority in the British Empire than the prompt and fearless response by Sir George Grey to what he conceived, and rightly conceived, to be his duty to his country?'[96] Seventy-five years after the Indian Rebellion, thus, the debate concerning Grey's response to the uprising continued to provide a means to comment on methods of imperial administration.

Notes and References

1. Leigh Dale, 'George Grey in Ireland: Narrative and Network' in David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 147. Many of the early biographies of Grey are very complimentary of the colonial governor. For a more critical view of Grey's role in South African history, see J.B. Peires, 'The Late Great Plot: The Official Delusion concerning the Xhosa Cattle Killing 1856-1857', *History in Africa* vol. 12 (Piscataway, New Jersey: Published by African Studies Association, 1985), pp. 253-279; Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-killing Movement of 1856-7* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989).

2. J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961).
3. Donovan Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment); Troops and Horses', *Historia*, vol. 32, no. 1, (May 1987), p. 64.
4. This is a frequent criticism of biographies of colonial governors written during the mid-twentieth century. For more recent works that incorporate the private correspondence of colonial governors; see Mark Francis, *Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60* (London: MacMillan Academic Press, 1992); Barbara Messamore, *Canada*s Governors General, 1847-1878: Biography and Constitutional Evolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
5. Williams, The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I; 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part II: The emergence of black consciousness in Cafffaria*, *Historia*, vol. 32, no. 2, (September 1987), pp. 56-67.
6. See Simon J. Potter, 'Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 46 (July 2007), pp. 621-646; David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Zoe Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002).
7. These are Rutherford's terms. See Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. v.
8. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I*, p. 57.
9. Peter Putnis, 'The Indian Uprising of 1857 as a Global Media Event', unpublished paper given at the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Cairo, July 2006.
10. *Cape Argus*, 8 August 1857.
11. *Cape Argus*, 8 August 1857.
12. The National Archives, Colonial Archives (henceforth TNA CO) 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
13. *Cape Argus*, 26 August 1857.
14. *Grahamstown Journal*, 8 August 1857.
15. INA CO 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
16. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
17. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
18. *Cape Argus*, 11 November 1857.
19. P/188/49 Proceedings 15 January 1858, No. 102 Sir George Grey to Governor General of India, 11 November 1857.
20. *Cape Argus*, 30 January 1858.
21. *Cape Argus*, 6 February 1858.
22. *Cape Argus*, 27 March 1858.
23. *Cape Argus*, 27 March 1858.
24. TNA CO 48/383 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 7 August 1857.
25. W.P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 87,93.
26. Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*, p. 195.
27. Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*, p. 195.
28. According to Williams, the Cape Colony had not provided horses to India in the past because the system of obtaining horses was expensive and often failed to provide more than a moderate supply. Additionally, unrealistic expectations on the part of authorities in India, administrative problems and a seeming 'lack of enterprise on the part of local farmers' discouraged horse trade between the colonies. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny or 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 65.

29. T.B. Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, no. 21 (September 1858), p. 130.
30. TNA CO 48/385 *Cape of Good Hope. Papers Relating to the Purchase of Horses at the Cape of Good Hope, for Cavalry and Artillery, for Service in the Colony or in India*p. 7.
31. *Cape Argus*, 30 January 1858. Also cited in Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I\ p. 69.
32. See 'Cape Horses for India', *The Cape Monthly Magazine** vol. IV, no. 19 (July 1858), pp. 1-10; Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', pp. 129-138.
33. Bayley, 'Cape Horses for Indian Remounts', p. 138.
34. Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I', p. 67.
35. TNA CO 48/384 Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 30 November 1857.
36. 'Editorial/Leader', *Times*, 20 October 1857.
37. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register),* 17 April 1858.
38. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register),* 17 April 1858.
39. *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register),* 17 April 1858.
40. *Times*, 20 October 1857, p. 6.
41. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, 374-375. For a detailed discussion of Grey's proposal to banish the king of Delhi to the Cape see Donovan Williams, 'An Echo of the Indian Mutiny: the proposed banishment of Bahadur Shah II to the Cape Colony, 1857', *Historia*, vol. 17, no. 4, (1972), pp. 265–268.
42. For a recent study of the British encounter with the Xhosa during the mid-nineteenth century, see Richard Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
43. The Xhosa represented a politically distinct 'tribal cluster*. Division among the Xhosa people often occurred, however, and independent chiefdoms were established. The Gcaleka Xhosa were a prime example. T.R.H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 62-63.
44. Examination of Nonqause before the Chief Commissioner (9 April 1858), *British Kaffraria Government Gazette*, reprinted in *Grahamstown Journal*, 1 May 1858; quoted in Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, pp. 71-72.
45. Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa*, 141-143; Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age*, pp. 71–72.
46. See Peires, *The Dead will Arise;* Peires, 'The Late Great Plot'.
47. Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa*, p. 141.
48. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, p. 87; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 380.
49. European settlers occasionally used the term 'kafir* to refer to the Xhosa specifically. More often, however, 'kafir, kaffir, and caffre' were used interchangeably to refer to all Africans.
50. The British referred to Sarhili as Kreli in colonial documents.
51. TNA CO 48/388, Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 11 February 1858. See also, Williams, 'The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part II*.
52. Hertfordshire Archives and Local Studies, Lytton Papers, D/DE/015/21, Sir George Grey to [General Peel], 19 February 1858.
53. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age,* pp. 88-89; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 385-389.
54. J.E.G. de Montmorency, 'Adderley, Charles Bowyer, first Baron Norton (1814-1905)', Rev. H.C.G. Matthew, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed.*Lawrence Goldman, May 2006, http:www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30341 (accessed 28 January 2008).
55. C.B. Adderley, 'The Troops For India', *Times*, 26 August 1857, p. 9.

56. 'Leader/Editorial*, *Times*, 27 August 1857, p. 6.
57. 'Leader/Editorial', Times, 27 August 1857, p. 6.
58. *Cape Argusy*9 September 1857.
59. Similar ideas were also entertained with regards to other colonies. See Marina Carter and Crispin Bates, 'Empire and Locality: A Global Dimension to the 1857 Indian Uprising', *Journal of Global History* (2010), pp. 51-73.
60. TNA CO 48/384, Sir George Grey to H. Labouchere, 3 October 1857.\
61. *Grahamstown Journal*, 22 September 1857.
62. *Cape Argus*, 24 March 1858.
63. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
64. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
65. J.L. McCracken, *The Cape Parliament 1854-1910* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 20.
66. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
67. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
68. *Cape Argus*, 11 May 1858.
69. *Cape Argus*, 1 May 1858.
70. *Grahamstown Journal*, 22 May 1858.
71. *Times*, 15 January 1858.
72. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 400.
73. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, pp. 422-423.
74. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, p. 119. Grey submitted numerous petitions to the Colonial Office, showing support for him among colonists as well as Africans. See *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857-73*, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), pp. 96-99. As official documents sent by Grey, however, the petitions must be viewed with skepticism. As Peires has noted, the Xhosa, 'the Thembu, the Mpondo and all other Xhosa-speaking peoples rejoiced at his departure "to a man".* See Peires, *The dead will arise*, pp. 325-326.
75. *Eastern Province Herald*, 16 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 29 October 1959.
76. *Eastern Province Herald*, 16 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 29 October 1959.
77. *Cape Argus*, 23 August 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, 17 December 1859.
78. 'Copy of a Dispatch from Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir *E.B. Lytton*, Bart. M.P, 31 July 1859* *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, pp. 115-116.
79. 'Copy of a Dispatch from Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir *E.B. Lytton*, 31 July 1859* *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, p. 116.
80. 'Copy of a Dispatch from the Duke of *Newcastle* to Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C. B, 4 June 1859' *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, p. 106.
81. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age*, 119; Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 427.
82. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 427.
83. Julie Evans, *Edward Eyre, Race and Colonial Governance* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005), pp. 80-81.
84. The treaty established three basic tenets: the Maori chiefs would consent to British rule, in return the British Crown would guarantee Maori land possession and would purchase any land the Maori wished to sell, and the Maori were granted the rights of British subjects. See Raewyn Dalziel, 'Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia*, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. Ill, *The Nineteenth Century*, Andrew Porter, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 573-596.

85. Dalziel, Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia', p. 579.
86. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 447.
87. James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986), p. 76.
88. According to the *Taranaki Herald*, while news of Grey's reappointment was 'not regarded unfavourably at Auckland', reports that it had 'restored confidence and hope' among the Maori were not true. *Takanaki Heraldy* 10 August 1861; 28 September 1861.
89. *Taranaki Herald*, 17 August 1861.
90. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey*, p. 451.
91. Belich, *The New Zealand War$y*p. 119.
92. Dalziel, 'Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia', p. 586.
93. Rutherford, *Sir George Greyy*pp. 555-556.
94. *Times*, 20 September 1898.
95. *Timesy* 25 October 1898. See also Times, 4, 6, 18, 31 October 1898. Rutherford also refers to the *Times* debate, concluding that Elgin and Grey redirected troops to India independently. See Rutherford, *Sir George Greyy* (footnote 374), p. 312.
96. Arthur N. Field, 'Did Sir George Grey Save India?* *The Mirror* (1 October 1933).

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